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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is the first major systematic study of resource-for-infrastructure (R4I) 
investment contracts in Africa. It describes the terms and conditions of the R4I 
investment contracts that Chinese investors have been using in the mining sectors of 
resource rich countries in Africa since the turn of the century. It then shows – and that 
is its paramount objective – why African governments should prefer R4I contracts over 
traditional investment contracts, especially production-sharing agreements (PSA) and 
turnkey infrastructure projects. R4I contracts are a remarkable departure from 
traditional foreign direct investment (FDI), unique in mining contract history, 
innovative and adapted to the particular circumstances of most resource rich countries 
in Africa.  
 
The dissertation investigates ways in which resource rich countries in Africa can frame 
their mining contracts so that they can maximize infrastructure investments while 
minimizing the risks and costs associated with China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of 
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Africa. It proposes R4I investment contracts as a model for taking the greatest 
advantage of China‘s mining investments in Africa. The basic mechanism is the 
exchange of natural resources for national infrastructure through the innovative 
combination of two different types of traditional investment contracts, namely a 
resource (minerals or hydrocarbons) contract and an infrastructure contract. China gets 
the resources; the host state in Africa the infrastructure.  
 
The dissertation‘s main argument is that the ways in which R4I contracts combine 
mining contracts and infrastructure projects offers FDI benefits greater than those 
provided by the mere sum of these two contract types. R4I contracts increase 
infrastructure investments exponentially by drastically reducing transaction costs. As a 
consequence, most countries that entered into R4I contracts attracted their largest 
infrastructure finance in recent years, if not since independence, even if such 
substantial finance does not come without its own package of risks. With the discourse 
on China‘s FDI in African mines shaped largely by insights from political science, 
economics and development theories, the present dissertation fills a gaping hole in that 
fast burgeoning Sino-African economic scholarship by approaching the issue from the 
perspective of contract law.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation aim at proposing R4I investment 
contracts as a model for countries affected by the resource curse to take the maximum 
advantage of China‘s FDI in the mining sectors. This aim requires showing that R4I 
contracts benefit resource rich countries in Africa more than traditional investment 
contracts, like PSAs and turnkey infrastructure projects. The beginning of the 21
th
 
century has coincided with the manifold increase of China‘s FDI in Africa, albeit 
China‘s contacts with the continent can be traced back to the Middle Ages. The 
dramatic upsurge of Chinese FDI on the continent is due to China‘s search for natural 
resources to feed its fast-growing economy, its desire to diversify its investment 
portfolio and find new markets. Faced with this rapid expansion of China‘s finance in 
Africa, several voices are spurring leaders in Africa on to be pro-active about China‘s 
FDI and to develop frameworks in order to leverage this renewed interest in the 
continent and its enormous potential. 
 
To fulfill its purpose to show that R4I contracts are more beneficial to resource rich 
countries in Africa than traditional investment contracts, the dissertation delves into 
specialized fields of law (contract law theory and law-and-economics) and political 
economy (resource curse theory), the main field being foreign direct investment. The 
essential question that arose from these theoretical orientations centers on how resource 
rich countries in Africa can structure the terms of their mining contracts so that they 
can maximize the building of local infrastructure and avoid excessive waste of their 
resources. Avoiding waste requires minimizing investment risks and transaction costs. 
Closely related to the essential question is the issue of the manner in which government 
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delegates of resource rich countries in Africa should negotiate financial terms to 
optimize the level of infrastructure finance.  
 
A thorough search of the relevant literature does not retrieve any systematic study of 
the terms of investment contracts or R4I contracts between African countries and 
China. Information retrieved shows that R4I contracts are distinguishable by their 
formal, financial and distributive structures. At the same time, the literature does not 
scrutinize the terms of R4I contracts, assess their comparative advantages, propose or 
oppose them as a model for investment in the mining sectors of Africa, or hold out any 
model that factors in the general political economy of resource rich states in Africa. All 
these are shortcomings that this dissertation seeks to cure. 
 
However, R4I contracts entail a number of investment risks. Chief among those risks, 
is the risk of unsustainable debt. The very large amounts of money that R4I contracts 
often represent are sometimes out of proportion relative to the size of the economy or 
the budget of the host governments in Africa, which indicates a risk of unsustainable 
debt. That risk is made more likely by the fact that the larger the debt the greater the 
risk of default. Other risks include the risk that the selection of the infrastructure 
projects to be built may be inefficient or excessively costly, environmental degradation, 
expropriation or displacement of local inhabitants. In addition, the political economy of 
resource rich countries creates considerable political risks, notably the risk of 
expropriating investors‘ property rights. Having said that, R4I contracts are a new 
contractual phenomenon. Their actual and potential costs and benefits have not been 
fully explored. The months and years that lie ahead will be rich in lessons as to the 
challenges and transformative potential of R4I contracts. 
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The necessity of elaborating a contractual response to China‘s swelling FDI is vitally 
strategic for resource rich countries in Africa. If those countries fail to organize their 
contractual response to Chinese FDI, they may fail to turn Chinese massive financial 
flows to the continent to their own greatest advantage. The literature on China‘s FDI in 
the mining sectors of Africa is conspicuous by the absence of a systematic contractual 
approach. It is this absence that this dissertation has filled up, and filling that gap is the 
fundamental significance of the dissertation.  
 
The absence of a systematic contractual approach to Chinese FDI in the mining sectors 
of Africa is surprising because contract law regulates the transfer of private property, 
and thereby wealth, in society. Any study serious about ways and means of influencing 
the distributive outcomes of FDI can ill-afford to ignore a contractual approach. 
Distributive preoccupations are key to the question whether or not African states and 
their people can optimize China‘s FDI in general and in their mining sectors. Resource 
rich countries in Africa will not get the best value for their natural resources if they do 
not put a strong emphasis on contracts and contract law. Contracts reduce the costs of 
transactions and negative externalities.  
 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that the combined use of a mining contract and 
an infrastructure project – which is what R4I contracts basically boil down to – offers 
greater FDI benefits than the simple use of these two investment contract types 
separately. By combining mining or oil with infrastructure, R4I contracts attract 
drastically more capital needed for infrastructure development. The implicit assumption 
here is that combining a modestly profitable project (i.e. infrastructure) with a very 
lucrative contract (i.e. mining or oil), a host state attracts more foreign investors or 
greater FDI than if it had offered the not-so-profitable project alone to investors. It is in 
 24 
 
that crucial respect that R4I contracts benefit resource rich countries in Africa more 
than traditional investment contracts.         
 
The crux of the dissertation‘s main argument is the final conclusion of a certain number 
of important logical steps. First, Chapter 3 emphasizes the characteristics of Chinese 
FDI in Africa and the manner in which the terms of R4I contracts capture this FDI and 
maximize the benefits it brings on. Second, Chapter 4 explains that macroeconomic 
fundamentals shape the economic exchanges between resource rich countries in Africa 
and China, and structures R4I contracts. Even if the majority of countries in Africa are 
resource rich they cruelly lack vital infrastructure, a fact that creates bottlenecks 
preventing their economies to reach their full potential. China, on the other hand, is not 
so richly endowed with natural resources but it boasts one of the world‘s most 
competitive construction industries. R4I contracts make these macro-economic 
conditions complementary by providing for the exports of the host country‘s natural 
resources to China in exchange for China‘s construction of local infrastructure in the 
host country. The task of Chapter 5 is to discuss the risks and factors that may increase 
foreign investors‘ costs of doing business in most resource rich countries in Africa and 
to identify the terms of R4I contracts that minimize these costs. Chapter 6 and 7 
scrutinize the terms of R4I contracts, compare them with ordinary investment contracts 
and conclude that R4I contracts maximize the benefits of Chinese mining FDI and 
minimize transaction costs better than ordinary investment contracts. Ordinary 
investment contracts do respond to Sino-African economic complementarities but not 
nearly as completely as R4I contracts. 
 
The chapter immediately following the dissertation‘s introduction is a preliminary 
discussion of basic concepts and investment contracts. It first elaborates on various 
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understanding of ‗contract‘ and succinctly describes the major types of investment 
contracts. After explaining the instrumentality of contracts in organizing FDI and 
business transactions, the chapter finds the intention of contracting parties, the purposes 
of FDI law and economic efficiency as criteria for the evaluation of the clauses that 
constitute the contractual model proposed in this dissertation. The contribution of the 
preliminary chapter (i.e. Chapter 2) is that it articulates the contract law perspective to 
China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of Africa. In doing so, it sets the scene for the 
dissertation‘s main argument. The four salient features of Chapter 2 are the 
dissertation‘s particular conceptualization of contract as the terms of an economic 
exchange, the explanation of a contract law perspective on China‘s FDI in Africa‘s 
mines, the typology of the most common investment contracts, and the criteria for 
clause selection and contract comparison. From these criteria, economic efficiency is 
by virtue of the dissertation‘s methodology the most determinative. It follows that the 
cost-benefit analysis is the best tool that the dissertation has at hand.  
 
The third chapter explains the key characteristics of China‘s FDI in Africa, especially 
China‘s investments in the mining sectors of Africa. It starts by elaborating on the oft-
touted South-South cooperation, which provides context and content to China‘s FDI in 
Africa. It then gives an overview of China‘s economic policies and reasons for 
investing in Africa. The most important part of the chapter describes the ordinary and 
distinctive features of China‘s FDI in Africa. The key features of China‘s FDI in Africa 
could be summarized as ‗summit diplomacy, equality, co-development and 
cooperation.‘ Other key features are the concentration on resource extraction, the 
presence of state-owned corporations, joint ventures as a strategy to create mutual 
benefits, and the state-to-state business model. Understanding the features of China‘s 
FDI in Africa enables the tailoring of R4I contract terms so as to make them suitable to 
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China‘s FDI. Contrariwise, understanding the terms of R4I contracts requires policy 
makers in Africa to fully grasp the peculiarities of China‘s FDI in Africa. This grasp is 
necessary because of the reflection of some general economic patterns of Chinese 
investments in the terms of R4I contracts. The terms of R4I contracts not only reflect 
the patterns of Chinese investments but they also attempt to make the most of those 
investments.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses China‘s growth, the strategic value of mineral resources in 
international business, infrastructure development and significant growth opportunities 
for countries in Africa. Evident complementarities exist between African and Chinese 
economies. China needs natural resources and offers its services to Africa through 
China‘s globally competitive construction sector while Africa needs infrastructure and 
offers its natural resources to China in exchange for infrastructure development. R4I 
investment contracts only translate these complementarities in a contractual form. The 
significance of Chapter 3 lay in the fact that its argument is the minor premise of the 
dissertation‘s central thesis. To support the dissertation‘s main argument, it is necessary 
to establish how R4I contracts realize Sino-African economic complementarities. The 
chapter establishes those complementarities by presenting the intersectoral 
complementarities that China‘s FDI creates in mining and infrastructure in resource 
rich countries in Africa and how R4I contracts best encapsulate these economic 
affinities. The vibrancy of the Chinese economy has re-vitalized mining sectors as 
scaling up infrastructure finance on the continent, the world‘s most endowed with 
natural resources. Today, China is the continent‘s foremost infrastructure financier. R4I 
contracts channel both mining and infrastructure investments, and for that reason they 
capture best economic complementarities between China‘s demand for primary 
commodities and Africa‘s demand for national infrastructure.  
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Chapter 5 is concerned with showing how China‘s FDI and South-South investment 
cooperation unfold in environments in Africa overshadowed by the resource curse. 
These political and economic environments thrust up transaction costs. After providing 
a background on risk in investment law and in general, the chapter addresses the 
heterogeneity, the nature and specificity of politically insecure and resource-rich states 
in Africa (PIRSA). It concluded that the resource-outcome causal relationship is 
moderated by several third variables, making it difficult to draw any conclusion as to 
causality in that multivariate relationship. It is for that reason that this dissertation 
utilizes the resource-outcome relationship as a simple association that indicates the 
kinds of risks that foreign investors run and the kind of factors that might preclude 
investment contracts from achieving their goals in resource rich countries in Africa. It 
is that revisited version of the resource curse that the dissertation has endogenized in its 
R4I model to make it one of its major assumptions. The terms of R4I contracts and 
foreign investment law strive to bring down transaction costs.  
 
The core argument of the dissertation is set out in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Chapter 6 
dissects the terms of R4I contracts, searching for systematic patterns. It finds that R4I 
investment contracts can be seen as a mining contract, as an infrastructure contract, or 
as both, even if they are not the mere addition of a mining and an infrastructure 
contract. It then argues that in reality the R4I contract model is a hybrid, a combination 
– and not the simple sum – of PSAs and turnkey projects. It reaches that argument by 
comparing R4I contracts with ordinary investment contracts in mining and 
infrastructure. The chapter explores, using efficiency as an analytical lens, the terms of 
R4I contracts. Its main argument is that the innovative combination of a mining or oil 
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contract and an infrastructure project yields greater benefits for resource rich countries 
in Africa than the mere sum of the contract and the project. The greater benefits are the 
larger infrastructure finance that resource rich countries can attract with R4I contracts 
and the substantial reduction in transaction costs that R4I contracts are capable of 
achieving. For those principal reasons, resource rich countries in Africa should adopt 
the R4I model, as outlined in Chapter 7, if they desire to leverage China‘s FDI to 
address the infrastructure deficit that puts a brake on their economic growth and 
development. 
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1. Research objective  
The principal purpose of the present research is to propose resource-for-infrastructure 
(R4I)
1
 investment contracts as a model for optimizing China‘s investments in the 
mining sectors of resource rich countries in Africa. Put another way, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate how, if at all, R4I contracts benefit resource rich African 
states more than traditional mining investment contracts. R4I contracts combine a 
                                                 
1
 The author is indebted to Vongai Kandiwa for suggesting this shorthand for resource-for-infrastructure 
investment contracts. 
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mining or oil contract and an infrastructure project in order to extract minerals or 
hydrocarbons and to pay for major infrastructure projects with revenues generated from 
the extractive activities. 
 
In this dissertation, the concepts of ‗demonstration‘ and ‗proof‘ are interchangeable and 
carry with them the same semantic and methodological implications. To ‗demonstrate‘ 
or to ‗prove‘ means, in this dissertation, to ‗show by evidence and argument that 
something is true or exists.‘2 In light of this definition, the purpose of the present 
research is therefore to show by evidence and argument that R4I contracts are more 
beneficial to PIRSA than traditional mining investment contracts. 
 
 
2. Background 
Since the turn of the century, a great many countries in Africa witnessed a growth in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from China that is little short of breathtaking. Statistics 
on China‘s FDI in Africa vary: China‘s Ministry of Commerce estimates that Chinese 
FDI in 2000-2006 totaled 6.6 billion US dollars
3
 whereas the National Bureau of 
Statistics
4
 published lower estimates for the same period. An expert from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences situated the exact amount of accumulated Chinese 
investments in Africa at 11.7 billion US dollars by the end of 2006.
5
  
                                                 
2
 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 724 (4
th
 ed. 2006), sv ‗prove‘: ‗show by evidence or 
argument that something is true or exists.‘ 
3
 Jian-Ye Wang, What Drives China‘s Growing Role in Africa? (International Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 07/211 October 2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07211.pdf. 
4
 The variety of statistics is complicated by the alleged unreliability and inaccuracy of China‘s National 
Bureau of Statistics, as suggested by Jamil Anderlini, China’s Growth Figures Fail to Add Up, FIN. 
TIMES (U.K.) Aug. 4, 2009.  
5
 Yang Guang, Director of the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, as quoted by Stephanie Hanson, China: A Helping Hand, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 2007, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/72924. 
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Nevertheless, official Chinese sources appear to underestimate the magnitude of 
Chinese FDI in Africa. Data from other sources, including some United Nations (UN) 
sources, reveal significantly higher amounts.
6
 The UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) indicates that, before the global financial meltdown, FDI 
inflows to Africa increased from 2.4 billion US dollars in 1985 to 87.6 billion US 
dollars in 2008.
7
 Whatever the official statistics may be, China‘s actual FDI in Africa 
could well be larger than what figures in financial reports suggest. 
 
China‘s presence on the African continent, which dates back to the Middle Ages,8 has 
been rapidly deepening and widening in recent years. The defining moment of these 
reinvigorated Sino-African economic relations is the two-day trade and investment 
Beijing Summit in November 2006 that hosted 48 African heads of states and foreign 
ministers. At the Summit, Chinese President Hu Jintao promised to propose 5 billion 
US dollars in the form of loans and credit and to double aid to Africa in 2009 – 
promises on which China delivered.  
 
One of the reasons for China‘s investments in Africa is to find natural resources and 
raw materials to feed its growing economy. China also seeks, holding around 2.1 
                                                 
6
 See Jian-Ye, supra note 3, at 11 (showing that a conservative estimate of China‘s investments in Africa, 
based on data from UN and other sources, produces significantly higher figures). 
7
 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN AFRICA REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERSHIP 79 (United Nations 2010). [hereinafter UNCTAD, SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION]. 
8
 Gao Jinyan, China and Africa: The Development of Relations Over Many Centuries, 83 AFR. AFF. 241, 
241 (1984). In fact, historians do not agree as to the exact time when China began contact with Africa. 
Although China started to build strong and durable relations with Africa in the 1950s (Adama Gaye, La 
Chine en Afrique Inquiète l’Occident, NEW AFR. June – August 2008, 8), some authors situate China‘s 
earliest contacts with Africa around the 10
th
 and 11
th
 centuries (JOHN READER, AFRICA: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
THE CONTINENT 328-29 (Hamish Hamilton Ltd. 1997)). 
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trillion US dollars in foreign exchange reserves,
9
 to diversify risks in the face of a 
weakening dollar, low interest rates and an expansionary fiscal policy in the United 
States (US) following the financial crisis that started in December 2007.
10
 The support 
of the Chinese central government
11
 and the dynamic financial mattress provided by 
Chinese state-backed banks, especially the Export Import Bank of China (China 
Eximbank), have facilitated the dramatic surge of China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of 
Africa.
12
  
 
There is an emerging consensus among experts on Sino-African economic relations 
that, if they are to benefit from China‘s FDI, countries in Africa need to devise, each 
and as a whole, an appropriate policy response. Given the pivotal economic roles of 
contracts, policy responses to China‘s FDI must feature contract law. At their most 
basic, contracts are the terms of economic exchanges, with stipulated distributive 
patrimonial consequences. African governments can utilize contracts to optimize 
China‘s FDI. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Richard McGregor, China’s Forex Reserves Pass $2,000 Mark, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jul. 15, 2009 
(reporting that foreign exchange reserves in China reached 2.132 billion US dollars); Peter Garnham, 
Dollar Falls As China Reveals Record Stockpiles, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jul. 14, 2009 (stating that analysts 
estimate that 65% to 70% of China‘s foreign exchange reserves are in US dollars and the rest in other 
currencies). 
10
 In 2008, China was the world‘s largest creditor of the US as it was the largest holder of US public 
debt: See Anthony Faiola & Zachary A. Goldfarb, China Tops Japan U.S. Debt Holdings, WASHINGTON 
POST, Nov. 19, 2008, at DO1 (stating that the growing dependence of the U.S. on Chinese cash is 
granting Beijing extraordinary sway over the U.S. economy); Anthony Faiola, China Worried About U.S. 
Debt, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 14, 2009 (reporting that China‘s concern that the U.S. loose fiscal policy 
is endangering its 1 trillion U.S. dollars holding of U.S. debt). 
11
 CHRIS ALDEN ET AL., CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE 7 
(Columbia University Press 2008). 
12
 Id. 16. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
This dissertation draws on specialized fields of law (contract law theory, and law-and-
economics) and political economy (resource curse theory) to find an explanatory 
framework for its main aim, which is to prove that R4I investment contracts are a 
superior contract form for optimizing China‘s FDI in Africa. Because R4I investment 
contracts are the object of this research, contracts and contract law theories are the 
obvious launching pads for the search of a fitting explanatory framework. 
 
3.1. Contracts as the terms of economic exchanges 
The answer to the question as to what acts or facts constitute a ‗contract‘ varies within 
a legal system and from one legal system to the other. In Africa‘s rural areas, where the 
majority of Africans live, the way people envision formal agreements conflicts to some 
degree with Western conceptions of contracts, which nearly all states in Africa have 
incorporated in their laws for historical reasons.  
 
The infinite variety of contracts and contract forms forces this dissertation to define 
contracts from an economic perspective. The dissertation refers to a contract as the 
terms of economic exchanges, with stipulated patrimonial consequences. This 
definition goes around the diversity of legal systems and legal definitions of contracts. 
It simplifies the analysis of the concept of ‗contract‘ and enables the dissertation to 
build a contractual model that can be adapted, with the necessary adjustments, to any 
legal system. 
 
A central tenet of the conception of contracts as the terms of economic exchanges is the 
recognition that contracts are essentially exchanges that emerge from interactions 
between parties. This dissertation focuses on a particular sort of interactions between 
 6 
 
parties, namely commercial contracts. As explained later in the dissertation, the view of 
contracts as terms of economic exchanges is both analytic and normative, and provides 
a more rounded account of contracts than alternative theories of contract.  
 
3.2. Resource curse 
Though China‘s FDI in Africa concentrates on all resource rich countries, this 
dissertation primarily focuses on politically insecure and resource rich states in Africa 
(PIRSA), which are defined in terms of their being affected by the ‗resource curse‘. No 
uniform, normative or legal definition exists for ‗resource curse.‘ However, it is not 
necessary to reach a consensus on the contents and contours of the resource curse. It is 
sufficient, for the nonce, to understand that phrase as referring to a seeming paradox, a 
paradox of plenty
13
 or the inverse relationship between the abundance of natural 
resources, on the one hand, and economic growth, stability and human development, on 
the other.
14
 PIRSA states thus require more and higher scrutiny because they carry the 
risk of not developing, despite the unprecedented surge of China‘s FDI. 
 
To conceptualize the set of investment risks and the transaction costs that foreign 
investors run and may incur in most resource rich host countries in Africa, the resource 
curse theory is useful. Richard Auty was the first in 1993 to come up with the 
proposition that countries rich in natural resources did not use that wealth to benefit 
their citizens and experienced slower economic growth than countries without mineral 
wealth.
15
 However, it was not until 2001 that the main evidence of the resource curse 
                                                 
13
 The phrase ‗paradox of plenty‘ was made famous by TERRY LYNN KARL. THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: 
OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES (University of California Press 1997). 
14
 The definition of ‗resource curse‘ is further discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
15
 RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE 
THESIS (Routledge 1993). 
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was adduced by Sachs & Warner.
16
 The resource curse theory provides the dissertation 
with a readily available knowledge and evidentiary base so that it is unnecessary to re-
establish the existence of the political, economic situation that fosters the risks that 
foreign investors are likely to encounter in the mining sectors of PIRSA. 
 
An important methodological implication derived from the resource curse theory is that 
the heightened risks of investing in some mining sectors are located in the political 
economy of the host countries. Consideration of the political economy of host countries 
allows a complete understanding of the complexities surrounding FDIs in the extractive 
industries of most resource rich developing countries. A study of China‘s FDI in 
African mines, which solely includes FDI legal methodologies, would paint only an 
incomplete picture of the risks and returns of such FDI. It is therefore imperative that 
this dissertation be situated in the resource curse discourse because it provides a useful 
body of knowledge and evidence, and derives insights from political economy as an 
academic discipline.  
 
 
4. Research problem 
The central research question is: How should resource rich countries in Africa frame 
the clauses of mining contracts with Chinese investors so as to maximize the 
construction of local infrastructure and avoid the risks of such mining and 
infrastructure investments? The reverse side of this question is: How can R4I contracts 
help turn PIRSA or resource cursed countries into developing, resource blessed 
nations? 
                                                 
16
 Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 827 
(2001). 
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The key verb is ‗optimize‘. PIRSA need to optimize China‘s mining investments, that 
is to say that they must maximize the benefits of, and minimize the costs and risks 
associated with, the mining investments. One such benefit, crucial to any country‘s 
growth and competitiveness, is infrastructure, whether social or mining. Africa counts 
among its development challenges a major infrastructure deficit, with FDI needs 
estimated at 93 billion US dollars annually and a funding gap on the order of 31 billion 
US dollars annually.
17
 
 
At its broadest, the term ‗risk‘ refers to the probability of permanent loss of assets. In 
FDI law, it refers to the probability of permanent loss of assets belonging to either 
foreign investors or host countries, or both, especially as a result of political instability. 
Risks are present at various levels: At the global, country, industry and firm levels. But 
FDI law and this dissertation are primarily interested in country-level risks. Regarding 
‗costs‘, perhaps the best way to think of ‗cost‘ is as the reverse side of ‗price‘.18 Stated 
differently, cost and price are two sides of the same coin. It is noteworthy, however, 
that the economic concept of ‗price‘ in law is not necessarily synonymous with 
‗money‘ and often entail nonpecuniary costs.19    
 
The notion of benefit, cost and risk are interpenetrating and interdependent. If benefits 
exceed costs, the net result is a profit, that is an efficient outcome. If conversely costs 
exceed benefit, the net result is a loss, an inefficient outcome. In the economic analysis 
                                                 
17
 VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., AFRICA‘S INFRASTRUCTURE: A TIME FOR 
TRANSFORMATION 1, 8 (World Bank 2010). 
18
 It is instructive that the definitions of ‗cost‘ and ‗price‘ in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 
197, 712 (4
th
 ed. 2006) are almost synonymous. That dictionary defines ‗cost‘ as ‗an amount given or 
required as payment‘ and ‗price‘ as ‗the amount of money for which something is bought or sold‘. 
19
 JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 31 (W.W. Norton & Company 
2008). 
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of the law, the purpose of a legal system is to avoid losses or excessive costs and the 
risk of losses. It is this concern with avoiding losses and augmenting profits that 
explains why, in an efficient contract law setting, the risk of loss is borne by the 
contracting party who can carry it at a cheaper price.
20
 As these basic notions amply 
show, law and economics can be seen as the application of economic theory – 
especially microeconomics and welfare economics – to examine the formation, 
structure, processes and economic impact of contracts.
21
 
 
Risks inhere in FDI and investment contracts because the long-term nature of the 
economic exchanges they regulate involve almost invariably risks of losses. It therefore 
follows from the foregoing that, in order to optimize China‘s FDI in the mining sectors 
of Africa, R4I contracts must maximize benefits (i.e. infrastructural works), reduce 
prices down to efficient levels and put the risk of losses on the shoulders of the 
contracting party who can insure against it the most cheaply.  
 
The research also answers the following two critical questions. First, to what extent, if 
at all, can investment contracts structure commercial transactions and, more precisely, 
China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of PIRSA? This question canvasses the resource 
curse, the costs and the investment risks that may keep investment contracts from being 
enforced according to the intentions of the contracting parties. Contract breaches, 
expropriations, confiscations, restrictions on currency exchanges, political violence,
22
 
                                                 
20
 On the risk-shifting function of contracts, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
105ff (Aspen Publishers 2007). 
21
  See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-
MODERNISM AND BEYOND 1 (Princeton University Press 2006). 
22
 See PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 3ff (Oceana Publications Inc. 1997). 
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are among the factors that may undermine the proper enforcement of investment 
contracts.  
 
The second critical question is: How should PIRSA draft the financing terms of R4I 
contracts to ensure the maximization of infrastructure investments in their respective 
countries? The financial arrangements woven through R4I contracts have attracted the 
most attention. This is not surprising given that China‘s finance is vertiginously soaring 
and ‗on a scale large enough to make a material contribution toward meeting Africa‘s 
vast infrastructure needs.‘23 The financial aspects of R4I contracts are pivotal as they 
furnish the dissertation with one of its core arguments, namely that R4I contracts have 
grown infrastructure finance by leaps and bounds and substantially cut the cost of 
capital down. 
 
 
5. Survey of the investment law scholarship 
5.1. Gaps in the scholarship 
A cursory survey of the existing legal scholarship on China‘s FDI in developing 
countries shows that, whereas most studies examine investment from and to China, 
very few touch on the terms of investment contracts, not to mention R4I contracts, 
between African countries and China. 
 
Wallace and others (1996) are an ideal point of departure for a review of the legal 
scholarship on the terms of mining investment contracts in Africa. These authors lay 
                                                 
23
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., BUILDING BRIDGES: CHINA‘S GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCIER 
FOR AFRICA 2 (The World Bank 2009). 
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out the model clauses of a traditional foreign investment ‗contract‘,24 which they group 
as follows: (1) Investment eligibility, (2) government authority, (3) obligations of 
parties and benefits of investors, (4) foreign exchange and investment protection, and 
(5) dispute resolution. An analysis of these model clauses establishes that R4I 
contracts, while building on traditional mining investment contracts, are original in at 
least two respects: Structure and finance.  
 
First, R4I contracts exhibit unique structural clauses, which Edinger & Jansson (2008) 
wrongly describe as ‗barter trade agreement‘.25 While Davies (2008) sums up these 
structural clauses as a ‗combination of both aid and private sector commerce models‘, 
these clauses are, in their essential form, reminiscent of the contrat d’échange 
(exchange contract) found in civil law jurisdictions.
26
 Second, Foster and others (2009) 
observe that China‘s finance is sizeable, a clear indication that these financial clauses 
can maximize the benefits of China‘s FDI. The host countries in Africa that signed up 
for R4I contracts benefited from very large infrastructure loans, if not the largest since 
their respective independence. Nevertheless, Foster and others caution that, in the 
context of debt relief initiatives, Chinese lending to PIRSA (like Sudan and Zimbabwe) 
have raised interrogating eyebrows as these loans fan uneasiness about debt 
sustainability.
27
  
 
                                                 
24
 DON WALLACE JR. ET AL., MODEL FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW WITH ANNOTATIONS (International Law 
Institute 1996). Although it presents a model law, rather than a model contract, the book expressly states 
at p.11 that the model law adopts a contractual approach to foreign investment.  
25
 Hannah Edinger & Johanna Jansson, China’s Angola Model Comes to the DRC, THE CHINA MONITOR 
(S. Afr.), Oct. 2008, at p.8. 
26
 See FRÉDÉRIC LECLERC, DROIT DES CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX 188 (Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence 2007). 
27
 See VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 7. 
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The greatest and most patent handicap arising from the review of the existing 
investment law scholarship, even patched together, is that there is no treatise that 
formally and systematically addresses the contractual clauses that African countries 
may utilize to leverage China‘s FDI. More specifically, the legal scholarship on 
China‘s FDI in developing countries is limited in that virtually no studies (1) dissect the 
nature of R4I contracts, (2) measure the competitiveness of R4I contracts
28
 or (3) 
propose the R4I contract form as a model for investment in the mining sectors of 
Africa, (4) build a contractual model that seeks to optimize China‘s mining investments 
in Africa, and (5) a model that speaks to the context-specific incidence of the resource 
curse on resource rich African states.  
 
This dissertation is an attempt at plugging the five gaps identified above in the 
investment law scholarship. In the non-legal literature, the Thirst for African Oil report 
by Chatham House specially examines the use of ‗oil-for-infrastructure‘ or ‗Angola 
mode‘ in Angola and Nigeria.29 While the Thirst for African Oil report specifically 
focuses on R4I contracts, this dissertation exposes the poor understanding of the 
concept of ‗contract‘ on which the report‘s description of R4I contracts rests.30 
 
The present research differs from previous research because of its different entry and 
exit points, its unique focal points, and its methodology. Firstly, this dissertation enters 
the debate by concentrating, using the language of investment law, on the responses, 
                                                 
28
 One possible exception is Dunia Zongwe, The Competitive Edges of China’s Resource-for-
Infrastructure Investment Contracts in Africa, 2 PEKING UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 227 
(2010). On closer scrutiny, however, that article is actually not an exception to the gaps identified in the 
legal literature on Chinese FDI in developing countries because it is a part of the present dissertation and 
was published while the author was working on this dissertation. 
29
 ALEX VINES ET AL., THIRST FOR AFRICAN OIL: ASIAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN NIGERIA AND 
ANGOLA vii (Chatham House 2009). 
30
 See Chapter 6. 
                                                                                                                             13 
with respect to the extractive industries, of African governments in order to increase 
China‘s FDI in their respective countries. This is different from previous research, 
which enters the debate by concentrating, using the language of human rights, on the 
impacts of China‘s FDI in order to denounce China‘s FDI. 31 This difference can be 
graphically represented as follows: 
 
Table 1: Bridging the gaps identified in the literature survey 
 
 ENTRY POINT    EXIT POINT 
 Principal 
Concern 
Subjects Objects Methodology Ultimate purpose 
Previous 
Research 
Impacts of China‘s Investments using human 
rights 
language 
to denounce 
China‘s 
investments 
Proposed 
Research 
Responses of African 
governments 
with respect 
to extractive 
industries 
using investment 
law language 
to increase 
China‘s 
investments 
 
Secondly, this dissertation differs from previous studies because of its intersection of 
focuses on (the terms of) R4I contracts and the resource curse. Lastly, the dissertation 
opts for model building as its methodology to achieve its main purpose.  
 
5.2. Human rights 
This dissertation does not use human rights law as its methodology to study the 
responses of governments to Chinese FDI in the mining sectors of Africa. The 
emphasis is instead on investment law, much as the dissertation acknowledges that 
human rights and moral considerations are relevant to foreign investment law. Indian 
                                                 
31
 See e.g. Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth, 27 
BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 83 (2009); Randall Peerenboom The Fire-Breathing Dragon and the Cute, Cuddly 
Panda: The Implication of China’s Rise for Developing Countries, Human Rights and Geopolitical 
Stability, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 17 (2006); THE ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
CLINIC & THE ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT AND GENOCIDE (Yale Law School 2005), available at 
http://acir.yale.edu/pdf/YaleLowensteinSudanReport.pdf.    
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economist Amartya Sen‘s stance that sustainable development cannot be simplistically 
disentangled from political liberties has imbued with a human rights dimension
32
 a field 
that for a long time drew apart aggregate gains from moral and distributive issues.
33
 
With regard to R4I contracts, human rights intermesh with foreign direct investment in 
three other respects. The construction of national infrastructure goes a long way in 
promoting socio-economic rights
34
 while the ‗social clauses‘ of R4I contracts target the 
fulfillment of certain socio-economic rights. Thirdly, the extractive activities of mining 
or oil firms in terms of R4I contracts may engage their liability for the displacement of 
local populations, expropriation of property or other human rights violations. 
Aggrieved parties could, after exhausting remedies in domestic courts, commence legal 
action against the liable corporations in US courts thanks to the provisions of the Alien 
Tort Claims Act.
35
 
 
Though intersecting at various points, human rights and foreign direct investment are 
analytically separate and practically distinguishable. This clarification is in order as 
critics have complained that the ‗hegemony‘ of human rights in the literature on 
economic development has clouded analysis and distorted the way projects are framed 
and imagined.
36
 It thus bears reminding, for the sake of clarity, that this dissertation‘s 
principal field of analysis is foreign investment, and human rights only come into the 
picture peripherally insofar as it directly pertains to R4I contracts.  
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 U.S. Code, vol. 28, sec. 1350. 
36
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RTS. J. 101, 108 (2002). 
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The relationship between foreign investors and host countries is primarily contractual 
and commercial in nature. The contractual nature of the investor-state relationship 
implies that the terms of that economic exchange are laid down and varied by mutual 
agreement of the contracting parties; the relationship between the parties is commercial 
in the sense that they are pursuing value-maximizing economic objectives, not 
necessarily the realization of human rights. In a typical mining investment contract, the 
foreign investor operates as a buyer and the host country as a seller of minerals.  
 
The human rights advocates who fail to distinguish between foreign investment and 
human rights have found it particularly hard to establish in law the link between 
China‘s FDI in Sudan and Zimbabwe, and human rights violations in those two African 
countries.
37
 What is missing from their claims is the fact that the primary responsibility 
to protect human rights falls on host states, as subjects of international law, not on 
foreign investors, who are not subjects of international law. Whereas foreign firms may 
be sued in domestic courts for the rights-violative consequences of their own extractive 
activities, they are not legally responsible for the human rights violations perpetrated 
by agents of the host state. 
 
Realizing that China‘s FDI in African mines is more of a contract law than a human 
rights issue is not an apology for China‘s actions vis-à-vis dictatorial regimes, nor is it a 
disregard for humanity. FDI law is ultimately about improving human welfare and 
dignity. Infrastructure development promotes and fulfills socio-economic rights, as 
                                                 
37
 Stephen Brown & Chandra L. Sriram, China’s Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Clarifying 
Issues of Culpability, in CHINA IN AFRICA: TRADE, AID AND INFLUENCE 250 (Robert I. Rotberg ed. 
2008)(arguing that there is insufficient evidence to hold China, as a foreign investor, legally responsible 
for the human rights violations in Sudan and Zimbabwe, although China might bear moral responsibility 
for human rights violations in those two countries).  
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shown later in the dissertation.
38
 Rather, that realization is a reminder that China‘s FDI 
is eminently a commercial matter and that other areas of law, like public international 
law, are better equipped to address human rights issues.  
 
 
6. Thesis 
After finding that R4I contracts combine traditional mining contracts and infrastructure 
projects, the dissertation demonstrates how the combination of these two investment 
contract types offers FDI benefits greater than those provided by the mere sum of a 
mining contract and an infrastructure project. Unlike the infrastructure sector, mining is 
very lucrative; it attracts the bulk of FDI to Africa. The central thesis is that, by 
combining mining and infrastructure, R4I contracts attract more capital needed for 
infrastructure development. In effect, R4I contracts exponentially increase the level of 
infrastructure finance. Most countries that entered into R4I contracts attracted their 
largest infrastructure finance in recent years, if not since independence.  
 
In this combination of investment contract types lies another sharp competitive edge of 
R4I contracts, which is that they produce better distributive outcomes while tackling 
certain aspects of the resource curse by strengthening the state. R4I contracts achieve 
wider distribution thanks to its unique way of accomplishing intersectoral 
complementarities in construction and mining in Africa, thus extending FDI benefits 
from the mining to the infrastructure sector. Very significant, R4I contracts serve as a 
potent tool for host countries to diversify their economy, especially when they are used 
on a national scale, as is the case with the R4I contracts in Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
                                                 
38
 See ‗3.4. Infrastructure in Africa‘ in Chapter 4. 
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If concluded, R4I contracts would not only stabilize but also maximize FDI in 
infrastructure, thereby consolidating host states through exponential increases in, if not 
steady streams of, FDI in physical capacity building. This proposition is premised on 
the truism that FDI in mining generally occurs independently of macroeconomic 
variables, investment climate, and the costs of doing business because of the scarcity of 
the minerals or hydrocarbons involved. By linking infrastructure and mining sectors, 
R4I contracts link the stable flow of FDI in mining to the flow of FDI in the 
construction sectors. This linking results in an important reduction of the cost of capital 
needed for infrastructure projects, which in turn leads to a dramatic increase in 
infrastructure finance. Traditional mining and infrastructure investment contracts do 
not yield the same results because they are confined to either resource extraction or 
infrastructure construction, but not both. This is another way of saying that R4I 
contracts are more efficient than traditional investment contracts.  
 
Even where both R4I contracts and traditional mining investment contracts provide for 
similar advantages, R4I contracts outcompete traditional mining investment contracts 
in a number of other ways. The body of the dissertation expounds on how R4I contracts 
are more adapted to the financial circumstances of African countries and less sensitive 
to their creditworthiness, they fulfill Sino-African economic complementarities, 
‗monetize‘ natural resources and dispense with financial intermediation, and reduce the 
risk that host governments will embezzle investment money. 
 
However, R4I contracts do not come without their own package of risks. Perhaps, the 
most important risk associated with R4I contracts is that they might plunge African 
countries back into a debt crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised that 
 18 
 
argument to sway the DRC to renegotiate its R4I contract with China from 9 to 6 
billion US dollars in 2009. Other important risks include probabilities that non-
economic considerations may determine the selection and location of infrastructure 
projects and that the infrastructure to be built may be overpriced, especially because the 
projects are not awarded following competitive bidding. Environmental degradation 
and the expropriation and displacement of residents are also non-negligible risks that 
R4I contracts create in some instances. 
 
The relative novelty of R4I contracts (the first known R4I contract was signed in 2001 
in Congo-Brazzaville) means that their actual potential – and their costs and risks – has 
not yet been fully explored, nor have there been several instances of such contracts. To 
date, there are only eight known R4I contracts, of which only two have been 
completed, in Sudan and Angola. Yet the results of the early R4I contracts are 
promising: the Sino-Angolan contract entered into in 2004 has resulted in, among 
others, the rehabilitation of the infrastructure (i.e. roads, bridges, houses, schools, 
hospitals, etc.) bombed during Angola‘s 1975-2002 civil war and the installation of a 
fiber optic telecommunication network nationwide. The six other R4I contracts have 
shown promising infrastructure developments as well.  
 
 
7. Significance of the research 
To reap the fruits of their economic relations with China, African governments must 
individually and collectively
39
 set up or upgrade investment policy and institutional 
                                                 
39
 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), ASIAN FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN AFRICA: TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 
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frameworks. One expert remarked that, while China has adopted its African Policy, 
Africa has not yet formulated its Chinese policy.
40
 The former President of Botswana, 
Festus Mogae, noticed that no agenda item from any African Union (AU) meeting 
before the 2006 China-Africa Summit raised the China-in-Africa subject.
41
 African 
countries went to the Summit with no joint strategy towards China and are crafting 
individual China policies ‗one small step at a time.‘ 42  Yet whilst the adoption of 
judicious national policies on Chinese mining and oil investments is easily defensible, 
the wisdom of designing a continental policy is questionable. Individual governments 
in Africa will without much doubt find it more convenient to hammer out a R4I deal 
bilaterally than to approach China with an AU-mandated R4I negotiation framework. 
 
An African expert on Sino-African economic relations have urged African 
governments to forge a constructive and balanced relationship with China.
43
 The cover 
of Adama Gaye‘s book Chine-Afrique: Le Dragon et l’Autruche44 (China-Africa: The 
dragon and the ostrich) is a most vivid imagination of the urge to be proactive
45
  vis-à-
vis China‘s FDI. On one side of the book cover, a fire-breathing, fire-spitting blood-red 
dragon is carrying in her kangaroo-like pouch a Chinese man brandishing bags of 
products ‗made in China‘ and, on the other side, an ostrich burying her head in the sand 
instead of facing the dragon. 
 
                                                 
40
 Sanusha Naidu, Research Director of the Emerging Powers in Africa Programme at Fahamu, Address 
at the Symposium ‗Africa and China in the 21st Century: The Search for a Mutually Beneficial 
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42
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43
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45
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As Gaye‘s book cover hints at, it is the sense in some quarters that China is engaging 
Africa on new terms, terms that Africa may not fully apprehend, terms that are silently 
dictated to her by China.
46
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) recommends that African countries mainstream Chinese investments, 
insofar as it is part of South-South cooperation, into their national development 
strategies.
47
 According to UNCTAD, cooperation with other developing nations like 
China and India has the potential to enhance Africa‘s capacity to deal with the 
challenges of poverty, poor infrastructure, and the development of productive 
capacity.
48
 
 
Some experts have recommended that African governments shy away from 
arrangements that threaten sustainable development.
49
 Other experts push governments 
in Africa to shift their current emphasis on the natural resource sector towards 
secondary and tertiary production.
50
 Still others have recommended that governments 
develop the governance capacity and the investment climate to promote FDI 
opportunities with China.
51
 The present dissertation takes up the investment policy 
challenge by pleading that PIRSA adopt a specific contractual model with China in 
their mining sectors.    
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The lack of contract law perspectives in the legal scholarship on the issue under 
examination is a disturbing omission in view of the fact that contracts are in market 
economies the principal door to economic relations and the circulation of wealth among 
persons.
52
 This is all the more disturbing given that one of the greatest challenges 
facing African governments that receive Chinese FDI is to build the capacity to 
negotiate highly sophisticated and innovative multi-million dollar mining deals if these 
are to benefit African peoples. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that an explanation of the utility of contracts in general is 
a justification of this dissertation‘s significance. Contracts perform four major 
economic functions: They reduce transaction costs, they protect third parties from the 
external effects of contracts, they control the means that parties used to persuade one 
another, and they influence distributive outcomes.
53
 Given the pivotal economic roles 
that contracts play, any policy response to China‘s FDI that would omit to incorporate 
contract law or recognize China‘s FDI as a contractual phenomenon would not be 
meaningful. Jason Yackee is going as far as recommending forgoing bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) in favor of a contract-based regime because investors have 
long had the ability to credibly commit to treat investors fairly through investment 
contracts.
54
  
 
The significance of the dissertation also rests on its marketing a contractual framework, 
a set of model clauses, a contractual model for use by PIRSA desiring to optimize 
China‘s mining investments. Contractual frameworks may be seen as a sort of standard 
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53
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54
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form contract, a blueprint or a ‗default‘ contract-‗template‘ – supplied to government 
delegates, relieving them of the need to negotiate anew all of the time and all of the 
terms of contracts. In that way, contractual frameworks or models are efficient. 
Presumably, most government delegates will alter, permute, tailor, or custom design 
the terms of these contracts, but without necessarily transforming their underlying 
structure, which may remain that of the default contract-template, i.e. R4I contracts. 
This role of contractual models as underlying structure will strengthen the capacity of 
government delegates from resource rich countries in Africa to negotiate the overall 
form of their commercial transactions with China and other foreign investors. 
 
 
8. Research design 
The research design opted for in this dissertation is model building.55 The model that 
this dissertation builds is attached as an Appendix at the end of the dissertation and is 
hereinafter referred as the ‗R4I Contract Model‘, the ‗R4I Model‘ or simply the 
‗Model‘ (with the first letters of these phrases in capital). Model building is the 
appropriate design for research that aims at building a new model or refining an 
existing one. In the process of arguing that R4I contracts are better cut out than 
traditional mining investment contracts to optimize China‘s FDI, this dissertation 
refines an existing contractual model (i.e. R4I contractual model) to respond to a 
particular contractual phenomenon (i.e. China‘s FDI in Africa).  
 
The R4I Contract Model is an abstraction from real R4I contracts and a translation of 
investment policy choices in a contractual form. It is built on the basis of available 
                                                 
55
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evidence of the terms of existing R4I contracts, especially the DRC-China R4I contract 
and the Angola-China R4I contract, insofar as the DRC-China R4I contract mirrors the 
terms of Angola-China R4I contract. It aims to be an optimal form of resource-for-
infrastructure investment contracts.  
 
Needless to say that the optimal R4I Model is a purely rational construct that contain 
some terms that the parties would have agreed upon had they been solely guided by 
concerns for economic efficiency. However, such construct may deviate from existing 
R4I contracts because in practice the terms of economic exchanges are often not guided 
by economic efficiency but by commercial and negotiating strength.
56
 Nonetheless, the 
utility of the R4I Contract Model is that it provides a benchmark for evaluating the 
existing R4I contracts as well as a sense of direction and accomplishments or failure for 
government delegates during contract negotiations.  
 
8.1. Classification, key questions and conceptualization 
The model building design is (1) empirical, engages in (2) low control (i.e. non-
laboratory) research and uses (3) hybrid (primary and secondary), (4) textual and 
numeric data. The key questions for which it is searching answers involve questions of 
meaning and explanation as well as questions of linkages and coherence between 
contractual terms. It also employs a constant comparative method: Between traditional 
investment contracts and R4I contracts; and between R4I contracts inter se.  
 
Building this contractual model occurs through a mix of deductive and inductive 
strategies. As far as deductive strategies are concerned, a set of legal postulates are 
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 See JEFFREY DELMON, PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE: PROJECT FINANCE, PPP 
PROJECTS AND RISK 155 (Kluwer Law International 2009). 
 24 
 
formulated and taken to be true. In this dissertation, those postulates are key investment 
policy choices united under the meta-principle of economic efficiency. From these 
postulates, contractual clauses are deductively derived.  Concerning inductive 
processes, selected clauses of existing R4I contracts are extrapolated and inserted into 
the R4I Contract Model. The dissertation follows these processes until the 
comprehensive R4I contractual framework or blueprint, as displayed in the Appendix, 
is created. 
 
8.2. Strengths and limitations 
When applied to the topic of China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of Africa, the model 
building design offers some advantages and may suffer from certain setbacks. 
Regarding its advantages, the design provides a set of statements that aim to respond to 
China's FDI in the mining sectors of PIRSA as effectively as possible. In addition, 
models tend to reduce transaction and agency costs, as explained in Chapter 7.  
 
The above strengths notwithstanding, model building designs are ineffective if they 
make implausible claims on reality, if they make claims that are not testable and vague, 
or that are conceptually incoherent, inconsistent and confusing. That is why this 
dissertation tries to steer clear of these pitfalls by basing its essential assertions on solid 
evidence. In model building, the main sources of error relate to the assumptions 
postulated (i.e. legal postulates) in specifying the model, the quality of the empirical 
data in which the model is firmly anchored and the correct use of statistics. Even if this 
dissertation only produces few statistics or quantitative data, it relies on those produced 
by credible sources. 
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9. Methodology  
To accomplish what it sets out to do and contribute new knowledge, the present 
research must succeed in proving the comparative advantages of R4I contracts over 
traditional mining investment contracts. For that purpose, the main methodology of the 
dissertation is cost-benefit analysis. The analysis consists in measuring and comparing 
the costs and benefits of investment contracts by placing monetary values on those 
costs and benefits. Whenever research sees an issue primarily in efficiency terms, cost-
benefit analysis appears as the best decision framework.
57
 Inasmuch as this dissertation 
sees China‘s mining investments in Africa primarily in efficiency terms, cost benefit 
analysis seems the most rational route for the dissertation to serve its purposes. 
 
Information on the effects (i.e. costs and benefits) of investment contracts requires 
sifting through a rich mass of legal and economic empirical data. The vast empirical 
data informing and constituting the premises on which the final conclusions of this 
dissertation rests fall in four principal groups, namely the available R4I contracts, a 
2009 World Bank infrastructure project finance database, expert interviews and the 
author‘s independent investigations.  
 
In the first group are R4I contracts. The terms of R4I contracts are the primary 
empirical data of this dissertation. In research studying contracts, contractual 
documents or any document reproducing the terms of the contracts being studied are 
the primary empirical data. Second, the empirical evidence on R4I investment contracts 
consists for the most part of raw data gathered by the World Bank and published in an 
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oft-cited report Building Bridges in 2009.
58
 The World Bank compiled this database on 
China‘s infrastructure finance in Africa by triangulation. To collect those data, the 
Bank used a powerful
59
 English language business media database, Factiva, which is a 
Dow Jones & Reuters company. The Bank then reviewed and attempted to verify the 
collected data through its own channels.
60
 The Bank ran a second round of data 
collection in which it systematically reviewed Chinese press reports that it validated 
through both Chinese and international sources.
61
 One of the downsides of the database 
is that it only covers the period from 2001 to 2007, thus raising the need to supplement 
the database.   
 
Open-ended expert interviews fall in the third group. There is no known publication or 
secondary sources devoted entirely to R4I investment contracts. The relative novelty of 
R4I contracts accounts for this dearth of secondary sources on R4I contracts. In order 
to supplement information presented in the World Bank database and to create an 
evidential basis on which credible investigations could be carried out on R4I contracts, 
the present research relied on several open-ended interviews with selected experts in 
finance, infrastructure, and investment contracts. The interviews thus produced 
information on R4I contracts in the form of expert witness evidence.   
 
Finally, the author conducted independent investigations to further supplement the 
information found in the World Bank database by searching for R4I contracts 
concluded after 2007 and by attempting to identify R4I contracts that the database 
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might have overlooked as ordinary, traditional investment contracts. This independent 
exercise allowed the research to identify at least two confirmed,
62
 one uncertain
63
 and 
one possible R4I contract.
64
 These investigations usually re-examine the World Bank 
database in light of recent publications on the issue of China‘s economic engagement 
with Africa. 
 
Apart from these sources, the research also uses more orthodox legal research 
methodologies and sources, the most obvious of which are investment contracts. 
Investment contracts lay down ground rules on which the contracting parties agreed, 
such as the law applicable to the investment project, the choice of a dispute resolution 
forum, force majeure, good faith and changed circumstances.
65
 In FDI law, the 
distinction between international law and domestic law is not watertight. The legal 
regime for investment contracts between a foreign investor and host state draws on 
both public and private law,
66
 both customary international law and national 
regulation.
67
 To be sure, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Serbian 
Loans Case, adjudicated that every investment contract must have a basis in a national 
legal order.
68
 The sources of FDI law, just like public international law,
69
 are 
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international treaties, customary international law, general principles of law, and 
judicial decisions.
70
  
 
Finally, with particular reference to its substantive sources as distinct from its formal 
ones, the dissertation, owing to the nature of the research, is both selective and eclectic 
in its sources and style, ranging from FDI law, law and economics, political economy, 
international finance, international relations and national politics. Research at a 
doctoral level encourages a certain measure of inter- and multi-disciplinarity that is out 
of the researcher‘s own depth and that trespasses on the turf of other experts. 
 
 
10. Outline of chapters 
10.1. Logical structure 
The gist of the dissertation‘s main argument is that R4I contracts considerably increase 
infrastructure investments in Africa by far more than traditional investment contracts. 
This argument is the final conclusion of a series of key inferences, basic and 
intermediate premises, that structures the entire dissertation. The basic inference is that 
macroeconomic fundamentals dictate the economic exchanges between resource rich 
countries in Africa and China (Chapter 4). Most countries in Africa are generally 
resource rich but lack backbone socio-economic infrastructure while China has not 
enough resources but one of the most competitive construction industries. These 
macro-economic fundamentals have led to massive investments from China to resource 
rich countries in Africa (Chapter 3), whose mineral wealth is associated with 
institutional weakness and a myriad political, economic and security issues (Chapter 5). 
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Another key inference is that, while many investment contracts respond to 
macroeconomic fundamentals, R4I contracts make Chinese and African economies 
truly complementary and are more efficient than ordinary investment contracts 
(Chapter 6), which is why they should serve as a model for resource rich countries in 
Africa (Chapter 7).  
 
Traditional mining contracts have been relatively successful in the trade of mineral 
resources but traditional project finance has failed to yield sizeable infrastructure 
investments because many infrastructure sectors are not financially attractive to foreign 
investors (Chapter 6). R4I contracts have resolved the lack of infrastructure 
investments by financing infrastructure development through its revenues from 
generally vibrant mining sectors while creating incentives to negotiate greater mining 
investments in order to finance infrastructural works (Chapter 6).  
 
This logical outline shows that the organization of the dissertation is thematic: Each 
chapter addresses themes structured so as to respond to the research objective of the 
dissertation. Thus, the dissertation does not read like a contract document. However, 
the organization of the analysis of R4I contracts in the Appendix is contractual, thus 
presenting the issues pertaining to R4I contracts comprehensively. 
 
10.2. Specific outline 
More specifically, in order to answer the basic research question, this dissertation 
adopts the following structure: 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction  
Chapter 2  Basic concepts and investment contracts 
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 This chapter defines key concepts and articulates them by putting forth 
the criteria for the selection of the clauses that constitute the proposed 
contractual framework for making the most of China‘s mining FDI. It 
also sets out the essential elements of the contractual framework 
designed in this dissertation. 
  
Chapter 3 China’s investments in Africa 
 This chapter identifies the peculiarities of China‘s investments in the 
mining sectors of PIRSA. It assesses the extent to which China‘s FDI as 
a contractual phenomenon structures China‘s commercial transactions 
and, in passing, R4I contracts in the mining sectors of PIRSA. 
 
Chapter 4  Sino-African Macroeconomic complementarities 
 This chapter discusses the strategic value of mineral resources in current 
global economic affairs and how this value affords some African states 
considerable growth opportunities. It shows the intersectoral 
complementarities that China‘s FDI creates in mining and construction 
in Africa.  
 
 
Chapter 5  The PIRSA   
 This chapter describes the geopolitical and socio-economic contexts of 
some PIRSA and expounds on the resource curse thesis.  
 
Chapter 6  Resource-for-infrastructure versus traditional investment contracts 
                                                                                                                             31 
 The chapter analyzes the R4I contracts and studies how these contracts 
resemble or differ from traditional investment contracts.  
  
Chapter 7  Optimizing China’s mining investments: The contractual model 
 This chapter proposes a contractual framework or model for the 
optimization of China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of PIRSA by 
outlining the basic clauses that can best leverage those investments. The 
entire R4I Contract Model is in the dissertation‘s Appendix. 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
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This chapter is about investment contracts. It divides its exposition of investment 
contracts in three parts. The first part of the chapter expounds on contracts in general. 
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Here, the chapter defines basic concepts of investment contracts and this dissertation. 
The next part presents FDI and how contracts can be instrumental in structuring FDI 
and business transactions. The third part spells out the rationale and policy goals of 
investment contracts and uses them as benchmarks for the inclusion of the clauses that 
constitute the contractual model proposed in this dissertation to optimize China‘s FDI. 
 
The contribution of this part of the dissertation is that it articulates the contract law 
perspective to China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of Africa. Moreover, in explicating 
what contracts and investment contracts do, the chapter sets the scene for the 
dissertation‘s central point, which is to prove that the R4I model is a superior form of 
investment contracts with respect to China‘s mining FDI. 
 
1. Investment, contracts and investment contracts 
1.1. Investment 
1.1.1. The concept of foreign direct investment 
The analysis and clarification of the ‗foreign direct investment‘ concept is in order 
because it lacks a precise meaning and; consequently, the boundaries of its field are not 
well demarcated. The IMF volunteers a now commonly used
1
 definition of FDI as 
 
… the category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one 
economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy.
2
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses the IMF definition. See 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD BENCHMARK 
DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 1996). 
2
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 86 (International 
Monetary Fund 1993). 
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Still, an investment contract or BIT can broaden or narrow the definition of FDI to 
extend or restrict the kinds of assets covered and to determine the nature of the 
obligations created by the contract or BIT.
3
   
 
White & Fan say that the concept is ambiguous for at least three reasons. First, the 
concept comprises and confuses funding, ownership and operation, which are three 
related yet distinct activities.
4
 As a result, it is unclear which one, if not all, of these 
activities the concept is referring to.  
 
White & Fan also say that the ambiguity arises because the analysis of the concept 
requires several approaches, including the financial theory relating to capital markets, 
game theory and the management theory relating to strategy, the theory of the firm, 
political theory, and neoclassical economics relating to production and trade.
5
 To these 
approaches can also be added legal techniques relating to the mitigation of political 
risks, insurance guarantees, incentives, and dispute resolution.  
 
The third reason for the ambiguity relates to the meaning of the three components of 
the phrase ‗foreign direct investment.‘ To get to the bottom of the concept and the full 
scope of the field of ‗foreign direct investment,‘ each of these three components has to 
be analyzed and clarified. Starting with ‗foreign,‘ it is not clear to which of these 
activities, namely funding, ownership or control of the firm, the word ‗foreign‘ 
applies.
6
 With respect to ‗direct,‘ the word usually indicates control of production 
facility and a significant degree of influence by the foreign investor on the firm‘s 
                                                 
3
 UNCTAD, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS VOL. I, supra Ch. 1 note 67, at 113. 
4
 COLIN WHITE & MIAO FAN, RISK AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 42 (Palgrave Macmillan 2006). 
5
 Id. at 44. 
6
 Id. at 43. 
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management,
7
 but ownership and control do not necessarily coincide.
8
 Finally, the 
word ‗investment‘ is equivocal. Economists define ‗investment‘ as the production of 
goods that will be used to produce other goods.
9
 Yet it is uncertain whether 
‗investment‘ refers to the financial flow generated by the production facility, as is often 
the case, or the actual transfer of resources.
10
  
 
For all these reasons of ambiguity and confusion, the boundaries of the province of 
foreign direct investment are disputed, but the dispute does not prevent the theoretical 
location of the core of foreign direct investment and the body of law that governs it. 
Locating FDI within the broad field of international economic law is critical to make 
sure that R4I contracts are properly labeled as investment contracts rather than trade 
agreements or other economic arrangements.
11
   
 
1.1.2. Foreign direct investment versus portfolio investment 
A distinction must be made between portfolio investment and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which is the object of this dissertation. FDI involves the acquisition of physical 
capital or the transfer of tangible and intangible assets from one (source) country into 
another (host) country to generate wealth in the host country under the total or partial 
control of the owner of the assets.
12
 The hallmark of FDI is the transfer of physical 
property – like plant and equipment – that is bought or built.13  
                                                 
7
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), supra note 2, at 86. 
8
 COLIN WHITE & MIAO FAN, supra note 4, at 43. 
9
 Kevin A. Hassett, Investment, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed. 
2008).  
10
 COLIN WHITE & MIAO FAN, supra note 4, at 43.  
11
 See e.g. DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, THE DRAGON‘S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA 46ff 
(Oxford University Press 2009)(describing incorrectly R4I contracts as ‗long-term trade‘ agreements). 
12
 See Deardorff's Glossary of International Economics, http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009); M. SORNARAJAH, supra Ch. 1 note 
70, at 8.  
13
 M. SORNARAJAH, supra Ch. 1 note 70, at 8. 
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By contrast, portfolio investment involves the transfer of capital for the purpose of 
buying securities in a firm incorporated or operating in another country. In economics 
and finance, ‗portfolio investment,‘ which usually occurs on stock exchanges across 
national borders and/or currencies, represents the acquisition of portfolio capital, that is 
financial assets (such as stocks or securities, bonds, deposits and currencies), but with 
no control of the securities‘ issuer by the portfolio investor.14 Obvious examples of 
portfolio investment are the purchase of corporate stocks and government bonds, but 
they could also be security instruments issued to raise capital for ventures.
15
 The 5.5 
billion US dollars purchase by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) of a 
20 percent stake in the South Africa‘s largest bank Standard Bank in February 2008 is a 
perfect example of a major portfolio investment.    
 
The other distinctive element is the issue of management: With portfolio investment 
management is divorced from control of the firm and the share of ownership in it.
16
 The 
reason for the separation of management from control is that the risks in portfolio 
investment can easily be managed. Another reason is that the investor brings into the 
host country physical capital that it could have used in its home state or elsewhere.
17
 
Finally, the nature of the enterprise also justifies why portfolio investment is not 
protected by a specific regime under international law and why FDI is. 
 
However, parties can blur the distinction between FDI and portfolio investment if they 
agree in a BIT or investment contract to incorporate portfolio investment in the 
                                                 
14
See Deardorff's Glossary of International Economics, supra note 12.   
15
 M. SORNARAJAH, supra Ch. 1 note 70, at 8. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. at 8. 
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definition of ‗foreign investment‘ if they intend to protect both FDI and portfolio 
investment. For that reason, this dissertation is concerned with portfolio investment 
only insofar as they relate to China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of Africa. 
 
1.1.3. Foreign direct investment versus international trade 
FDI is also distinct and distinguishable from international trade because the business 
nature of the two differs, notwithstanding the strong links of the two with international 
economic law in general.
18
 Whereas a trade transaction characteristically consists in a 
one-off exchange of goods and money, a FDI deal initiates a long-term relationship, a 
‗lasting interest‘19 between the foreign investor and the host state, which may span 
more than 30 years.
20
 The long-term nature of FDI appears from the investor‘s business 
plan, which often sinks substantial resources into a project, expecting to recoup the 
sunk costs plus an attractive rate of return on the investment at a later stage.
21
  
 
Contracts are adequately equipped to stabilize the long-term relationships that FDI 
gives rise to. Contracts are the specifically legal machinery appropriate when a 
specialized economy – which relies on exchange for apportionment of product and 
productive energy – moves into the phase of credit dealings, i.e. of future dealings 
generally.
22
 R4I contracts are also relational in that they occur through time in a 
process of continuous interaction between parties. The more relational an exchange (i.e. 
the more it is projected into the future), the more likely the parties will be unable in 
                                                 
18
 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra Ch. 1 note 65, at 2. 
19
 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), supra note 2, at 86. 
20
 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra Ch. 1 note 65, at 3. 
21
 Id. at 3-4. 
22
 Karl Llewellyn, Contract: Institutional Aspects, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1931, 330-331. 
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advance to precisely define performance obligations in advance or the allocate risks 
optimally,
23
 as is the case with R4I contracts. 
 
1.1.4. Risks 
The long-term relationship imbedded in FDI transactions implies risk. A risk, in 
investment and finance law, means the probability of a permanent loss of assets. In 
discussing risk, analysts must be able to tell the possibility that a party to the contract 
may default (i.e. default risk) from the degree of dispersion among possible outcomes 
(i.e. volatility risk).
24
 Thus, saying that a party is risk averse signals that she prefers low 
volatility investments to high volatility investments, and that she must be paid a risk 
premium to accept the high volatility risk investment, even if there may be almost no 
risk of default.
25
  
 
An omnipresent item of the design of FDI is to identify beforehand the risks inherent in 
the long term relationship both from a legal and business perspective, then to formulate 
a business concept and a legal structure suitable to the implementation of the project, 
and to minimize risks that may arise during the implementation.
26
 In the course of 
negotiating an investment agreement, the foreign investor normally bears the 
commercial risks, and the host state would bear the non-commercial, political risks. 
Political risks are the risks faced by an investor that a host country will confiscate all or 
a portion of the investor‘s property rights located in the host country.27 Volatility risks 
                                                 
23
 ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 28 (Thomson/West 2006). 
24
 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 13 (The American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foundation 1998). 
25
 Id. at 17. 
26
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra Ch. 1 note 65, at 4.  
27
 PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra Ch. 1 note 22, at 1. 
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and some forms of default risks are commercial risks and do not therefore qualify as 
political risks. 
 
 At the conclusion of the investment contract after the resources have been sunk into 
the project, the balance of power shifts from the foreign investor to the host state. The 
greatest risk is that of a change of government that would alter the scheme of 
obligations, risks and benefits, which the two parties have agreed upon during the 
negotiations of the investment contract and which ground the investor‘s business plan 
and legitimate expectations spelt out in the plan.
28
 Since they are sovereign, host 
governments can modify the terms of investment contracts.
29
 This risk is far more acute 
for governments that start with a weak reputation, like many governments in Africa, 
especially where no geological survey is available or planned, so that the future value 
of prospecting rights for minerals changes contingent upon discoveries.
30
 Coupled with 
unstable commodity prices, political risks lurk when host governments experience 
pressures to raise mining/oil taxes when prices are unusually high. For example, this 
year in Zambia, the government considered windfall taxes on copper exports as a 
response to copper price hikes.  
 
The transfer of physical property to the host country, foreign investors‘ role in the 
management of their investments, the long-term relationship that FDI deals create, and 
the risks inherent in FDI are all traits that identify and distinguish FDI from other 
branches of international economic law like international trade. FDI is intrinsically 
distinct from the broader field of international economic law by its structure and 
purpose. 
                                                 
28
 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra Ch. 1 note 65, at 4-5. 
29
 Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for the Resource Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9, 16 (2008). 
30
 Id. 
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1.2. Contracts 
1.2.1. The nature of contracts 
This section of the chapter simply proffers a very basic notion of contracts, at the risk 
of sounding shallow, because contributing a contract perspective to the scholarship on 
China‘s investments in Africa necessarily presupposes a basic understanding of 
contracts. The point of this section is to provide that basic understanding, not to unveil 
a general theory on contracts or grind out a textbook on contract law. 
 
The answer to the question as to what acts or facts constitute a ‗contract‘ is location-
specific: It varies within a legal system and from one legal system to the other. In a 
federal system like that of the US, the answer may depend on the law of the states 
where the acts or facts in question take place.
31
 In the context of the French legal 
system, Jean-Luc Aubert remarks that the extraordinary diversity of the contractual 
phenomenon destabilizes the integrity and unity of the French notion of contract.
32
 
 
 Furthermore, in the rural areas or customary law settings of some developing countries 
such as those found in Africa and Asia, Western conceptions of contracts may not 
match the local practices of promising.
33
 The Nigerian jurist Elias held an opposite 
view. He recognized that contractual relationships in ‗simple‘ African communities 
                                                 
31
 This statement is not oblivious of the fact that the US Uniform Commercial Code has achieved a 
considerable degree of uniformity in the contract and commercial laws of the 50 states of the US. 
32
 JEAN-LUC AUBERT, supra Ch. 1 note 52, 19. 
33
 Terrance O‘Reilly, Contract Theory On and Off the Grid, 92 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1585 (2006) (claiming 
that the lack of a reliable institution of contract in a society indicates, to the extent the society has a 
convention of promising, that the local convention of promising differs in significant respects from those 
familiar to developed societies in the West). The author agrees with Terrance O‘Reilly that ‗social 
conventions of promising‘ in developing countries may differ from those in developed ones, but the 
author disagrees with O‘Reilly‘s assumption there can be a society, even in developing countries, 
without a practice of promising or contracting. 
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were indifferent to executor contracts.
34
 However, he wrote that the essential features 
of mutuality of obligations, respect for one‘s plighted word, the avoidance of fraud or 
force or unlawful breach of contract are present in the African law of contract.
35
 In 
other words, Elias believed that the African conception of contract is in no fundamental 
sense different from the Western conception.   
 
The differences of legal tradition and historical developments between common and 
civilian lawyers further complicate the definition of a contract. Whereas common 
lawyers generally define contracts as self-imposed promissory obligations,
36
 civilian 
lawyers define them as agreements that produce obligations and certain patrimonial 
effects.
37
 In common law jurisdictions like the US and the United Kingdom (UK), 
competing understandings of contract exist alongside the orthodox view of contracts as 
a promise. Jurists have also argued that contracts are, or should be regarded as, (1) 
obligations imposed by law to ensure that those induced to rely on certain 
representations are not made worse off as a consequence,
38
 and (2) obligations to 
respect property-like rights that have been intentionally transferred (not created) 
between contracting parties.
39
 Table 2 below presents these contract theories plus the 
exchange theory that this dissertation propounds.     
 
Table 2: Nature of contracts 
                                                 
34
 T.O. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 153 (Manchester University Press 1956). 
35
 Id. 
36
 STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 56 ff (Oxford University Press. 2004).  
37
 JEAN-LUC AUBERT, supra Ch. 1 note 52, 20ff. 
38
 Lon L. Fuller & W. Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 53 (1936); 
PATRICK ATTIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (Clarendon Press 1981); GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ohio State University Press 1974); STEPHEN A. SMITH, supra note 36, 78 (stating 
that reliance theories of contract are models rather than theories adopted in full by a scholar or a group of 
scholars).  
39
 Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 42ff (D. 
Patterson ed., 1996). 
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Theory Promise Reliance Transfer Exchange 
Main 
Argument 
Contracts as 
self-
imposed 
promissory 
obligations
40
   
Contracts as 
obligations 
imposed by law to 
ensure that those 
induced to rely on 
certain 
representations are 
not made worse off 
as a consequence  
 
Contracts as 
obligations to  
respect property-like 
rights 
 that have been 
intentionally  
transferred (not 
created) 
 between contracting 
parties  
 
Contracts as the  
terms of economic  
exchanges  
 
Leading 
proponent 
Joseph Raz A model rather than 
a theory adopted in 
full by a scholar or 
a group of 
scholars
41
 
 
Peter Benson Not a general contract 
theory, but a specific 
analytical framework  
used  to explain  the 
existing R4I contracts 
and the proposed R4I 
model   
 
 
Three basic categories encompass prominent contract theories, namely party-based, 
standards-based, and process-based.
42
 Party-based theories are those that aim at 
protecting one party to a contract. Some theories protect the promisor, as do will 
theories. According to the will theory, courts should give legal force to commitments 
because the promisor has ‗willed‘ or voluntarily chosen to be bound by those 
commitments.
43
 For will theorists, contract law ‗gives expression to and protects the 
will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect.‘ 44  Will 
theories are therefore subjective theories on the nature of contracts. Conversely, 
                                                 
40
 The majority US legal scholars regard Charles Fried‘s Contract as Promise (CONTRACT AS PROMISE: 
A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (Harvard University Press 1982)) as the archetype of this 
contract theory. This dissertation does not claim copyrights over this perspective as such but over the use 
of this perspective to analyze R4I contracts. 
41
 STEPHEN A. SMITH, supra note 36, at 78. 
42
 Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271ff (1986). 
43
 Id. at 272. 
44
 Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 575 (1933). 
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however, reliance theories are protective of the promisees‘ reasonable reliance on the 
promisor‘s commitments. 
 
The three main standard-based analyses of contracts are fairness, rights and efficiency 
theories. Unlike party-based theories, standard-based theories are normative and not 
analytic. Among fairness-based contract theories, are arguments that contract law 
should make sure that parties do not exploit or take advantage of each other or that 
parties treat each other fairly, or in good faith, or even altruistically.
45
 Rights-based 
theories maintain that contractual obligations should not infringe individual rights and 
that contract law should enforce such obligations, as opposed to some other wider 
social goal of efficiency, social welfare, or the like.
46
  
 
Efficiency-based theories hold that contract law should promote efficient behavior or 
efficiency, which they understand as behavior whose benefits outweigh its costs.
47
 The 
R4I contractual model and the view of contracts as the terms of economic exchanges, 
espoused by this dissertation, are efficiency-based. The judiciary can promote efficient 
                                                 
45
 STEPHEN A. SMITH, supra note 36, at 160. 
46
 Id. at 140-141. 
47
 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (Aspen Publishers 2003). 
Excellent treatises on the economics of contracts can be found in the following publications: Chapter IV 
(General contract law) and Chapter V (Regulation of contracts) of BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT & GERRIT 
DE GEEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Gees 1999); 
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG (ED.), READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (Cambridge University 
Press 1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87-130 (1989); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Fixed Price Versus Spot Price 
Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27-46 (1987); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk 
Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983); George L. Priest, A 
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297-1352 (1981); Charles J. Goetz & Robert 
E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); 
Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determination of ‗Unfair‘ Contractual Arrangements, 70 American 
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 1980, 356-362; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Paul H. Rubin, The 
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. ECON. 223-233 (1978); Alan 
Schwartz, The Law and Economics Approach to Contract Theory (The Center for Law and Economic 
Studies, Columbia University School of Law, Working paper No. 123).  
 44 
 
behavior through the instrumentality of court orders, but in practice efficiency theories 
argue that law promotes efficient behavior by establishing incentives for efficient 
behavior and disincentives for inefficient behavior.
48
 
 
Thirdly, the best-known process-based contract theory is the bargain theory of 
consideration, which still rules the day in American contract law. The theory came 
about as a means to distinguish, out of the infinitely great number of agreements struck 
every day, between enforceable and unenforceable agreements.
49
 Section 71 of the US 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts is an authoritative statement of consideration:
50
 
 
1. To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. 
2. A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for 
his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise. 
 
Here, it is not what is bargained for that matters; it is that each party‘s promise is 
induced by the other‘s.51 The bargain theory of consideration has two shortcomings at a 
minimum: First, the theory‘s exclusive focus on process conceals the substantive values 
that dictate the choice of process; second, the inability of the theory to explain why 
certain types of agreements are not or should not be enforceable.
52
 These issues of 
contract formation feature prominently in national contract laws, but admittedly 
investment contracts are invulnerable to such issues because of the undeniable nature of 
investment contracts as bargains and economic exchanges.  
 
                                                 
48
 STEPHEN A. SMITH, supra note 36, at 109. 
49
 See Randy Barnett, supra note 42, at 287. 
50
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1), (2)(1979). 
51
 Randy Barnet, supra note 42, at 289. 
52
 Id. at 289-290. 
                                                                                                                             45 
1.2.2. Contracts as terms of economic exchanges 
The sheer variety of contracts forces, as it were, this dissertation to adopt a working 
definition of contract beyond the legal field. Whilst legal definitions of contracts vary, 
definitions of the economic reality referred to by those definitions do not. In the 
economic analysis of contract law, Steven Shavell‘s definition is germane. A contract 
is
53
   
 
a specification of the actions that named parties are supposed to take at various times, generally 
as a function of the conditions that hold. The actions typically pertain to delivery of goods, 
performance of services, and payments of money, and the conditions include uncertain 
contingencies, past actions of parties, and messages sent by them.   
 
However, for its analytical purposes, this dissertation prefers to refer to a contract as 
the terms and conditions of economic exchanges, with stipulated patrimonial 
consequences. This definition also circumvents the problem posed by the differences of 
legal definitions of contracts and instead stresses the economic nature of contracts, 
especially the contract and property dimensions of economic exchanges. Such an 
approach, not far away from Shavell‘s, facilitates references to those transactions while 
leaving it to local lawyers in given jurisdictions to work out the particularities of 
contract formation, i.e. process of specifying actions and conditions.  
 
An economic exchange or a bargaining transaction involves a seller of goods or 
services, or both, and a buyer. Simply put, a sales analogy is a most useful analytical 
tool to detect the presence or absence of an economic exchange. Economic exchanges 
are infinite, and this dissertation only zeroes in on commercial contracts, that is, 
contracts between a firm as a seller to another firm as a buyer. Classified according to 
                                                 
53
 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 291 (Harvard University Press 
2004). 
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the parties (firms or individuals), economic exchanges fall into four broad transactional 
categories regulated by specific areas of the law:
54
  
 
1. A firm sells to another firm, called commercial contracts and the prime subject 
of contract law;  
2. an individual sells to another individual, primarily regulated by family law55 
and real property law;
56
 
3. a firm sells to an individual, primarily regulated by consumer protection law, 
real property law,
57
 and securities laws; and  
4. an individual sells to a firm, regulated by laws governing labor relations.  
 
In contracts, a ‗firm‘ stands for one of the following three economic entities:58 (1) A 
corporation, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or 
accounting firm.  
 
This transactional classification discloses that contract law does not cover the entire 
realm of economic exchanges. A good example of this proposition is the different 
status of contracts in law and in economics. International law does not envision treaties 
as a form of contracts whereas law and economics scholarship often treats treaties as 
‗contracts.‘ Some scholars analogize treaties to contracts 59  while others claim that 
                                                 
54
 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 
541, 544 (2003). 
55
 For example, antenuptial agreements and divorce settlements. 
56
 For example, home sales and some lease agreements. 
57
 Most leases between a firm and an individual belong to this category. 
58
 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, supra note 54, at 545. 
59
 JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 28 (Juta & Co., Ltd. 
2005)(stating that treaties may be of a contractual nature when two or more states ‗contract‘ with each 
other to establish a particular legal relationship in matters such as trade, air and landing rights and mutual 
defense); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. 
INT‘L L. 1, 30ff (1999)(stating that as an agreement intended to be legally binding, a treaty is often 
considered to be a form of contracts). 
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treaties are contracts.
60
 Richard Posner claims that treaties, international conventions, 
and other agreements between or among nations are contracts.
61
 The economics of 
contracts can be applied to them, even if that means assuming that nations behave 
much like individuals in their commercial relations.
62
 For Posner, therefore, BITs are 
‗contracts‘ just like international investment contracts. Likewise, this dissertation views 
treaties in economic terms and equate them to contracts, insofar as they embody the 
terms of economic exchanges.  
 
‗Terms‘ or ‗clauses‘ are units of agreements and as such they are the quintessence of 
economic exchanges. Following the Aristotelian ethical tradition, James Gordley 
distinguishes contracts to make gifts from contracts to exchange, which he describes as 
‗an act of voluntary commutative justice63.‘64 The renowned jurist Lon Fuller loosely 
defined an ‗exchange‘ as a ‗transaction from which each participant derives a benefit, 
or, more restrictively, as a transaction in which the motives of the parties are primarily 
economic rather than sentimental.‘65  
 
Framing contracts as exchanges is a stance that is not without critics. J.E. Penner, 
professor at University College London, is highly skeptical of contemporary notions of 
property and contract, which he argues are corrupted by ‗fetishism‘ in Karl Marx‘s 
sense.
66
 Penner claims that the fetishized notion of property is intrinsically linked to a 
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correspondingly fetishized notion of contract, whereby all contracts are exchanges of 
property rights, and property is nothing but that which can be exchanged.
67
 For Penner, 
the problem with such notions is that contracts are reduced to purchaser choice, and 
ideas of contracts as relational, long-term, joint ventures under which parties coordinate 
their behavior to mutual and joint advantage are downplayed.
68
 
 
However, alternative contract theories – whether party-based, standard-based or 
process-based
69
  – fail to capture the cost-benefit analysis that is at the heart of risk 
assessment in general and the main research question asked and the type of contracts 
examined in this dissertation. Efficiency and economic contract theories do in fact 
employ cost-benefit analyses, but they are normative
70
 and not analytic, though the 
boundary between normative and analytic questions is fuzzy.
71
 At any rate, the view of 
contracts as terms of economic exchanges is both analytic and normative. It therefore 
provides a more rounded account of contracts.  
 
1.2.3. The contract and property dimensions of exchanges 
The dissertation‘s definition of contracts recognizes that economic exchanges have 
certain stipulated consequences on property and property rights. Indeed, contract and 
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property are ‗two fixed points of the economics of exchange.‘72 Contracts provide for 
the creation, variation, transfer and termination of property rights.  
 
A property right is the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used, be it 
owned by a private person or the government.
73
 The entire domain of private law is 
related to property rights. Property law is the body of rules that defines property rights; 
contract law is the body of rules that allows the transfer or exchange of property 
rights.
74
 Stephen Smith convincingly argues that, insofar as one of property law‘s 
fundamental task is to determine how and when property rights are created, property 
and contract are conceptually similar.
75
 Viewed from that angle, contract is closer to 
property than to tort, although both contract and tort form the major part of the law of 
obligations.
76
  
 
Of property law in general, Smith said that it is a ‗hodge-podge of rules whose 
strongest connection is often historical rather than conceptual.‘77 Today, the idea of 
property in law, to use a phrase by Penner, is suffering from an identity crisis in that 
property as a distinct and separate category in a legal system does not make much 
sense.
78
 Penner believes that:
79
 
 
‗[p]roperty‘ will disappear as a meaningful category of rights if every valuable entitlement, 
from the right to vote to the right to the shirt on your back, is a property right. The chief 
rhetorical value of isolating property norms from others lies in the forceful way in which 
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property norms carry weight in a normative system; if no meaningful basis for distinguishing 
property norms from other norms can be found, then this rhetorical advantage has no warrant.  
 
In particular, property law‘s identity crisis worsens as the law converts some 
contractual rights into property rights, such as debts and bank balances.
80
  
 
The emphasis in this dissertation on mineral resources and hydrocarbons compounds 
the individuation problem of property law. Minerals and hydrocarbons are types of 
property that receive special treatment under separate legal regimes loosed from the 
general property law. With the notable exception of the US, in nearly all other countries 
extractable resources are owned by the state and subject to peoples‘ rights under 
national and international law.
81
 Prominent among these, is the right of peoples to 
economic self-determination. 
 
1.2.4. Contract law approach to China’s FDI 
Most experts on Sino-African economic relations agree that host governments in Africa 
need to devise an appropriate response to derive the greatest benefit from China‘s 
mining investments. The response that this presentation is proposing is contractual. It 
proposes the adoption of R4I contracts as a model for making the most of China‘s 
investments in the mining sectors of Africa.  
 
The present doctoral research bridges a gap in the legal scholarship on China‘s FDI in 
the mining sectors of Africa by enriching and enlightening the debate with a contract 
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law perspective. As said in the introductory chapter, the want of a contract law 
perspective in the legal scholarship on China‘s FDI in Africa‘s mining sectors has no 
warrant, considering the indispensable economic roles that contracts assume in market 
economies.   
 
In essence, a contract law approach to any phenomenon is one that could support 
interpretive accounts of that phenomenon by examining the contracts or contractual 
relationships involved. That is to say that a contract law approach must imply a 
contract theory. This proposition is not only cogent in logic, but it is also compelling as 
a practical matter. If a perspective on China‘s FDI in Africa does not embody a contract 
law theory or theories, it is inconceivable to contend that the perspective is based on 
contract law.  
 
Contract theories address two different sorts of fundamental questions: What (the 
analytic question) and why (the normative question).
82
 Thus far, there is no ‗complete‘ 
contract theory because no contract theory has yet managed to incorporate and 
attempted to answer both the analytic and the normative question.
83
 Worse still, under 
either the analytic and normative question, jurists have so far proffered no complete 
descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor have they proposed a complete 
normative theory, explaining what the law should be.
84
  
 
In view of the above, it is small wonder that scholars have not yet carved, if not fleshed 
out, a complete description and justification of China‘s R4I contracts in Africa – a 
project that this dissertation plans to make come true. The analytic aspects of the 
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dissertation‘s contract law approach to China‘s FDI and R4I contracts lie in the 
dissection of the terms of R4I contracts and their comparison with other investment 
contracts. The normative aspects of the approach, on the other hand, reside in the 
arguments and evidence advanced and adduced to demonstrate that R4I contracts are a 
model, superior to ordinary contract types, for investment in the mining sectors of 
African economies. These two aspects make up the dissertation‘s contract law approach 
to China‘s FDI and R4I contracts in Africa. 
 
 
2. Investment contracts in business transactions 
Before elaborating on the role of investment contracts in structuring deals in the 
business world, it is apposite to review the functions of contracts in general. This 
section brushes a picture of the utility of contracts and the various ways in which they 
can structure FDI. The point of this exercise is to show how contracts and contract law 
can organize China‘s mining FDI in Africa. 
 
Contracts perform both social and economic functions.
85
 In society, contracts are 
instrumental in interpersonal communication, distribution, and the administration of 
property. In the market, contracts serve as normative standards, a distributive tool, and 
a mechanism to ensure the predictability and stability of economic relations. R4I 
contracts contain clauses with similar social and economic functions. In this 
dissertation, economic functions are emphasized whereas social ones are skimmed 
over, though equity is discussed when addressing distributive justice issues.  
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2.1. Utility of contracts 
2.1.1. Social functions 
a) Standard-setting 
Contracts subject parties to a set of rules, fixed by the parties‘ mutual assent, that they 
have to abide by, failing which specified remedies would avail the aggrieved party. 
Parties are bound by the contract to observe certain promised behavior – to perform, to 
give or to refrain from doing something, etc. – and that behavior is taken for granted by 
the social polity to such an extent that the law guarantees its application. Thus, 
contracts are an effective mode of setting standards for the behavior of parties to a 
contract.  
b) Distribution 
Distribution is the appendage of any contract law system. Aggregate contracting 
between persons ensures the effective economic operation of contract law by 
organizing the distribution of property and wealth within and without a given 
jurisdiction.  
c) Stabilization 
The inherent or latent threat of sanctions for breaches strengthens the binding effect of 
contracts. The positive form of this threat is the obligation to honor contracts, as 
encapsulated in the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda.
86
 In Sapphire, the learned judge 
declared that:
87
 
 
[i]t is a fundamental principle of law, which is constantly being proclaimed by international 
Courts, that contractual undertakings must be respected. The rule ‗pacta sunt servanda‘ is the 
basis of every contractual relationship. 
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The sanctity of contractual obligations implies that situations fixed by contract are 
stable and reliable. Contracts are predictive tools for economic relations: They situate 
these relations in time, allow for long-term exchanges, and organize, by anticipating it, 
the course of future relations.  
 
2.1.2. Economic functions 
a) Communication 
First, contracts create (mostly) economic (and sometimes social) relations between 
individuals. Contracts are channels by which persons establish relations and bonds with 
others. Even though the communication in question is economic in nature, it does not 
exclude affective considerations. Friendship, solidarity, amongst others, can initiate or 
inspire contractual agreements. In R4I contracts and a host of contractual documents, 
especially their preambles, parties agree on the pursuit and achievement of 
development targets in addition the purely business motives of the parties. However, 
contractual relationships are primarily economic and patrimonial; they are about the 
exchange of property or services between persons, natural or juristic. 
b) Distributive justice 
Contracts are an instrument for the (re)distribution of property that maintains a certain 
equilibrium in the value of exchanged things. They enable persons to get what they do 
not have with what they have. From this perspective, exchange contracts are most 
probably the most spontaneous contractual mechanisms. That is not to say that R4I 
contracts are the most spontaneous investment contracts. R4I contracts are much more 
complex than simple exchange contracts but they share in common with exchange 
contracts a concern for the maintenance of a balance in the value of exchanged things. 
Financial intermediation consolidates the distributive function of contracts by 
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generalizing it. In this regard, R4I contracts differ from most investment contracts 
because they mostly dispense with financial intermediation through a barter-like 
payment system. 
 
However, this distributive function does not redress inequalities between contracting 
parties. Whereas contracts may optimize economic exchanges between African states 
and China in the mining and infrastructure fields, they may not be sufficient for the two 
parties to equalize the balance of economic exchanges or engage in interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. The international economic system is based on unequal 
exchange
88
 and the terms of international economic exchanges, R4I contract terms 
included, often reflect these unequal power equations.
89
  
 
If a party takes the lion‘s share of the benefit of a bargain it is usually because that 
party wields a bargaining advantage, leverage or monopoly power;
90
 or because the 
other party lacks in professional integrity or the required negotiating skills. The 
challenge for African states is therefore to negotiate contract terms competently so as to 
get the best deal possible for a party in a weaker position, though contracts are arguably 
not fit to counterbalance stronger bargaining power.
91
  
c) Patrimonial administration 
Finally, contractual arrangements permit the administration of property. This 
extrapolates from the distributive function of contracts, outlined above. Just like 
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contracts entitle persons to control, use, vindicate, encumber, and alienate property and 
property rights, so do R4I contracts permit parties to exchange natural resources for 
infrastructure.  
 
2.2. Investment contracts 
Foreign investors and host countries use contracts extensively. The variability of 
contract forms is infinite, and parties can even enter into innominate contracts and 
contracts sui generis. In fact, this dissertation‘s position is that R4I contracts are sui 
generis, a Latin phrase that refers to agreements whose originality precludes any 
insertion of such agreements within any existing category of contracts.
92
 For that 
reason, the dissertation invents the new category of resource-for-infrastructure (R4I) 
investment contracts. R4I contracts are a category of investment contracts that blends a 
mining or oil contract and an infrastructure project in a single binding agreement.  
 
The galaxy of possible contract forms extends to FDI. However, constant and uniform 
business practice in several host countries warrants the stereotyping of some 
investment contractual arrangements in general and in the mining sectors. The common 
denominator of investment contracts is that they typically bind host states to honor the 
contracts. In the natural resources and infrastructure sectors, the three main generations 
of investment contracts are concession agreements, production-sharing agreements 
(PSA) and contractual arrangements creating infrastructure.  
 
2.2.1. Concession agreements  
The mining or oil contract in a R4I framework agreement may be set up following the 
modern version of concession agreements. A concession agreement is an investment 
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contract in terms of which a host state grants a foreign investor exclusive rights to 
explore and produce natural resources, demarcated for those purposes. In such 
arrangements the state retains ownership of the resources and the power to revoke the 
contract for public convenience or default,
93
 even though exercising that power would 
predictably have adverse reputational consequences for the host state. In fact, the 
concession of a public function to a private person is not a recent phenomenon; it 
harkens back to the Middle Ages.
94
 Concession agreements have been around for quite 
a long while since the colonial days. They took center stage during the colonial period 
as the transfer of resources from the colonies to the metropolitan states became 
necessary for these states to convert resources into manufactured products or use them 
to fuel their industries.
95
  
 
Before 1945, early companies that operated in the natural resources sectors used 
concession agreements, which tied up production in large areas of land for considerably 
long periods of time.
96
 The agreements transferred title of oil reserves to investors yet 
they did not oblige investors to explore or produce oil.
97
 Host countries would receive a 
bonus for the oil concession and royalties for barrels produced.
98
 
 
The nature of concession agreements is still contested among international law 
scholars. Notwithstanding the consensus that concession agreements are contracts and 
not treaties, the issue remains whether they have the nature and character of public law, 
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private law, or a mixture of the two
99
.
100
 Scholars have variously argued that 
concession agreements are public contracts,
101
 private contracts,
102
 and analogous to 
French administrative contracts.
103
 This question is not merely academic; it has very 
practical ramifications. Deeming that concession agreements are private contracts 
signals a process that shunned broad, open deliberation at each stage of the creation of 
the concession agreement and the parties shielded the agreement from public 
knowledge or influence.
104
 The issue has not yet been authoritatively settled, but it 
clearly appears from the controversy that the answer depends in a large measure on the 
position in the municipal laws of the host states.     
 
Concession agreements, in a modified form, are still in use in natural resources sector 
and have resurfaced in the field of infrastructure and utility construction. For example, 
a 2009 mining agreement between Liberia and China for the development of the Bong 
iron mine in Liberia is a present-day version of a concession agreement.
105
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2.2.2. Production sharing agreements 
In the vast majority of cases, the mining or oil contract in R4I framework agreement is 
modeled after production sharing agreements (PSA). After dramatic changes in mineral 
industries in the 1960s and 1970s, the old concession agreements were replaced by 
profit sharing agreements or, more commonly, production sharing agreements. 
Following the wave of independence in the 1960s, the former colonies and newly 
independent states needed to re-structure their respective mineral industries. In the oil 
sector, where Indonesia pioneered the introduction of PSAs in the 1970s,
106
 the 
independent states created state oil corporations and vested them with the ownership of 
the state‘s oil resources. 107  Furthermore, collective actions by cartels of producer 
countries and the desire to develop necessary skills and new technologies by those 
countries precipitated changes in the petroleum and, to a lesser extent, mineral 
resources sectors.
108
 These changes altered the power equations between producer 
countries and foreign investors. Eventually, in the oil industry, PSAs supplanted 
concession agreements, even if the latter are not rare in the mining industry today.  
 
Under PSAs, which operate on the basis of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources,
109
 foreign corporations perform a participatory role.
110
 Host state-
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owned corporations exercise dominant control of the operations.
111
 The risks of failure 
to find commercially usable oil reserves shifted to foreign investors,
112
 but the tax 
deductibility of exploration expenses countervails those risks. If and when oil reserves 
are found and produced, the two parties to the PSA divide the product among 
themselves following a negotiated formula, often subject to a gradual decrease of the 
rights of the investor.
113
  
 
Just like concession agreements, so is the nature of PSAs a matter of debate. Like 
traditional concession agreements, PSAs are transactions of a contractual and 
commercial nature.
114
 Nevertheless, beyond this basic finding, scholars are not of one 
mind as to whether PSAs are private contracts, administrative contracts or a mixture of 
both.
 115
 Here, too, it clearly appears that the answer largely depends on the provisions 
in the laws of host states.     
 
Whatever their nature might be, PSAs may sometimes contain limited protections and 
guarantees for foreign investors. They may ensure protection from straightforward 
termination, but might fail to protect from implicit means of modifying contractual 
terms by dint of legislative and regulatory enactments or amendments.
116
 Since their 
first implementation by Indonesia in the 1970s, PSAs quickly became a favorite vehicle 
for FDI in developing countries with unstable or unclear legal regimes.
117
 And 
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preferable though they may look at first blush, PSAs place the burden of financing on 
the shoulders of host states, which is why not many countries have resorted to PSAs.
118
 
 
2.2.3. Infrastructure contracts 
Infrastructure and utility projects are third-generation investment contracts. In the early 
1990s during the period of privatization, contractual arrangements creating utilities and 
infrastructure emerged beyond the area of natural resources.
119
 Build, operate, and own 
(BOO) projects epitomize these arrangements, which typically place all major benefits 
and risks on foreign investors.
120
 With the build, operate and transfer (BOT) variant of 
these arrangements, foreign investors transfer at end of a certain period the entire 
project to the host state. Projects aimed at infrastructure construction alone take on a 
special form.
121
 
 
BOOs and BOTs are often public-private partnerships (PPPs). PPPs are models for 
developing and financing infrastructure projects and for decreasing costs associated 
with these projects. Project costs are, for the public sector, the budgetary constraints 
and the lack of required technical expertise.
122
 For the private sector, the costs include 
the constraints in (1) acquiring land, (2) obtaining permits and clearances, (3) securing 
approvals from local authorities and (4) overcoming inordinate delays caused by 
government organs and agencies.
123
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Foreign investors tend to prefer BOO projects over BOOT (build, own, operate and 
transfer) projects for many reasons. First, BOO projects do not revert to the 
government at the end of the term.
124
 Other reasons relate to the transfer conditions in 
BOOT projects. With BOOT projects, the transfer has conditions that distort the pricing 
of the finance, it may ultimately prove unpopular with public subscribers, and it adds 
complexity to the structure.
125
 Finally, uncertainty exists as to whether host 
governments will have the desire or appropriate structures in place to take back the 
project in the long run.
126
  
 
Other PPPs include: 
1. BOR (build operate and renewal of concession), 
2. BLT or BRT (build, lease or rent and transfer), 
3. BT (build and transfer immediately), 
4. BTO (build, transfer and operate), 
5. DBFO (design, build, finance and operate), 
6. DCMF (design, construct, manage and finance), 
7. MOT (modernize, own/operate and transfer), 
8. ROO (rehabilitate, own and operate), and 
9. ROT (rehabilitate, own and transfer). 
 
PPPs sometimes take on a concession form. In spite of the substitution of traditional 
concession agreements by PSAs in the oil sector, the concession contract form has not 
vanished from FDI law and practice.  
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The above presentation of the various investment contract forms adumbrates a point, 
which becomes evident later in this research piece, that R4I contracts are one of a kind 
in the sense that they do not fit any existing form of investment contracts. Instead, the 
dissertation describes in Chapter 6 that R4I contracts are an innovative combination of 
traditional mining contracts and infrastructure projects, principally BT projects. For the 
time being, however, the next section moves to articulate the principle which must 
preside over the determination of the (economic) efficiency of R4I contracts.   
 
 
3. Determination of optimal clauses for R4I contracts 
To be successful, investment contracts must serve and fulfill their own specific 
purposes and the general goals of FDI law, even if the two often overlap. Likewise, R4I 
contracts can be evaluated at two levels: (1) Their lesser or greater capacity to realize 
the contracting parties‘ intentions to exchange natural resources for infrastructure, and 
(2) their approximation or achievement of FDI goals. In addition, economic efficiency 
is the method by which R4I contracts best advance the ideals of the contracting parties 
and FDI law.
127
 Economic efficiency is the most apt method to fulfill the intentions of 
the parties to maximize their preferences and the purposes of FDI law at the lowest cost 
possible. The importance of these evaluation criteria and economic efficiency is that 
the dissertation derives from them a test for the selection of clauses for the R4I contract 
model that it proposes. 
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 See NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: BASIC 
TOOLS FOR NORMATIVE REASONING 2 (Cambridge University Press 2005)(arguing that the economic 
analysis of law helps develop legal proposals, ascertain their consequences and assess which 
consequences best advance the established ideals). 
 64 
 
3.1. The intentions of parties to R4I contracts 
The acid test for the terms that must form part of the R4I contract model is whether it 
advances the intentions of (1) the African parties to maximize China‘s FDI in their 
mining and infrastructure sectors, and (2) the Chinese parties to import natural 
resources from, and build infrastructure in, Africa. Most importantly, this is also the 
test that ultimately determines which contract form – concession agreement, PSA, PPP 
or R4I – is superior. 
 
The test does not only organize the dissertation so as to allow findings that squarely 
answer the dissertation‘s overarching purpose; it is above all party-centered, which 
brings the test closer to most generally accepted theories of contract law that obtain in 
most jurisdictions. 
 
3.2. Investment goals 
The second test for the optimal clauses of R4I contracts is their enforcement of FDI 
goals. Classical economic theory on FDI assumes that FDI is entirely beneficial to host 
economies.
128
 Nowadays the (more nuanced) position is that, in view of its costs and 
negative externalities, FDI is on balance beneficial to host economies. Traditional FDI 
theory expresses the benefits of FDI in terms of increases in employment, overall 
domestic demand, state revenues, personal income, productive efficiency, transfer of 
technology, labor and managerial skills, and overseas market networks.
129
  
 
It is fair to say that the overall goal of FDI and FDI law is to promote economic 
development. UNCTAD acknowledges that the paramount objective of developing 
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 M. SORNARAJAH, supra Ch. 1 note 70, at 48. 
129
 JAMES C. BAKER, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE ROLE OF 
ICSID AND MIGA 5 (Greenwood Publishing Company 1995). 
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countries in seeking of FDI is economic development.
130
 Deardorff's Glossary of 
International Economics defines ‗economic development‘ as the ‗sustained increase in 
the economic standard of living of a country's population, normally accomplished by 
increasing its stocks of physical and human capital and improving its technology‘.131 
Stated differently, R4I contracts should be judged by the impact that they have on 
economic development in the host countries in Africa.  
 
3.3. Economic efficiency 
The economic analysis of law, or law and economics, organizes and directs the 
fundamental inquiry of this dissertation. The fundamental inquiry is on the terms of 
mining contracts that could maximize the building of local infrastructure by Chinese 
investors and minimize the risks and costs of those investments. In a nutshell, the 
economic analysis of investment contracts is the methodology of the present doctoral 
research. The research makes use of a cost-benefit analysis in its quest to identify an 
optimal model for the optimization of China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of resource 
rich countries in Africa.  
 
In order to ascertain the net effect of investment contracts and R4I contractual model 
proposed in this dissertation, a cost-benefit analysis is opportune. A cost-benefit 
analysis involves identifying and expressing the effects (i.e. costs and benefits) of 
investment contracts and the R4I contracts in monetary terms. It is a general 
assumption that the measurement of costs and that of benefits differs, but in fact both 
                                                 
130
 UNCTAD, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS VOL. I, supra Ch. 1 note 67, at 53. 
131
 http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/, Deardorff's Glossary of International 
Economics, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/e.html#EconomicDevelopment (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2009).  
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measurements are flip sides of the same coin.
132
 Benefits would be measured by the 
willingness of buyers to pay for the outputs of investment contracts whereas costs 
would be measured by the amount of compensation required to exactly offset the 
negative consequences.
133
 
  
 
This chapter has explored the multiple ways in which scholars understand contracts, the 
different roles that contract play in economic (and, to a lesser extent, social) relations, 
and how they can structure business deals, including those between China and African 
states. The four highlights are the conceptualization of contract as an exchange, the 
explanation of a contract law perspective on China‘s FDI in Africa‘s mines, the 
typology of existing investment contracts, and the test for clause selection and contract 
comparison. The conceptualization of investment contracts as the terms of economic 
exchanges has no ambition to reign as one general theory of contracts, among other 
competing others. It is a perspective that lubricates the analysis of R4I contracts by 
going around the conceptual intricacies created by the sheer diversity of legal 
definitions of contracts between and within common law and civil law countries.  
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1. Introduction and general context 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter explicates the characteristics of China‘s FDI in Africa, with special emphasis on 
China‘s FDI in Africa‘s mines. The present chapter relates to the project by placing the 
microscope on China‘s FDI in Africa and pointing out where the traits of Chinese investments 
are carried forward in R4I contracts. The succeeding chapter relates to the dissertation‘s chief 
project – to prove the comparative superiority of the R4I contract form over traditional mining 
investment contracts – by elaborating upon the macroeconomic factors that drive China‘s 
investments in mining and construction in Africa.  
 
The chapter opens by presenting the general theoretical context in which FDI from China to 
Africa originates and derives its overall meaning. It continues with a glimpse of the People‘s 
Republic of China (PRC) that narrows down to the PRC‘s economic policies and reasons for 
investing abroad and in Africa. That section is followed by a survey of the literature of China‘s 
economic forays into Africa. It then sketches China‘s investment policies in Africa. The crux of 
the chapter is touched upon in the next section where it describes the ordinary and distinctive 
features of China‘s FDI in Africa. Thereafter, it discusses the comparative advantages of Chinese 
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FDI in Africa over traditional FDI. The chapter closes with a discussion on the comparative 
advantages of Chinese FDI in Africa over traditional FDI.    
 
Understanding the peculiarities of China‘s FDI in Africa enables the tailoring of R4I contract 
terms so as to make them suitable to China‘s FDI. Vice versa, to understand the terms of R4I 
contracts, policy makers in Africa also need a firm grasp of the peculiarities of China‘s FDI in 
Africa. This grasp is necessary because of the connection between the economic patterns of 
Chinese investments and the terms of R4I contracts. Finally, understanding the characteristics of 
investments from China and the economic conditions in their respective countries would also 
help policy makers determine how the terms of the R4I contracts should be negotiated so as to 
take the greatest advantage of China‘s increasing FDI. 
 
1.2. The general context: South-South cooperation 
The general context of China‘s FDI in Africa is firmly anchored in South-South economic 
cooperation. South-South cooperation refers to economic exchanges between countries in the 
Global South, that is to say between developing countries. The idea of South-South cooperation 
came to life after the first large-scale Asian-African conference, the Bandung Conference in 
1955, and started to shape development studies in the late 1990s.
1
 Since 2000, countries in the 
global South have organized two South summits
2
 and a second Bandung Conference in 2005 in 
Indonesia.  
 
South-South cooperation grew out of shared realizations that the international economic order is 
lopsided and that poor nations would find durable solutions to their problems in other developing 
countries rather than in the rich north.
3
 Managing Director of the World Bank and former 
                                                 
1
 See Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, supra Ch. 1 note 49, at 516. 
2
 In 2000 in Havana, Cuba and in 2005 in Doha, Qatar. 
3
 Chris Melville & Olly Owen, China and Africa: A New Era of ‘South-South Cooperation,’ Open Democracy July 
8, 2005, at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-G8/south_2658.jsp; Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, supra Ch. 1 
note 49, at 516-517.   
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Finance Minister of Nigeria, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, said that ‗African countries are clear that 
when it comes to economic growth and transformation, China has more to offer that is relevant 
to present-day Africa.‘4 At heart, a counter-hegemonic model of bilateral relations, South-South 
cooperation rests on the triple bedrock of struggle, common interests and transformation.
5
    
 
It is however mind-boggling that in practice the promotion of South-South cooperation, as a 
philosophy, does not rise above mere rhetoric.
6
 A charitable explanation for this situation may be 
that the present conditions in global economic exchanges militate against the emergence of a 
genuine South-South cooperation praxis. The truth of the matter is that in the science of law the 
often touted concept of ‗South-South‘ is under-theorized and normatively poor.7 By way of 
illustration, a simple search on major legal databases such LexisNexis and WestLaw with a 
―South-South‖ query in the title field only retrieved one entry8 as of November 8, 2009.  
 
UNCTAD offers a decent definition of ‗South-South cooperation‘ but remains silent on what 
‗South-South investment‘ entails. UNCTAD defines ‗South-South cooperation‘ as the 
‗processes, institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical 
cooperation among developing countries in pursuit of common development goals.‘ 9  This 
definition does not give any clues as to the contents of the phrases ‗South-South cooperation‘ or 
‗South-South investment‘. Incidentally, one of the most significant contributions of this 
dissertation, insofar as foreign investment law is concerned, is to add in a skeletal form the 
                                                 
4
 As quoted by KWEKU AMPIAH & SANUSHA NAIDU, supra Ch. 1 note 45, at 5-6. Emphasis added. 
5
 Horace Campbell & Sreeram Chaulia, Unequal Equals: Angola and China, 13 WORLD AFF., Spring 2009, at 52. 
6
 However, this fact does not mean that there are no multilateral institutional platforms for the promotion of South-
South cooperation. The intergovernmental think-tank South Centre, High-Level Committee on South-South 
Cooperation of the UN General Assembly, the UNCTAD, the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation of the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), and the Group of 77, are examples of such platforms. 
7
 The very few legal analyses of South-South cooperation include Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, supra Ch. 1 note 49, at 
516ff. 
8
 I.e. Craig Jackson, Conflict Resolution – The Pre-Resolution Strategy of North-South Integration and South-South 
Integration, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1227 (2001). 
9
 UNCTAD, SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION, supra Ch. 1 note 7, at 1. 
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normative flesh to the barely descriptive concept ‗South-South cooperation‘. The dissertation 
outlines a South-South investment normative framework at the end of this chapter. 
 
Despite the rapid growth of South-South investment agreements since 1990, a significant share 
of outward FDI stock by developing countries in other developing countries is not covered by 
South-South agreements.
10
 Likewise, despite the rapidly increasing FDI in mining from 
emergent countries, especially China and India, Africa has hardly seen any comprehensive 
South-South investment agreements.
11
 This shortcoming implies that the vast majority of mining 
investment contracts between African states and their counterparts in the developing world take 
place outside the explicit normative framework of South-South cooperation. It also implies that 
African countries are in large part failing to capture the tremendous economic gains that would 
otherwise avail to them had their investment contracts been modeled after South-South 
standards. Eventually, it might lead commentators to believe that repeated mention of South-
South cooperation in public declarations by African and Chinese leaders merely refer to the 
identity of economic partners and not to any particular, distinct mode of conducting FDI. 
 
This chapter lodges and fixes China‘s FDI within a legally prescriptive framework of South-
South cooperation, the basic elements of which are presented in the chapter‘s final section. 
Chapter 6 details the incidence of South-South cooperation norms on the R4I investment contract 
model proposed in this dissertation.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), Executive summary to SOUTH-SOUTH 
COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS (United Nations 2005). 
11
 Id. at 35. 
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2. The People’s Republic of China 
2.1. Historical background 
Unified in 221 BC under the Qin or Ch'in Dynasty, China had led the world in the arts and 
sciences for several centuries until the outbreak of civil strife, famines, military defeats and 
foreign occupation in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century.
12
 After World War II, the Communists under 
Mao Zedong restored China‘s sovereignty. At the same time, however, Mao Zedong‘s 
Communists instituted a dictatorial socialist system that intruded into and claimed the life of tens 
of millions of people.
13
 On October 1, 1949, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) was founded. 
1978 was a watershed in Chinese history. From 1978 onwards, Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping 
and subsequent leaders embraced a market-oriented economic path. 
 
2.2. Government 
China is officially a Communist state, the world‘s most populated14 country, with a civil law 
system and a unitary government. In reality, China is no longer a one-man Communist state. 
Albert Keidel describes present-day China as a ‗corporate technocracy‘:15 
 
[China‘s] direction is set by the Communist Party Central Committee, with its various leadership bureaus, 
standing committees, subcommittees, so-called leading groups, and commissions. The Central Committee 
appoints and supervises implementation by management, which is China‘s government administration— its 
president, premier, and cabinet (State Council). 
 
It would be far-fetched to qualify China as ‗democratic‘, but China has indubitably expanded 
personal choice in the past few years, notwithstanding the tight political controls that still obtain 
in the PRC.
16
 
                                                 
12
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook : China, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).   
13
 Id. 
14
 In July 2009, it was estimated that the Chinese total population was 1,338,612,968. See The World Factbook : 
China, supra note 12.  
15Albert Keidel, China‘s Economic Rise – Fact and Fiction 13 (Carnegie Policy Brief No. 61, 2008), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb61_keidel_final.pdf. 
16
 The World Factbook : China, supra note 12.   
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The Chinese Constitution, promulgated on 4 December 1982, is the supreme law of the land: No 
law or administrative rules or regulations may infringe the Constitution; and all organs, the 
armed forces, all political parties, all social organizations, all enterprises and all institutions must 
abide by the Constitution and the law.
17
 The 1982 Constitution provides for four fundamental 
principles. These principles enjoin the Chinese people to:
18
  
(1) keep to the Socialist road; 
(2) uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; 
(3) uphold the leadership of the Communist party; and 
(4) uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
  
The most important principles are first to uphold party leadership and then to adhere to the 
socialist road.
19
 The ruling party in the PRC is the Communist Party of China (CPC), which is 
controlled by the Party‘s Politburo Standing Committee, composed of four to nine persons, often 
all older men, who make all decisions of national interest. The role of the People‘s Liberation 
Army (PLA) to enforce these decisions is crucial when crises arise. 
  
Power in the PRC is distributed among three institutions: The CPC, the state and the army (i.e. 
the PLA). The CPC, with its 73 million members,
20
 structures the entire country. The primary 
organs of state power are the National People‘s Congress (NPC), the President,21 and the State 
Council, which is China‘s cabinet or highest executive body. Under the 1982 Constitution, the 
NPC is the highest organ of state power in the PRC. It meets each year for two weeks 
approximately to review and adopt major new policy directions, national legislation, the national 
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 XIAN FA art. 5 (1982)(P.R.C.). 
18
 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1875-1982) 172 (Foreign Languages Press 1984). 
19
 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 98 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
20
 Hichem Ben Yaϊche, L’Afrique, Au Coeur de la Géopolitique Chinoise, NEW AFR., Jun. – Aug., 2008, at 18. 
[hereinafter Hichem Ben Yaϊche, Géopolitique Chinoise]   
21
 The incumbent as of 2009 was Hu Jintao. 
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budget, and major personnel changes. The Communist Party‘s Standing Committee enacts the 
majority of national legislation. The Party‘s Politburo Standing Committee adopts most 
initiatives submitted to the Standing Committee of the NPC for consideration by the State 
Council.  
 
The State Council includes the Premier, a varying number of vice premiers,
22
 five state 
councilors,
23
 and 29 ministers and heads of State Council commissions. Given the lack of a 
vibrant opposition, the Communist Party controls government appointments. Thus, Communist 
party adherents occupy powerful positions in the state structure and in the PLA. Other political 
parties exist, but these parties, commonly referred to as ‗democratic parties‘ do not represent a 
meaningful opposition or alternative to the Communist party. Nonetheless, democratic parties 
take part in the People‘s Political Consultative Conference and the National People‘s Congress.  
 
The level of support that the Communist Party enjoys is high owing to the success of the 
Communist Party in improving the quality of life in China since the founding of the country in 
October 1949. However, the widening gap between rich and poor and corruption within the 
government leadership are some of the greatest challenges that the Communist Party faces.  
  
2.3. Economic policies 
Both pessimistic and optimistic interpretations compete to explain China‘s development. 
Collapse and threat theories are the negative interpretations. The collapse theory describes 
China‘s economic reforms as bogged down by myriad ills, such as rising inequality and 
corruption, declining state power and credibility.
24
 The threat theory presents China‘s as a threat 
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 As of 2009, there were four vice premiers. 
23
 Equivalent to vice premiers but with smaller portfolios. 
24
 MINXIN PEI, CHINA‘S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY (Harvard University 
Press 2006); GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (Random House 2001)(arguing that a deep look 
into China‘s economic apparent progress reveals that the weaknesses of the system and the long-term decline, if not 
collapse).  
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to the US and, concomitantly, to the West.
25
 By contrast, the optimistic theories see China as a 
peaceful nation moving towards democratization, more liberalization and greater prosperity.
26
 
 
These competing views on China‘s development notwithstanding, the fact remains that the 
Chinese economy is growing rapidly. By the year 2000, output had quadrupled. In 2007, China 
took over from Germany as the third largest economy.
27
 In 2010, it officially claimed Japan‘s 
position as the second largest economy in dollar terms, though in 2008, China‘s gross domestic 
product (GDP) was already 3.5 trillion US dollars, the second largest after the US.
28
 Even if 10 
percent of the Chinese population lives below the breadline, for much of the population, living 
standards have improved dramatically.
29
 The average monthly salary in Beijing was 485 US 
dollars in 2008.
30
 China‘s economic success has engendered a new class of billionaires. At the 
end of 2007, there were 106 billionaires in China, as opposed to 15 billionaires at the same time 
the previous year.
31
  
 
China‘s general success in lifting 400 million Chinese out of absolute poverty, coupled with its 
ability to weather the 2008-2009 financial crisis, rendered China‘s development model very 
attractive to many a developing country. In Africa, polemical discussions about the desirability 
of adopting the Chinese model or the so-called Beijing Consensus are common. Generally 
                                                 
25
 John J. Mearsheimer, China’s Unpeaceful Rise, CURRENT HIST., April 2006; Zbigniew Brzezinski & John J. 
Mearsheimer, Clash of the Titans, FOREIGN POL‘Y, Jan./Feb. 2005; BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE 
PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC TARGETS AMERICA (Regnery Publishing Inc. 2000); MICHAEL D. SWAINE & ASHLEY J. TELLIS, 
INTERPRETING CHINA‘S GRAND STRATEGY (Rand Corporation 2000). 
26
 ZHENG BIJIAN, CHINA‘S PEACEFUL RISE: SPEECHES OF ZHENG BIJIAN 1997-2005 (Brookings Institution Press 
2005); BRUCE GILLEY, CHINA‘S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE: HOW IT WILL HAPPEN AND WHERE IT WILL LEAD (Columbia 
University Press 2004); Edward Friedman, Why China Matters, 49 J. INT‘L AFF. (1996). 
27
 Geoff Dyer, China Becomes Third Largest Economy, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 14, 2009 (reporting that a revision of 
growth figures by Chinese authorities revealed that China overtook Germany as the third largest economy in 2007). 
28
 Isabel Hilton, First City of the Future, THE OBSERVER (Eng.), Jul. 6, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/06/china.  
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 The World Factbook : China, supra note 12; Isabel Hilton, supra note 28. 
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 Isabel Hilton, supra note 28. 
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speaking, the discussions pit those who advocate adopting the Beijing Consensus
32
 against those 
who campaign for Africa to chart its own development path.
33
 Of course, many debaters fall 
somewhere in between
34
 these two extreme poles.
35
 China‘s African Policy seems to take a 
middle position as it stipulates that ‗common development‘ signifies that African countries and 
China work together in the exploration of the road to sustainable development.
36
 The phrases 
‗exploration of the road to sustainable development‘ and ‗work together‘ suggest that, even if 
Africa‘s road to sustainable development should be explored, the exploration of such road is a 
joint venture between Africa and China.   
 
2.4. Reasons for China’s FDI in Africa 
Chinese FDI on the continent is multifaceted and multifactorial. Most reasons for China‘s FDI in 
Africa coincide with the reasons for FDI in general. These include the search for natural 
resources, markets, assets and efficiency. Likewise, China invests massively in Africa for four 
principal reasons: To lock in natural resources, to search for markets, to diversify its investment 
portfolio, and to garner support for the one China policy. The policy paper released in January 
2006, China‘s African Policy, spells out additional reasons for China‘s FDI in Africa. From the 
Policy, mutual benefit and common development emerge as the most plausible explanations for 
China‘s FDI. Last, factors of secondary importance also explain China‘s FDI in the mining 
sectors of Africa.  
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 Martyn J. Davies, Special Economic Zones: China’s Developmental Model Comes Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: 
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 137 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008) (observing that China is exporting its development 
model to Africa through special economic zones); Martyn Davies, China’s Development Model Comes to Africa, 35 
REV. AFR. POL. ECON., Mar. 2008. (stating that China is exporting its development model in Africa). 
33
 Most Chinese commentators and high-ranking officials maintain that China‘s FDI and aid to Africa is mainly 
aimed at enabling governments in Africa to attain self-sufficiency by finding their own development brand: see 
KWEKU AMPIAH & SANUSHA NAIDU, supra Ch. 1 note 45, at 11; ROBERT I. ROTBERG, CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, 
AID, AND INFLUENCE 2 (Brookings Institution Press 2008) (stating that China is not interested in exporting its 
development model).   
34
 KWEKU AMPIAH & SANUSHA NAIDU, supra Ch. 1 note 45, at 11 (after explaining arguments of scholars on both 
poles, Ampiah & Naidu asks the question as to whether Africa has any strategies in its engagement with Africa). 
35
 Joshua Eisenman & Joshua Kurlantzick, China’s Africa Strategy, CURRENT HIST., May 2006, at 219-64 (arguing 
that China‘s engagement with Africa lacks in substance and is driven by resource needs and energy security 
concerns). 
36
 Part III of China‘s African Policy. 
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2.4.1. Energy and natural resources 
China invests in Africa to secure access to natural resources, which are vitally important for the 
perennity of China‘s economic growth. According to Chris Alden and others, the overarching 
driver of Chinese engagement in Africa is Beijing‘s strategic pursuit of resources and raw 
material supplies for growing internal energy needs, showing China‘s position as a center of 
global manufacturing.
37
 China invests huge amounts of capital in Africa for its own survival. It 
desperately needs the primary resources buried beneath the soils of Africa ‗to feed its massive 
industrial surge and – ultimately – America‘s substantial consumer demand.‘38 With its stunning 
economic growth the last 20 years, China has a constant need for raw materials, notably oil and 
hardwood timber.  
 
China has enormous needs yet limited resources. It consumes 20 per cent of the world‘s copper, 
40 per cent of the world‘s coal, 35 per cent of its steel, 10 per cent of its oil and 94 per cent of its 
aluminum.
39
 Yet China has only seven per cent of the world‘s arable land, three per cent of the 
world‘s forests and two percent of the world‘s known oil reserves.40 Apart from coal, rare earth 
metals and oil reserves, China is not richly endowed with natural resources.
41
 In 2007, metal 
ferrous ore accounted for 13 percent, while oil alone represented 71 percent, of Africa‘s exports 
to China.
42
  Africa accounted for one third of China‘s oil imports. It is to cater for its limited 
resources that China has integrated Africa in its economic development. 
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Over the past 25 years, energy consumption in China has augmented on a 5.5 percent average, 
including a 15 percent rise in energy consumption for 2007.
43
 As energy consumption increases, 
China has become more and more reliant on its own coal supplies.
44
 Over the last few years 70 
percent of China‘s energy demand has come from coal.45 By diversifying its energy portfolio, 
China is no longer the hostage of coal price volatility.
46
 It is a leading exporter of textile and 
clothing, yet it depends on the US and some African countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, 
Guinea, Nigeria, Togo and the Central African Republic (CAR)) for cotton.
47
 Similarly, the 
Chinese fishing industry depends on Africa‘s coastal waters.48  
 
The year 1993 is a milestone in China‘s development as it represents China‘s transition from an 
oil exporter to an oil importer,
49
 the second largest after the US. Chinese national production no 
longer sufficed to meet the country‘s demand for oil and energy. China really needed to find 
additional energy sources. National energy considerations made Africa a strategic option in 
commercial and investment terms. China abandoned its Communist ideology and embarked upon 
a series of economic reforms, from which originates China‘s African strategy.50 
 
2.4.2. Search for markets 
China‘s FDI in Africa treads beyond natural resources. From China‘s standpoint, Africa 
represents a market in which it wants to gain a foothold for Chinese firms and products. With a 
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population of 850 million, Africa constitutes an immense market for Chinese manufactured 
goods and production platform for Chinese companies.
51
 Chinese construction firms have 
penetrated local markets in Africa through close bidding on Chinese government-sponsored 
infrastructure projects.
52
   
 
2.4.3. Portfolio diversification 
China holds around 2.1 trillion US dollars in foreign exchange reserves.
53
 It is investing part of 
its reserves abroad, including Latin America and Africa, in order to diversify investment risks in 
the face of a weakening dollar, low interest rates and an expansionary fiscal policy in the US.
54
 
The weakening of the US dollar and the low levels of interest rates in the US created several 
risks for China‘s 1,600 billion US dollar worth of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, in order to 
diversify risks, China is betting on a continent that is increasingly becoming economically 
attractive.
55
 
 
2.4.4. Support for the one-China policy 
Support for the one-China policy does not in itself motivate China‘s FDI in Africa, though 
China‘s FDI has consistently been tied to the recipient country‘s adherence to the one-China 
policy. China uses its investments on the continent to drum up diplomatic support for its position 
on the Republic of China, Taiwan. China still considers Taiwan its 23
rd
 province,
56
 albeit 
renegade. 
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In its African Policy, the Chinese government shows its appreciation for the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have 
official relations with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification.
57
 After several 
bilateral meetings between President Hu Jintao, many of his African counterparts re-affirmed 
their adherence to the one-China policy, which of necessity implies that they support and respect 
China‘s stance that China‘s territorial integrity extends to Taiwan.  For instance, the presidents of 
Benin, Togo, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, and Niger, have all endorsed China‘s position on the status of 
Taiwan (see Table below for countries in Africa that severed ties with Taiwan). All told, the 
Chinese government is nonetheless prepared to form and develop state-to-state relations with 
African countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one 
China principle.
58
   
 
Table 3: The impact of the one China policy in Africa 1989-2008 
 
Year Countries in Africa that broke ties 
with  Beijing to establish ties  
with Taipei 
year Countries in Africa that broke ties with  
Taipei to establish ties with Beijing 
1989 Liberia (second) 1993 Liberia (second) 
1990 Guinea-Bissau 1994 Lesotho (second) 
1990 Lesotho (second) 1996 Niger (second) 
1991 Central African Republic (third) 1998 Central African Republic (third) 
1992 Niger (second) 1998 Guinea-Bissau 
1994 Burkina Faso  1998 South Africa 
1996 The Gambia 2003 Liberia (third) 
1996 Senegal (second) 2005 Senegal (second) 
1997 Chad (second) 2006 Chad (second) 
1997 Liberia (third) 2008 Malawi 
1997 Sao Tome and Principe  Swaziland is the only country in Africa that has 
Never established diplomatic relations with 
Beijing 
 
 These countries had previously diplomatic relations with Taipei and have broken them to establish relations with Beijing. 
Source: Deborah Bräutigam, China’s African Aid: Transatlantic Challenges (2008) 3.  
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2.4.5. Other reasons 
There are other, less important, reasons for China‘s economic ventures in Africa. These include 
the desire to attain global stature as a central player in the world economy and finance, to reuse 
idle equipment,
59
 to circumvent import quotas imposed on Chinese products,
60
  and increasingly 
to feed the rising Chinese population.
61
 China‘s FDI in Africa is a reflection of China‘s self-
identity and growing role as a global leader in economy and finance. Its cultural and historical 
world view as the middle kingdom zhongguo (中国) supports its aim to realize international 
stature as a respected and great global power.
62
 And to maintain this international stature, China 
prefers
63
 the votes of African countries at the UN – the 53 African states comprise more than a 
quarter of the UN General Assembly –, the WTO, and other multilateral organizations.  
 
 
3. The literature on China’s FDI in Africa 
Liters of ink have wetted the piles of papers on the influx of China‘s FDI in Africa. Philip Snow 
(2008) captures well the rising tide of studies on China‘s investments and other economic 
relations in Africa that floods the media:
64
 
 
[N]ow [China‘s presence in Africa] has become a major world issue, a burning question about which over 
thirty international conferences were held in 2006 alone, on which every self-respecting columnist finds it 
necessary to express an opinion, French ministers draw up reports and US congressmen address joint letters 
to the Beijing government. 
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To oversimplify, scholars are divided as to whether China is a development partner,
65
 an 
economic competitor or a colonizer
66
.
67
 What transpires almost invariably from the existing 
scholarship on China‘s FDI in Africa is the common plea that Africa adopt a strategy to forge a 
solid, constructive and balanced relationship with China. Thus far, however, political, economic 
and development analyses have been – quite understandably – shaping the discourse on China‘s 
FDI in Africa.   
 
Alden (2005) reviews the history of the economic relations between China and Africa
68
 while 
Gaye (2006), in addition, analyzes the political, economic and social causes of the Sino-Africa 
economic relations.
69
 Wang (2007) provides a quantified assessment of China‘s multifaceted 
roles and influences in Africa.
70
 Goldstein and others (2006) analyze the role of China and India 
in selected commodity and energy markets.
71
 Bräutigam (1998) scrutinizes the distinctive 
characteristics, the relatively different impact and the different outcomes of China‘s aid in 
Africa.
72
 Jenkins and Edwards (2007) investigate the impact of China and India‘s trade in sub-
Saharan African countries.
73
 Edwards and Jenkins (2005) examine the linkages between China‘s 
trade and poverty reduction efforts in Africa.
74
  Kennan and Stevens (2005) identify which 
African countries are the biggest beneficiaries of China‘s investment and trade in Africa.75 
Broadman (2007) studies the policy challenges for increasing China and India‘s trade and 
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investment in Africa.
76
 Vivien Foster and others (2009) extensively document the infrastructure 
projects that China has been financing in Africa up until 2007 and conclude that China is the 
leading infrastructure financier in Africa.
77
      
 
3.1. The statistics 
The chief hurdle in sizing up China‘s FDI is the unavailability of comprehensive, detailed and 
reliable statistics. The 2007 World Bank study, Africa’s Silk Road, notes that, despite the rapidly 
escalating attention devoted to African-Asian trade, systematic data available to carry out 
rigorous analysis on this issue is surprisingly poor.
78
 Another obstacle to accurate monitoring is 
the fact that the Chinese government has a tradition of secrecy and is usually reluctant to publish 
figures for its FDI in Africa. Deborah Bräutigam noticed that:
79
 
 
With the Chinese declining to give any official figures for annual aid to Africa, journalists, scholars and 
even researchers at institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) grabbed 
any figures they could find and published them as hard facts. 
 
Further, attempts to quantify China‘s FDI bump against definitional differences. In fact, China 
has blurred the perceptible line between aid and investment, repackaging both as single major 
international business transactions. China has occasionally merged aid and private sector trade 
models.
80
 In 2009, the Chinese definition of ‗aid‘ had not yet matched that of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).
81
 For these reasons, statistics of China‘s FDI in Africa must be taken with a pinch of 
skepticism. 
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In 2008, China‘s interest and investments in Africa and the continent‘s largely unexplored 
natural resources had increased five-fold since 2001.
82
 Although statistics on China‘s FDI in 
Africa and the methodologies used to produce these statistics are variable, it is estimated that 
accumulated investment by Chinese firms doubled from $6.27 to almost $12 billion between 
2005 and 2006.
83
 On the other hand, Sino-African trade figures – which jumped from 11 billion 
in 2000 to more than 100 billion US dollars in 2010 – dwarf Sino-African investment figures. 
These figures notwithstanding, China‘s FDI stock in Africa is outshone by those of the UK (30 
billion US dollars in 2003), the US (19 billion US dollars in 2003), and France (11.5 billion US 
dollars in 2003).
84
  
 
Figure 1: Chinese outward FDI stock by region, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total: 45 billion US dollars 
 
Source: H. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road (2007) 
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Figure 2: Chinese outward FDI flows by region, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total: 5.5 billion US dollars 
 
Source: H. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road (2007) 
 
 
The picture is rosier for China when it comes to trade in Africa. Today, China ranks as the 
continent‘s largest trading partner ahead of the US, France and Britain.85 Between 2000 and 
2006, trade between China and Africa hit a record high, surging as it did from 11 billion to 55 
billion US dollars.
86
 In the opening months of the year 2007, China‘s exports to Africa escalated 
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by 36 per cent whereas Africa‘s imports increased by 81 per cent.87 Projections were that trade 
between the two regions would reach 100 billion US dollars before 2010, 10 times the trade 
figure in 2000.
88
 China and Africa passed the 100 billion US dollar trade target in 2008 when the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced in February 2009 that China-Africa 
trade had reached the ‗historic‘ level of 106.8 billion US dollars the previous year.89  
 
China‘s FDI to Africa, swelling though it may be, is small in comparison to China‘s total FDI 
stock (see Table 4 below).
90
 In 2006, China invested more in Latin America, Asia, and Europe 
than it did for Africa. A few factors account for lower FDI in Africa, namely the relative lack of 
habit on the part of Asian firms to invest abroad; transaction and information costs are higher 
when investing in Africa than in other Asian economies; and constraints in both host- and home-
country regulatory frameworks.
91
 Nevertheless, in that same year, China invested less in North 
America and Oceana. China‘s outward FDI flows thus signal growing South-South cooperation, 
with China, India, Malaysia, and Singapore leading Asian outward FDI in Africa.
92
 
 
Table 4: China’s total outward FDI stock 
(in millions of US dollars) 
 
Regions Year 2006 
Asia 7663.25 
Africa 519.86 
Europe 597.71 
Latin America 8468.74 
North America 258.05 
Oceana 126.36 
Total 17633.97 
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Source: E. Obuah, China’s Investment in Africa: A Catalyst for Growth and Development or a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Exploitation (2008) 8. 
 
 
3.2. The 2008-2009 global financial crisis 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis adversely impacted global FDI flows. FDI inflows were expected 
to fall from 1.7 trillion US dollars in 2008 to below 1.2 trillion US dollars in 2009.
93
 UNCTAD 
predicted that global FDI inflows would slowly recover in 2010 at 1.4 trillion US dollars and 
gain momentum in 2011 at 1.8 trillion US dollars.
94
 When the global financial crisis began to 
unravel, some analysts predicted that China‘s FDI would dwindle down.95 But not only did these 
forecasts lack evidential backing,
96
 but investments to developing and transition economies 
surged.
97
 MOFCOM reported a 81% rise to 552 million US dollars in the first half of 2009, from 
the same period in 2008.
98
  
 
3.3. Contractual frameworks 
A review of legal scholarship on the question of China‘s FDI in developing countries shows that 
most studies seldom touch on contractual frameworks for investments from China to Africa but 
often examine investment from and to China. Debates on investments have concerned the 
general issue of whether and, if so, to what extent investment frameworks attract FDI. Where 
contractual frameworks for FDI are concerned, studies have tended to revolve around another 
general issue, namely whether or not states should adopt multilateral frameworks on investment.   
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A brief note on multilateral investment frameworks. Kennedy (2003) considers the desirability of 
a multilateral framework on investment as the legal response to the economic arguments for an 
open investment climate.
99
 Regarding the connection between legal frameworks and FDI, Franck 
(2007) focuses on how, if at all, investment treaties affect investment.
100
 Despite the absence of 
any multilateral investment frameworks between China and PIRSA, Ewelukwa (2008) notes that 
there is a possibility of a free trade agreement between China and the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU)
101
 in the near future.
102
  
 
 
4. China’s investment policies in Africa 
China implemented an efficient and effective trade policy geared towards exports that allowed it 
to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, estimated to amount to 1,600 billion US dollars in 
2008.
103
 China, which joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, is the first exporter 
in the world with a trade surplus of 262.2 billion US dollars in 2007.
104
 In July 2008, China 
emerged as Japan's top export destination for the first time since World War II, overtaking a 
crumbling US market in July with a spurt of demand for fuel before the Beijing Olympics.
105
 In 
2007, its world trade represented 2.17 billion US dollars while its trade with Africa had then 
reached 72 billion US dollars.
106
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4.1. China’s African Policy 
Where FDI in Africa is concerned, China‘s preeminent policy document is the African Policy 
that China adopted on 12 January 2006. The pertinence of China‘s African Policy is that it 
discloses some characteristics of and further reasons for China‘s FDI in Africa. The Chinese 
government by its Policy ‗wishes to present to the world the objectives of China‘s policy towards 
Africa and the measures to achieve them.‘107  The most important principle of Sino-African 
cooperation is co-development.
108
 
 
Li Anshan, professor at the School of International Studies at Beijing University, offers a clear 
bird‘s eye view of China‘s African policy.  Professor Li divides China‘s African Policy into three 
periods, to wit normal development (1949-1977), transition (1978-1994), and rapid development 
(1995 – present). 109  Certain elements of China‘s African policy changed whereas others 
remained constant.
110
 The first change occurred during the first period when China‘s African 
policy shifted from forming alliances in order to fight against super powers to strengthening 
exchange and dialogue with Africa to find common ground while reserving differences.
111
 In 
1978, the International Department of the CPC began to receive more African party delegations, 
greatly developing Sino-African relations thenceforth by signaling that the PRC was no longer 
restricting its diplomatic contacts to communist states in Africa.
112
 The second shift – which also 
started in the first period – was from an emphasis on political contact to exchanges through 
multiple channels.
113
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The Chinese government proposes to cooperate with Africa in diverse fields in the years to 
come, with a view to ‗promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term 
and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.‘ 114  China also pledges to 
unswervingly carry forward the tradition of Africa-China friendship and develop a new type of 
strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win 
cooperation and cultural exchange.
115
  
   
The most important clause of the Policy is the one that lists the five principles guiding China-
Africa exchange and cooperation, and driving to lasting China-Africa relations. These principles 
are sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity and common development.
116
 Li reminds that, 
even though the principle of equality has been advocated among individuals, no parties other 
than China make mention of it in their international relations. He therefore claims that equality 
(which includes respect for sovereignty and mutual benefit) is a model for international 
relations.
117
 Another feature of China-Africa cooperation is the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries.
118
   
 
Of the five principles of China‘s African policy, only mutual benefit and common development 
may also stand as reasons for China‘s FDI in Africa while the balance appears to be no more 
than guiding principles. The Policy explains mutual benefit as reciprocity, as China‘s support of 
African countries in their endeavor for socio-economic development and nation building, and as 
China‘s promotion of common prosperity.119 
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The Policy‘s sense of common development is learning from and drawing upon each other‘s 
experience in governance and development, capacity building and strengthening exchange and 
cooperation in education, science, culture and health.
120
 In a nutshell, common development 
entails that China and African countries work together in the exploration of the road to 
sustainable development.
121
 The purpose of mutual benefit and co-development is to increase 
Africa‘s ability to self-develop.122   
 
In the Policy, the Chinese government encourages Chinese enterprises to participate in the 
building of infrastructure
123
 and to develop and exploit resources rationally, with a view to 
helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength and 
realize sustainable development in their own countries.
124
  
 
4.2. China in Africa 
China‘s policies on overseas FDI matured and moved towards a more transparent and proactive 
policy framework.
125
 From the 1980s onwards, China has adopted a strategy to penetrate African 
economies and formulated, then implemented, several policies that underlie its FDI in Africa. 
The strategy of the Chinese government rested on three legs:
126
  
1. China would invest in any African state, irrespective of the state‘s records in human 
rights and the rule of law (the competitive political advantage);  
2. it engages low-cost bidding based on the use of low skilled labor and management (the 
comparative economic advantage); and  
3. it deploys intensive diplomacy and offers African states projects and low-interest 
development assistance (diplomacy and development assistance).  
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4.2.1. Investment policy framework 
China specially designed these policies to cater for economic conditions at home and to satisfy 
insatiable internal demands for energy resources by prodding Chinese corporations to invest 
overseas. With regard to FDI in Africa, China established 11 centers for investment promotion, 
regularized bilateral economic trade, and it timely informs businesses about opportunities, trade 
regulations, market situation, trade policies, and commodity shortages in host countries.
127
 
 
The main policy changes consisted in relaxing emigration rules, diversifying aid forms, creating 
specific state-owned corporations and privatizing others. In 1984, China loosened its emigration 
policies to among other things encourage small scale entrepreneurs to engage into trade and FDI 
in Africa.
128
 It also announced that foreign aid would take on various forms, including aid for 
joint venture partnerships between Chinese companies and African companies.
129
  
 
In 1988, the Chinese government created a state parastatal, the Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), to secure oil agreements and exploration concession overseas with foreign 
companies and states. In 1994, China founded the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the 
China Export-Import Bank (China Eximbank), today the world‘s largest export credit agency, to 
grant funds for concessional loans to support industrial, infrastructure, and social welfare 
projects by Chinese enterprises operating abroad. In the late 1990s, China entered into a myriad 
of BITs with African states and erected several cooperation schemes, such as the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, and intergovernmental joint committees on trade 
and economic cooperation.
130
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Then in 1997 the 15
th
 Party Congress announced China‘s privatization and overseas expansion 
policies,
131
 enshrined in the Chinese phrases zhuada fangxiao (privatization of grasping the large 
and releasing the small) and zouchuqu (going out), respectively.
132
 Privatization consisted in 
selecting leading corporations across economic sectors and exhorting them to expand abroad 
with incentives relating to taxes, loans, credit, foreign exchange, imports and exports.  
 
In particular, Chinese construction corporations doing projects in Africa obtained export credits 
for feasibility studies, guarantees for bank loans, export credits to fund operational costs of 
projects, and lines of credit for machinery and equipment.
133
 Consequently, by the late 1990s, 
China‘s large firms started to expand their exploration investment opportunities, especially in 
resource rich countries in Africa, pursuant to China‘s industrial priorities (see distribution of 
China‘s FDI flows to Africa in Figure 3 and Table 5 below). In 2004, China‘s FDI in Africa 
converged mainly on light-manufacturing textile sector with about 64 per cent; resource-based 
sector (oil, timber, and mining) accounting for 28 per cent investments in the oil production; and 
in construction and infrastructure sectors.
134
 
 
 
Figure 3: Product distribution of Africa’s trade with China, 2004 
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Source: H. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road (2007) 
 
 
Table 5 Sectoral distribution of China’s FDI flows to Africa 1979-2000 
 
Sector/industry     Number of projects Investment value 
(millions of dollars) 
Agriculture                                               22                               48                      
Resource extraction                                44                             188 
Manufacturing                                       230                             315 
Machinery                                  20                               16 
Home appliances                       36                              25 
Light industry                             82                               87 
Textiles                                      58                             102 
Other manufacturing                  34                               86  
Services                                                 200                            125 
Others                                                        3                                6 
Total                                                     499                             681 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of 
Cooperation among Developing Countries (2007) 56. 
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4.2.2. Key Chinese institutions 
Chris Alden‘s book China in Africa offers a decent rendition of key Chinese institutions in the 
doling out of outward FDI to host states in Africa. Alden explains that China‘s FDI operates on a 
somewhat rigid bilateral basis, folded in the public regional diplomacy setting that is FOCAC, 
and occasionally played out at a multilateral level.
135
 This multi-dimensional, multi-level 
approach has bewildered observers who noted a discrepancy between the promotion in China‘s 
rhetoric of African regionalism and China‘s actual preference for bilateral channels.136 Beijing 
has established a diplomatic consultative system in 28 countries in Africa covering a broad range 
of issues.
137
 In short, Beijing conducts its Africa FDI policy at all levels, bilateral (primarily), 
regional and multilateral. 
 
The key Chinese institutional actors in foreign trade, economic co-operation and FDI are 
Beijing‘s top executive structure, government ministries (i.e. the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Chinese sub-national 
entities and state-owned financial institutions, especially the Export Import Bank of China. It is 
chiefly at the bilateral level that these key institutions carry out China‘s resource diplomacy; tie 
it to China‘s development assistance; promote Chinese multinational firms, the opening of 
markets, and bilateral trade frameworks; and bring up the Taiwan recognition issue.
138
 The latter 
item of discussion draws further strength in public declarations at the regional and multilateral 
levels.
139
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a) Beijing’s top executive structure 
Beijing‘s top executive structure formulates the broad parameters of China‘s FDI to Africa. This 
structure is composed of the CPC leadership, the Politburo and its subcommittees, also known as 
the Leading Small Groups.
140
 Major initiatives and strategic shifts in policies emanate from 
Beijing‘s top executive structure.141  The State Council‘s National Development and Reform 
Commission is a crucial link in the policy formulation chain. The function of the Commission is 
to design long-term macroeconomic strategies and focus China‘s energy security.142 
 
b) Chinese government ministries 
A few key Chinese ministries play an initial and central role in foreign assistance and economic 
co-operation, including FDI. The State Council looks over these ministries to ensure they 
implement Beijing‘s foreign assistance, economic co-operation and FDI policy. The Chinese 
Ministry of Finance prepares the entire budget for foreign aid. It is the Ministry of Commerce 
(previously known as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation), through its 
Department of Foreign Aid, that plans, monitors and manages funds and their disbursement.
143
 
An economic councilor in the Chinese embassy administers and oversees foreign aid and FDI in 
each individual host country.
144
 
 
c) Chinese sub-national entities 
China‘s FDI policy-making is decentralized in the sense that Chinese provinces and 
municipalities also initiate and enter into investment agreements with African countries or their 
sub-national constituents.  This decentralization originates from China‘s opening as a result of 
reforms in the late 1970s.
145
 Beijing afforded provincial and municipal authorities special 
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privileges, policy concessions and financial assistance as incentives for FDI and foreign trade.
146
 
This development led to the emergence of provincial firms from renovated state-owned 
corporations, with a clear business orientation and financial resources made available for FDI.
147
 
Occasional tensions between the central government in Beijing and local authorities, with the 
latter sometimes prioritizing local interests over national ones in the pursuit of economic gains, 
raise the prospects of dissonance boiling over in foreign policy goals and implementation.
148
 
 
d) State-owned financial institutions 
The Chinese government founded the Export Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) in 1994. 
With enough financial assets to outgun the World Bank, China Eximbank, the world‘s largest 
credit agency
149
 and one of China‘s three policy banks under the State Council,150 is the single 
biggest financing conduit for Chinese projects and R4I contracts in Africa.
151
 China Eximbank is 
a linchpin of China‘s FDI policy and outflows to Africa. Its principal activities are to accompany 
Chinese businesses by granting finance export credit and international loans for overseas 
construction and FDI, and offering official lines of credit.
152
 
 
The Bank has sought to establish working relationships with regional and continental banks, such 
as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the East African Development Bank. Out of the 
AfDB annual meeting in Shanghai in 2007, China Eximbank and the AfDB have considered co-
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financing and parallel financing of projects.
153
 In comparison to the financial institutions in the 
US, Japan and Britain lending to states in Africa, China Eximbank boasts a much larger 
portfolio, entrusted with 15 billion US dollars in support of a series of projects in 2005, thirty 
times greater than that of its nearest rival.
154
 Nevertheless, the bank is said to depart from OECD 
‗best practices‘ by snubbing environmental impact and social standards for projects.155 However, 
in contradistinction to bilateral and multilateral Western lending institutions, China Eximbank is 
more flexible, less risk averse and responsive to the demands of the elites in African 
governments.
156
  
 
 In 2006, the President of the China Eximbank, Li Ruogu, said that he expected the Bank to 
disburse up to 20 billion US dollars over the next three years.
157
 The secrecy and lack of 
transparency about Chinese finance stoke up fears that Chinese banks are ‗free-riding‘ by 
extending loans to low income countries newly freed of crippling debt.
158
 
 
In addition to China Eximbank, China has raised from the ground other financial institutions to 
channel finance projects that it sponsors in Africa. The Industrial and Construction Bank of 
China (ICBC), the world‘s largest bank by market capitalization, made the headlines in October 
2007 when it purchased a 20 percent stake in South Africa-based Standard Bank, Africa‘s largest 
bank, for 5.6 billion US dollars.
159
 Half of the stake that ICBC purchased from Standard Bank 
consisted of existing shares and the other half consisted of new shares while the entire 20 percent 
stake makes ICBC the single largest shareholder of Standard Bank. This Chinese portfolio 
investment in Standard Bank is strategic as Standard Bank operates in 18 countries in Africa. 
The great strategic value of China‘s investments in Standard Bank is evident from the fact that 
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ICBC has used Standard Bank to finance 65 projects in Africa, most notably the Morupule B 
power station in Botswana, Africa‘s largest power station as of 2010.160 ICBC has been pursuing 
its joint venture strategy with Standard Bank to strike structured project finance deals and to 
expand into retail banking.
161
 
 
In March 2009, an equity fund that China set up to provide finance to Chinese corporations 
operating in Africa, the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), opened its first representative 
office in Johannesburg, South Africa. China initially endowed CADF with 1 billion US dollars 
when it established CADF on 26 June 2007, but the total endowment is 5 billion US dollars, to 
be achieved gradually.
162
 In May 2010, CADF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
for establishing a CADF regional office in Zambia for Central and East Africa.
163
 The opening of 
a CADF regional office for Central and East Africa is a positive development in China-Africa 
relations and another piece of evidence of China‘s expanding finance in Africa.  
 
4.2.3. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
China created a cooperation scheme and platform, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), to discuss trade and investment issues with African states. Parties to the discussion 
often talk about the benefits and rewards of regional economic co-operation. The culmination of 
China‘s regional diplomacy in Africa and modeled after the Franco-African Summit,164 FOCAC 
is an offspring of China‘s strategy of ‗going global‘ (zouchuqu).165 FOCAC is an integral part of 
China‘s larger ‗summit diplomacy‘ with Africa. Summit diplomacy is admittedly unique to 
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China-Africa relations in that Africa has not had such summit diplomacy with any other country, 
neither has China enjoyed such diplomacy with any other continent.
166
 
 
To date, four FOCAC summit meetings with African states took place in 2000 (Beijing, China), 
2003 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), 2006 (Beijing, China), and 2009 (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt). At 
those meetings, Chinese leaders have confirmed China‘s ambition to consolidate consultation 
and cooperation; and to promote political dialogue and economic cooperation with African 
countries to seek mutual reinforcement and common development.
167
 They christened this 
cooperation ‗a new strategic partnership‘ at the FOCAC summit in 2006.168 The most dazzling 
facet of FOCAC is its standardized cooperation mechanism with its follow-up actions.
169
 
 
In November 2006, for two days heads of states and foreign ministers from 48 African countries 
met in Beijing with Chinese President Hu Jintao at a summit on trade and investment. At the 
summit, China unveiled plans to build three to five special economic zones (SEZ) across the 
continent.
170
 President Hu Jintao pledged to:
171
  
 
1. double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009; 
2. provide 3 billion US dollars of preferential loans and 2 billion US dollars of preferential 
buyer‘s credits to Africa in the next three years; 
3. set up a China-Africa development fund which will reach 5 billion US dollars to 
encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them; 
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4. build a conference centre for the African Union (AU) to support African countries in their 
efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and support the process of African 
integration; 
5. cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 
2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and the least developed 
countries (LDCs) in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China; 
6. further open up China‘s market to Africa by increasing from 190 to over 440 the number 
of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the LDCs in Africa having 
diplomatic ties with China; 
7. establish 3 to 5 trade and economic cooperation zones (ECZ) in Africa in the next three 
years; and  
8. over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural 
experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centers in 
Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa and provide 300 million RMB of grant for providing 
artemisinin and building 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers to fight malaria in 
Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and 
increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the 
current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009. 
 
At the 2006 summit, Chinese firms and African governments and businesses signed upwards of a 
dozen investment agreements. The agreements were worth 1.9 billion US dollars and covered 
sectors such as resource extraction, infrastructure and manufacturing.
172
 Some elements of these 
pledges are accomplished through R4I contracts. 
 
4.3. China’s investments in Africa 
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China invests dozens of billions of US dollars in African countries. In the words of Harry 
Broadman, the accelerating trend of economic exchanges between African countries and China is 
one of the most significant features of the current global economy and the ‗vanguard‘ of South-
South commerce in the 21
st
 century.
173
 The demand for mineral and natural resources by China 
and a few other emerging economies like India and Brazil has hiked up the price of commodities 
such as copper, iron, gold, oil and cement. This increased demand in the world‘s commodity 
markets resulted in commodity prices becoming competitive once again, which in turn prevented 
in more than one African country the closure or restructuration of steel factories and state 
subsidization of minerals. 
 
China‘s presence on the continent, which dates back to the 1950s,174 has been rapidly increasing 
in recent years. There are more than 800,000 Chinese living and working in Africa.
175
 There are 
more than 1,000 Chinese small and medium-sized companies involved in manufacture.
176
 By 
2007, there were over 800 Chinese companies, including private individuals, medium and large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) doing meaningful business in Africa.
177
 At the same time, 
‗Chinatowns‘ are mushrooming on the continent. 
 
The growing presence of China in virtually all African countries also translates a corresponding 
growing importance of Africa for China‘s geopolitics. Since 1991, it has become a tradition for 
China‘s foreign affairs minister to visit African countries every January every year.178 President 
Hu Jintao visited 17 African countries between 2006 and 2007. No foreign head of state ever 
paid as many visits to Africa as President Hu Jintao.
179
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The principles of China‘s policy in Africa, and in the third world generally, are based on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:
180
 
- Equality and mutual benefit 
- Aid without conditions or conditionalities; 
- Non-interference in each other‘s internal affairs; 
- Mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 
- Primacy of the state in the conduct of political and commercial relations. 
 
Outlined in 1963 when China‘s Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Africa,181 these principles 
have always been a basic component of China‘s engagement with Africa, shaping the way China 
positions itself vis-à-vis the West.
182
 Then, in 1982, China‘s Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang put 
forth a new form of cooperation with Africa, favorable to both parties and marking the beginning 
of China‘s ‗win-win‘ policy.183 China‘s ‗win-win‘ policy ushered in a new era of pragmatism 
that is today at the center of China‘s presence in Africa.184 This pragmatism is also visible in the 
results produced by R4I contracts. Bo Xilai, China‘s Minister of Commerce, put it as follows: 
China will help African countries gain economic independence, broaden their bilateral 
cooperation, and meet the goals of mutual benefit and common prosperity.
185
 
 
 
5. Characteristics of China’s FDI in Africa 
In order to understand the contract terms of R4I contracts and to tailor legal principles for a 
policy framework suitable to China‘s FDI, this section identifies the peculiarities of China‘s FDI 
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in African countries. Li Anshan sums up the characteristics of China-Africa economic relations 
as ‗summit diplomacy, equality, co-development and cooperation.‘186 These characteristics are 
pertinent to R4I contracts because, by exchanging natural resources for national infrastructure, 
the parties cooperate through R4I contracts in order to ensure co-development and mutual 
benefits.  
 
China‘s investment practices in the region are particular in more than one respect. The 
particularity of China‘s investment practices ranges from the role of Chinese culture in contract-
making,
187
 to their conception of law and dispute resolution,
188
 to the comparatively broad-based 
nature of their investments.
189
  
 
 
5.1. Concentration on resource extraction 
China‘s FDI concentrates on resource extraction, and that is why R4I contracts always involve 
natural resources and Chinese FDI is clustered in resource rich countries in Africa (see Table 6 
below). 
 
Table 6: Product and geographic concentration of Africa’s trade with China, 2002-2004 
averaged
190
 
 
 Exports to China Imports from China 
Product concentration 0.40 (+0.25)
191
 0.02(+0.01) 
Geographic concentration 0.17 (+0.09) 0.09 (+0.05) 
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Source: H. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road (2007). 
 
 
Table 7: Major recipients of China’s FDI 2003-2006 (in million dollars US) 
 
countries 2003-2006 
Sudan 357.83 
Algeria 197.48 
Nigeria 191.01 
South Africa 114.88 
Zambia 105.36 
D.R. Congo 53.77 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
32.73 
Ethiopia 30.39 
Egypt 29.98 
 
Source: E. Obuah, China’s Investment in Africa: A Catalyst for Growth and Development or a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Exploitation (2008) 10. 
 
 
5.2. State-owned corporations 
One of the most visible aspects of FDI from China in Africa is the quasi-omnipresence of 
Chinese state-owned corporations, albeit most Chinese firms in Africa are small and medium 
enterprises (SME).
192
 The Chinese parties to R4I contracts are almost in all instances stated-
owned corporations. Even if Chinese private corporations have recently – timidly yet gradually – 
started to compete with state-owned corporations, state-owned corporations spearhead China‘s 
quest for African markets. State-owned corporations purvey FDI from China and have long-term 
time horizons. In 2005, they represented more than 83 per cent of China‘s global flow and stock 
of FDI.
193
 They are owned or associated with the Chinese government, especially the large 
corporations managed by the government ministries and agencies.
194
 By contrast, the vehicles of 
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FDI from Europe and North America are privately-owned corporations, and characteristically 
have relatively short time-horizons.
195
  
 
 
Table 8: Major Chinese corporations in Africa 
 
Corporations Sectors Major countries 
 of operation 
Alcatel Shanghai Bell (ASB) Telecommunication South Africa, Nigeria, Angola 
ZTC Corp. Telecommunication Egypt 
Huawei Technologies Telecommunication Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt,  
Tunisia 
China National Petroleum Corp.  
(CNCPC) 
Petroleum Sudan, Nigeria 
PetroChina Petroleum Nigeria 
China National Petrochemical  
Corp. (SINOPEC) 
Petroleum Gabon, Angola, Sudan 
China National Oil Offshore  
Corp. (CNOOC) 
Petroleum Nigeria 
Henan Gouji Tourism Sierra Leone 
Shanghai Audio and Video  
Electronic Co. 
Manufacturing/ 
electronics  
South Africa 
China Jiangsu Changzhou  
textile Corp. (a  
Sino-Tanzanian joint venture) 
Manufacturing/ 
Textile 
Tanzania 
Shanghai Huayuan Group Corp.  
(local subsidiary of Enitex Co. Ltd.) 
Manufacturing/ 
Textile 
Nigeria 
China Road and Bridge Corp.  
(CRBC) 
Construction Angola 
China Complant Turn-keys projects 
Financed by 
Chinese 
Government 
Many countries in Africa 
 
Source: E. Obuah, China’s Investment in Africa: A Catalyst for Growth and Development or a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Exploitation (2008) 9.  
 
 
5.3. Equity joint ventures 
Equity joint ventures with local firms are the main form of China‘s FDI flows into African 
economies.
196
 Joint ventures are vehicles that give Chinese investors access to local contracts and 
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to resources that are exclusively restricted to local firms.
197
 Many Chinese investments carried 
through R4I contractual arrangements involve joint ventures between a national resource 
company of the host country and a state-owned Chinese company or a consortium of Chinese 
state-owned companies.    
 
5.4. State-to-state business model 
The state-to-state business model that characterizes China‘s FDI and R4I contracts in Africa is in 
large measure responsible for the success of Sino-African joint ventures. Beijing‘s support for 
Chinese state-owned corporations has been decisive in directing FDI in Africa, as opposed to 
other regions.
198
 Alden and others point that the dramatic upsurge of China‘s FDI in the mining 
sectors of Africa is due to the support of the Chinese central government
199
 and the dynamic 
financial mattress provided by Chinese state-backed banks.
200
  
 
The state-to-state business model typical of China‘s FDI in Africa has lessons for conventional 
wisdom and debates on the effectiveness of investment contract clauses in attracting FDI.
201
 To 
recall, conventional wisdom is that BITs have been successful in both promoting and protecting 
foreign investment,
202
 but a few scholars contend that the empirical evidence on the effect of 
BITs on FDI is weak.
203
 The state-to-state model suggests that it serves the promotion and 
protection of Chinese FDI in Africa more effectively than BITs, though China has also signed 
BITs with many countries in Africa. That said, while there are differences between the state-to-
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state model used by Chinese investors and traditional international project finance structures, 
both rely and depend on state involvement, usually through the grant of a concession.
204
   
 
Progress made by Sino-African joint ventures can partly be attributed to high-level visits by 
government and business leaders, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, bilateral agreements, 
joint intergovernmental committees and cooperation between African and Chinese enterprises.
205
 
The imprint of the Chinese government is visible in the weak reporting requirements imposed on 
Chinese firms and their observable willingness (as government-owned or managed firm) to 
operate at a loss.
206
 More specifically, the Chinese government subsidizes Chinese construction 
firms that are awarded state-sponsored infrastructure projects, that dominate China Eximbank‘s 
portfolio and that operate at margins which, absent the state‘s role, would not be commercially 
viable.
207
  
 
Engaging African countries through state-to-state agreements is an outgrowth of the recognition, 
coupled with the realization of the dangers of political instability from sources in the Middle 
East, that China‘s economic survival hinges on its access to energy and critical natural 
resources.
208
  
 
5.5. Strengths of China’s FDI 
Chinese investors and investments have a number of characteristics that make their actions on 
the continent very effective, some of which apply to R4I contracts as well. Among other 
characteristics, are the discipline, the industriousness and the good organization of Chinese 
investors. 
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5.5.1. Substantial financial flows 
China injects sizeable funds into African economies through traditional and R4I investment 
contracts. It is indeed the first time since the wave of independence in the 1960s that Africa as a 
continent is the beneficiary of such high volumes of investments, trade, or credit with low 
interest rates.
209
 In that connection, Alex Vines and others claim that China is less cautious and 
less risk averse than democratic Asian countries operating in Africa like India because China is 
not democratic.
210
 On China‘s economic engagement with Africa, Robert Rotberg noticed that 
China:
211
 
 
constructs or refurbishes roads and railways, creates export processing zones, supplies equipment, and 
builds up national industrial bases. Where sub-Saharan African nation-states are particularly fragile or 
questionably ruled, China also supplies arms and military firepower, builds barracks, provides uniforms, 
and various types of technical assistance, army to army. Never have the economies of sub-Saharan Africa 
grown so rapidly. 
 
 In 2005, China promised Angola a two billion US dollar loan to repair Angola‘s infrastructure. 
In 2006, China added another billion US dollars to the loan it granted to Angola. There is little 
doubt that these substantial investments helped African countries extirpate themselves from the 
global economic recession.  
 
5.5.2. Sustainable growth rate 
In recent years, the average annual growth rate of FDI flows to Africa was 17 percent, 
comparable to the 20 percent growth rates in China.
212
 By the end of 2006, China‘s total 
investment in Africa amounted to over 11 billion US dollars.
213
 After years of growth spurts 
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succeeded by downturns, Africa now appears to have broken that cycle and to be growing at a 
sustainable rate.
214
 In the decade before 2008, the continent grew at an average rate of 5.4 
percent in tandem with the rest of the world (see Figure 4).
215
  
 
Figure 4: Per capita incomes of Africa increasing with other developing countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: H. Broadman, Chinese-Africa Trade and Investment, in R. Rotberg, China into Africa (2008) 92. 
 
 
This picture of a ‗growing Africa,‘ where there are emerging economic success stories runs 
counter to conventional wisdom.
216
 Even though it is yet to be established that R4I contracts 
bring about sustainable economic growth, the infrastructure built in terms of R4I contracts is a 
prerequisite for sustainable growth.  
                                                 
214
 Harry G. Broadman, supra note 173, at 89. 
215
 Id.  
216
 Id. 
                                                                                                                             111 
 
5.5.3. Broad base 
China‘s FDI is diverse and cuts across several sectors of African economies. Likewise, R4I 
contracts cut across mining and infrastructure sectors. Even if China directs the bulk of its FDI to 
mining, Beijing also pumps its money into infrastructural construction, telecommunication, agro-
processing, power generation, manufacturing, tourism, national defense,
217
 in disparate African 
countries. China‘s fast modernizing industries and expanding middle class with rising incomes 
and purchasing power, push up demand not only for Africa‘s traditional exports of extractive and 
raw agricultural commodities but also for the continent‘s non-traditional exports, such as 
processed commodities, light manufactured products, household consumer goods, and tourism.
 
218
 
 
The breadth of Sino-African economic relations is also apparent in areas other than trade and 
investment, like contract business, labor service, and consultant services, all of which are fast 
flourishing.
219
 At the end of 2004, MOFCOM approved 715 non-financial projects.
220
   
 
5.5.4. Competitiveness 
China, through its FDI and its firms, tries to help host countries in Africa build projects which 
require less investment while yielding quicker results. Chinese FDI and firms are generally very 
competitive. R4I contracts have a strategic advantage over ordinary investment contracts in that 
the package of resource and infrastructure investments that it offers have made them more 
attractive to some African leaders. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo reportedly said 
that, if in the middle of planning a bidding round for the sale of oil blocks, Nigeria felt the need 
                                                 
217
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to have good economic relations with another country that promised to undertake major 
infrastructure projects, Nigeria had the ‗sovereign right to do the [oil-for-infrastructure] 
package.‘221 
 
However, the claim that R4I contracts are attractive and competitive packages should be 
qualified. A cut should be drawn between the competitiveness of China as a resource and 
infrastructure investor and the inherent advantages of R4I contracts as a model for foreign direct 
investment.
222
 Some resource or infrastructure investors will not be able to employ R4I contracts 
and, even if they could, it is uncertain whether they would be able to produce outcomes 
comparable to those China produced in Africa. In short, the use of R4I contracts alone may not 
be sufficient to guarantee certain outcomes. Nevertheless, this realization does not deduct from 
the focus and contribution of this dissertation because the dissertation does not propose R4I 
contracts as a model for optimizing FDI from any investor but from China. 
 
In the construction sector, the Financial Times reported in January 2008 that Chinese 
construction firms had won 50 percent of all new public works projects in Africa, edging out 
competitors with higher overheads.
223
 China has displaced European, American and Japanese 
diplomatic and economic interests in many African countries where they were present, and 
winning influence in countries where Western investors were absent.
224
 The expeditiousness of 
Chinese investors gives China a competitive edge over Africa‘s traditional partners. Senegal 
President Abdoulaye Wade wrote that:
225
 
 
I have realized that one could in three months sign with the Chinese an agreement that could take five years 
of negotiations with the World Bank.
226
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President Wade also praised China for being less formalistic. 
 
Chinese investors are generally noted for their discipline, industriousness and good organization. 
The Governor of Katanga, a southeastern province of the DRC, Moise Katumbi Chapwe, stated 
that Chinese firms finance FDI in the DRC more easily because Chinese banks have steelier 
nerves than their Western counterparts.
227
 The Governor added that Chinese companies are also 
keen to upgrade their plants and expand into other businesses, decisions that other foreigners are 
reluctant to make.
228
 
 
5.5.6. Technology transfer 
China brings along technological know-how adapted to the continent‘s needs and enables 
technology transfer by employing and training local professionals. With regard to training and 
capacity building, China has signed several agreements on health, which consisted in the 
exchange of medical teams and the training of health professionals on the continent.
229
 For 
instance, the R4I contract between Angola and China expressly provides for technology transfer 
through the subcontracting of construction jobs to Angolan firms. China further proposes to send 
free of charge medicine and medical equipments in African countries.
230
 In the past few years, 
China has formulated programs on the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, like 
malaria and HIV/AIDS, and deployed in 47 countries more than 15, 000 medical doctors.
231
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5.5.7. Affordable products 
Chinese products are affordable. They have a good quality/price ratio, which corresponds to the 
purchasing power of most Africans. Lower prices have allowed for the creation of a new class of 
consumers and the formulation of innovative programs.
232
 China declares that it provides the 
best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. It is 
never the less wise for parties to R4I contracts and other investment contracts to include 
warranties whereby Chinese investors undertake to replace equipment and material that are not 
up to the contract specifications. Chinese investors, as sellers of construction equipment and 
material, could overcome the risks of defective products by signaling the quality of their 
equipment and material by undertakings cheaper for them to give than it would for sellers of 
low-quality equipment.
 233
  A common undertaking is to offer a warranty against the equipment‘s 
proving to be substandard.
234
  
 
5.5.8. Aid-investment packages 
Another distinctive advantage of investments from China is the fact China has blurred the 
perceptible line between aid and investments, repackaging both as single major international 
business transactions. In actual fact, Chinese aid is multiform, ranging as it does from 
government-deducted interest loans, aid combined with co-investment, and grants.
235
 Aid or 
official development assistance (ODA) are grants or loans that are intended primarily to foster 
development in the recipient country, and that have at least a 25 percent grant element.
236
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Some scholars believe that the loan terms of R4I contracts are a mix of aid and investment in that 
they are partly commercial and partly concessional.
237
 Surely, the available loan terms of R4I 
contracts disclose market rates, though they are very good market rates.
238
 It thus appears that 
R4I contracts can countenance both market and concessional terms, and channel either aid or 
foreign direct investment.  
 
5.5.9. Aid and debt relief 
Senegal President Wade, in an article in the New African magazine, stated that China provides 
direct aid.
 239
 Former Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, unveiled in 1964 the ‗Eight Principles‘ of 
China‘s aid to foreign countries (Zhou Enlai‘s Eight Principles). In essence, these principles 
promised that China would provide the most favored assistance to Africa, while imposing 
restraints on Chinese aid personnel.
240
 The principles are as follows:
241
 
 
1. The Chinese government does not regard aid as a kind of unilateral grant but as 
something mutual. 
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the 
sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for 
any privileges. 
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest free or low-interest loans and 
extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the 
recipient countries as far as possible. 
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4. The purpose of aid is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to 
help them embark step by step on the road to self-reliance and independent economic 
development. 
 
The 16 agreements concluded in 2006, totaling 1.9 billion US dollars and involving a dozen 
Chinese and African corporations, followed the promise by President Hu Jintao to propose 5 
billions of US dollars in loans and credit and to double aid to the continent in 2009.
242
 Moreover, 
since the institution of FOCAC, China cancelled 1.3 billion US dollars of the debt owed by states 
in Africa and wrote off another 1.2 billion US dollars.
243
 China is also aligning its development 
assistance to the UN‘s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce poverty by half by 
2015.
244
 In June 2006, for example, China announced a debt relief worth 20 million US dollars in 
Senegal‘s favor.  
 
5.5.10. Grand infrastructural projects 
A characteristic pattern of China‘s FDI and R4I contracts in Africa is the systemic and organic 
link between infrastructural projects and business transactions.
245
 China plays a central role in 
infrastructure development in Africa as it finances several grand infrastructural projects, with a 
focus on hydropower generation, roads and railways.
246
 Chinese construction firms build roads, 
bridges, railways, EPZs, harbors, petrochemical installations and military barracks. Most China‘s 
infrastructural projects in Africa are funded by aid and carefully aim to complement its business 
activities. Most of the Chinese firms engaged in infrastructural projects are in the construction 
sector; and many of them are state-owned corporations.
247
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More than 30 African countries are engaging with China on major infrastructure finance 
agreements. China also allows African countries to upgrade their infrastructure at all-time 
records. In this regard, President Wade said that Chinese infrastructure has not only stimulated 
African economies but also contributed to the welfare of the entire people, not only the elite.
248
 
In April 2006, the Algerian government has awarded Chinese and Japanese contracts worth 7 
billion US dollars for the construction of a 1,300 kilometers road linking Tunisia and Morocco. 
In June 2006, China promised Senegal to invest 35 million US dollars in the construction of the 
biggest theatre of West Africa to promote African art.
249
 In exchange for the construction of 
ports, roads, hospitals, railways and other infrastructure, China frequently gets access to mines 
and mining titles. That strategy is at the heart of the resource-for-infrastructure philosophy. 
 
5.5.11. Creating trade capacities 
The most cited evidence of the benefits of China‘s FDI in Africa is the staggering surge in trade 
between China and Africa and the favorable terms of trade enjoyed by some African countries.
250
 
Chinese investors build factories, which create employment and enable the acquisition of 
technical skills. One Chinese entrepreneur, Liehui He, explained the business of his corporation 
as follows:
251
 They export Chinese textile products to Africa, then make clothes, which they re-
export from certain African countries to other African countries as well as overseas to Europe 
and the US. He said that his Touchroad corporation advocates the creation of EPZs, where it can 
make goods to be sold locally and in other African countries.
252
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5.6. Weaknesses of China’s FDI 
Commentators have advanced various reasons for their arguments that China‘s FDI threatens 
certain states in Africa. Some fear that Chinese FDI may repeat patterns that lead to the 
economic marginalization, de-industrialization and underdevelopment of Africa. Others have 
warned that, whereas on balance the short-run opportunities of China‘s FDI outweigh the 
economic costs for Africa, especially resource rich countries, the long-run risks related to 
inadequate institutions and poor governance systems may be serious.
253
 China‘s FDI has also 
been associated with many problems, some of which are by their very nature intimately 
connected to mining activities.
254
 These problems include notably the potential for corruption, 
environmental degradation, safety and health risks, low wages, and poor labor relations.  
 
Others say that China‘s FDI contains traces of China‘s state-led brand of capitalist development, 
distinctive for its low standards of corporate and environmental governance, which have caused 
unbridled environmental destruction, corruption and poor labor relations.
255
 For instance, in 2005, 
a mine accident claimed the life of 49 workers in 2005. One year later, Zambian workers in a 
Chinese-run mine violently rioted against low safety standards and wages. Capitalizing on the 
workers‘ bitterness, opposition leader Michael Sata accused the Chinese workers of exploiting 
Zambian workers during an election campaign that he eventually lost. 
 
5.6.1. Investment without industrialization 
The South Africa-based Brenthurst Foundation forecasts that Asian investors are likely to 
dominate industries like textile in the future and that such domination will inhibit most African 
countries climbing the traditional first step of the industrialization ladder.
256
 Emmanuel Obuah 
                                                 
253
 Andrea Goldstein et al., China’s Boom: What’s In It for Africa, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER 
AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE 27, 28 (Chris Alden et al. eds. 2008). 
254
 See Monika Weber-Fahr et al., Mining, in A SOURCEBOOK FOR POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 443-444 
(World Bank 2002). 
255
 Joshua Kurlantzick, supra note 209, 5; Emmanuel Obuah, supra note 47, at 11. 
256
 Competition or partnership? China, United States and Africa – An African View? 2 (Brenthurst Foundation, 
Discussion Paper 2, 2007). [hereinafter, Brenthurst Foundation] 
                                                                                                                             119 
maintains that China‘s FDI might de-industrialize African economies by failing to provide 
forward and backward linkages that would stimulate auto-centric development in Africa.
257
 
Chinese firms in Africa, he says, are vertically integrated to their parent firms in major cities in 
China to promote trade and development for China.
258
  
 
The nature of contracts and aid projects delivered through China Eximbank strengthens vertical 
integration. According to Obuah, vertical integration would crystallize the continued reliance of 
countries in Africa on China for the supply of spare parts and the maintenance of these 
projects.
259
 However, Obuah‘s observation does not apply to R4I contracts, which countries like 
Angola and the DRC have used not only to develop their mineral industry but also to diversify 
the host economy through the construction of infrastructure in several areas.  
 
Some scholars have concluded that, given the current state of African economies and the likely 
prediction that Asian countries will overwhelm some industries, African countries are best 
positioned to serve a supply function to China.
260
 They suggest that a mix of natural resource 
exploitation, agricultural self-sufficiency and high-value agro-exports, and the expansion of its 
unique range of service industries including tourism, is the most rewarding growth path for 
Africa.
261
 
 
5.6.2. Debt sustainability 
China‘s finance and R4I contracts may be a double-edged sword. While it is seen by most 
government officials in Africa as salutary, China‘s financial largesse raises the specter of another 
debt vicious cycle. The danger of falling into a debt trap is intensified by the large size of 
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Chinese finance. This proposition is based on the premise in finance that the larger the debt the 
greater the risk of default. Debts are actually not in themselves economically deleterious. To be 
sure, credit and debt are the lifeblood of business. Debts become a public finance disaster when a 
state‘s public debt is greater than its reasonable debt servicing capabilities. But the contention is 
made that Beijing‘s loans to African governments through export credits and concessional 
finance will create new forms of debt unsustainability.
262
  
 
The debt unsustainability contention is one that is routinely heard within Western circles when 
speaking of the financial terms of R4I contracts. The contention features general accusations that 
China is ‗free-riding‘, undermining as it does the debt relief granted through bilateral (the Paris 
Club) and multilateral programs (the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and the HIPC).
263
 Two 
pieces of evidence are proffered to corroborate the accusations. First, Beijing has expanded 
concessional loans and reduced its grant assistance to Africa; second, it has strengthened the role 
of China Eximbank and authorized China Development Bank to administer the CADF.
264
 In 
2010, however, UNCTAD has published a report on South-South cooperation that states that 
empirical evidence in Angola and Sudan contradicts the debt unsustainability contention.  
 
5.6.3. Disparities between poor and rich host countries 
China‘s FDI and R4I contracts impact countries in Africa differentially. Chinese FDI is said to 
accentuate disparities between resource rich and resource poor countries in Africa, thus repeating 
the effects that FDI from Europe has long had on Africa. China‘s FDI ignores countries in Africa 
that are resource poor or considerably less resource-endowed because China‘s investment policy 
is significantly energy and resource driven. However accurate, this criticism also applies to the 
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UK, the US, France, from where some scholars on China-Africa economic relations are voicing 
their criticisms of China‘s FDI in Africa. 
 
5.6.4. Modest technology transfer and job creation 
China labor-based comparative advantage over Africa‘s resource-based advantage means that 
Chinese FDI occurs to the detriment of the large labor force in Africa.
265
 This comparative 
advantage raises concerns whether China‘s FDI will in the long term add value in the sense of 
technology transfer, education and opportunities for Africans.
266
 This observation is common 
among commentators.  
 
However, several mining contracts provide for the employment of local workers. The problem 
appears to result from the failure to enforce contract provisions on local workers employment 
rather than the inherent features of China‘s FDI. In the case of R4I contracts, the claim that 
Chinese FDI only marginally creates jobs is incorrect. R4I contracts produce mega-infrastructure 
projects, which create hundreds of jobs, if not many more. Infrastructure projects are, unlike 
mining agreements, labor-intensive. 
 
5.6.5. Scramble for resources in Africa 
Fears also relate to the risks that the influx of China‘s FDI could set off a scramble for resources 
in Africa. If China uses aid tied to investment to win major oil and gas deals, it could convince 
other emerging powers in Africa, like India, to follow suit, potentially undermining governance 
and sparking conflict for resources.
267
 Here, the accusation is that China is a ‗new colonialist‘, a 
‗new economic imperialist‘ or a scrambler.  
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All things considered, however, accusations that China is a colonialist do not hold much water 
because the systematic patterns of China-Africa economic relations differ from the economic and 
political patterns that defined dealings in colonial times. Stephanie Rupp argues that China‘s 
engagement with Africa is neither colonial nor neocolonial.
268
 Rather, China is leveraging 
structural features of African political and economic systems that serve the interests of the 
Chinese and African states, often to the detriment of ordinary people.
269
  
 
What sets apart China‘s ventures from the 19th century colonization of Africa is the high level of 
political and economic self-determination that states in Africa enjoy. And, unlike the situation 
that prevailed under European colonization, African states retain more and spread more widely 
the benefits of FDI.
270
 China‘s involvement in Africa has significantly contributed to the 
continent‘s economic development and five percent growth rate for a decade before the 2008-
2009 financial crisis dampened Africa‘s growth prospects.271  
 
5.6.6. Dumping and undermining competition 
There are also fears that the presence of Chinese multinational corporations might drive away 
competition. It goes without saying that, if Beijing uses its relative advantage in manufacturing 
to dump cheap consumer retail products, it will annihilate economic growth and development in 
Africa. Markets in Africa are progressively dumping sites for cheap consumer retail products, 
like textiles, garments, leather goods and electronic products,
272
 thereby displacing jobs and 
reversing endeavors to vivify local entrepreneurship.  
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Andrea Goldstein and others show that China‘s FDI will be complementary in some countries 
and competitive in others.
273
 Complementary effects for African producers result from increased 
demands for raw materials from China and other Asian countries.
274
 However, competition 
comes about where Asian economies indirectly divert investment resources away from African 
economies and compete with infant local manufacturing sectors.
275
 Chinese state-owned 
construction firms might, with the backing of the Chinese government, eclipse local competitors 
with cheaper tendering and subsidies to Chinese contracts.
276
   
 
5.6.7. Environmental degradation 
Scholars and activists are pointing fingers at China‘s mining investments and construction of 
hydroelectric power dams for harming the environment. For instance, activists have leveled 
environmental concerns against the R4I contracts for the construction of hydroelectric power 
dams in Congo-Brazzaville and Ghana, and the construction of infrastructure in Gabon.
277
 Over 
the years, activists succeeded in discouraging the World Bank and other aid agencies from 
funding large-scale hydropower dams in poor countries arguing that project planners failed to 
incorporate social and environmental costs.
278
  
 
In fact, the risk of environmental degradation is not unique to Chinese mining investments but to 
all extractive activities. In countless instances, resource extraction has polluted or caused the 
degradation of the environment, which can sometimes be irreversible. Mining has posed 
problems in the copper mining in Zambia prior to privatization, abandoned pits and shafts over a 
large area of unregulated artisanal mining in West Africa, and tailing dumps around 
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Johannesburg in South Africa.
279
 No doubt Chinese investors are aware of the necessity and have 
been able to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIA) in connection with numerous 
projects in various African countries.
280
 The available terms of R4I contracts do not explicitly 
provide for environmental impact assessments (EIA), but municipal law almost always oblige 
mining or oil firms conduct EIAs before they can start operations.
281
 In the case of the DRC-
China R4I contract, however, the President of the China Eximbank declared that it required each 
project to spend 3 percent of the investment on environmental mitigation.
282
  
 
 
5.6.8. Dutch disease 
Some analysts claim that, instead of contributing to the diversification of local economies, 
China‘s FDI in Africa reinforces over-independence on the export of primary commodities at the 
detriment of the manufacturing sector. Thus, the claim is that Chinese FDI brings about the 
‗Dutch disease‘: It expands the mining sector, occasioning a corresponding decline in the 
manufacturing sector. If African states do not effect macro-economic structural reforms, 
including diversification of the economy, Africa will undoubtedly remain an exporter of raw 
materials to China. This criticism is open to debate but the necessity to put up a sound economic 
diversification policy is not. R4I contracts might be precisely the policy framework needed to 
diversify the economy effectively, as appears to be the case with the DRC-China and Angola-
China R4I contracts. 
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6. China and Africa’s traditional partners 
Debates on whether Africa should stay West, go East or head South are raging on. What those 
debates share in common is that protagonists in debates invariably engage in cost-benefit 
comparisons of traditional FDI with FDI from China or India, or with FDI from other countries 
in the global South. Adama Gaye said that Africa has two major options: To embrace China‘s 
investments or to preserve old friendships by maintaining the status quo with Africa‘s traditional 
partners in the West.
283
  
 
It is important to pause here to note that, although China is the biggest user of the resource-for-
infrastructure formula, the distinction between R4I contracts and ordinary investment contracts 
does not mirror the comparison between China and traditional investors. China utilizes both R4I 
contracts and the ordinary investment contracts that investors from Western nations work with, 
but traditional investors have not yet resorted to the R4I contract formula for their purposes.   
 
It is counter-productive to constantly compare China‘s investments in Africa with investments 
from the continent‘s traditional partners in the West. Yet analyzing China‘s FDI in Africa 
without such comparisons would be hollow because policy makers in Africa can only know if 
they are contracting on better terms if they carry out comparative analyses. Comparisons are 
further called for because of the palpable competition between China and traditional lenders. In 
comparative exercises, the main argument characteristically boils down to the claim that China is 
more competitive in Africa than traditional investors and institutions.  
 
China‘s FDI and presence in Africa are generally eliciting all manner of apprehension in much of 
the Western media. Described by Ampiah & Naidu as ‗hysteric‘,284 this apprehensive response 
comes in many forms and shapes, from concerns that China is intruding into the Western 
                                                 
283
 Adama Gaye, supra note 8, at 7. 
284
 KWEKU AMPIAH & SANUSHA NAIDU, supra Ch. 1 note 45, at 4-5. 
 126 
 
powers‘ traditional sphere of influence, to concerns that China reverses notable progress made by 
the international community, like ostracizing rogue states for undemocratic practices and 
violations of international law and human rights.
285
 It also comes in as ‗threat theories‘ and 
‗campaigns of suspicion‘ that depict China as a new neo-colonial power with an imperialist 
agenda and define the nature of China‘s engagement with Africa as ‗purely exploitative, 
extractive and destructive.‘286  
 
China distinguished itself from traditional partners, hard hit by the 2008-2009 economic and 
financial woes, by substantially investing in Africa during that global financial crisis. Chinese 
entrepreneurs and businesses have regarded, and have been financially encouraged by Beijing to 
regard, Africa as a continent of economic potential populated by consumers.
287
 In 
contradistinction, Western investors have viewed Africa with pessimism as a place of chaos and 
uncertainty and as a security risk. Conversely, Beijing has capitalized on this uncertainty to enter 
Africa at a relative bargain while using its own growth to fuel Africa‘s.288  
 
China strives to distance itself from the West by declaring that its intentions, unlike those of the 
West, are based on pacifism and the respect for foreign cultures.
289
 The Chinese leaders proudly 
stated during the first two FOCAC meetings that China‘s relations with Africa were free of 
political conditionality, serving their mutual interests, and spoke against neo-colonialism and 
Western hegemony in international affairs.
290
  
 
Thus far, China‘s investments have produced more tangible results than those of traditional 
partners. China‘s better performance is partly due to the bigger size of its capital inflows on the 
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continent. In 2007, China‘s Eximbank promised to establish a 20 billion US dollar fund to 
finance infrastructure and trade for three years, a fund greater than the pledges made by Africa‘s 
traditional partners. China also fulfils the promises that it makes more than the traditional 
partners do. For example, after China promised to cancel the greatest part of the debts that 
African countries owed to it, it actually cancelled the debts. However, the ambivalence of 
Western countries in pursuing their own national interests and in tying aid and investments to 
democracy and human rights did not have the expected results.
291
  
 
Some analysts believe that China‘s FDI in Africa are gradually making the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) obsolete, irrelevant and redundant on the continent.
292
 
Ampiah & Naidu are of the view that China‘s role as an alternative source of credit to the IMF 
and the World Bank is most probably the ‗most profound element of China‘s engagement with 
Africa.‘ 293  In 2007, China‘s investments in Africa totaled 9 billion US dollars whereas 
investments in Africa by the World Bank only amounted to 2.5 billion US dollars.  
 
China‘s FDI have forced Africa‘s traditional partners, effectively taken aback by the nature and 
extent of China‘s capital inflows, to re-think their development assistance strategies in Africa. 
For instance, the World Bank is trying to persuade China to become the Bank‘s associate in 
project finance in Africa. In December 2007, the World Bank and China agreed to develop joint 
projects in Africa. But, at the same time, China has created the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC), a Chinese national sovereign wealth fund, which has financial assets worth 200 billion US 
dollars.
294
 Africa‘s traditional partners have also started to imitate China‘s emphasis on 
infrastructure development and its practice of granting loans, commercially unviable in the short 
term yet strategic in the long term. A third example of the adjustment by traditional partners to 
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China‘s presence in Africa is the fact that Western countries appear to respect the sovereignty of 
African countries a little bit more than hitherto.  
 
 
7. Lessons for a normative South-South framework 
It is apposite at this juncture to institute the basic elements of the normative investment 
framework of South-South cooperation. These elements are general lessons and strategic themes 
derived from systematic patterns of China‘s FDI in Africa presented in this chapter and recast 
here, leaving out chance fluctuations, as policy choices for the South-South normative 
investment framework. For the most part, the elements retained for the South-South framework 
differ or emphasize different policy choices from the investment models that traditional investors 
championed and elaborated. The importance of this general South-South framework is that the 
R4I investment contract model proposed in this dissertation is (best construed as) a particular 
application of the framework. Any reading of the R4I contract form as an application of 
traditional investment models would be misguided, if not far off the mark. 
 
History of economic domination – South-South cooperation is an idea born in pain as it 
historically emerged as a reaction to colonialism, neo-colonialism, economic domination by 
Western powers, and underdevelopment. This history informs South-South cooperation by 
insisting on such principles as equality, mutual benefit, co-development, respect for sovereignty 
and self-determination.
295
 R4I contracts are the essence of the win-win partnership proclaimed in 
public declarations by African and Chinese leaders. 
Present of economic self-determination and reforms – Partly as a result of its painful past, today 
South-South cooperation is the consecration of the principle of economic self-determination. The 
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principle manifests itself through the assertive roles of African countries in effecting macro-
economic structural changes to increase China‘s FDI; decreasing the cost of doing business; 
negotiating investment agreements, including R4I contracts; renegotiating skewed mining 
contracts; and in using China‘s thriving FDI in Africa to boost its lesser bargaining position by 
playing off Eastern and Western investors and pushing against the demands of traditional donors, 
the World Bank and the IMF.
296
   
Energy and natural resources – Energy security and natural resources, including fossil fuels, are 
the focus of South-South cooperation patterns. In that regard, these patterns resemble the 
practices of traditional investors, if not those of colonial masters.
297
 However, they 
fundamentally differ from North-South FDI not so much in their focus as in the way R4I 
contracts and other investment contracts utilize natural resources to ensure mutual benefit for 
China and Africa. 
Physical infrastructure – one fundamental difference between South-South (or Chinese) and 
North-South FDI is that the former prioritize infrastructure building.
298
 This priority is evident in 
the infrastructure component of R4I contracts. South-South cooperation pays special attention to 
post-conflict countries and the least developed countries (LDCs) by urging states to assist these 
countries in reconstructing, rehabilitating political, social, and economic infrastructure.
299
 
Multi-sectoral investment – Another fundamental difference is that South-South cooperation 
covers a vaster realm of economic sectors. In particular, R4I contracts are effective tools for the 
diversification of the economy, laying the groundwork for such diversification by building 
infrastructure in various sectors of the host economy. 
Multipolar world and partner diversification – South-South cooperation is a mechanism to 
diversify Africa‘s economic partners. The key principle or legal norm is that Africa should strive 
                                                 
296
 See Richard Dowden, Why Africa Welcomes the ‘New Colonialism’, THE TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Nov. 9, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6908835.ece . 
297
 Stephanie Rupp, supra note 268, at 66. 
298
 Provisions on physical infrastructure, see High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation, Marrakech, 
Morocco, Dec. 15-19, 2003, Marrakech Framework of Implementation of South-South Cooperation ¶ 9 [hereinafter 
Marrakech Framework]. 
299
 Marrakech Framework ¶ 39. 
 130 
 
to spice up healthy competition among its economic partners so as to extract the best terms of 
economic exchanges. The corollary of this principle is that states in Africa should not allow 
either the emergent Asia or the traditional West to become so monopsonic – and thereby so 
complacent – a player as to dictate the terms of economic exchanges or, specifically, R4I 
contracts. 
Aid and conditionalities – South-South cooperation is distinguishable from traditional investment 
by the absence of aid conditionalities. Aid is but a means to greater FDI. The purpose of the 
absence of aid conditionalities is to enable self-development. Chinese investors do not condition 
the signing of R4I contracts or any other investment contracts on the compliance by the host 
countries with some standards. Further, R4I contracts function like an incentive for greater FDI 
in local infrastructure development. 
Debt sustainability – A recurrent theme of the Chinese version of South-South cooperation is 
whether Chinese finance risks entrapping African nations into another vicious debt cycle.
300
 This 
risk creates an obligation on states in Africa to take reasonable measures to prevent their public 
finances from running off rails. With specific reference to R4I contracts, this risk creates an 
obligation on states to negotiate the terms such that they do not incur more debt than they 
reasonably afford.  
Alternative source of finance – A striking feature of South-South cooperation is that it opens up 
an alternative source of development finance. African states should take advantage of and widen 
these alternative sources of finance and alternative financial institutions with a view to reducing 
their dependence on multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.  
Multilateral cooperation scheme and regional integration – Epitomized by FOCAC, which is a 
unique trait of Sino-African economic relations, South-South cooperation is a multilateral 
platform for the discussion of trade and investment and an opportunity to dream up economic 
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programs to realize regional integration in Africa. Without such programs, FDI in Africa, 
however substantial, may fail to foster sustainable development.  
Creating trade capacities and industrialization – South-South cooperation is also the linkages 
between FDI and trade through the creation of trade capacities and industrial bases in Africa. 
China‘s creation of SEZs in a number of African countries is a good example. R4I contracts can 
serve identical purposes as it develops mining infrastructure and practically always involves 
exports of primary commodities to China.  
Equality – equality is a fundamental norm of South-South cooperation. It stems from the 
common experience of countries in the global South in terms of development.
301
 It is reflected in 
consistent and persistent attempts by these countries to resolve in their favor substantive and 
regulatory issues in international economic law, especially foreign investment law. The 
preponderant role of the host and home states in the execution of R4I contracts and the change 
they represent from classic FDI law should be seen in this light. 
Co-development and win-win – win-win is the most essential element of South-South 
cooperation. Though different scholars have interpreted this element differently, the dissertation 
concludes that it is more accurate to read the realization of economic complementarities between 
investing state and the host state into it. It is because R4I contracts realize these 
complementarities that this dissertation concludes that R4I contracts are the essence of ‗win-win‘ 
rhetoric of African and Chinese leaders. 
Centrality of the state in development – Unlike the prescriptions of neoliberal philosophies and 
international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the IMF, China‘s investment 
policies and R4I contracts in Africa re-instate the state in its central role as the initiator and 
facilitator of economic development. African leaders have typically embraced China‘s 
development assistance in part because it offers an alternative development model based on a 
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more central role for the state, eschews any meddling in internal affairs and emphasizes 
partnership and solidarity among developing states.
302
  
State-to-state business model – Much of the advantages of South-South cooperation originates 
from the state-to-state business model that it ushers in foreign investment law. Traditionally, 
foreign investment law assumed a tripartite set of actors in a typical investment law relationship, 
namely the home state, the host state and the (private) investors.
303
 However, the emerging state-
to-state business paradigm heralded by China, of which R4I contract are a prime example, will 
surely influence the typical investment law relationship by encouraging the fusion of home states 
and investors. The involvement of the home and host states determines the decision of foreign 
investors to invest in the African host state as opposed to states with a more attractive investment 
climate. 
State-owned corporations – The state-to-state dealings characteristic of South-South cooperation 
and R4I contracts bear fruits to a large extent because of the presence of state-owned 
corporations. FDI using state-owned corporations as vehicles usually translates a structuring of 
the economic and political system of the home state that is at odds with pure capitalism. China 
and Brazil have political and economic systems with ostensibly socialist components.  
Substantial financial flows – South-South cooperation assumes gradually rising levels of FDI. 
The R4I contracts signed in Africa mark in the majority of cases the largest financial 
commitments on infrastructure development that the host countries received since their 
independence. However, this element is not exclusive to South-South cooperation as foreign 
investment law and practice is pregnant with such commitments. It remains the case nonetheless 
that recent state practice reveals that South-South cooperation fulfills these commitments more 
than North-South economic cooperation.  
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Uncertainty as an opportunity – the involvement of the home and host states in South-South FDI 
results in the re-evaluation of risks and investment climates in Africa such that more and more 
investors from emergent countries see the continent optimistically as a place of opportunity. In 
effect, China struck multiyear R4I deals for infrastructure development in various sectors with 
countries, such as Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC, which traditional investors 
customarily regard as high risk FDI destinations. 
Equity joint ventures – To ensure the exchange of experience, expertise, technology, resources, 
managerial skills, while at the same time taking advantage of favorable tax treatment, host and 
home states promote in South-South investment agreements joint ventures as the preferred form 
of cooperation. Joint ventures are the vehicles for the financing of infrastructure works carried 
out in terms of R4I contracts. 
Search for markets – Finally, South-South cooperation differs from North-South cooperation 
schemes in that it does not view people in Africa simply as net exporters of raw materials but 
also as consumers who, altogether, constitute attractive markets for investors. 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
SINO-AFRICAN MACROECONOMIC COMPLEMENTARITIES 
 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 134 
2. China‘s growth ..................................................................................................... 138 
2.1. The history of a dramatic transformation ...................................................... 138 
2.1.1. The shell of a modern economic system (1980-1989) ........................... 139 
2.1.2. Expanding market-oriented reforms (1990-2000) ................................. 139 
2.1.3. Double-digit growth (2001-2007) .......................................................... 140 
2.1.4. Global financial crisis (2008-2009) ....................................................... 142 
2.1.5. Scientific development (2009-present) .................................................. 143 
2.2. China-Africa economic transmission channels ............................................. 144 
3. Commodities and commodities markets .............................................................. 145 
3.1. Oil and mining sectors .................................................................................. 145 
3.2. Commodities markets.................................................................................... 150 
3.3. The 2008-2009 financial crisis ...................................................................... 152 
3.3.1. Genesis of the crisis: The US housing market ....................................... 152 
3.1.2. Incidence on commodity markets .......................................................... 155 
4. Infrastructure in Africa ......................................................................................... 160 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 160 
4.2. The severe lack of infrastructure finance ...................................................... 162 
4.3. Infrastructure investment by sector ............................................................... 166 
4.3.1. Power...................................................................................................... 167 
4.3.2. Rail and roads ......................................................................................... 170 
4.4. Project finance ............................................................................................... 176 
5. The strategic value of the R4I contractual model ................................................ 178 
6. Conclusion............................................................................................................ 183 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The chapter preceding this one presented the multi-faceted FDI from China to Africa. 
In the process, it remarked that South-South economic cooperation, the general context 
of China‘s FDI in Africa, held only a marginal sway over the way African states and 
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their Chinese counterpart conclude investment contracts. It attempted to remedy this 
lacuna by drawing out from the systematic patterns and strategic themes of China‘s 
FDI in Africa the basic elements of a normative investment framework for South-South 
cooperation.  
 
This chapter discusses China‘s growth, the strategic value of mineral resources and the 
resource-for-infrastructure investment contract model in international business, 
infrastructure development and significant growth opportunities for countries in Africa. 
A 2009 World Bank report Building Bridges found and aptly analyzed the 
complementary relation between China‘s growth and Africa‘s resources. Effectively, 
evident economic complementarities exist between China‘s thirst for natural resources 
and Africa‘s crave for basic infrastructure. China has one of the world‘s largest and 
most competitive construction industries and limited natural resources; Africa has an 
infrastructure deficit and a wealth of resources.  
 
Even though African exports to Asia as a whole do not exhibit a significant pattern of 
product diversification, intersectoral complementarities between Africa and China do 
exist.
1
 This is true in a general context where Africa is a large supplier of raw materials 
to China, including energy resources, and China is a supplier of manufactured products 
to African economies.
2
 This context is largely driven by factor endowments.
3
 The 
World Bank presented those complementarities as follows: 
 
Table 9: Economic complementarities between China and Sub-Saharan Africa 
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 Infrastructure Resources 
Africa Africa has a major infrastructure deficit, 
with unmet investment needs ≈ 31 
billion US dollars 
Africa is a major export of natural resources, with 
infrastructure bottlenecks preventing full  
realization of its potential 
China China has a large, globally competitive 
construction industry 
China‘s manufacturing-based economy creates high 
demand for natural resource inputs, beyond those 
domestically available. 
 
 Source: V. Foster et al., Building Bridges (2009) 29; V. Foster & C. Briceño-Garmendia, Africa’s Infrastructure (2010) 66. 
 
However, what the Building Bridges report does not see is that R4I investment 
contracts translate these complementarities in a contractual form. It is by drawing this 
further conclusion – R4I contracts translate Sino-African economic complementarities 
– that this chapter differs from and adds on to the Building Bridges report. That 
conclusion is in fact the main submission of this chapter. Those Sino-African 
macroeconomic complementarities are the fundamental clauses of R4I contracts as they 
also reflect the basic intentions of the African and Chinese parties.
4
 
 
Table 10: Fundamental structure of R4I contracts 
 
 Infrastructure Resources 
Africa Resource rich African party contracts with 
China for the construction of major 
infrastructure works 
In exchange for Chinese infrastructure 
loans, the African party grants to China 
rights to exploit minerals or hydrocarbons. 
China China deploys its state-owned 
construction corporations to build 
infrastructure works 
China uses exports of minerals or hydrocarbons 
to pay for the costs of infrastructure works 
 
 
The organization of this chapter mirrors the structure of the chapter‘s main argument. 
Accordingly, the first part of the chapter succinctly narrates the economic growth of 
China; the second part examines the incidence of China‘s growth on commodities 
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markets and how it is driving China to search for natural resources in Africa. The 
following part depicts China‘s growth and how it has led its highly competitive 
construction industry to build infrastructure in Africa. The chapter closes by 
demonstrating that R4I contracts are the contractual form of economic 
complementarities between China and Africa. 
 
The significance of this part of the research lies in the fact that the argument expounded 
in this chapter is the minor premise of the dissertation‘s central thesis. To recall, the 
central thesis is that R4I contracts outcompete other types of investment contracts 
chiefly because they spread investment in mining to other vital economic sectors 
through infrastructure building. Verifying that thesis, which is the subject of Chapter 6, 
requires that this dissertation establishes beforehand how R4I contracts realize Sino-
African economic complementarities. The role played by economics in shaping the 
terms of exchanges has been implicit since organized society began;
5
 the task of this 
chapter is to make explicit the role macroeconomics plays in organizing the terms of 
R4I contracts.  This chapter discharges this task by showing the intersectoral 
complementarities that China‘s FDI creates in mining and infrastructure in resource 
rich countries in Africa and how R4I contracts best encapsulate these economic 
affinities.  
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2. China’s growth 
Growth and growing FDI from the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in Africa has 
been the predominant driver of a corresponding growth and growing development 
opportunities in Africa. The past decade has witnessed a positive economic growth in 
the vast majority of countries in Africa, only interrupted by the 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis. This positive development is strongly associated with China‘s rise as a 
first-rate economic player in Africa, notably China‘s demand for the continent‘s 
subterranean resources. It is thus necessary to trace the economic growth in China and 
identify the China-Africa economic transmission channels. 
 
2.1. The history of a dramatic transformation 
On 1 October 1949, China proclaimed itself the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) (中
华人民共和国). From 1949 to 1978, China had a centrally planned economy. The year 
1978 marks a watershed in China‘s history as this is the year China, under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, geared towards a market-oriented mixed economy in a 
one-party state. 
 
The economic transformation of China can be summed up in five historical periods. In 
the first period China established the core economic institutions of a modern economy. 
It expanded those institutions and market-oriented reforms in the second period. The 
next period saw an average double-digit economic growth, and the fourth period saw 
China entering, weathering and fast recovering
6
 from the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Scientific development, further expansion and the consolidation of economic gains are 
defining the fifth period. 
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2.1.1. The shell of a modern economic system (1980-1989) 
During the first stage, from the early 1980s to the violence after the protest at 
Tiananmen Square in 1989, the government set up the shell of a modern economic 
management system and created small privileged coastal zones to nurture global 
commerce and finance.
7
 Among the important economic reforms, Xiaoping privatized 
farmlands, enabled the creation of several small and medium-sized companies, reduced 
price controls, and promoted global trade and FDI. Xiaoping set up privileged coastal 
zones to spur global trade and finance on. Market-based price inflation benefited 
farmers while it reduced the purchasing power of urban dwellers. The government also 
distributed land and animals to farmers.
8
  
 
Up to this day, agriculture and industry still play a centripetal role in the Chinese 
economy as they both employ 70 percent of the population.
9
 Nevertheless, agricultural 
production does not meet local demand. China now imports food from developing 
countries, including African agricultural exporters – a situation that might explain why 
the R4I contract that China signed with Ghana features the export of cocoa products to 
China.      
 
2.1.2. Expanding market-oriented reforms (1990-2000) 
The second period of the Chinese economic reforms took place in the 1990s and 
consolidated the gains of the first phase. The government augmented market-oriented 
reforms (profit incentives, modern management and privatized corporate systems), 
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leading to millions of urban worker layoffs from overstaffed businesses.
10
 It is worth 
noting that China is selective in its adoption of market-oriented reforms and that it has 
never fully embraced all the tenets of Western capitalism.  
 
The Chinese government reinforced profit incentives and imposed price controls to 
help businesses internalize costs. These measures strengthened a progressively 
privatized Chinese corporate system. To reduce costs incurred as a result of the newly 
market-based wages, personnel-bloated businesses laid off their employees massively. 
These reforms triggered urban unemployment, rural poverty exacerbated by food price 
controls, and eventually widespread upheavals.
11
 Rural hardship and lay-offs touched 
off wide social unrest. The government reacted to the turmoil with a set of new 
measures. It tried to assuage the unrest by introducing a new system of urban social 
safety nets, inadequate rural compensation, and vigorous law enforcement efforts.
12
  
 
2.1.3. Double-digit growth (2001-2007)   
From 2001 to 2007, market institutions, domestic investment and demand, and China‘s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, propelled China‘s growth to 
more than 10 percent.
13
 China‘s spectacular growth mainly relied on the country‘s own 
revenues.
14
 Before the 2008 financial crisis, China had a growth rate average of 9.6% 
for almost two decades.
15
 Economic growth in China has been such that some scholars 
like sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein have started to wonder whether it is still 
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appropriate to regard China as a country of the global South.
16
 These interrogations are 
not surprising given that this is the first time in history that emerging nations are a 
driving force of the world economy. 
  
China fared well in terms of investment and trade. China, which is expected by some 
scholars to become the world‘s biggest economy by 202517 or 2035,18 is the ideal FDI 
destination. In 2007, it attracted 80 billion US dollars. As a result, its foreign exchange 
reserves are the largest, having topped 1.9 trillion US dollars in September 2008. China 
has become a leader in international trade. With a total international trade of 2.18 
trillion (1.22 trillion in exports and 955.8 billion in imports), China is the world‘s 
largest exporter and second largest trading power after the US. It is the world‘s 
workshop, not only for the first stages of export manufacturing but also for more 
advanced stages as it now manufactures laptop computers, iPods, and digital medical 
devices.
19
  
 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) (上海证券交易所), the fifth largest securities 
exchange in the world with a market capitalization of 3 trillion US dollars in 2007, is 
earning impressive amounts of initial public offerings (IPOs). Economically powerful 
Chinese companies listed on the SSE include PetroChina, China Mobile and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).  
 
                                                 
16
 Immanuel Wallerstein, How to Think About China, (Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, 
Commentary No. 273, 2010), available at http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm.  
17
 KWEKU AMPIAH & SANUSHA NAIDU, supra Ch. 1 note 45, at 7. 
18
 Albert Keidel, supra Ch. 3 note 15. 
19
 DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, supra Ch. 2 note 11, at 9.  
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Before the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, China attracted FDI estimated at more 
than 60 billion US dollars per year.
20
 The ensuing employment growth, coupled with 
tax reforms, attenuated the urban lay-offs and rural hardship carried forward from the 
previous period.
21
 However, rapid economic growth had negative environmental 
externalities. Pollution, like national income, increased and spread in some areas; and 
Chinese people started to focus on social and environmental issues.
22
 
  
2.1.4. Global financial crisis (2008-2009) 
The fourth period is characterized by the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The crisis, 
set off by the subprime mortgage loans debacle in the US housing market,
23
 gripped 
financial and securities markets the world over.  To offset the devastating fallout of the 
global financial crisis, the Chinese government pumped 586 billion US dollars into the 
national economy to stimulate local demand.  
 
The centerpiece of the stimulus package was an enormous surge in infrastructure 
spending (including the 2008 Sichuan earthquake reconstruction) funded by a burst of 
bank lending.
24
 Infrastructure spending accounted for 72 per cent of the entire stimulus 
package.
25
 Chinese infrastructure spending maintained a certain demand level for 
copper, which cushioned the fallout of the global financial crisis on copper exporters 
like Zambia and the DRC. 
 
                                                 
20
 Adama Gaye, supra Ch. 1 note 8, at 12. 
21
 Albert Keidel, supra note 15, at 2. 
22
 Id. 
23
 See R. Glenn Hubbard & Christopher J. Mayer, First, Let’s Stabilize Home Prices, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
2, 2008.  
24
 Stephen Roach, Insight: China’s Consumers Key to Revival, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jul. 28, 2009. 
25
 Id. 
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2.1.5. Scientific development (2009-present) 
Finally, the current period is characterized by the consolidation of economic gains, 
further expansion and a new ‗scientific development‘ strategy, which rests on 
government and academic studies.
26
 Freshly out of the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis, China continues its worldwide expansion. On the very first day of 2010, China 
and the 10-country Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) launched the 
biggest regional trade agreement, measured by population. Covering 1.9 billion people, 
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed on the New Year day of 2010 would 
benefit China immensely as China enjoys easier access to the Asian markets and can 
sell goods that it can no longer sell to European and North American consumers.
 27
   
 
China is further expanding its business in Africa where it now plans to relocates some 
of its industries. It is working with the World Bank to see how it can move some of its 
labor- and energy-intensive industries through the establishment of SEZs and other 
special trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa.
28
 Additionally, in line with its 
scientific development priorities, the Chinese government made junior leadership 
appointments in 2008 to last for the next 15 years and restructured ministries and 
agencies.
29
  
 
Niall Ferguson observes that China has replicated the Western world‘s scientific 
method and capitalist enterprise, and that thanks to such strategy the past decade has 
                                                 
26
 Albert Keidel, supra Ch. 3 note 15, at 2. 
27
 Kevin Brown, Biggest Regional Trade Deal Unveiled, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 1, 2010. 
28
 See Deborah Bräutigam, Africa’s Eastern Promise: What the West Can Learn from Chinese 
Investment in Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 5, 2010 [hereinafter Deborah Bräutigam, Africa’s Eastern 
Promise]; James Lamont & Geoff Dyer, China Eyes Industrial Bases in Africa, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 
3, 2009. 
29
 Albert Keidel, supra note 7, at 2. 
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seen the balance of world economic power tilts east.
30
 The crisis saw China leading 
other emergent economies, like Brazil and India, in weathering the financial storm as 
the developed economies were contracting,
31
 thereby reviving theories that Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China (BRIC) are decoupling from the developed economies.
32
 By 
January 2010, Chinese banks had eclipsed US banks as four Chinese banks (China 
Merchants Bank, China Citic, ICBC, and China Construction Bank) claimed four of the 
top five spots as the most highly valued financial institutions.
33
   
  
 
2.2. China-Africa economic transmission channels 
The rise of China, one of the world‘s fastest growing economy, is felt in Africa in terms 
of mounting investment, trade and development aid. In other words, investment, trade 
and development aid are the three principal channels through which growth in China is 
increasingly transmitted to African economies. Particularly, because Chinese economic 
relations with African nations center on resources, mining sectors in Africa and growth 
in China are communicating vessels. This interconnectedness between growth in China 
and growth in mining sectors in Africa is the essence of Sino-African economic 
complementarities. Having dealt with growth in China in the preceding section, the 
next section turns to growth in the mining sectors of resource rich and commodity 
dependent countries in Africa.  
 
 
                                                 
30
 Niall Ferguson, The Decade the World Tilted East, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 27, 2009.  
31
 David Oakley, Emerging Market Equities Outperform West, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), June 7, 2009. 
32
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[hereinafter David Oakley, Decoupling] 
33
 Patrick Jenkins, China Banks Eclipse US Rivals, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 10, 2010 (reporting the results 
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3. Commodities and commodities markets 
3.1. Oil and mining sectors 
Africa is resource rich. Its oil and mining sectors have a great deal to offer to foreign 
investors. That economic base justify the terms found in the oil or mining component 
of existing R4I contracts. It therefore follows that, in order to understand the oil or 
mining component of R4I contracts, experts need a full mastery of the economics in oil 
or mining, insofar as they relate to China‘s FDI in Africa. This section explains the 
dynamics of China‘s FDI in Africa‘s oil and mining sectors from the early 21st century 
up to date.  
 
China‘s interest and investment in Africa and Africa‘s ‗virgin‘, largely unexplored and 
unexploited natural resources
34
 have increased five-fold since 2001.
35
 Even though 
China‘s FDI surge is manifold, the real size of China‘s investments is most probably 
‗under-reported‘.36 Driven by the acute demand for raw materials to lubricate its own 
booming economy, China has been investing colossal amounts of capital into the 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons and minerals in African countries. Thus, 
by the end of 2006, China‘s total investment in Africa had amounted to over 11 billion 
US dollars.
37
  
 
Although this figure is relatively unimpressive, the real economic impact of 
investments from China – and India to a lesser extent – has been to bid up commodity 
                                                 
34
 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK & AFRICAN UNION. OIL AND GAS IN AFRICA 13 (Oxford University 
Press 2009) [hereinafter AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK & AFRICAN UNION, OIL IN AFRICA]. 
35
 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2007: MEASURING THE PULSE OF 
AFRICA (African Development Bank & OECD Development Centre 2007) [hereinafter AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2007]. 
36
 Jian-Ye Wang, supra Ch. 1 note 3, at 11 (showing that Chinese official figures radically understate the 
extent of China‘s investments in individual countries in Africa). 
37
 Stephanie Hanson, supra Ch. 1 note 5.  
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prices, which in turn led to major windfall gains for the vast majority of African 
countries.
38
 In 2007, Angola recorded a staggering 19.8% rate of annual economic 
growth, Equatorial Guinea a rate of 9.8%, Gabon 5.5%, Libya 6.8%, Nigeria 3.2%, São 
Tomé & Principe 7%, and Sudan 11.2%.
39
   
 
Even in the midst of the unfolding global financial crisis, the prices of various 
commodities, especially oil and copper, tumbled and then resurged, mirroring optimism 
that China‘s economy was on course for a rapid recovery, buoyed by its government‘s 
586 billion US dollars stimulus package.
40
 While the rise in the world price of oil is 
certainly a major factor at play for some African countries, these data show that non-
oil-rich countries also have had sound economic growth rate.
41
 Table 11 below shows 
that, even if the GDP growth rates of resource rich countries in Africa dropped in 2009 
on account of the financial crisis, especially Botswana, most resource rich African 
countries experienced positive economic growth and fared well above the world and 
the EU average GDP growth rates. The relatively positive performance by commodity 
dependent countries in Africa stood on the shoulders of China‘s economic strength and 
demand for primary commodities during the 2008-2009 world economic crisis.  
 
Table 11: GDP growth rates and GDP (PPP)
42
 2009 
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Resource rich countries 
in Africa 
GDP growth 
Rate (in %) 
World rank GDP (PPP) 
(in billion US dollars)
43
 
World rank 
China
44
 8,4 5 8, 767 3 
Congo (Brazzaville) 7,5 6 17 128 
Liberia 5 24 2 188 
Ghana 4,7 26 37 98 
Egypt 4,5 29 470 27 
Tanzania 4,5 30 58 85 
Zambia 4,5 31 19 126 
Libya 4 37 92 71 
Morocco 4 38 145 59 
Uganda 4 39 353 33 
Nigeria 3,8 43 42 95 
Sudan 3,8 45 93 70 
Zimbabwe 3,7 47 0,3 210 
Algeria 3,4 51 244 46 
Côte d‘Ivoire 3,2 54 36 99 
Niger 3,2 55 10,7 145 
Mali 3 61 15 133 
Dem. Rep. Congo 3 65 22 118 
Sierra Leone 2 85 4,5 160 
Togo 1,8 87 5,2 156 
Mauritania 1,5 91 6 153 
Tunisia 0,7 102 84 73 
Namibia 0,7 103 14 136 
Angola -0,2 110 134 62 
Chad -1 125 16 132 
World
45
 -1 126   
Guinea -1 128 10,6 146 
Cameroon -1,5 136 43 94 
Equatorial Guinea -1,8 139 23 115 
South Africa -1,9 143 489 26 
Gabon -2,8 159 21 119 
European Union
46
 -4 181   
Botswana -12 209 24 111 
 
Source: CIA, World Factbook (2010). 
                                                                                                                                              
services have a direct equivalent in the United States (for example, the value of an ox-cart or non-US 
military equipment); as a result, PPP estimates for some countries are based on a small and sometimes 
different set of goods and services.‘ 
43
 GDP PPP figures have been rounded up, except where the rounded-up GDP PPP figures for two or 
more countries are the same. 
44
 China is not an African country but it is only included in the table for comparative purposes and 
because of the emphasis in this dissertation on China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of Africa. 
45
 The world GDP growth rate average is included in the table only for comparative purposes. 
46
 The EU GDP growth rate average is included in the table only for comparative purposes. 
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As reported by the World Bank in 2007, the 43.5 percent increase in FDI mainly 
concentrated in oil exporting and other mineral resource rich sub-Saharan countries.
47
 
To be sure, in 2004 the top ten Chinese FDI destinations were, in order of importance, 
Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, Guinea, Benin, Madagascar, Republic of Congo, Cȏ te 
d‘Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Gabon.48 Although data on global sectoral FDI flows to 
Africa are incomplete, by looking at FDI destinations in Africa, one can conclude that a 
large proportion of FDI still goes to the oil sector.
49
  
 
It is small wonder that China, which needs to sustain its resource-intensive economic 
growth and development, invests in the mining sectors of Africa, the world‘s least 
developed yet most endowed continent. As early as 1989, the World Bank had already 
declared that Africa is the most endowed continent in terms of natural resources.
50 
With newly found oil in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Uganda, to mention but a few examples, 
that declaration might well be an understatement today. 
 
Africa reportedly holds stocks of extractable oil, gas, coal and uranium worth between 
13 trillion and 14.5 trillion US dollars, with an additional 1.7 trillion US dollar 
potential in areas such as agriculture, tourism, and water.
51
 It should therefore not 
astonish analysts that emerging countries are aggressively investing in Africa. The 
                                                 
47
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‗dark‘ continent, now one of the fastest growing regions in the world, 52  holds 10 
percent of the world‘s oil reserves, 40 percent of its gold, and 80 to 90 percent of its 
chromium and platinum.
53
 In 1998, out of 103 minerals, Africa held
54
 
 
the most estimated reserves of 24 (or 23%), second most of 7 (7%), and third most of 21 
minerals (20%). It also held more than 50% of cobalt, gold, diamonds, vanadium, manganese, 
phosphate, platinum, chromium, and iridium reserves. It held most of the world‘s iron and 
copper ore; and third most of the world‘s bauxite. 
 
 
China extracts different minerals in different sub-Saharan African countries. China 
extracts copper and cobalt in Zambia and the DRC. It buys wood in Gabon, Cameroon, 
Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia. It is getting platinum and chrome in 
Zimbabwe. China also extracts iron, coal, nickel and aluminium from various countries 
on the continent.  
 
Oil, this globally strategic commodity, makes oil exporters in Africa (see Table 6 
below) highly attractive in FDI terms. Oil and gas satisfy two thirds of global energy 
requirements
55
 while the three main non-renewable fuels (oil, natural gas and coal) 
meet 90 percent of global commercial energy consumption.
56
 Half of the oil that China 
imports from Africa comes from Angola. In addition to exploitation, China engages in 
exploration ventures. In April 2006, President Hu Jintao ended his official tour in 
                                                 
52
 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE. LIONS ON THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN 
ECONOMIES 9 (McKinsey & Company 2010). 
53
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54
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Africa by entering into an offshore exploration agreement with Kenya in an area of 
115, 343 square kilometers north and south of Kenya.
57
 
 
 
Table 12: Proved reserves of oil in Africa 2009 
 
 Country Proved reserves  
(in million barrels) 
World rank 
 Saudi Arabia
58
 266,000 1 
1 Libya 43,600 9 
2 Nigeria 36,200 10 
3 Algeria 12,200 16 
4 Angola 9,000 18 
5 Sudan 5,000 24 
6 Egypt 3,700 28 
7 Gabon 2,000 33 
8 Congo-Brazzaville 1,600 34 
9 Chad 1,500 36 
10 Equatorial Guinea 1,100 39 
11 Cameroon 200 56 
12 Dem. Rep. Congo 180 59 
13 Côte d‘Ivoire 100 66 
14 Mauritania 100 67 
15 South Africa 15 85 
16 Ghana 15 86 
17 Benin 8 91 
18 Morocco 0, 750 97 
19 Ethiopia 0,430 98 
 
Source: CIA, World Factbook (2009) 
 
3.2. Commodities markets 
Commodities markets inform the terms of R4I contracts. They particularly inform the 
oil or mining component of R4I contracts. Demand by China and other emerging 
nations for raw materials drives up commodity prices; commodity prices determine the 
                                                 
57
 Regina Jere-Malanda, supra Ch. 3 note at 39, at 14. 
58
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comparative purposes. 
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amount of raw materials countries in Africa would be willing to exchange for 
infrastructure. It is the same price mechanism and the inherent instability of 
commodities markets that influence the decision that R4I contracts be spot price rather 
than fixed price contracts. Indeed, if demand for primary commodities frequently shifts 
up and down, as is the case with markets for oil and mineral resources, it is less risky 
for resource rich countries in Africa to agree that R4I contracts be spot price contracts. 
 
Commodity markets are exchanges where raw and primary products are traded by 
direct physical trading or by derivatives trading. Traders buy and sell commodities in 
standardized contracts. Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BMF), Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group, Bursa Malaysia (MDEX), Central Japan 
Commodity Exchange, Climex, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Euronext and the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), are some of the major commodities exchanges 
in the world. 
 
There are at least four categories of traded commodities, namely agricultural 
commodities (grain, food and fiber), livestock and meat, energy commodities, and 
minerals. Traded energy commodities are West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, 
Brent crude, ethanol, natural gas, heating oil, Gulf Coast gasoline, reformulated 
blendstock for oxygenate blending (RBOB) gasoline, propane and uranium. 
 
Minerals can be further grouped into precious metals (gold, platinum, palladium, and 
silver), industrial metals (copper, lead, zinc, tin, aluminium, aluminium alloy, nickel 
and recycled steel), and rare metals. Rare metals (germanium, cadmium, cobalt, 
chromium, magnesium, manganese, molybdenum, silicon, rhodium, selenium, 
titanium, vanadium, niobium, lithium, indium, gallium, tantalum, tellurium, and 
 152 
 
beryllium) are not traded on any commodities exchange. Producers, consumers and 
traders provide price information for these rare metals. 
 
3.3. The 2008-2009 financial crisis 
In 2008, the crisis in the capital markets sent the prices of the major commodities (like 
gold, oil, copper and cobalt) tumbling. From a foreign investment law perspective, the 
pertinence of the lessons learned from the 2008-2009 financial crisis is in reminding 
policy makers of the inherent volatility of commodities markets and the necessity to 
buffer from systemic risks. The advanced financial crisis depressed global demand for 
manufactured goods from Asia; and in turn Asia‘s appetite for Africa‘s commodities, to 
produce manufactured exports, waned.
 59
 The global credit squeeze also constrained 
trade financing, which exacerbated the demand slump and led to a collapse in 
commodity prices.
60
 
 
3.3.1. Genesis of the crisis: The US housing market 
The US housing market bit into the forbidden apple by introducing subprime mortgage 
loans.
61
 Subprime mortgage loans led up to the financial and securities market crises. 
This ‗depression from within,‘ the most dangerous type of recessions, is caused by the 
bursting of an investment bubble,
62
 like the bursting of the housing bubble in 2008 in 
the US. A bubble is a steep surge in the value of some asset classes that cannot be 
explained by a change in any of the economic fundamentals that determine value, for 
instance improvements in product quality.
63
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The so-called subprime crisis spread out throughout the financial services industry like 
a cancer. The metastatic spreading of the subprime crisis is a complex scenario. 
Subprime borrowers obtained mortgage loans from mortgage banks. Mortgage banks, 
such as Countrywide Financial, sold subprime mortgages on the secondary market. 
Securitizers, especially Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, then purchased subprime 
mortgages on the secondary market, pooled them, and securitized them, that is to say 
that they sold mortgages as mortgage-backed securities to financial institutions and 
investors on the open market. Financial institutions sold subprime mortgage-backed 
securities to their shareholders, their depositors and to one another. Mortgage-backed 
securities spread even farther within and without the US financial markets when 
financial institutions started exchanging credit default swaps. The US and later global 
financial crisis unraveled when the US homeowners started defaulting on their 
mortgages. This complex scenario can be graphically represented as follows:
64
 
 
Figure 5: The US financial crisis (2008-2009) 
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 ‗Anatomy of a Financial Crisis‘, Robert C. Hockett, Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  
Hockett notes: ―FI‖ means Financial Institution – i.e., a Commercial Bank, Investment Bank, Investment 
Company, Pension Fund, Insurance Company, or like institution.  ―MBS‖ means mortgage-backed 
security.  ―CDS‖ means credit default swap.  Shaded circle and boxes indicate that mortgage ―banks‖ are 
not banks in the ordinary sense.  The generic term for these institutions is more accurate:  They are 
mortgage ―originators.‖  The best known of them these days is probably Countrywide Financial, taken 
over by Bank of America in June 2008 after financially faltering.  The best known ―securitizers‖ surely 
are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Another notorious securitizer, this one lacking any ―implicit federal 
guarantee,‖ was the so-called ―IndyMac,‖ recently put in receivership. 
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Source: R. Hockett, Business Organization, 2009. 
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3.1.2. Incidence on commodity markets 
The year 2008 marked the worst annual fall for commodity markets in decades. The 
Reuters-Jefferies Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) index almost fell below 40 
percent in 2008, a record annual fall since its creation in 1956.
 65
 Oil was first to fall in 
July 2008, followed by ‗anything dug from the earth.‘66 Furthermore, the Standard & 
Poors (S&P) Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI)
67
 was on track to fall by more 
than 50 percent. Even global securities exchanges outperformed the S&P GSCI index 
despite the fact that in 2008 they recorded their worst year after the Great Depression.
68
  
 
2008 also marked a year of spectacular highs and lows for commodities; and oil 
markets went through a year marked by record volatility. The spike in crude oil prices 
catapulted the value of other commodities in global commodities exchanges. In July, 
the Nymex West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the benchmark for US crude oil, peaked at 
147.27 US dollars a barrel, a record high, and then went on to trade at less than 40 US 
dollars in the closing week of December, a record low.
69
  
 
In Nigeria, Africa‘s second largest economy by nominal GDP, local financing 
problems and the global financial crisis plagued oil production, even if the financing 
problem predated the global financial crisis. In fact, Nigeria‘s difficulties in financing 
its share of joint venture oil projects indicated that Nigeria might not have been able to 
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keep oil production at the then prevailing levels or at double the then production levels, 
as it had initially planned. 
 
Nigeria President Umaru Yar‘Adua initiated legislation in August 2008 aimed at 
restructuring the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) so as it can raise 
capital through credit markets, rather than relying on federal government revenues.
 70
 
This may be a salutary move in the face of allegations by a government minister in July 
2010 that the NNPC was insolvent with massive debts.
71
 Unfortunately, the enactment 
of the proposed law would take some time. In the meantime, oil production at Nigeria‘s 
joint venture fields was set to decline from 1.7 million bpd to 700,000 bpd if NNPC 
failed to resolve the funding issue. That eventuality would have disastrous 
consequences for Nigeria as oil production accounts for 80 percent of federal 
government revenues. 
 
In Sudan, official sources indicated that the country produced 500,000 bpd of crude, 
but Sudan was then planning to increase the country‘s production capacity to 600,000 
bpd in 2009. Unfortunately, as the national budget forecasted, oil revenues would drop 
by 43.7 percent in 2009 from more than 60 percent in 2008 owing to the spreading 
financial crisis.
72
 Sudan‘s raw and primary commodities are agricultural and mineral. 
Oil production has started to dominate the economy since October 2000, the bulk of oil 
reserves being in Muglad and Melut rift basins in the south of the country.  
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The Sudanese government attempted to compensate the revenue shortfalls by creating 
new taxes. Earlier, though, officials from Sudan‘s Ministry of Finance claimed that 
Sudan would not be vulnerable to the global economic downturn because they believed 
that US trade sanctions against Sudan had insulated it from western economies. Sudan 
Finance Minister Tarek Shalabi stated that the government would try to diversify the 
economy by also focusing on other sectors, primarily agriculture, which employs a 
large portion of the Sudanese population. In the agricultural sector, cotton and gum 
Arabic are the country‘s major exports, but Sudan is on its way to diversify its cash 
crops.  
 
Pessimistic prospects for oil demand and widespread deleveraging by hedge funds in 
the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an iconic US investment bank, provoked 
a serious nose-dive of the demand for crude oil in the second semester of 2008.
73
 
Producers and OPEC countries individually and jointly decided to cut production, but 
the production reduction only had a modest effect on the price of base metals. 
 
Nearly all commodities ended in the red, weighed down by the credit crunch. The grim 
predictions for the global economy sank the value of base metals even deeper into the 
financial abyss. Copper fell by 56 percent in 2008, after reaching a zenith of 8,930 US 
dollars a ton in July 2008.
74
 FDI and GDP growth fell in copper exporting countries 
like Chile, Zambia and the DRC. Several copper and cobalt mines in the DRC‘s 
southern province Katanga – the country‘s main mining center – laid off more than 
200,000 workers and closed down, frustrating government plans to revive the 
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Congolese dormant mining industry
75
 in the second semester of 2008. Around 52 out of 
56 mining companies in Katanga considerably scaled back their operations and output; 
and many international mining corporations folded their copper and cobalt mines.  
 
Fortunately, some minerals did not suffer through the collapse of commodities markets. 
Gold and silver, which both serve as monetary metals, were some of the rare 
exceptions. Throughout 2008, the value of gold increased by 3.7 per cent, trading at 
850 US dollars per ounce in commodities exchanges. However, the situation was 
different with light metals as the appreciation in the value of light metals held in 
London Metal Exchange warehouses is usually indicative of the recessionary moods of 
the economy.  
 
Platinum, for its part, fetched as much as 904.50 US dollars a troy ounce following 
news that power shortages might diminish platinum output in South Africa, the world‘s 
largest producer of platinum.
76
 Platinum is a central ingredient in autocatalysts, which 
is why the automobile industry is the biggest consumer of platinum.
77
 However, car 
sales dramatically declined, thereby pushing down the value of platinum from a historic 
high of 2,230 US dollars in March 2008 to about 820 US dollars per ounce in 
September that same year.
78
 As regards aluminium, its value went down by 378 percent 
in 2008 notwithstanding output reduction. 
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The credit crunch negatively impacted on commodity prices by severely restricting the 
availability of credit from investment banks to hedge funds, thereby forcing hedge 
funds to reduce long positions, that is to say bets that price would keep increasing.
79
 In 
addition, high petrol retail prices eventually discouraged motorists, and demand for 
crude oil sharply fell in 2008, the first time in 25 years.  
 
More fundamentally, the 2008 financial crisis has dashed one idea and revived another 
one that both drove the bullish market for the past six years prior to the crisis. It dashed 
the idea that commodity exchanges were benefiting from a unique, once-in-a-century 
upswing.
80
 Experts described the upswing as a ‗supercycle‘ because of the mounting 
demand from the emerging economies, especially China, that desired to meet their 
equally increasing domestic urbanization and infrastructure spending.
81
 The spread of 
the credit crisis blew away that idea as it slowed down economic activities in developed 
and developing countries alike. What is more, contrary to the ‗supercycle‘ thesis, 
demand from emerging economies has since the 1970s contributed to the injection of 
much volatility, together with high prices, in markets for oil and petroleum products.
82
   
 
Yet the financial crisis revived and verified – at least partially – the idea that China is 
‗decoupling‘ from the global economy and has become an independent source of global 
finance. The idea suggests that emerging markets can grow in spite of an economic 
downturn in the developed world
83
 and implies therefore that the Chinese economy 
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would be disconnected from the financial crisis. Strong internal demand for primary 
commodities would insulate the Chinese economy from the fallout of the financial 
crisis and push up the price of commodities,
84
 particularly metals and energy 
commodities. China‘s stimulus package seems to have partially proved the decoupling 
theory right. 
 
 
4. Infrastructure in Africa 
4.1. Introduction 
China‘s robust economic growth positively impacted infrastructure development in 
Africa. The lesson taught by the conclusion of R4I contracts in Africa is that resource 
rich countries can use the attractiveness of their oil and mining sectors as an incentive 
for foreign investors to direct finance to infrastructure development. This lesson is 
borne out by the structure of R4I contracts, which comprise the terms of both mining or 
oil contracts and infrastructure projects. To put the infrastructure component of R4I 
contracts in the right context, this part of the chapter presents the infrastructure deficit 
from which nations in Africa suffer. (The infrastructure contracts that ordinarily cater 
for infrastructure development are the object of Chapter 6) This contextualization 
enables the final part of this chapter to show that the combination of these traditional 
infrastructure contracts with oil or mining contracts through R4I contracts is highly 
strategic.   
 
‗Infrastructure‘ refers to all basic inputs and requirements for the proper functioning of 
the economy.
85
 There are two types of infrastructure: Social and economic. Social 
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infrastructure facilitates the supply of skilled and healthy personnel to operate and 
manage other factors of production while economic infrastructure relates to facilities 
that provide societies with services necessary to conduct daily life and engage in 
productive activities.
86
 Thus, ‗mining infrastructure‘, as used in this dissertation, is a 
sub-type of economic infrastructure and refers to the facilities that provide investors 
with services necessary to engage in extractive activities. Health and education are 
good examples of social infrastructure; power, transport, ICT, and water are good 
examples of economic infrastructure.  
 
From the very definition of infrastructure it is evident that economic development is 
inconceivable without social and economic infrastructure. Econometric evidence shows 
that infrastructure development has a positive impact on economic growth, especially 
infrastructure development in telecommunications, followed by roads and electricity.
87
 
 
Africa‘s infrastructure stocks inherited from colonialism backed up reasonably strong 
economic growth from the early 1960s to the oil shocks in the 1970s.
88
 From the 1970s 
until the mid-1990s, economies on the continent took a downturn. Strong demographic 
pressure and the urbanization attending it pushed up the demand for infrastructure, 
which outstripped the supply of infrastructure by governments in Africa. Yet in the 
1990s, under the false assumption that the private sector would chip in money for 
infrastructure development, African governments and donor countries neglected 
infrastructure investment,
89
 with often catastrophic economic consequences. Before the 
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1990s, several governments in Africa were confronting budgetary crises, aggravated by 
misguided fiscal policies and the inefficiencies of the government agencies charged 
with the delivery of public infrastructure.
90
 
 
It was not until after the mid-1990s that economic sluggishness, coupled with 
increasing interest in regional trade and other economic agreements, catalyzed change 
in Africa‘s economic structure. 91  During the second half of the 1990s, African 
governments were grappling with a stifling debt crisis and hurting for infrastructure 
finance. Under the circumstances, they cut resources allocated to public infrastructure 
investments in the hope that the private sector would replace the public sector in the 
financing of public infrastructure projects.
92
 That period saw the private sector 
financing up to approximately 15 percent of infrastructure projects in Africa.
93
    
 
4.2. The severe lack of infrastructure finance 
The greatest obstacle to infrastructure development in Africa is the severe lack of 
project finance. Infrastructure projects require massive capital injections. In 2009, the 
World Bank estimated that Africa counted among its development challenges a major 
infrastructure deficit, with investment needs estimated at 20 billion US dollars per year 
and an associated funding gap on the order of 10 billion US dollars per year.
94
 In 2010, 
it estimated that some 93 billion US dollars is needed to address Africa‘s infrastructure 
deficit and that Africa is already spending 45 billion US dollars a year on 
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infrastructure, with a financing gap on the order of 31 billion US dollars.
95
 The gap is 
divided almost equally between capital expenditure (22 billion US dollars) and 
spending on operation and maintenance (17 billion US dollars).
96
  
 
Many experts have suggested that private capital, whether foreign or local, is the most 
apt to provide adequate funds for major infrastructure projects.
97
 However, privately 
financed infrastructure projects are difficult for a number of reasons: The lack of 
relevant information on the part of Western or capital-exporting nations; many host 
countries do not possess adequate experience in policy-making and negotiations; a 
great number of host countries, which are typically developing countries, do not have 
the legal framework, the administrative regulations, the documentation or properly 
organized departments and ministries as well as a lack of professional training.
98
 
Another hurdle is the administrative law that half African countries have inherited from 
the European colonizers. Administrative law, which the French legal system has deeply 
influenced, contains interventionist powers which authorize governments to modify 
certain infrastructure projects.
99
 
  
Apart from being costlier, infrastructure in Africa trails behind those found in other 
continents quantitatively and qualitatively. Africa receive the smallest share of global 
FDI and infrastructure finance because of the low creditworthiness of most countries in 
Africa, the limits of local financial markets, the low profitability and the risk profiles 
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characteristic of a lot of infrastructure projects.
100
 In addition, armed conflicts have 
destroyed a large amount of physical infrastructure, even if the number of armed 
conflicts in Africa has considerably decreased since the bloody decades that followed 
the series of independence in the 1960s. Consequently, infrastructure in Africa is last 
on most standard indicators, except for the ICT sector where sub-Saharan Africa 
performs better than South Asia, as shown in Table 13 below. 
 
Table 13: Infrastructure development indicators in Africa and other regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: v. Foster et al., Building Bridges (2009) 30. 
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The continent is in desperate need of substantial project finance for its infrastructure 
projects. Because capital requirements for the construction and rehabilitation of 
infrastructure are significant, major infrastructure projects rely more and more on a 
combination of public- and private-sector finance and regional cooperation projects to 
pool capital and spread investment costs.
101
 Infrastructure projects with private 
participation are often financed with a mix of equity and nonrecourse debt – debt 
contracted by the project company without recourse to the sponsors (i.e. project 
finance).
102
 
 
China has for a long time invested in Africa in various fields, including infrastructure. 
However, after 2003, Chinese infrastructure investments on the continent have scaled 
up in many countries and today China is the leading infrastructure financier in Africa. 
After 2003, China‘s infrastructure finance jumped from 500 million US dollars per year 
up to around 1.3 to 1.7 billion US dollars per year in 2004 and 2005, topping 7 billion 
US dollars in 2006 before sliding back to around 4.5 billion US dollars in 2007.
103
 
Upwards of 35 African countries have benefited from Chinese infrastructure finance,
104
 
the biggest recipients including Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, the DRC, and Equatorial 
Guinea. Most Chinese-financed infrastructure projects are small in size and do not 
generally exceed 50 million US dollars, except for half a dozen megaprojects – and 
most R4I contracts – worth more than 1 billion US dollars.105 
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What makes China competitive in the industry is low-cost professional staff and not 
unskilled manual labor. Several state-owned corporations and construction collectives 
(run by local governments or communities in urban and rural areas) are now exporting 
construction services in many regions in the world, including Africa.
106
 Before 1984, 
most Chinese state-owned corporations were general construction companies engaging 
in all trades necessary for construction work. These SOEs were large business 
organizations with a permanent workforce.  
 
4.3. Infrastructure investment by sector 
China‘s infrastructure investments can be by divided by sector, namely infrastructure –
general, transport, information and communication technologies (ICT), power and 
water (including irrigation and sanitation). Two main sectors – power (especially 
hydropower) and transport (especially railroads) – make up the bulk of Chinese-funded 
infrastructure projects, as presented in Figure 6 below.
107
 ICT sector investments in the 
main take the form of equipment supply while the water sector receives the smallest 
share of Chinese funds.
108
  
 
Figure 6: Chinese infrastructure finance by sector 2001-2007 
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Source: V. Foster et al., Building Bridges (2009) 22. 
 
4.3.1. Power 
A recent World Bank report claimed that power is by far Africa‘s greatest 
infrastructure development challenge.
109
 Africa‘s sectoral performance is worst when it 
comes to electricity access rates in both relative and absolute terms.
110
 The World Bank 
report states that, whether measured by consumption, generating capacity, security of 
supply, Africa‘s power infrastructure, at 124 kilowatt-hours per capita in 2010 and a 
total generation of 350,000 gigawatt-hours in 1994, is falling and delivers but 10 
percent of what it delivers in the developing world.
111
 People in Africa consume oil-
based power more uniformly than coal-based power, which prevails in Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, Morocco and Niger.
112
  
 
                                                 
109
 VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., supra Ch. 1 note 17, at 5. 
110
 Antonio Estache, supra note 87, at 13. 
111
 VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., supra Ch. 1 note 17, at 5; Afeikhena Jerome, 
supra note 85, at 35. 
112
 Id. at 36. 
 168 
 
Less than a third of sub-Saharan Africans have electricity.
113
 In particular, women in 
Africa bear the brunt of the infrastructure deficiencies as they have to collect woods for 
cooking and heating in the absence of electricity while rural women have to walk 6 
kilometers daily to rivers and springs to fetch water.
114
 The rural population in Africa is 
the worst off in terms of access to electricity.
115
 China‘s active involvement in power 
infrastructure development is therefore welcome as the continent has barely developed 
5 percent of its hydropower potential.
116
   
 
Power outages make firms operating in Africa lose 5 percent of their sales, and cost 
host governments 1 to 2 percent of their GDP.
117
 Droughts, oil market crashes, conflicts 
and high growth or other structural issues are behind the power supply crisis in Africa, 
which adversely affects economic growth and productivity in national economies. In 
response, countries in Africa resort to a minimum of 750 megawatts of emergency 
power generations, which devour budgetary resources and cost up to 4 percent of 
GDP.
118
 
  
It is the power sector, hydropower in particular, that gets the lion‘s share of Chinese 
infrastructure finance, although China has also been actively erecting thermal power 
stations in Sudan and Nigeria, and electricity transmission in Tanzania and Angola. The 
power sector in Africa has so far attracted more than 5.3 billion US dollars in 
cumulative financial commitments.
119
 To put these figures on Chinese finance in 
broader perspective, private sector investment in infrastructure, including Chinese 
                                                 
113
 Meeting on Africa‘s Development Needs, supra note 89, at 1. 
114
 Id. 
115
 Antonio Estache, supra note 87, at 13. 
116
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 22. 
117
 Id. 
118
VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., supra Ch. 1 note 17, at 5.  
119
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 21. 
                                                                                                                             169 
investment, concentrates on ports, telecommunication (fixed lines), rail and electricity 
generation, in that order of importance.
120
  
 
By 2008, China was participating on the order of 3.3 billion US dollars in 10 major 
dam projects in nine different countries in Africa, with the total value of these projects 
estimated at 5 billion US dollars.
121
 The largest projects are the Mambilla scheme 
(2,600 megawatts) in Nigeria, the Merowe dam in Sudan (1,250 megawatts) and the 
Kafue Lower Gorge and Kariba North projects (more than 1,000 megawatts) in 
Zambia.
122
 The combined hydropower generating capacity of these plants is in excess 
of 6,000 megawatts, which is a major portion of the 17,000 megawatts of Africa‘s total 
generating capacity.  
 
Project finance has become a tool of choice worldwide for the finance of power and 
energy projects, like the construction of plants using coal, oil, gas as well as 
hydroelectric, combined heat, power, and renewable energy plants. As governments in 
developing countries remove ‗natural‘ monopolies and liberalize energy markets, 
private sector companies are increasingly funding new power stations using project 
finance with guaranteed offtake purchase agreements.
123
 This private sector investment 
into electricity generation makes the energy market more competitive, and provides 
reliable and consistent sources of energy for industry and business.
124
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4.3.2. Rail and roads 
Telecommunications and transport structure levels and patterns of development. They 
shape access to medical and educational services and the capacity of governments to 
regulate the behavior of people in society effectively.
125
 Infrastructure weaknesses 
constrain industrial productivity and the development of a vibrant private sector.
126
 
a) Railways 
People and goods move through various modes of transport (road, rail and sea) in 
Africa as in the rest of the world. However, in most of Africa, corruption, obstructive 
government regulations and restrictions on entry to transport markets often cause 
bottlenecks at point of interchange.
127
 Poor roads, rails and harbor infrastructure add 30 
to 40 percent to the cost of goods traded among African nations.
128
 In addition, most 
countries in Africa are landlocked and the long queues of freight at borders increase 
transport costs and impair the logistics performance of African countries. 
 
China‘s experience with rail infrastructure in Africa goes as far back as the 1970s when 
China built the Tanzania Zambia railway.
129
 China‘s financial commitments with 
respect to railways are estimated at 4 billion US dollars for the maintenance of more 
than 1,350 kilometers of existing railway lines and the construction of more than 1,600 
kilometers of new ones.
130
 With the largest deals struck in Nigeria, Gabon and 
Mauritania,
131
 these commitments will expand Africa‘s total railway network of about 
50,000 kilometers.  
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Regarding railway networks, the continent is largely disconnected, if not dilapidated, 
while intraregional commerce is negligible. With the exception of Eastern and Southern 
African rail networks, most railways lines on the continent are independent of one 
another. Existing railway lines do not connect countries in Africa; they are mostly 
routes to the sea. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, governments have embarked in 
liberalization programs and today national railway transport markets are open to private 
competition, which has effectively led to intermodal competition and operational 
efficiency.
132
 Additionally, railway projects are, unlike a great deal of infrastructure 
projects, financially attractive for foreign investors. As of 2009, 47 railway networks 
were operating in 32 African countries, as illustrated in the Figure 7 below.   
 
Figure 7: Rail networks in Africa 
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Source: V. Foster & C. Briceño-Garmendia, Africa’s Infrastructure (2010) 230. 
 
Between 1995 and 2005, railways carried more freight (about 80 percent) than 
passengers.
133
 Yet service volumes on African railways in Africa remain very low at 
250,000 tons a year and are comparable to a moderately busy branch line in many 
countries in other regions.
134
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b) Roads 
The continent‘s progress on the construction and maintenance of roads has been better 
than on railways. In most of Africa, governments have established second-generation 
road funds independently financed by road user charges, contract-based maintenance 
management agencies, and autonomous road agencies. Around 80 percent of the main 
road networks are on average in good or fair condition.
135
 Roughly half of the main 
road network is in good condition, one-third is in fair condition as opposed to one-
quarter for rural roads (see Figure 8 below). In October 2010, a Chinese deputy 
commerce minister told the press that Chinese firms in Africa have built 60,000 
kilometers of roads.
136
 However, accurate assessment of road networks development in 
Africa is difficult to obtain because of the lack of reliable statistical information and the 
necessity to use surrogate indicators.
137
 
 
Figure 8: Quality of main road networks in Africa 
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Source: Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, Africa’s Infrastructure (2010) 218. 
 
Moreover, some countries in Africa (including Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia) 
outsource most road maintenance work under performance-based maintenance 
contracts. Nonetheless, both roads and rails do not attract sufficient funding.  
 
Moving on, the road expenditures in Africa are very high relative to the size of national 
economies, but they are still low in absolute terms.
138
 Part of the high cost is due to the 
fact that, after roads are built, most African countries prioritize road building more than 
road maintenance, thereby neglecting the imperatives of recurrent costs and road 
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management.
139
 Other problems relating to roads include the fact that road condition 
improvements did not extend as much to rural areas, high road traffic freight costs, and 
low mobility as a result of costs and transport unavailability.  
 
Despite the general consensus that agriculture is vital to economic growth, only one-
third of rural inhabitants live within 2 kilometers of an all-season road.
140
 At 204 
kilometers of road per 1,000 square kilometers,
141
 Africa has a density lower than that 
of other developing regions of the world and a lower concentration in main road 
networks. This is a troubling state of affairs given that roads are the means of 
transportation mostly used by people in Africa. Foster & Briceño-Garmendia even 
came to the conclusion that the idea of an interregional trunk road network, or Trans-
African Highway, is far off because of many missing links and poor maintenance of 
key segments.
142
 The lack of interregional road network should be a matter of great 
concern as landlocked countries – and Africa counts many of them – tend to be poorer 
and have less infrastructure than their counterparts, except for landlocked countries in 
Western Europe as they boast developed interregional transport networks.
143
 However, 
the good news is that relative to its GDP Africa has a large road network and that main 
trunks in Africa do not lag behind other regions as much as other African road types.
144
 
 
The thrust of institutional reforms is the second-generation road funds backed by fuel 
levies, even if the efficacy of fuel levies varies widely across the continent.
145
 
Difficulties arise because of, among other reasons, tax evasion, delayed transfers of 
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revenues and less-than-planned collection of levies.
146
 In addition, toll roads, which 
represent less than 1 percent of road networks and are overwhelmingly concentrated in 
South Africa, have a commercial potential only in South Africa and Nigeria,
147
 due to 
the larger size of their economies. The reason for this situation is that only South Africa 
and Nigeria have a road network that can attract a minimum of 15,000 vehicles a day, 
which is the threshold traffic flow to make concessions economically viable.
148
  
 
4.4. Project finance 
The infrastructure component of R4I contracts embodies a single or several 
infrastructure sub-contractual arrangements. These sub-contractual arrangements often 
take the form of the most generally used infrastructure contracts. Infrastructure 
contracts, commonly referred to as project finance, deal with the methods of 
construction, the financing and operation of the facility, and agreed procedures to be 
implemented in the event of default, failure to complete the construction, and failure to 
perform during the operational period. Scott Hoffman defines project finance as a term 
generally referring to
149
  
 
a non-recourse or limited recourse financing structure in which debt, equity, and credit 
enhancement are combined for the construction and operation, or the refinancing, of a particular 
facility in a capital-intensive industry, in which lenders base credit appraisals on the projected 
revenues from the operation of the facility, rather than the general assets or the credit of the 
sponsor of the facility, and rely on the assets of the facility, including any revenue-producing 
contracts and other cash flow generated by the facility, as collateral for the debt.  
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For Jeffrey Delmon, ‗project finance,‘ is a type of debt finance that can be defined as 
the financing of a major new project or large project expansion when the lenders place 
primary reliance on the revenues of the new project for repayment, and the assets and 
contracts of the project as security.
150
 From the two definitions, it is clear that project 
finance can involve either nonrecourse or limited debt; and that lenders rely above all 
on the revenues and assets of the borrower for the grant and repayment of the finance. 
However, project finance is not synonymous with the raising of funds to pay for the 
costs of any project.
151
  
 
The most often cited benefits of project finance are the non-recourse nature of the debt, 
the ability of the project's sponsors to maximize their equity leverage while maximizing 
any tax benefits; and the ability to provide off-balance sheet treatment.
152
 Project 
finance is used by governments the world over in all sorts of large-scale infrastructure 
projects, especially in infrastructure and energy development. Some advantages and 
disadvantages of project finance are presented in Table 14 below. 
 
Table 14: Advantages and disadvantages of project finance 
 
Criteria advantages disadvantages 
limitation/restriction 
on recourse 
nonrecourse debt  
debt treatment off-balance  
leveraged debt  
avoidance of restrictive 
covenants in other  
transactions 
lender supervision 
financing terms favorable lender reporting 
requirements 
internal capital 
commitment policies 
increased insurance 
coverage 
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 Katharine C. Baragona, supra note 123, at 139. 
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 SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, supra note 149, at 6.  
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 Katharine C. Baragona, supra note 123, at 140. 
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political risk political risk  
diversification  
incentive to take 
unacceptable risks 
risk allocation widely shared complex 
collateral limited to project 
assets 
 
lenders/loans incentive for lenders 
to work out rather than 
foreclose on troubled  
loans 
increased lender 
risk 
matching of specific 
assets with liabilities 
 
credit opportunities Expanded high interest rates 
and fees 
 
Source: Adapted from Scott L. Hoffman, The Law and Business of International Project Finance (2001) 12ff. 
 
Project finance is ordinarily deployed under the framework of public-private 
partnerships (PPP). However, the Chinese signature business model envisages a greater 
role for the state as state-owned corporations from China step into the shoes of 
traditionally private investors to enter into economic relations with African countries. 
 
 
5. The strategic value of the R4I contractual model 
To find out the strategic value of the R4I contractual model, game theory is rich in 
insight. Game theory is the study of strategies (i.e. choices) adopted by players or 
agents (i.e. actors). Solutions to game theory modeling are dependent on assumptions, 
so that they are rarely right in absolute terms but almost always right relative to the 
assumptions of the model.
153
 When only two players are involved, at least two 
assumptions about the players‘ mutual knowledge apply. The players are assumed to 
have mutual knowledge of the game (i.e. rules of the game, the payoff structure, etc.) 
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and the players‘ Bayesian rationality (i.e. knowledge that the two players are rational 
and that each player knows the other player is rational).
154
 
 
In the model below, Africa and China are assumed to be aggregated individual players 
acting just like a single player in, let us say, a soccer game. The values attributed to 
Africa and China in the model are rough estimates of the actual demand for resources 
and infrastructure by Africa and China. The values are not accurate but they are not 
entirely arbitrary as they originate from available economic data. The main point of 
these rough estimates is not precision but illustration of the strategic value of the 
resource-for-infrastructure model over ordinary investment contractual models. 
 
The fundamental assumption in the model is that Africa wants China‘s investments in 
its infrastructure and China wants to import Africa‘s mineral resources. Africa attaches 
a value of 45 to China investing in Africa‘s infrastructure. ‗45‘ represents the 45 billion 
US dollars that Africa is already spending annually on infrastructure.
155
 China attaches 
a value of 28 to its investments in the mining sectors of Africa. ‗28‘ represents the 
rounded up proportion of China‘s trade with Africa that goes to the extraction of 
mineral resources in 1979-2000.
156
 Sino-African trade was valued at slightly more than 
100 billion US dollars.
157
 28 percent of 100 billion US dollars is 28 billion US dollars. 
The latter amount is therefore a very rough estimate of the portion of trade devoted to 
resource extraction. China attaches a value of 16 to financing and building 
infrastructure in Africa. ‗16‘ represents the 16 billion US dollars of total financing 
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 Francesco Farina, Game-Theoretic Solutions to Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness, in LEGAL 
ORDERING AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 191 (Fabrizio Cafaggi et al. eds. 2007).  
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 VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., supra Ch. 1 note 17, at 1 and 8. 
156
 See Table 11 below. Resource extraction amounted to 188 million US dollars out of a total investment 
value of 681 million US dollars. That means that resource extraction accounted for 27,606461% of total 
investment. If that figure is rounded up, resource extraction becomes 28%. 
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 Sino-African Trade Passes $100 Bln Mark in 2008, XINHUA (P.R.C.), Jan. 27, 2009. 
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commitments that China made with respect to infrastructure projects in Africa in 
2008.
158
 All the values attributed to Africa and China represent their respective payoff 
matrix, as presented in Table 15 below. 
 
Table 15: The strategies of Africa and China 
 
 Africa 
China Resources Infrastructure 
Resources A: 28   28 B: 28    45 
Infrastructure C: 16   28 D: 16    45 
 
In Cell A, Africa and China attach the same value to resource extraction. In all other 
cells, they attach different values to resource extraction and infrastructure investment. 
Though they know each other‘s purposes well through bilateral consultations, the 
payoffs that appear in Table 15 represent their intrinsic interests in resource extraction 
and infrastructure investment. China prefers to extract resources no matter what Africa 
does. China has a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is when a person‘s best 
choice is the same, no matter what the others do.
159
 Likewise, Africa prefers 
infrastructure investment no matter what China does. Africa also has a dominant 
strategy. 
 
The payoff matrix produces a compelling case for a cooperative coordination game that 
will yield a greater payoff to Africa and China than a non-cooperative game. The 
coordination of independent actions in situation of multiple equilibria, like in the 
Africa-China model, is the most straightforward reason to use contracts.
160
 China will 
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choose Cell A and B because the payoffs in those cells increase by 12 (28 – 16) 
compared to cells C and D. Africa will choose cells B and D because the payoffs 
increase by 17 (45 – 28) compared to cells A and C. It is evident that the only cells 
where the payoffs of China and Africa converge is Cell B. B is therefore the optimal 
solution for Africa and China, a solution that requires both parties to coordinate their 
actions by agreement, contractual or otherwise. And, when an agreement serves pure 
coordination purposes, they are self-enforcing because it is in each party‘s private 
interest ex post to comply with the chosen equilibrium or agreement.
161
 
 
The agreement that Africa and China will find may fill one or other of these contractual 
forms. To extract resources, Africa and China may choose a production sharing 
agreement (PSA), the most used form of mining and oil contracts. They may also 
choose a mining concession, a participation agreement, a service contract or a risk 
service agreement.
162
 These contracts serve well the interests of Africa and China in 
Cell A. To finance and build infrastructure in Africa, Africa and China may choose any 
type of infrastructure contracts, a BOT, a BT or a BRT, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Infrastructure contracts serve well the interests of Africa and China in Cell D. 
However, only resource-for-infrastructure contracts fully capture the interests of Africa 
and China in Cell B, the optimal solution for Africa and China. Table 15 shows that for 
traditional investment contracts to capture Cell B the parties will have to add 
infrastructure projects and mining or oil contracts whereas R4I contracts combine 
infrastructure projects and mining or oil contracts. The optimality of R4I contracts 
means that they are likely to be the long-term trend of Sino-African economic relations. 
                                                 
161
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They will remain in use for as long as macro-economic fundamentals would sustain 
their existence.
163
    
 
Table 16: The contractual form of Sino-African economic complementarities 
 
 Infrastructure Resources 
Africa Africa has a major infrastructure 
deficit 
 
Africa is a major exporter of natural resources 
 
China China has a globally competitive 
construction industry 
China‘s manufacturing-based economy creates  
high demand for natural resource inputs 
 
Investment 
Contracts 
Infrastructure contract (e.g. BOT, BT) Mining contract (e.g. PSA, concession 
agreement) 
Resource-for-infrastructure 
 
 Adapted from Source: V. Foster et al., Building Bridges (2009) 29. 
 
Finally, to the extent that R4I contracts reflect the purposes and interests of the African 
and Chinese parties given the constraints that the parties confront and other things 
being equal, then the R4I contractual model is also a predictive framework.
164
 It 
predicts that under conditions X it should be expected that parties enter into a R4I 
contract; or, conversely, when parties sign a R4I contract, it should be assumed that 
conditions X are present. ‗Conditions X‘ is a symbol for the macro-economic 
conditions that give rise to the desirability to enter into a R4I contract. Those macro-
economic conditions were the subject of this chapter. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the macroeconomic fundamentals underpinning R4I contracts have 
been dissected. At a macroeconomic level, intersectoral economic complementarities 
tie China‘s demand for raw materials to Africa‘s mining sectors. The meteoric rise of 
the Chinese economy happened by stages since 1978: The Chinese government first 
laid out the foundation of a modern economy; it expanded the economic reforms; and 
experienced double-digit economic growth, only bogged down by the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. But China rapidly jumped back on its feet and reportedly passed the 
symbolic 10% GDP growth rate mark in the fourth quarter of 2009.
165
  
 
The vitality and vibrancy of the Chinese economy has energized mining sectors in 
Africa, the world‘s most endowed. Chinese economy pushed up the foreign exchange 
earnings of resource rich countries in Africa. China‘s growth has also immensely 
contributed to infrastructure finance on the continent, making China the leading 
financier of infrastructure projects in Africa. Such contribution is welcome and well-
timed given that most standard infrastructure development indicators show that Africa 
on the whole is behind other continents. Infrastructure project finance drags contracts 
into the picture and governs the relationship between the various participants in 
infrastructure investments. Because it consists in both mining and infrastructure 
investments, the R4I contract form captures best economic complementarities between 
China‘s demand for primary commodities and Africa‘s demand for basic infrastructure. 
The finding that R4I contracts are the contractual form of Sino-African economic 
complementarities is the chapter‘s main submission over and above the chapter‘s 
suggestion that the terms of economic exchanges in the mining sector between China 
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 China Posts Scorching Growth but Prices Heat Up, FRANCE 24, Jan. 21, 2010, 
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and resource rich African countries should assume, whenever possible, a R4I contract 
form. The next chapter sharpens its focus on the distinctive risks of investments, 
especially those pertaining to Africa‘s natural resources, the resource leg of R4I 
contracts. 
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This chapter shows how China‘s FDI and South-South investment cooperation play out 
in environments in Africa overshadowed by a curse of resources. This dissertation calls 
the countries cursed by their resources on the continent ‗politically insecure166 and 
resource rich states in Africa‘ (PIRSA). For our purposes, the ‗resource curse‘, a 
controversial and contested concept with unclear contents and boundaries, is the 
aggregate of factors that may preclude the full enjoyment of a wealth of resources by 
the majority of citizens in a given country.  
 
This chapter describes the political economy of PIRSA and discusses the merits of the 
resource curse theory. It is thus divided in two major parts. The first part is a discussion 
on the resource curse theory, followed by an outline of take-home policy implications 
of the theory for foreign investment law. The second part sub-divides into two 
descriptive sections on the heterogeneity of countries in Africa, and the nature and 
specificity of PIRSA. By way of background, the chapter opens with an exposition of 
risk – a general notion and central idea in foreign investment law.   
 
 
1. Risk in foreign direct investment 
Africa is a place in the global South that foreign investors generally perceive to be 
risky, at any rate riskier than its sister continents. That the continent is a place where it 
                                                 
166
 As cautioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the phrase ‗politically insecure‘ is not 
synonymous with ‗political instability‘. Rather, it relates to the foreign investment law concept of 
‗political risk.‘ See PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra Ch. 1 note 22, at 1. 
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is not easy to do business is a fact appreciated by non-traditional investors like China, 
India and Russia, and by African entrepreneurs and the African diaspora who have 
decided to invest overseas.
167
 ‗Risk‘ effortlessly calls to mind all sorts of frightening 
ideas, like ‗danger‘, ‗insecurity‘, ‗uncertainty‘, or ‗loss‘.168 After all, etymologically, 
‗risk‘ comes from the Italian word risco, which means ‗danger‘. It is therefore right 
time to delimit the ambit of ‗risk‘ in this dissertation. 
 
1.1. Risk in general 
Every analysis of risk requires a proper definition. In finance, ‗risk‘ is a polysemic term 
that generally refers to the probability of permanent loss of assets. This rendition of risk 
is minimalist, but it adequately frames the following elaboration of the concept.  
 
Risk is often (con)fused with uncertainty. Since the publication of Risk, Uncertainty 
and Profit, Frank Knight‘s is the generally accepted dichotomy,169 and it says that risk 
is the set of calculable possible future outcomes for a relevant performance indicator, a 
known set of probabilities.
170
 Conversely, uncertainty is what cannot be known because 
it is in some fashion unpredictable and therefore non-quantifiable.
171
  
 
In recent years, several scholars have called into question the sanctity of Knight‘s 
dichotomy. Three schools of thought propose competing explanations of the relation 
between risk and uncertainty. The first school of thought contends that risk and 
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 Harry G. Broadman, supra Ch. 3 note 173, at 92. 
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uncertainty are distinct,
172
 the second school counter that the two are inseparable,
173
 
and the third school adds that the two are part of the same continuum.
174
  
 
For White & Fan, confusion concerning risk comes from a failure to distinguish 
between the characteristics of risk and the causes and consequences at different 
levels.
175
 White & Fan then link characteristics, causes and consequences of risk with 
impact, incidence and response.
176
 
 
Table 17: Risk characteristics, causes and consequences 
 
Characteristics Significant unpredictability of a key performance indicator(s)  
which indicates the achievement of an important strategic  
objective(s). (Variance in the performance indicator) 
Impact 
 
Causes A set of risk-generating events or changes in behavior,  
sometimes called shocks usually interacting closely  
with the relevant contexts. 
Incidence 
Consequences Long-term consequences – structural or organizational change  
e.g. the choice of organizational form such as the introduction  
of limited liability. 
Medium-term consequences – the adoption and 
 implementation of generic risk control strategies by key players 
 e.g. the adaptation of the capital structure. 
Short-term consequences – at the micro level, specific  
investment decisions and their financing; at the macro level,  
specific FDI inflows into particular countries.   
Response 
 
Source: C White & M Fan, Risk and foreign direct investment (2006) 29-30. 
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1.2. Risk in foreign investment law 
There are four levels of risk: Global, country, industry and enterprise risks (see Figure 
9 below). This dissertation is preoccupied with country-level risks. 
 
Figure 9: A typology of risk 
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Source:  C. White & M. Fan, Risk and foreign direct investment (2006) 175 
 
 
A fundamental concern of modern foreign investment law is that host states will 
behave opportunistically after the signing of an investment contract and the sinking by 
the foreign investor of costs into an investment project. This change in the bargaining 
positions of the parties once the costs of the projects have been sunk is known as 
‗obsolescing bargain‘ in the business-school literature of the 1970s, as one of ‗credible 
commitment‘ in the transaction cost economics literature of the 1990s, and more 
recently as a problem of ‗political risk.‘177 
 
The rules of foreign investment law grant special protection to political risk. ‗Political 
risk‘ is in general the probability that a host country will confiscate all or a portion of a 
foreign investor‘s property rights located in the host country. 178  Political risk is 
different from commercial risk, which is a risk or loss assumed or suffered in the 
normal course of business. 
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Foreign investment entails risks for both the investing corporations and the recipient 
countries. For investing corporations, risks increased after the end of colonialism. 
During the colonial period, an investor from an imperial state taking assets into the 
colonies had absolute protection.
179
 Today, investors no longer have this kind of 
protection and usually resort to law to insure against investment risks. A few 
international and national investment insurance schemes, such as the Multilateral 
Insurance Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the US Overseas Private Investment 
Corporations (OPIC), flourished to insure investors against investment risks. China has 
established Sinosure, a state-owned export credit insurance firm, to insure Chinese 
corporations operating abroad against non-payment risks.
180
 Sinosure is involved in 
providing export credit insurance in the R4I contract between Ghana and China for the 
construction of the Bui dam. 
 
Regime changes or changes to the existing political and economic policies of host 
states are the main political risks to foreign investment.
181
 Those changes are the 
greatest threat to the effective implementation of R4I contracts in Africa.
182
 Many 
factors may precipitate the materialization of political risks. These risk factors include 
ideological hostility, nationalism, ethnicity, changes in industry patterns, uncertain 
legal framework, the absence of a BIT, onerous contracts, regulation of the economy, 
human rights and environmental concerns, and contracts made by previous regimes.
183
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The idea of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to swap oil blocs for 
investments in various infrastructure projects in Nigeria provides a good illustration of 
the great risk that political changes pose to R4I contracts.
184
 During oil licensing rounds 
in 2005, 2006, and 2007, Obasanjo granted a right of first refusal (RFR) to the Asian 
national oil corporations that would promise to build infrastructure in exchange for the 
oil blocs that Nigeria was auctioning. After Obasanjo left office in May 2007, his 
successor President Umaru Yar‘Adua reviewed all and cancelled many sales of oil 
blocs allocated on the basis of Obasanjo‘s RFR.185 The lesson to learn from the risk that 
a new government may cancel an investment contract signed by a previous government 
is that the timing of the negotiation and conclusion of investment contracts must always 
take electoral cycles into account.   
 
There are four major types of political or non-commercial risk:
186
 Expropriation, war 
and political violence, breach of contract, and currency restrictions. 
 
1.2.1. Expropriation and other takings 
Expropriations are ‗the most severe form of interference with property,‘187 even though 
they are prima facie lawful.
188
 States enjoy the right to expropriate or the ‗right of 
eminent domain‘, which is an entitlement that emanates from the states‘ territorial 
sovereignty.
189
 International law recognizes the right of states to change their economic 
and other policies. This right is an inherent aspect of state sovereignty. The Declaration 
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on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States stipulates that ‗each state has the right freely to choose and develop its 
political, social, economic and cultural systems.‘190 The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) held that:
191
 
 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters which each State is 
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a 
political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. 
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which 
must remain free ones.  
 
 
Expropriations are but one of three types of takings, often used interchangeably, 
namely confiscation, expropriation, and nationalization.
192
 ‗Confiscation‘ is the 
capricious taking of property by the rulers of the state for personal gain. 
‗Expropriation‘ (or ‗compulsory acquisition‘ as it is termed in the Zimbabwean 
Constitution) refers to the taking by states for an economic or public purpose whereas 
‗nationalization‘ refers to the industry- or economy-wide takings designed to end or 
diminish foreign investment in the economy or in sectors of the economy.
193
 Likewise, 
nationalizations and expropriations have different economic impacts: Unlike 
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expropriations, nationalizations can be crippling and devastating for a host country‘s 
economy, as was the case for Zimbabwe after the nationalization of White-owned 
agricultural lands in the early 2000s.
194
  
 
1.2.2. War and political violence 
Africa is relatively more prone to conflict and violence than any other continent. The 
security situation of host countries is relevant to the assessment of investment risks 
because insecurity and instability in the host country increase the odds of asset losses 
for investors. The security situation is all the more relevant to investment risk 
assessments in Africa because Africa is the region of the world that is the most affected 
by insecurity and conflicts.
195
  
 
Table 18: Chronology of major conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Year Country Name of conflict Type of conflicts 
1948-1994 South Africa Anti-apartheid struggle Internal 
1955-1972 Sudan First civil war Internal 
1960-1965 DRC Post-independence war Internal 
1960-1964 Rwanda Ethnic strife Internal/ethnic 
1961-1974 Angola Independence war Independence 
1962-1974 Guinea-Bissau Independence war Independence 
1964-1975 Mozambique Independence war Independence 
1965-1980 Zimbabwe Struggle for majority 
rule 
Independence 
1966-1990 Namibia Liberation struggle Independence 
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1966-1969 Nigeria Biafra civil war Internal 
1966-2006 Chad Civil war Internal 
1966 Namibia Caprivi strip secession Internal/regional 
1970-1974 Burundi Ethnic strife Internal/ethnic 
1974-1978 Ethiopia Revolution Internal 
1974-1991 Eritrea War for independence Internal 
1975-1991 Mozambique War with Renamo Internal 
1976-1977 Ethiopia/Somalia Ogaden war Interstate 
1979 Tanzania/Uganda Amin invasion Interstate 
1978-1991 Ethiopia Civil war Interstate 
1979-1996 Central African 
Republic 
Coups and civil strife Internal 
1980-1986 Uganda Obote overthrow/civil 
war 
Internal 
1982- Senegal Casamance Internal 
1983-1985 Zimbabwe Mateleland unrest Internal 
1983-2005 Sudan Second civil war Internal 
1984-1989 Somalia North west secession Internal 
1989-1997 Liberia Civil war Internal/regional 
1990-1994 Rwanda Civil war and genocide Internal/regional 
1990- Sierra Leone War with RUF Internal/regional 
1991 Somalia Civil war Internal 
1992-2002 Angola Second war with 
UNITA 
Internal 
1993 Burundi Civil war Internal/ethnic/regional 
1996-2003 Central African 
Republic 
Army mutinies/coup 
attempt 
Internal 
1997-2000 Congo (Brazzaville) Civil war Internal 
1997 Comoros Anjouan secession Internal 
1996-1997 DRC Civil war Regional 
1998-2001 DRC Second civil war Regional 
1998-1999 Lesotho Coup attempt/civil 
strife 
Internal 
1998-1999 Guinea-Bissau Civil war Internal 
1998 Ethiopia/Eritrea Border conflict Interstate 
2000 Guinea External attacks Regional  
 2002 Cȏ te d‘Ivoire Civil war Internal/regional 
 
Source: Adapted from M. Gazibo, Introduction à la politique africaine (2006) 114; Department for International Development 
(DFID) et al., The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Framework document (2001) 25. 
 
 
1.2.3. Breach of contract 
Host government interference with state-investor contracts is another political risk. 
Host governments may for one or another reason decide to unilaterally vary the terms 
of the contracts they have signed with foreign investors. When a host state breaches a 
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clause of an investment contract that keeps the state from taking a foreign investors‘ 
property, the breach may amount to expropriation, nationalization or confiscation, as 
the case may be. If intangible assets, including contract rights, are protected property 
rights, then they may be expropriated, which in turn may lead to a duty to 
compensate.
196
  
 
These breaches may occur where a government wishes to review and rescind contracts 
that an illegitimate previous government entered into, where it is economically 
efficient
197
 or necessary to preserve economic equilibrium,
198
 where the contracts are 
onerous, where they have been concluded in violation of applicable laws or as a result 
of corruption. In the DRC, the government struck more than 50 onerous deals with 
foreign investors during the 2003-2006 transition. After pressures from civil society 
and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the government that won 
the 2006 democratic elections started a review of these mining deals. The review 
established that, of the 57 contracts and 6 agreements reviewed, none were viable, 40 
required re-negotiation, while the remainder had to be cancelled. It is very likely that, if 
the political opposition wins the elections in the DRC, the new government will 
cancel
199
 or renegotiate the terms of the R4I contract that the previous government 
entered into with China in 2008.  
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If a foreign investor signs an investment contract with an unrepresentative government, 
an incoming democratic government that replaced the unrepresentative one may wish 
to question the legitimacy of the unrepresentative government and the contract that it 
signed.
200
 In the 1980s during South Africa‘s occupation of Namibia, the UN Council 
on Namibia prohibited all transactions in Namibia‘s natural resources, including 
uranium contracts, with the regime administering Namibia and controlled by South 
Africa.
201
 If, in addition, the terms of the contracts are unequivocally disadvantageous 
to the host state, the incoming host government would be more than justified in seeking 
to rescind the contract.  
 
The problem of legitimacy posed by unrepresentative governments and the investment 
contracts that they signed is more severe in the case of military juntas. Sornarajah 
argues that in the extractive industries the case for the invalidity of investment 
contracts is greater because an unrepresentative government cannot act on behalf of a 
people in whom sovereignty over natural resources vest in terms of international law.
202
 
Inevitably, similar questions have surfaced concerning the resource-and-infrastructure 
(R&I) investment contract that the privately-owned Hong-Kong registered China 
International Fund (CIF) has signed with the military junta in resource rich Guinea in 
2009.
203
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1.2.4. Currency restrictions 
A fourth type of political risk is restrictions imposed on transfers, the conversion or 
exchange of currency. Local currency regulations may partially or entirely restrict the 
transfer, conversion, repatriation, or exchange of funds. For example, the host state 
may license banks and brokers to handle foreign exchange, thereby limiting the 
availability of foreign exchange for commercial transactions – a move that has 
engendered a great deal of corruption in LDCs.
204
 However, the risk of currency 
restrictions is lower in the case of natural resources and commodities, whose output is 
sold in the export market, thereby yielding hard currency directly.
205
  
 
On closer analysis, currency restrictions amount to regulatory takings, thus 
expropriations. Yet some currency restrictions do not constitute regulatory takings. 
Exchange controls, for example, apply to the whole economy uniformly and cannot be 
regarded as expropriation notwithstanding the fact that it affects a foreign investor‘s 
property rights.
206
 It seems now accepted that a country can impose currency 
restrictions when justified, though FDI law curtails the ability of poor countries to 
adopt such regulations. In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina,
207
 an ICSID 
Tribunal held that states should draw a line between ‗measures of general economic 
nature, particularly in the context of the economic and financial emergency and 
measures specifically directed to the investment‘s operation.‘ Indeed, exchange 
controls would be justified if and when deployed during an economic crisis to stem the 
flight of capital from the host state. 
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1.3. Protective devices 
Foreign investment law and R4I contracts hold an arsenal of contractual devices to 
shield foreign investors from political risks and other types of risks that they face in 
host countries. There are investment-specific and general contractual devices to shield 
foreign investors from risks. The general devices endeavor to specify the parties‘ 
obligations or investment incentives in each possible state of the world and the sharing 
of risks, gains and losses in each state of the world. Each state of the world can be 
defined both in quantitative terms by the cost and value of performance, and in 
qualitative terms by the factors that produced that cost and value.
208
 Terms on price, 
quantity and remedy are quantitative whereas terms on the causes of fluctuations in the 
cost and value of performance (e.g. force majeure clauses, common law doctrines of 
excuse) are qualitative means of partitioning each state of the world.
209
 
 
Investment-specific devices protect foreign investors from political risks by 
internationalizing investment contracts. These devices are stabilization, choice-of-law 
clauses, arbitration, damages, waiver of sovereign immunity, waiver of local remedies 
exhaustion requirement, currency conversion, repatriation, interest rates, force majeure 
clauses, state interest in project, and state-as-party clauses. Internationalization 
(achieved chiefly through stabilization, choice-of-law and arbitration clauses) requires 
investor-state contracts to go through a process that propels them to a higher legal orbit. 
Out of the sphere of the domestic law of host states, that legal orbit or international 
system is composed of a complex blend of private international law, general principles 
of law and international law.  
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It is conventional wisdom that in order to strengthen contractual protective devices 
through internalization, BITs between home states of foreign investors and host states 
are unavoidable.
210
 However, Jason Yackee disputes the conventional view and argues 
that investment contracts can effectively address political risks, with no need for 
BITs.
211
 Without necessarily endorsing Yackee‘s argument on the redundancy of BITs, 
this section moves on to briefly outline the protective devices of investment contracts. 
 
1.3.1. Transparency in R4I contracts  
Transparency concerns are recurrent in the literature on the economic exchanges 
between African countries and China. With very few exceptions, government delegates 
negotiate, draft and sign R4I contracts in a non-transparent manner despite the 
enormous natural resources at stake. The lack of transparency should be prominent in 
discussions on investment risks in relation to R4I contracts and investment contracts in 
general. Opacity creates the risk of a dramatic waste of resources for both host 
countries and foreign investors and increases the odds that political risks like 
expropriations, contract breaches and subsequent changes to the law, materialize going 
forward.  
 
The word ‗transparency‘ conveys the idea that any social entity should be prepared to 
subject its activities to (public) scrutiny and consideration.
212
 Transparency obligations 
are held by the host state, the foreign investor and its home state.
213
 Yet in defiance of 
best practices, R4I contracts do not result from the award of contracts through open, 
public tender, but from direct negotiations with foreign investors. Many an analyst has 
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raised alarm at the opacity of the negotiation process and the great risk of corruption 
and favoritism.  
 
These transparency concerns are laudable and understandable; unfortunately most 
analysts misunderstand the complex nature of R4I contracts and miss the point of an 
auction, which is what a tender essentially is. First, R4I contracts are not simply the 
sale of primary commodities; they are also building contracts, which are complex 
contractual arrangements. Private negotiations are appropriate when a contract is 
complex, involves the provision of services and the possibility of win-win moves and 
outcomes.
214
 Second, auctions are meant to get for the seller the best value for his or 
her property when there are many buyers in the market. Whereas several foreign 
investors would line up if a host government in Africa conducted a mining/oil licensing 
round, it is doubtful whether any foreign investors other than the Chinese state-owned 
corporations would be willing or able to build national infrastructure in return for 
minerals/oil. The fact that the number of qualified investors is strictly limited means 
that the costs of holding an auction would surpass those of direct negotiations with the 
already known high-value investors.  
 
Another point with transparency is the identification of the items of both governmental 
and corporate information that are to be made publicly available. Most investment 
contracts that impose a transparency obligation usually refer to ‗laws‘, ‗regulations‘ 
and ‗procedures‘.215 The advance publication of R4I contracts is exceptional. In most 
cases, the R4I contract document is deemed confidential and classified under 
confidentiality and state secret laws.  
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Advance publication of investment contracts and measures is generally very rare. It is a 
greater degree of intrusion than some developing countries are willing to accept.
216
 
Host countries may resent advance publication as undermining their sovereign right to 
discuss and decide on FDI without the formal intervention by foreign investors and 
their home countries. Further, in cases where there is a power imbalance between host 
and home countries, the weaker host country may fear undue influence on its decision-
making processes. UNCTAD believes, however, that the absence of any transparency 
provisions may contribute to undue influence being exercised away from the eyes of 
other stakeholders and the general public.
217
 
 
Regarding issues of transparency, the partial or complete publication of the terms of the 
R4I framework contract, after negotiations and signature, can equally serve the 
purposes of transparency. The DRC published entirely its R4I framework contract with 
Chinese state-owned corporations. 
 
1.3.2. Takings clauses 
Takings clauses protect foreign investors from political risks by restraining the right of 
host states to take or otherwise interfere with property and property rights. They 
achieve that purpose by imposing requirements that lawful takings be for a public 
purpose, non-discriminatory and compensatory of the investors aggrieved by the 
taking. Like most international investment contracts, R4I contracts contain takings 
clauses by which African parties undertake to never and in no circumstances 
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whatsoever appropriate, nationalize, nor expropriate, directly or indirectly, the joint 
venture as well as its property.  
 
With the three types of takings (expropriations, nationalizations and confiscations), the 
issue of whether the host state must pay compensation is relatively easy. Disputes 
frequently revolve around the formula for and calculation of compensation. Most 
important, disputes also involve the question as to whether a measure by host states 
amount to a ‗taking‘ at all. Certain measures by host states may not result in the actual 
taking of property, but may still erode the management, use or control, or a significant 
depreciation in the value, of the assets of a foreign investor.
218
 Here the issue is the 
distinction between measures that trigger takings clauses and their compensation 
requirement, and measures that interfere with the property rights of foreign investors 
without falling under the scope of takings clauses.
219
  
 
1.3.3. Stabilization clauses 
Stabilization clauses aim at preventing future changes in the legislation of the host state 
from varying the terms of an investment contract to the detriment of an investing 
foreign party. The key element of a stabilization clause is the stripping of the host 
government‘s right to unilaterally alter a foreign investor‘s rights by changing its 
municipal law.
220
 Foreign investors stand to lose in any agreement with the host state if 
the state legislates in a way that varies any contractual right or right to property that is 
located within its territory.
221
 It is therefore in the investor‘s interest to immunize 
foreign investment from a range of legislative amendments in given areas, like taxation, 
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environmental controls and other regulations as well as to prevent the destruction of the 
contract itself before the contract expires.
222
 International investment law comes off as 
particularly well suited to protect investor‘s rights even in circumstances where key 
constituencies in the host country lobby for legislative amendments or a cancellation of 
an investment contract. The reason for this observation is that international investment 
law consists of a set of binding constraints designed to insulate economic policy from 
majoritarian politics.
223
   
 
However, stabilization clauses cannot fulfill their ideals because constitutional theory 
prescribes that a sovereign state cannot bind its actions by contract and that it can 
always change its legislation. They nonetheless raise the legitimate expectations of the 
parties, which are factored in the assessment of dispute settlement fora when they 
award compensation.
224
 Thus, arbitrators may use violations of stabilization clauses by 
a host state to award damages, but generally they do not order specific performance of 
a stabilization clause out of respect for state sovereignty and because of the inability to 
enforce such an award.
225
 If contracts could bind the legislative sovereignty of host 
states, foreign investors would be promoted to the position of legal persons under 
international law; and investment contracts would be elevated to the status of a treaty, 
which is unquestionably not the case.  
 
1.3.4. Choice-of-law clauses 
Another technique to protect foreign investment is to incorporate a choice-of-law 
clause in the investment contract. Whereas stabilization clauses ‗freeze‘  domestic laws 
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as they were at the time of signing an investment contract, choice-of-law clauses 
exclude the application of the domestic laws of the host state and subject the contract to 
some external standards like the ‗general principles of law‘.226 The default contract 
provision is that the law of the host state is the governing law because it is in the 
majority of cases the place of performance under the contract, though some 
jurisdictions put limitations on choice-of-law clauses. However, pursuant to the well-
established principle of party autonomy in contract law, parties to an investment 
contract may choose the legal system that will apply to the contract. A party to the 
contract can therefore choose a legal system other than that of the host state as 
applicable to the contract. Parties usually select a neutral, commercially sophisticated, 
well-developed body of law such as English law or New York law.
227
 By choosing a 
foreign legal system a foreign investor can prevent a host state wishing to evade 
contractual obligations from taking an unfair advantage or counting on the 
parochialism of domestic courts in the event of a dispute over the terms of the contract.  
 
The weakness of choice-of-law clauses is that they do not have the desired effect of 
subjecting investment contracts to a system which is higher in the hierarchy than that of 
the legal system of the host state.
228
 A foreign legal system chosen by either or both 
party will have only a co-equal and not a superior authority.
 229
 That is the reason why 
parties sometimes choose the laws of the host state that are not inconsistent with 
international law,
230
 albeit there is no specific branch of international law that applies to 
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contracts between states and foreign private parties.
231
 According to Sornarajah, the 
difficulty for foreign investors to skirt the law of the host state is the special nature of 
foreign investment agreements as opposed to contracts in relation to which the law 
developed the party autonomy doctrine:
232
 
 
Unlike export transactions, which have a uniform degree of contact with several jurisdictions, 
the foreign investment contract has contact predominantly with the state…The carrying out of 
any major industrial project attracts the application of many regulatory controls, such as those 
relating to planning, environmental protection, customs controls and similar areas of public law. 
Such laws…will be regarded as mandatory provisions of the law, and it is well accepted in 
every legal system that mandatory laws cannot be evaded by the mere technique of choosing a 
foreign law as the law applicable to the contract. 
 
1.3.5. Arbitration 
Arbitration is a third contractual device protective of foreign investment. An arbitration 
clause refers for adjudication all disputes between the host state and the foreign 
investor to a neutral forum – often an international mechanism like the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). An arbitration clause is 
preferable to an equivalent provision in a BIT because the arbitration clause can be 
tailored to the needs of the parties and can, unlike BITs, be used in conjunction with 
stabilization and choice-of-law clauses.
233
  
 
Typically, a foreign investor will not trust the ability of a developing country and its 
courts to adjudicate on investor-state dispute impartially and independently. Reference 
of disputes to the domestic courts of a country other than the host country raises issues 
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of sovereign immunity.
234
 Foreign investors often opted for ad hoc tribunals and later 
for ICSID tribunals when negotiations with host states fell through. The World Bank 
adopted in 1965 the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), which came into force in 
1966. The primary purpose of ICSID is to facilitate the conciliation and arbitration of 
international investment disputes.
235
     
  
1.3.6. Other clauses 
Damages – Foreign investors may protect their interests by insisting on the inclusion of 
a damages clause in the investment contract. The damages clause should lay down that 
the state has no right to violate contract terms and, in the event of the state 
expropriating the investor‘s property or contract rights, the state is obliged to 
compensate the investor the full value of the investment.
236
 To avoid long disputes over 
the method of determining damages, the damages clause should clearly stipulate the 
method of valuation of the expropriated property.
237
 
 
Sovereign immunity waiver – Investors may also insert a clause into the contract that 
stipulates that the host state may not claim sovereign immunity from legal processes 
when it carries out activities that are commercial in nature. Waivers of sovereign 
immunity often appear in BITs, though nothing keep parties from adding the waiver in 
the investment contract. Sovereign immunity waivers are controversial in the eyes of 
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several developing countries and their civil society because of the observation that they 
not only limit national sovereignty but also impede the democratic process.
238
   
 
Waiver of local remedies exhaustion requirement – International arbitration rules 
oblige investors to exhaust domestic remedies before instituting proceedings at the 
international level in a neutral forum. To provide for a speedier and more effective 
process, investors may demand that the host states waive the requirement that investors 
exhaust domestic remedies before they can proceed to the international forum. 
 
Miscellaneous – Investors and states may negotiate to allow investors to convert 
revenues into hard currencies and to repatriate profit. In addition, parties may negotiate 
how interest on arbitral awards is going to be calculated as well as the exceptional 
circumstances under which parties will be relieved of their contractual duties. Finally, 
to ensure the effective enforcement of the investment contract, investors may urge the 
host state itself to execute the contract and to join as a party thereto.
239
       
 
 
2. The Resource curse 
Economic literature on the determinants of economic growth in mineral economies in 
Africa is replete with discussions on the resource curse, the contradiction between 
wealth of natural resources and development.
240
 The literature sub-divides in three 
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separate sub-literatures:
 241
 On the relationship between natural resources and political 
regimes, on the relationship between natural resources and economic performance, and 
the relationship between natural resources and civil war. This is to say that the resource 
curse negatively impact political systems, the economy and social stability. 
 
The overall tendency in legal scholarship has been to posit the veracity of the resource 
curse.
242
 Yet empirical research on the resource curse theory is not conclusive because 
the relationship between resources and their effects on government, the economy and 
stability, is mediated by too many circumstantial variables for any causal relationship 
to be inferred. For that reason, this dissertation handles the resource curse theory in a 
unique, unusual way: It does not endorse the theory as a framework predictive of poor 
governance, economic performance and social relations; rather, it utilizes it as a 
framework indicative of the risks that foreign investors may face in most resource rich 
countries in Africa. 
 
2.1. The curse on democracy 
Several studies have advanced arguments and evidence to the effect that the ‗unearned‘ 
revenues from natural resource exploitation results in lower democracy. Proponents of 
those arguments would claim that R4I contracts contribute to lower democracy to the 
extent that they provide rents to host governments in the form of dividends, royalties 
and fiscal revenues from natural resources exploitation. Leonard Wantchekon (1999) 
found that a one percent increase in resource dependence, measured by the ratio of 
primary exports to GDP, increases the probability of authoritarianism by about eight 
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242
 See for instance, Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence as a 
Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril and Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 395 (2009); 
Patrick J. Keenan, supra Ch. 1 note 31. 
                                                                                                                             209 
percent.
243
 Wantchekon came to that conclusion after examining evidence from 141 
countries between 1950 and 1990. He said that the lack of transparency and the lack of 
rules in the rent distribution process engender authoritarian governments in resource 
rich economies. After analyzing evidence from 113 states between 1971 and 1997, 
Michael Ross (2001) added that the states that relied on oil or mineral exports tended to 
become less democratic.
244
 One-third of the world‘s resource-dependent economies are 
in Africa.
245
 
 
Arguments on the causal relationship between natural resources and low levels of 
democracy
246
 belong to any one of four schools of thoughts. The first school is state-
centric and argues that governments in resource rich countries increase public spending 
and decrease taxes in order to dilute pressures for the democratic opening of 
governments.
247
 The second school of thoughts contends that natural resources 
undermine democracy by enabling governments to spend more on internal security.
248
 
The third school connects political regimes and civil wars. The argument is that natural 
resources abundance fixes governments on power, causing opposition groups to seek 
executive power by any means, even extra-constitutional means.
249
 The case of the 
fourth school is that natural resources wealth blocks democracy by barring the social 
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and cultural changes underpinning democracy such as higher educational levels.
250
 
Michael Herb has been a critic of the fourth school of thought. Using cross-regional 
dataset, he finds no consistent support for the proposition that rentierism has a net 
negative effect on democracy.
251
  
 
2.2. The curse on the economy 
The resource curse theory also holds that the abundance of natural resources impairs 
economic performance. Development economics orthodoxy in the 1950s had it that 
natural resource wealth would benefit developing countries. Developing countries were 
believed to suffer from imbalances in the factors of production: Even though most had 
labor surpluses, they fell short of investable capital.
252
 The general prognosis was 
therefore that countries richly endowed with natural resources would most easily 
resolve capital shortages thanks to their ability to export raw materials and their 
attractiveness to foreign investors.
253
 
 
The myriad perspectives on the causal connection between natural resources and 
economic performance stress different aspects of the connection. Though economic 
perspectives abound, nowadays studies have started to question the validity and 
reliability of economic explanations.
254
 As a result, most recent studies on the 
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relationship between natural resource wealth and economic performance have 
incorporated insights from political science.
255
  
 
2.2.1. Economic explanations   
Subsequent economic research digged out a host of objections to the theoretical 
orthodoxy in development economics, with evidence suggesting that resource rents 
adversely affected terms of trade, GDP growth rates, commodities market volatility, 
and linkages of the extractive industries to the rest of the economy. 
 
a) Terms of trade 
Some economists maintain that exports of primary commodities is bad for the terms of 
trade. In international trade and economics, ‗terms of trade‘ are the relative prices of a 
country‘s exports to imports at any one time and which are set by the value of that 
country‘s currency (i.e. exchange rate). In plain English, ‗terms of trade‘ means how 
much one country imports per export. An appreciating exchange rate makes exports 
more expensive and less competitive in world markets, and, conversely, a depreciating 
exchange rate makes imports more expensive.
256
  
 
The Prebisch-Singer thesis
257
 submits that the net barter terms of trade between raw 
materials and manufactures slide along a long-term downward trend. Stated differently, 
the thesis claims that, unless global economic patterns change, the distribution of gains 
from trade between commodity-dependent countries and those exporting mainly 
                                                 
255
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manufactures will be unequal.  Many an economist has found that the terms of trade for 
primary commodities has dropped since the early 20
th
 century (the ‗secular 
deterioration‘ hypothesis) and that the rates of the decline of terms of trade ranges from 
0.1 to 0.3 percent.
258
 Since the beginning of the 1980s, terms of trade for primary 
commodities decreased as the volume of commodity exports increased. The spike in 
the volume of commodity exports was fuelled by the debt crisis, structural adjustment 
programs, the fall of centrally planned economies in eastern Europe and the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) after 1989, and the 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis.
259
  
 
Fortunately, since the dawn of the 21
th
 century, the terms of trade between some 
countries in Africa and China have improved. These developments contradict 
predictions that exports of primary commodities negatively impact the terms of trade. 
 
b) GDP growth rate 
The resource curse theory says that natural resources wealth reduces the rate of 
economic growth. David Wheeler (1984) found that during the 1970s the countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa that were rich in natural resources experienced lower economic 
growth rates, but he concluded that this economic performance may well be due less to 
bad management than to adverse circumstances.
260
 Eric Neumayer (2004) deducted 
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depreciation from GDP to arrive at ‗genuine income‘ and use genuine income to test 
the resource curse.
261
 He found that the test results supported the curse, but noted that 
evidence also suggested that the curse is partly due to over-consumption.
262
 
 
With the exception of Côte d‘Ivoire, CAR, the DRC, and Zimbabwe, however, the 
actual economic growth rates of resource rich African countries over the past decade 
irrefutably belie theories that natural resource wealth is ominous for GDP growth rates 
(see Figure 10 below). 
 
Figure 10: Economic growth rate in Africa 1996-2005 
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Source: H. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road (2007). 
 
 
c) Commodities market volatility 
International commodity markets are generally known to be inherently unstable; and 
instability within those markets could negatively reverberate as far away as the 
domestic economies of resource rich nations in Africa.
263
 This instability of 
international commodity markets leads to the instability of government revenues, 
foreign exchange reserves and creates risks for foreign investors. Yet the jury is still 
out as to whether the exceptional instability of export earnings is harmful and helpful to 
commodity-dependent economies. A stable of economists found that export earning 
instability can either be harmful to economic growth or harmless.
264
 Jere Behrman 
(1984) found no evidence supporting claims that instabilities in international 
commodity markets have a deleterious impact on the economy of resource rich 
countries.
265
 Like David Dawe (1996) and Behrman stated,
266
 export instability claims 
depend on the method of measuring export instability, which often distorts conclusions 
on the effect of export instability. Dawe concludes that export instability is positively 
                                                 
263
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associated with investment, but negatively associated with growth in several resource 
rich countries from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s. 
 
Yet some economists believe that export earning instability is beneficial to mineral 
economies. Studies have shown consistently that uncertainty about export earnings of 
resource rich countries compels them to buffer themselves against future exogenous 
shocks and produces higher economic growth
267
 and unusually high levels of private 
investment.
268
 As Ghosh & Ostry (1994) found, developing countries have responded 
to increases in export instability by building up precautionary savings balances.
269
 
 
d) Forward and backward linkages 
Economic analyses have also put forth arguments that resource rents do not spread to 
other sectors of the economy. For Albert Hirschman (1958), one of the major problems 
with the exploitation of natural resources is that it is an ‗enclave‘: Multinational 
corporations exploit natural resources and repatriate profits and do not invest them into 
the local economy.
270
 This situation occluded development by confining opportunities 
to develop backward and forward linkages between mineral extraction and other 
sectors of the host economy.
271
 These economic linkages arguments lost much 
credibility in the 1970s as developing nations took dominant control of mineral 
extraction, restricted the repatriation of profits and nationalized major hard-rock and 
petroleum firms. Some strands of the dependency theory claim that those measures 
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would solve the problem of economic linkages.
272
 However, notwithstanding currency 
restrictions, national control of extractive industries and other measures in the same 
line, linkages of resource rents to the rest of the economic are still to materialize. 
Michael Ross (1999) speculates that the problem may be due to export diversification 
constraints or the lack of political will to foster linkages, even when states have the 
capacity to do so.
273
  
 
R4I investment contracts are particularly suited to diversify the economy as they build 
infrastructure in other sectors. This feature of R4I contracts is visible in the Angola-
China and the DRC-China R4I contracts. In the Angolan example, the Angolan and 
Chinese parties invested through a R4I contract hundreds of millions in various sectors, 
including health, education, energy, water, fisheries, agriculture, transport, 
communication, and public works.   
 
e) The Dutch disease 
Though the ‗Dutch disease‘ is loosely associated with the resource curse, the true 
meaning of the concept is narrower. Coined in the 1980s after the discovery of the large 
North Sea natural gas field in the Netherlands in 1959, the ‗Dutch disease‘ refers to the 
deindustrialization of a country‘s economy that ensues from a resource boom, whose 
mechanism can be described as follows.
274
 The discovery of natural resources raises the 
real exchange rate of the country as its exports sharply increase, thereby rendering its 
manufactured products less competitive than those from other countries. As a 
consequence, capital and labor drift towards the extractive sector away from other 
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tradable sectors, primarily manufacturing and agriculture, increasing in the process 
production costs in those sectors. At the same time the Dutch disease hypothesis states 
that commodity booms lead to wealth effects and to an appreciation of real exchange 
rates that squeeze other tradable sectors,
275
 a wealth of evidence shows that resource 
booms do not harm most mineral economies but that they often hurt manufacturing 
sectors. 
276
  
 
Other studies on the link between natural resources wealth and economic performance 
went beyond emphases on terms of trade, rates of economic growth, commodities 
markets, and linkages to the rest of the economy. These studies found that, compared to 
non-mineral economies, resource rich countries do badly in terms of inflation, 
corruption,
277
 savings rates,
278
 external indebtedness, export diversification, 
employment, wage dualism, and agricultural growth. Wood and Berge (1997) found 
that whether a country exports mainly manufactured products or mainly primary 
products is a function of the skills of its labor force, relative to its natural resource 
endowment.
279
 Michael Ross (2003) found that, after controlling for initial income, a 
state‘s dependence on mineral exports in 1970 is robustly associated with poverty and 
low levels of human development for the poor in the late 1990s. 
280
 After making 
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headway in reducing its dependence on raw materials in the late 1980s, Africa‘s efforts 
in that regard has since stalled.
281
   
 
2.2.2. Political explanations 
Political explanations postulate that the reason why natural resource abundance causes 
poor economic performance is directly related to the developmental capacity of the 
state as an institution. These explanations are part of general efforts to excogitate a 
political economy of development that accounts for the political incentives that 
generate the suboptimal economic performance of some resource rich states.
282
 They 
posit resource rents as the independent variable and economic morosity as the 
dependent variable. James Robinson and others (2002) say that countries with strong 
political institutions benefit from resource booms whereas those with weak political 
institutions suffer from a resource curse.
283
 The difference is that states with strong 
institutions are capable of creating the capacity to, inter alia, absorb resource rents. 
 
The necessary implication from such observations is clearly that state-building is 
indispensable for countries in Africa to turn a resource boom into a resource blessing. 
A study by Cameron Thies (2010) bolsters that implication as it positively tests the 
claim that natural resources affect state fiscal capacity and that increased fiscal capacity 
deters the onset of state failure.
284
 Inversely, when public revenues decline, the benefits 
of predation on natural resources increased, with state failure a logical and often a real 
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world result in Africa.
285
 Viewed from that angle, therefore, R4I contracts avoid the 
onset of state failure insofar as R4I contracts increase the fiscal capacity of the state.     
 
The notion of the ‗rentier state‘, pioneered by the economist Hussein Mahdavi, 286 
encapsulates most political explanations. The rentier state is a state that derives rent
287
 
– regular and substantial amounts of unearned income – from various sources related to 
extractive activities, including taxes on the exportation of natural resources, mining 
royalties, corporate income taxes, etc. Resource rents may substitute for taxes, which 
create pressures for accountability,
288
 or may soften the necessity to levy taxes and the 
incentive of the rentier state to be accountable vis-à-vis its citizens. The rentier state 
neglects to develop extractive industries, resulting in the state lacking information 
needed to formulate appropriate development strategies.
289
 As Hootan Shambayati 
(1994) demonstrated, rentierism enhances state autonomy and by eliminating 
economically motivated pressure groups and by making a segment of the bourgeoisie 
dependent on the state.
290
 Resource rents also make governments in resource rich 
countries risk averse, preferring to maintain the status quo and sacrifice efficient 
development policies that may meet strong opposition groups in society. 
 
Because rentier states possess vast reserves of ‗unearned‘ income to spend, they tend to 
develop greater capacity in distributive functions (such as social welfare, education, 
and health) and production functions than in functions regulating and supervising the 
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economy and domestic taxation.
291
 For instance, Kiren Aziz Chaudry (1994) 
emphasizes the relative weight of political coalitions, institutional structures and policy 
in determining the outcomes of economic liberalization reforms in resource rich 
countries.
292
 More precisely, Chaudry argues that the nature of the state‘s involvement 
in the economy and different patterns of business-government relations ultimately 
determined the outcomes of economic reform in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
293
 Dirk 
Vandewalle (1998) shows how, as a result of Libya‘s failure to develop strong state 
institutions, substantial oil revenues did little to finance the modernization and building 
of the Libyan state.
294
  
 
Political scientist Terry Karl (1997), who uses the concept of ‗petro-state‘, argues that 
oil-exporting countries chose common development trajectories and suffered similar 
disappointing political and economic outcomes.
295
 Petro-states share the propensity to 
engage in the ‗political distribution of rents‘ more than in production, economic growth 
and private investment.
296
 Mick Moore (2004)
297
 argues that unearned rents create 
conditions conducive to bad governance, including autonomy of government from the 
citizenry, incentives for foreign interventions, coups, failure to the expand the tax 
collection capacity of the state, and non-transparency in government spending.  
 
Richard Auty (2001) showed that mineral rich countries in the Caspian region are 
slower reformers than resource poor countries in transition in the same region, even if 
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all the countries in the region have failed to create developmental political states.
298
 He 
however found that corruption and rent-seeking did not vary with natural resource 
endowment.
299
 Auty & Gelb (2001)
300
 present evidence showing that resource rents 
will most probably develop predatory or factional oligarchies rather than 
developmental political states because (1) resource rents create a high tolerance by the 
poor majority for unfair asset distribution, creating in turn risks that the state fails to 
redistribute wealth, (2) resource rich countries are more prone to trade protectionism 
than to efficient export-oriented policies because of the Dutch disease, (3) the 
importance of the resource sector means that it can support inefficient inward-looking 
sectors, and (4) resource rents lead resource rich countries to ‗cumulative policy error‘.  
 
2.2.3. Rational and behavioralist explanations 
Ideas that resource endowments can lead to short-sighted behavior, inefficient policies 
or ‗irrational exuberance‘301 gained currency as early as the 16th century when Jean 
Bodin said that:
302
 
 
Livy remarks that the inhabitants of rich and fertile country are normally mean and cowardly, 
whereas a barren soil makes men sober of necessity, and in consequence careful, vigilant, and 
industrious. 
 
Rational explanations of resource rents on economic performance assume that mineral 
resource wealth gives rise to corruption and rent-seeking behavior among the political 
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elite of a given mineral rich country. Michael Ross (2001) uses the phrase ‗rent-
seizing‘ to describe the process whereby political elites seek to seize resource rents 
directly or by appropriating to themselves to right to distribute resource rents.
303
 When 
resource rents are forecast to be short-lived, political elites tend to maximize resource 
rents; when they are forecast to be permanent, elites tend to redistribute resource rents 
to influence elections.
304
 In either case, resource rents compromise positive economic 
outcomes. Ragnar Torvik (2002) developed a model showing that with rent seeking a 
greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs seeking rent 
and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms.
305
 Torvik concludes 
that:
306
 
 
…increased productive capacity may decrease or increase welfare, depending on how it 
increases profits in rent seeking, relative to profits in modern production. Because of demand 
externalities, the initial response of entrepreneurs is strengthened, and increased productive 
capacity induces negative or positive multipliers.  
 
Behavioralist explanations, on the other hand, do not assume that political elites are 
rational self-maximizers but that they suffer from either a myopic sloth or ‗irrational 
exuberance‘, prompting them to formulate and implement ill-advised policies. Some 
political scientists have for example explained that natural resource discoveries made 
political elites irrationally optimistic, wishful in their thinking
307
 and wasteful in their 
spending.
308
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2.2.4. Societal explanations 
Unlike political, rational and behavioralist accounts of the impact of resource 
abundance on economic performance, societal explanations do not worry so much 
about political elites as they do about the relative power of various groups and classes 
in society. A group of scholars claimed that resource rents strengthen well-connected 
business groups and that the government in those resource rich states designs policies 
aimed at benefiting those groups.
309
 James Mahon (1992) noted that the same events 
that made Latin America competitive in manufactured exports forced poor citizens to 
sacrifice so that their country could repay a public debt that financed the purchase of 
foreign assets by the rich.
310
 In Latin America, resource wealth gave rise to the 
emergence of landed and business elites with vested interests in import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) as opposed to the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
practiced in resource poor East Asia, where no such elites exist.
311
 
 
Another group of researchers has defended that natural resource abundance subverts 
social cohesion by lessening the capacity of states to manage social tensions and 
external economic shocks.
312
 Tensions between social groups flare up as the ownership 
of or the right to distribute oil, hard minerals and plantation crops is concentrated in the 
hands of a few well-connected individuals or families (rentier capitalists), making it 
difficult to reach social consensus on an economic reform agenda.
313
 During times of 
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economic prosperity these tensions subside but resurface when the state suffers from 
economic shocks or decline.
314
  
 
2.2.5. Dependency or neo-colonialist explanations 
A line of thinking in the scholarship on the resource curse claims that countries rich in 
natural resources are forced into the capitalist structure of the global economic system. 
The global capitalist system is one based on unequal exchange where the interests of 
poor countries are subordinated to those of rich countries. The global capitalist system 
impairs the ability of resource rich countries to pursue autonomous programs of 
economic development.
315
 For Michael Perelman (2003), for example, the origins of 
the curse of oil do not lie in the physical properties of petroleum but in the ‗social 
structure of the world:‘316 
 
A rich natural resource base makes a poor country, especially a relatively powerless one, an 
inviting target—both politically and militarily—for dominant nations. In the case of oil, the 
powerful nations will not risk letting such a valuable resource fall under the control of an 
independent government, especially one that might pursue policies that do not coincide with the 
economic interests of the great transnational corporations. So, governments that display 
excessive independence soon find themselves overthrown, even if their successors will foster an 
environment of corruption and political instability. 
 
With China‘s spectacular investments in Africa‘s oil and mining sectors, some 
commentators have already started interpreting the failed coups in Equatorial Guinea in 
2005
317
 and in Guinea in 2009
318
 as evidence of the scramble among powerful 
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countries for resources in Africa. John B. Foster (2006) says that, although the US 
military buildup is frequently justified as necessary to counter growing instability in the 
oil regions of sub-Saharan Africa, American ‗grand strategists‘  are clear that the real 
issues are oil and China‘s growing presence in Africa:319 
 
All across Africa today, China is acquiring control of natural resource assets, outbidding 
Western contractors on major infrastructure projects, and providing soft loans and other 
incentives to bolster its competitive advantage… Most threatening from the standpoint of U.S. 
grand strategists is China‘s $2 billion low-interest loan to Angola in 2004, which has allowed 
Angola to withstand IMF demands to reshape its economy and society along neoliberal lines… 
Like the old scramble for Africa this new one is a struggle among great powers for resources 
and plunder—not for the development of Africa or the welfare of its population.  
 
 
2.3. The curse on security 
A third incidence of the resource curse is armed conflicts. The resource curse theory 
holds that certain types
320
 of natural resources lead to civil wars and influence their 
duration and the number of war-related human casualties. Natural resources can be 
categorized according to the type of civil war that they cause.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
involvement in the failed coup against the President of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea is only a tiny part of 
the present-day race for Africa‘s mineral wealth).   
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Table 19: The causal relationship with resource types and war types 
 
Type of  
Resources 
Example Type of 
war 
Explanation 
Point source 
resources close 
to the capital 
oil 
(Angola, 
Chad, 
 Congo), 
coffee  
(Rwanda) 
state 
control/ 
coup 
d‘Etat 
Point source resources can be easily monopolized by 
a single group because of their concentration in 
particular locations. 
 
Resources distant from the capital are easier for 
rebels to monopolize than those proximate to the 
capital. Point source 
resources distant 
from the capital 
oil (Sudan, 
Nigeria/ 
Biafra), 
copper 
(DRC) 
secession 
Diffuse resources 
close to the capital 
cropland 
(Senegal- 
Mauritania) 
rebellion/ 
rioting 
Diffuse resources cannot be easily monopolized by a 
single group because of their dispersion over a broad  
geographical area. 
 
Resources distant from the capital are easier for 
 Rebels to monopolize than those proximate to the 
capital. 
 
Distant  diffuse resource are easily accessible, 
marketable and sufficiently valuable. 
Diffuse resources 
distant from the 
capital 
diamonds 
(Angola, 
DRC, 
Liberia, 
Sierra  
Leone), 
camels and 
bananas 
(Somalia) 
war- 
lordism 
Lootable resources alluvial 
diamonds 
and 
narcotics 
separatist Extraction of lootable resources involves highly 
skilled labor and benefits skilled workers, resource 
firms and the government. 
Unlootable resources oil, natural 
gas, and 
deep-shaft 
minerals 
non- 
separatist 
Extraction of unlootable resources involves 
unskilled 
labor and benefits unskilled workers and local 
people. 
 
Source: P. Le Billon, The political ecology of war (2001) 572ff; M. Ross, Oil, drugs and diamonds (2003); A. Rosser, The political 
economy of the resource curse (2006) 19-20.  
 
Since 1990 natural resources have played a central part in triggering, prolonging and 
financing eight
321
 civil wars in Africa.
322
 The UN has on several occasions singled out 
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mineral resources as a cause of conflicts in Africa. In a report on the causes of conflict 
in Africa, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that control of mineral 
resources, in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola, are economic motives for the 
armed conflicts. 
323
 The UN General Assembly even passed a resolution in which it 
urges the diamond rich countries and the diamond industry to ‗find ways to break the 
link between conflict diamonds and armed conflict.‘324 
 
2.3.1. Outbreak 
The discourse on resource-conflict causal mechanisms takes place in the larger debates 
on the causes of civil wars.
325
 Two camps have emerged in those debates. The first 
camp stresses the motives of rebel organizations and posits that grievances resulting 
from economic inequalities cause wars; the second camp emphasizes the economic 
motives and opportunities, and suggests that greed (i.e. the rebels‘ desire to enrich 
themselves) and opportunities to fund rebel organizations determine the outbreak of 
civil wars.
326
  
 
In the grievance camp, political scientists like Michael Ross place a particular focus on 
grievances arising from the exploitation of natural resources: Land expropriation and 
compensation disputes, corruption,
327
 environmental degradation, labor and labor-
related issues. The poor management of a large mining sector almost unavoidably 
results in massive violations of human rights and may touch off armed conflicts. The 
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substantial mining revenues often create vicious cycles of corruption and inefficient 
governance, which both set the scene for the massive violations of human rights and 
armed conflicts.
328
 The DRC‘s 1996-2003 civil wars, the worst humanitarian crisis 
since World War II,
329
  were in large part fuelled by the illegal trade in minerals in the 
eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. The fact that it claimed the life of 
over five million people is probably the strongest evidence of the connection between 
mining and civil strife. 
 
In the greed camp are, among others, economic studies by Collier & Hoeffler, who 
produced a hefty body of evidence for the proposition that the resource wealth is 
strongly correlated with civil wars. They defined resource wealth in terms of the ratio 
of primary exports to GDP and examined 98 countries and 27 civil wars. Collier & 
Hoeffler‘s model suggests that what actually happens is that opportunities for  
controlling primary exports cause civil wars and the grievances that they engender 
incite diasporas to fund further conflict.
330
 They found that resource abundance 
increased the risk of civil war, usually secessionist wars,
331
 and decreased it if exports 
exceeded a certain threshold level.
332
 However, they found that the effect of resource 
abundance on civil wars was less significant if their earlier export-based measure of 
wealth was replaced by a rent-based measure.
333
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Beyond greed and grievance hypotheses, researchers have found alternative 
explanations for the role of natural resource wealth in setting off armed conflicts. In 
any event, it is more realistic to proceed on the general premise that civil wars often 
result, if not always, from several causal mechanisms rather than one. It is for that 
reason that a combination of explanations, rather than one overarching explanation, is 
more likely to illuminate the debate on the resource-conflict causal link.  
 
Single factor causal theories, such as ‗looting‘ explanations, do not enrich debates on 
the role of natural resources in armed conflicts. First, the ‗looting‘ explanation states 
that resource wealth causes wars because rebels can finance their activities by 
exporting natural resources themselves or by taxing the exporters.
334
 Many other 
contributing factors, like the fragility of social cohesion, could account for those wars 
rather than the mere opportunities offered to rebels to finance wars through the illegal 
trade or taxation of natural resources.  
 
A second alternative explanation is that civil wars in resource rich countries are caused 
by state weakness and not by greed or grievances.
335
 In 2008, an African Development 
Bank report stated that mineral resources did not exactly cause war in the DRC, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.
336
 It maintains that these three countries actually experienced state 
failure before suffering resource-fuelled civil wars.
337
 Auty (2004) argues that resource 
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rents create the necessary conditions for civil war by making the state predatory then by 
causing it to collapse, with war eventually breaking out depending on the type of 
resources the state possesses.
338
 Third, dependency explanations hold that, by 
increasing the probability that foreign actors will be involved in a rebellion, natural 
resources increases the risks of civil war.
339
   
 
2.3.2. Prolongation 
Some scholars have concluded that natural resource abundance prolongs the duration of 
civil wars. Natural resource wealth is said to stretch wars by providing rebels with the 
means to sustain their activities through looting, by making it less likely in a 
secessionist conflict that governments will adhere to a peace agreement granting a 
region fiscal autonomy, and by enabling rebels to sell future exploitation rights to 
minerals in the territory they plan to control
340
.
341
 Doyle & Sambanis (2006) found that 
the export of primary commodities is negatively associated with the success of peace 
building efforts in wars since 1945,
342
 which imply that primary commodity exports 
tend to prolong wars.
343
 James Fearon (2004) found that finances from contraband 
(cocaine, diamonds, and opium) have played a significant part in many of the longest 
civil wars since 1945.
344
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Ballentine & Nitzschke (2003) wrote that the way in which natural resources provide 
rents to combatants is pertinent to the duration of civil wars.
345
 The exploitation of 
natural resources by rebel groups finances and sustains armed conflicts. Rebel groups 
prefer to settle in areas producing primary commodities with considerable economic 
rents.
346
 The largest rents derive from the exploitation of natural resources, which is 
generally for export.
347
  
 
Access to lootable resources (e.g. alluvial diamonds and narcotics) appears to lengthen 
non-secessionist conflict by benefiting insurgents disproportionately whereas access to 
unlootable resources (e.g. oil and deep-shaft minerals) lengthen separatist and non-
separatist conflicts depending on the strength of the government.
348
 Luc Omgba, 
carried out statistical analysis with data covering a period ranging from the 1970s to the 
1990s and found that oil, probably owing to its strategic importance in world markets, 
prolongs the duration of government in power.
349
  
 
On balance, however, one of the weaknesses of claims that resource rents drag civil 
wars is that it is not yet clear which physical properties of natural resources are likely to 
ignite or prolong wars.
350
 Furthermore, natural resources are seldom the entire story 
behind insecurity and armed conflicts, but they make other underlying issues 
compounding conflicts intractable.
351
 
                                                 
345
 KAREN BALLENTINE & HEIKO NITZSCHKE, BEYOND GREED AND GRIEVANCE: POLICY LESSONS FROM 
STUDIES IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMED CONFLICT 5 (International Peace Academy, IPA Policy 
Report 2003). 
346
 PAUL COLLIER et al., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 75 
(World Bank and Oxford University Press 2003). 
347
 Id. 
348
 Karen Ballentine & Heiko Nitzschke, supra note 180. 
349
 Luc Désiré Omgba, On the Duration of Political Power in Africa: The Role of Oil Rents, 42 COMP. 
POL. STUD. 416 (2009).   
350
 Michael L. Ross, What Do We Know About Natural Resources, supra note 178, at 349. 
351
 PAUL COLLIER et al., supra note 181, at 63. 
                                                                                                                             233 
 
2.3.3. Human casualties 
There is sufficient empirical evidence proving that civil wars that emerge in 
environments rich in natural resources tend to result in higher levels of indiscriminate 
violence and, thereby, higher levels of civilian casualties.
352
 Based on empirical 
research in Uganda, Mozambique and Peru, Jeremy Weinstein (2007) explains that 
structures of internal control and external governance shape the capacity of rebel 
organizations to discipline their members and influence the expectations of civilians 
about their behavior when they seize a town.
353
 Weinstein claims that the 
indiscriminate character of insurgent behavior cause higher aggregate levels of violence 
as civilian resistance makes it increasingly difficult for economically opportunistic 
insurgencies to operate.
354
 
 
 Table 20: Relationship between resource endowments and rebel violence 
 
Initial endowments 
Challenges Economic endowments 
Control: 
ensuring that combatants follow orders permit indiscipline to maintain membership but  
control military strategy from the top 
Governance: 
managing civilians in areas of territorial 
control 
extract resources through coercion 
Violence: 
punishing individuals or groups for acts 
of defection 
employ violence indiscriminately and to a significant degree  
Resilience: 
maintaining rebel membership over 
time 
coercive tactics persist as groups find it difficult to change 
 their membership and alter civilians‘ expectations. 
 
                                                 
352
 JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN, INSIDE REBELLION: THE POLITICS OF INSURGENT VIOLENCE 7 (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
353
 Id. at 10.  
354
 Id. at 11. 
 234 
 
Source: J. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (2007) 12. 
 
The DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone may serve as examples of Weinstein‘s argument. 
The three countries are resource rich countries where the civil wars that afflicted their 
communities were to a greater or lesser extent resource-based.
355
 The humanitarian 
situation in these countries was depressingly bleak in 2008, with the DRC reeling from 
the deadliest civil war since World War II;
356
 Liberia posting 85 per cent of 
unemployment rate,
357
 the world‘s second highest in 2008; 358 and Sierra Leone listed 
as the country with the lowest human development that year.
359
  
 
 
3. PIRSA 
3.1. The heterogeneity of Africa 
What waters down the generalizability of theories on the political economy of resource 
rich countries in Africa is the continent‘s heterogeneity. It is extremely arduous to talk 
or theorize about the African continent as if it were a homogenous whole. With 53 
states and more than a billion people,
360
 the continent – the second largest and second 
most populous after Asia – is incredibly diverse (see Table below). Africa is highly 
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fragmented geographically, with extremely inconvenient and costly transportation 
networks, accounting for its small role in global commerce and investment.
361
  
 
Table 21: Heterogeneity of sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 GDP  
growth 
1996 
-2000 
GDP 
per 
capita, 
2000, 
in US 
dollars 
Sectors 
as  
percentage 
of GDP 
 
 
Oil 
produ- 
cers 
land- 
locked 
agri- 
culture 
indust- 
try 
manu- 
facturing 
services 
Angola 7.9 799 9 59 4 32 X  
Benin 4.8 324 35 14 9 50   
Botswana 5.7 3,671 2 44 4 43  X 
Burkina Faso 4.6 248 31 20 14 49  X 
Burundi 1.2 107 49 19 n.a 27  X 
Cameroon 4.5 737 43 15 8 40   
Cape Verde 6.5 1,292 7 20 1 73   
Central African Rep. 0.9 225 56 22 n.a 22  X 
Chad 7.8 261 59 8 6 29 X X 
Comoros 2.0 378 41 12 4 47   
Dem. Rep. Congo 0.0 88 59 12 5 n.a  X 
Republic of Congo 3.5 940 6 56 6 38 X  
Côte d‘Ivoire 1.5 574 26 18 15 56   
Equatorial Guinea 20.9 4,101 5 60 n.a 3 X  
Eritrea 2.2 174 14 22 10 55   
Ethiopia 5.5 132 41 9 n.a 39  X 
Gabon 1.7 3,860 9 68 5 22 X  
Gambia, the 4.5 327 28 13 5 48   
Ghana 4.7 275 35 25 9 40   
Guinea 3.6 381 24 35 4 37   
Guinea-Bissau 0.6 134 61 12 9 25   
Kenya 2.8 427 13 16 11 52   
Lesotho 2.7 543 16 36 18 38  X 
Liberia  130 61 9 8 30   
Madagascar 3.3 229 26 15 13 50   
Malawi 3.2 154 36 14 10 40  X 
Mali 5.7 237 33 24 3 35  X 
Mauritania 4.9 437 17 27 8 46   
Mauritius 4.9 4,223 5 26 19 56   
Mozambique 8.4 276 23 32 14 36   
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Namibia 4.0 2,035 10 23 11 57   
Niger 3.5 155 40 17 7 43  X 
Nigeria 4.0 402 26 48 4 24 X  
Rwanda 7.5 250 40 21 10 38  X 
São Tome & Principe 3.1 354 17 16 4 67   
Senegal 4.6 461 17 21 13 62   
Seychelles 2.0 6,688 3 28 16 70   
Sierra Leone 1.1 170 n.a n.a n.a n.a   
Somalia  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a   
South Africa 3.1 3,346 3 29 18 59   
Sudan, the 6.4 439 28 27 7 39 X  
Swaziland 2.8 1,358 n.a n.a n.a n.a  X 
Tanzania 5.4 314 41 15 7 35   
Togo 3.3 244 41 23 9 36   
Uganda 6.1 262 29 19 8 43  X 
Zambia 3.6 339 19 33 11 38  X 
Zimbabwe -2.4 457 16 21 13 42   
 
 # of 
bor- 
ders 
conflict 
affected 
population 
(millions) 
surface 
area 
(thousands 
of sq. km.) 
population 
density 
(# of people 
/sq. km.) 
Export 
diversifi- 
cation 
index 
 
Angola 3 X 14.5 1,247 12 1.1 
Benin 4  7.1 113 63 2.1 
Botswana 2  1.7 582 3  
Burkina Faso 6  12.7 274 46 2.2 
Burundi 3 X 7.5 28 269 1.6 
Cameroon 6  16.7 475 35 4.4 
Cape Verde 0  0.5 4 122 9.2 
Central African Rep. 5 X 4.0 623 6 3.4 
Chad 5 X 9.1 1,284 7 2.6 
Comoros 0  0.6 2 282 1.2 
Dem. Rep. Congo 9 X 56.4 2,345 24 3.0 
Republic of Congo 4 X 3.9 342 12  
Côte d‘Ivoire 5 X 17.4 322 54 4.0 
Equatorial Guinea 2  0.5 28 18 1.2 
Eritrea 3 X 4.6 118 39 5.2 
Ethiopia 5 X 71.3 1,104 65 4.0 
Gabon 3  1.4 268 5 1.6 
Gambia, the 1  1.5 11 130 5.2 
Ghana 3  21.4 239 90 4.0 
Guinea 6  8.2 246 34 4.2 
Guinea-Bissau 2 X 1.6 36 44 4.8 
Kenya 5  32.9 580 57 16.0 
Lesotho 1  1.8 30 61  
Liberia 3  3.5 111 32 2.0 
Madagascar 0  17.7 587 30 8.1 
Malawi 3  11.4 118 96 3.0 
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Mali 7  12.2 1,240 10 1.3 
Mauritania 4  3.0 1,026 3 3.8 
Mauritius 0  1.2 2 612 11.7 
Mozambique 5 X 19.5 802 24 2.0 
Namibia 3  2.0 824 2  
Niger 7  12.4 1267 10 1.9 
Nigeria 3  143.3 924 155 1.3 
Rwanda 4 X 8.4 26 320 2.4 
São Tome & Principe 0  0.2 1 171 1.5 
Senegal 5  10.6 197 54 12.2 
Seychelles 0  0.1 0
362
 189 2.7 
Sierra Leone 2 X 5.5 72 77 3.8 
Somalia 3 X 10.3 638 16 6.1 
South Africa 6 X 45.3 1,219 37  
Sudan, the 8 X 35.2 2,506 14 1.6 
Swaziland 1  1.1 17 65  
Tanzania 7  37.2 945 39 21.7 
Togo 3  5.1 57 89 5.3 
Uganda 5 X 27.2 241 113 7.3 
Zambia 7  10.9 753 15 5.1 
Zimbabwe 4  13.1 391 34 8.1 
 
Source: H. Broadman, Africa’s silk road (2007). 
 
3.2. The definition 
‗Politically insecure and resource rich states in Africa‘ (PIRSA) is a phrase that this 
dissertation coins. Since it has no precedent in other pieces of scholarly research, the 
phrase requires careful definition for the sake of clarity, coherence and consistency. It 
is just as important to define the phrase PIRSA so as to narrow down the list of relevant 
countries and those that will be the focus of this dissertation. Surely, it is not only the 
case that the majority of countries on the continent are richly endowed,
363
 but it is also 
highly impracticable to be all-embracing because R4I contracts – the object of this 
                                                 
362
 Surface area of Seychelles is 450 square kilometers. 
363
 Relying mainly on economic data from the CIA World Factbook 
[https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (last accessed Dec. 16, 2009)], 
the dissertation found that, of the 53 countries constituting the African continent, at least 30 countries are 
resource rich, namely Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (D.R.C.), the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Côte d‘Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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dissertation – are likely to be incompatible with some legal and economic systems in 
Africa.  
 
PIRSA is a complex, multilevel and multidimensional concept. At its most basic, it 
relates to countries affected by the resource curse in Africa. At a secondary level, the 
phrase refers to countries in Africa richly endowed with minerals and hydrocarbons 
that exhibit (1) undemocratic regime types, (2) poor economic governance, and that are 
either resurging from, plunging into or in the throes of (3) armed conflict. At the third 
level, the indicator level,
364
 the dissertation uses the Freedom House‘s rankings of 
countries,
365
 the World Bank‘s database366 and the Fund for Peace‘s rankings of failed 
states, to measure regime type,
367
 economic performance
368
 and security situation,
369
 
respectively. These definitional requirements must be met cumulatively, which means 
that, if a country does not fulfill any of those requirements, it cannot be regarded as a 
PIRSA. 
 
                                                 
364
 This definition of the concept PIRSA follows the three-level model of concept definition expounded 
in GARY GOERTZ, SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A USER‘S GUIDE (Princeton University Press 2006). 
365
 Information on the methodology of Freedom House is available at www.freedomhouse.org (last 
accessed Dec. 16, 2009). By way of summary, here is a reproduction of the most essential information on 
the Freedom House‘s rating methodology: The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political 
rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three 
subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning 
of Government (3). The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of 
Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these questions on a scale 
of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties 
present. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status 
of ―Free,‖ ―Partly Free,‖ or ―Not Free.‖ Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 
to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free. 
366
 Contained in Table 21 ‗Heterogeneity of sub-Saharan Africa‘ above. 
367
 A Freedom House rating of ‗Not Free‘ would indicate a country situation meets the political 
dimension of the definition of the PIRSA concept. 
368
 The dissertation examines the cumulative effects of the average GDP growth rate from 1996 to 2000, 
to the GDP per capita, the GDP per sector and the export diversification index to determine whether the 
economic performance of a country in Africa has been poor.  
369
 A Fund For Peace rating of ‗Alert‘ would indicate that a country situation meets the security 
dimension of the definition of the PIRSA concept. 
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Using the above thick concept of PIRSA, the countries in Africa that fall under that 
definition consist of Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Guinea, Côte d‘Ivoire, Niger, Cameroon, and Republic of Congo (Congo-
Brazzaville). These 9 countries are relevant cases, cases to which the R4I model 
elaborated in this dissertation should apply. Relevance in the cases of Zimbabwe, 
Sudan, the DRC, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and Angola is also due to the available 
evidence that these states entered with China into agreements involving natural 
resources. The 21 non-PIRSA
370
 are relevant to this dissertation even if they are not its 
primary focus (see Figure 11 below) because it is possible to apply the R4I contract 
model to non-PIRSA as has been done in Angola, Gabon, Ghana and Nigeria. 
 
Figure 11: Scope of the dissertation   
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The entire usefulness of the PIRSA concept lies in the fact that it indicates the sort of 
obstacles that might block R4I contracts and more traditional investment contracts from 
benefiting states and their respective people in Africa. Put another way, the usefulness 
of the PIRSA concept is that it signals that the costs of doing business is high in the 
countries that it stands for. From an economic analysis of investment contracts, high 
transaction costs are inefficient. Inefficiencies in the infrastructure sector alone already 
cost countries in Africa 17 billion US dollars every year.
371
  
 
The comparative advantage of a particular investment contract type over another is 
therefore a function of its ability to intercede in the reduction of transaction costs 
or/and the resolution of one or more dimensions of the resource curse. A phrase that 
carries that comparative advantage is ‗flexibility for development‘. This sort of 
flexibility can be understood as the ‗ability of an investment contract to be adapted to 
the particular conditions prevailing in developing countries and to the realities of the 
economic asymmetries between these countries and developed countries.‘372 In other 
words, it is the greater flexibility for development that makes, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, one investment contract type more beneficial to developing countries and 
PIRSA than another type. 
 
3.3. The contexts 
The contexts in which most countries in Africa evolve are marked by accountability, 
capacity and security issues. According to Transparency International, more than half 
                                                 
371
 VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., supra Ch. 1 note 17, at 31. 
372
 UNCTAD, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS VOL. I., supra Ch. 1 note 67, at 53. 
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of the most corrupt
373
 countries were in Africa in 2008.
374
 Of the 18 countries in that 
category of countries, 10 were African.
375
 Ranked from the most corrupt, these 
countries were Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Guinea 
Bissau, the DRC, and Congo-Brazzaville.
376
 Moreover, the Fund for Peace ranks 
countries in terms of institutional capacity.
377
 It had, as of October 2008, a list of 32 
failed states. Of these 38 failed states, 22 were located in Africa.
378
 In descending order 
of state failure, these African countries were Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, the 
DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea, Cȏ te d‘Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Niger, Burundi, Cameroon, Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Congo-
Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and Eritrea.
379
  
 
The reason why PIRSA should resort to R4I contracts ultimately lies in governance 
issues. If a host country is faced with governance challenges, the need for greater 
transparency, or an institutional failure to build infrastructure, it makes sense for that 
country to resort to R4I contracts.
380
 It is in that sense that R4I contracts can be viewed 
                                                 
373
 ‗Most corrupt countries‘ refers to the lowest tenth on the list of transparency/corruption of 
Transparency International. 
374
 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2009, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table (last visited May 
21, 2010).  
375
 Id. 
376
 Id. 
377
 The Fund for Peace uses six political indicators, two economic indicators and four social indicators. 
The six political indicators are criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state, deterioration of public 
services, misapplication of the rule of law and human rights violations, the security apparatus operating 
as a state within a state, the rise of factionalized elites, and the intervention of other states or external 
political actors. The economic indicators are uneven economic development among group lines and 
severe economic decline. Finally, the social indicators mounting demographic pressures, massive 
movement of refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), legacy of group grievance, and human 
flight. 
378
 The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index Scores 2009, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 (last 
visited May 21, 2010). 
379
 Id.  
380
 Phone interview with Vivien Foster, supra Ch. 4 note 163. 
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as a mechanism to bind host governments into performing a governance function, that 
is, public investments in social and economic infrastructure.  
  
Unsurprisingly, as the World Bank report on the ease of doing business demonstrates, it 
is hard to do business in the countries plagued by conflict, corruption, or institutional 
dysfunction on the continent.
381
 Effectively, the World Bank shows that countries with 
the least conducive regulatory environment for business are the CAR, DRC, Guinea-
Bissau, São Tomé & Principe, Republic of Congo, Chad, Burundi, Eritrea, Niger, 
Guinea, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Angola.
382
  
 
Table 22: Comparative ease of doing business in Africa
383
 
 
                                                 
381
 See World Bank, Doing Business 2010, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/?regionid=7.  
382
 Id. 
383
 Adapted from World Bank, Doing Business 2010, supra note 216. 
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384
 Countries in italics are not African but have been included in the table for purely comparative 
purposes. 
Economy 
Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
Rank 
Starting a 
Business 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Enfor
cing 
Contr
acts 
Singapore
384
 1 4 4 2 5 13 
United States 4 8 4 5 61 8 
United Kingdom 5 16 2 10 16 23 
Mauritius 17 10 87 12 12 66 
France 31 22 43 73 59 6 
South Africa 34 67 2 10 23 85 
Botswana 45 83 43 41 18 79 
Namibia 66 123 15 73 97 41 
Rwanda 67 11 61 27 59 40 
Tunisia 69 47 87 73 118 77 
China 89 151 61 93 125 18 
Zambia 90 94 30 73 36 87 
Ghana 92 135 113 41 79 47 
Kenya 95 124 4 93 164 126 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 106 24 71 73 140 148 
Ethiopia 107 93 127 119 42 57 
Seychelles 111 81 150 57 34 70 
Uganda 112 129 113 132 66 116 
Swaziland 115 158 43 180 54 130 
Nigeria 125 108 87 57 132 94 
Morocco 128 76 87 165 126 108 
Brazil 129 126 87 73 150 100 
Lesotho 130 131 113 147 63 105 
Tanzania 131 120 87 93 120 31 
Malawi 132 128 87 73 24 142 
India 133 169 30 41 169 182 
Madagascar 134 12 167 57 74 155 
Mozambique 135 96 127 41 98 129 
Algeria 136 148 135 73 168 123 
Gambia, the 140 114 135 172 176 67 
Cape Verde 146 136 150 132 110 38 
Burkina Faso 147 115 150 147 144 110 
Sierra Leone 148 58 127 27 161 144 
Liberia 149 57 135 147 85 166 
Sudan 154 118 135 154 93 146 
Mali 156 139 150 147 158 135 
Senegal 157 102 150 165 172 151 
Gabon 158 152 135 154 107 150 
Zimbabwe 159 145 113 119 131 78 
Comoros 162 168 167 132 41 153 
Djibouti 163 177 177 178 65 161 
Togo 165 170 150 147 155 154 
Mauritania 166 149 150 147 175 83 
Côte d'Ivoire 168 172 150 154 152 127 
Angola 169 165 87 57 139 181 
Equatorial Guinea 170 178 135 147 163 72 
Cameroon 171 174 135 119 170 174 
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4. The applicability of resource curse theories 
This chapter discussed risk, the resource curse and PIRSA. It now concludes by 
reflecting on the applicability of the resource curse to PIRSA and other resource rich 
countries in Africa. So many criticisms have been leveled against resource curse 
theories or their methodologies that it is legitimate to ask whether scholars should 
continue employing them or replace them with other theoretical frameworks. So many 
intervening variables are left out of the causal chain that one is entitled to question 
whether it has ever been incontrovertibly established that natural resource windfalls 
cause economic stagnation, authoritarian regimes or civil wars. For example, it is 
unclear whether the resource curse applies to all natural resource economies or just a 
portion of them.
385
 Neither is the evidence conclusive as to which line of causation the 
resource curse hypothesis runs:
386
 It is indeed possible that the disappointing social and 
economic policies are the cause rather than a result of human poverty and civil strife in 
resource rich countries. 
 
                                                 
385
 Andrew Rosser, supra note 75, at 13. 
386
 Id. 
Benin 172 155 150 154 167 177 
Guinea 173 179 167 172 171 131 
Niger 174 157 150 154 141 138 
Eritrea 175 181 177 109 110 48 
Burundi 176 130 167 154 116 172 
Chad 178 182 150 132 133 170 
Congo, Rep. 179 166 135 154 180 159 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
180 140 167 154 160 179 
Guinea-Bissau 181 183 150 132 130 143 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 182 154 167 154 157 172 
Central African 
Republic 
183 159 135 132 179 171 
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Recent research has demonstrated that the Dutch disease is premised on factually 
incorrect assumptions
387
 and that the negative terms-of-trade effect of a rich resource 
endowment may be statistically significant at the global level and yet still be elusive at 
the national level.
388
 In addition, a number of scholars have produced evidence 
contradicting the resource curse theory. Prominent among those are studies that found 
no support for the causal relationship between natural resources and civil wars.   
 
Realizing the deficiencies of a purely economic analysis, economists have co-opted 
perspectives from political science. Economists have come to that realization because it 
became obvious that public policy as an intervening variable was an indispensable 
piece of the resource curse puzzle. On the other hand, unlike economic explanations, 
political explanations of the effect of resource windfalls on economic performance are 
by and large untested either quantitatively or by rigorous qualitative case studies. This 
situation resulted in the failure to build a cumulative body of knowledge on the policy 
failures of resource rich countries and in ‗underspecified‘ arguments with ‗nebulous 
variables, ambiguous domains of relevant cases and fuzzy causal mechanisms.‘389  
 
However, both economic and political explanations have not sufficiently taken account 
of the part that social forces and structures play in mediating the relationship between 
natural resources and development outcomes. Like Gwenn Okruhlik (1999) has argued, 
the rentierism suffers from economic determinism and that it is limited because it 
                                                 
387
 Michael L. Ross, Review Essay, supra note 75, at 305-306 (stating that the Dutch disease wrongly 
assumes that (1) an economy‘s capital and labor supplies are fixed and fully employed before a resource 
boom starts and that (2) domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes). 
388
 Id. at 303. 
389
 Id. at 308-309. 
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relegates political choices to the back seat, thereby neglecting the linkages between the 
state‘s deployment of rents and its political consequences for certain social groups.390 
 
The latter point raises the issue of determinism, which is the mechanical kernel of the 
resource curse theory. The problem with resource determinism, like all determinism, is 
that it fails to account for variations in the development outcomes of individual 
resource rich countries because it does not see individual groups as having much 
control over their lives. For example, the resource curse theory would not be able to 
explain why resource rich countries, like Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana and 
Algeria, have so far fared admirably well in economic and political terms.  Some 
scholars have stated that they are analyzing general tendencies so that their analyses do 
not necessarily prevent the possibility of variations in mediating variables and 
development outcomes.
391
 While this justification is a reasonable one, it still does not 
remove the necessity to explain variations as this is the only way to devise strategies to 
help resource rich countries avoid the curse. 
 
In conclusion, the resource-outcome causal relationship is moderated by several third 
variables, making it difficult to draw any conclusion as to the causality in that 
multivariate relationship. It is for that reason that this dissertation utilizes the resource-
outcome relationship as a simple association that indicates the kinds of risks that 
foreign investors run and the kind of factors that might preclude investment contracts 
from achieving their goals in resource rich countries in Africa. It is that revisited 
version of the resource curse that the dissertation has endogenized in its R4I model to 
make it one of its major assumptions.  
                                                 
390
 Gwenn Okruhlik, Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of 
Oil States, 31 COMP. POL. 3 295-316 (1999). 
391
 Andrew Rosser, supra note 75, at 23. 
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The next chapter presents the clauses of R4I contracts and how they tackle some of the 
stumbling blocks particular to the political economy of resource rich countries. 
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The core argument of this dissertation is unfolding from this point onwards. To recall, 
the core of the dissertation‘s argument is that R4I contracts edge over traditional 
investment contracts.  Preceding chapters laid down three premises of that argument. 
The first premise was that economic complementarities between China and Africa 
drive China‘s FDI in Africa. China needs raw materials to feed its growth and Africa 
needs infrastructure to kick-start or bolster hers. The second premise states that such 
macroeconomic fundamentals have resulted in China‘s investing in mining and 
infrastructure in Africa. The third and most important finding was that resource-for-
infrastructure contracts are the contractual dimensions of China‘s FDI in mining and 
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infrastructure in Africa, and best translate Sino-African economic complementarities in 
a contractual form. Thus, resource-for-infrastructure contracts are the contractual form 
of economic complementarities between China and Africa. In sum, the three premises 
of the dissertation‘s core argument express a strong link between macroeconomic 
fundamentals, FDI and contract terms. 
 
The previous chapter showed that, either for resource-for-infrastructure contract models 
or more traditional investment contracts, risks and costs are high in most resource rich 
countries in Africa. This chapter is a surgical examination of R4I contracts and a 
demonstration of the comparative advantage of the resource-for-infrastructure 
investment contract model in reducing these risks and costs. It first submits that R4I 
investment contracts can be seen as a mining contract, as an infrastructure contract, or 
as both, even if they are not quite the addition of a mining and an infrastructure 
contract. In fact, the R4I contract type is a hybrid, a combination – and not the mere 
addition – of PSAs and turnkey projects, which are mining and infrastructure contracts, 
respectively. To arrive at that conclusion, the chapter compares R4I contracts with 
traditional investment contracts in mining and infrastructure.  
 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided in five major parts. The first part examines R4I 
contracts and the second part distinguishes them from similar or closely related 
contracts. The third part examines the resource leg and the next part the infrastructure 
leg of R4I contracts. The final part compares R4I contracts with production-sharing 
agreements (PSAs) and with BOT projects.   
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1. Resource-for-infrastructure contracts 
1.1. Introduction 
The first part of the present chapter dissects R4I contracts and sets them apart from 
similar or closely related contracts. It aims to dissipate conceptual clouds and clarify 
the nature of this emerging mode of Chinese contracting in the mining sectors of 
Africa. In the main, this part shows how prevailing representations of the deals 
inexorably lead to misrepresentations, inaccuracies and uncertainties. It shows those 
defects in three phases. In the first phase, it explains the basic concept of ‗resource-for-
infrastructure‘ (R4I) and describes the R4I deals in question. The second phase shows 
how the deals differ from asset-based project finance and barter trade agreements. The 
third phase concludes by noting that most analyses of R4I contracts tend to confuse R4I 
contracts with existing contracts and that, in doing so, they blind themselves and 
largely fail to see the innovative nature of R4I contracts.  
 
Pundits on China-Africa relations have often baptized recent Chinese mining deals in 
Africa contradictory names. A first group, which includes the World Bank and 
prominent scholars, calls those deals ‗resource-backed‘ transactions; a second group 
prefers to call them ‗barters;‘ and a third group simply cannot find the right name for 
them. To make matters worse, some scholars in those groups use the names ‗resource-
backed‘ and ‗barters‘ interchangeably.  
 
This debate about names would have been comparable to the notoriously futile 
Byzantine discussions about the sex of angels if it did not disclose a deep conceptual 
confusion about what those deals are. Indeed, the first group maintains that in those 
deals natural resources are merely used as pawns; the second group insists that 
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resources are part of a broader barter agreement; and the third group finds no 
precedents for those deals in contract law history.  
 
The rub is that these conceptions of the Chinese mining deals as security, as barter and 
as unprecedented, are contradictory and mutually exclusive. First off, a transaction 
cannot be simultaneously a pawn and a barter. Second, pawns and barters are not new, 
unique or unprecedented. So what are those deals then? And what should they be 
called? Most importantly, why should one even bother to know the true nature or 
proper name of those Sino-African resource deals? The following answer those 
questions.  
 
 
1.2. The resource-for-infrastructure concept 
Mainstream representations of R4I contracts assume a clear, specific, unified and 
widely accepted concept of the resource-for-infrastructure model. The truth, 
unfortunately, is that no such concept exists. A report by the respected UK NGO 
Chatham House entitled Thirst for African Oil, published in 2009, is a good instance of 
the wrong assumption of a unified understanding of the resource-for-infrastructure 
model.
1
 The Thirst for African Oil report purports to provide a comparative study of the 
impact of Asian oil corporations in Nigeria and Angola, and to show the different 
fortunes of the Asian oil corporations in those two countries.
2
 The report then states 
that it especially examines the use of oil-for-infrastructure deals or ‗Angola mode‘.3  
 
                                                 
1
 ALEX VINES ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 29. 
2
 Id. at vii. 
3
 Id. 
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The Thirst for African Oil report observed that while Nigeria was ‗playing politics‘ 
with Asian oil corporations, Angola was driven by economic necessity to quickly 
access funds in order to finance its post-war reconstruction.
4
 As a consequence, 
concludes the report, ‗the oil-for-infrastructure concept worked in Angola but not in 
Nigeria.‘5 It attributes the ‗failure of the oil-for-infrastructure deals‘ in Nigeria to the 
failure of the then-President Olusegun Obasanjo‘s government to manage the scheme.6 
 
The reasoning and conclusion of the Thirst for African Oil report stir up two 
fundamental issues: Did contracts exist between Nigeria and the Asian oil companies 
and, if so, what form did those contracts take on? The report‘s answer to the first 
question reveals an internal contradiction. First, the report concludes that the ‗key 
weakness‘ of the concept of oil-for-infrastructure in Nigeria was that there were ‗no 
legally binding agreements that would have tied the development of oil blocks to the 
simultaneous delivery of the infrastructure.‘7 The report cannot conclude that the oil-
for-infrastructure ‗deals‘ in Nigeria failed and conclude at the same time that there was 
no legally binding agreements tying oil development to infrastructure development. 
Saying that there were no legally binding agreements to tie oil to infrastructure is 
tantamount to saying that there was no oil-for-infrastructure contract in the first place. 
Assuming that the statements made in the report are true, it is a contradiction to claim 
that a contract that never came into being in the first place has subsequently failed.  
 
Studies on China‘s engagement with Africa consistently conceive economic exchanges 
whereby a host country in Africa trades its resources for China‘s construction of local 
                                                 
4
 Id. at 3. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. at 27-28. 
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infrastructure as transactions of a contractual nature. However, while it is clear that the 
basic idea of resource for infrastructure consists in swapping through contracts 
natural resources for infrastructure, it is not clear how this swap is to be achieved. 
This uncertainty is because the basic idea of resource for infrastructure can take several 
forms. The Angola mode that the report is referring to in describing oil-for-
infrastructure is the connection or tying of resource extraction to the development of 
infrastructure. As shown later in this chapter, this connection or tying has been 
achieved with actual R4I contracts through the innovative combination of a mining or 
oil contract and an infrastructure project. By stating that there were no legally binding 
agreements tying resource extraction to infrastructure development in Nigeria, the 
report is indirectly stating that those contracts, if there ever was one, took any contract 
form except an oil-for-infrastructure form. In fact, the report presents separate and 
distinct contracts (i.e. memoranda of understanding (MOU), rights of first refusal 
(RFR) and oil block sales) as oil-for-infrastructure deals on the mere basis that the 
President Obasanjo intended to exchange oil blocs for a promise by Asian oil 
corporations to construct key infrastructure. It does not differentiate between the MOU, 
the RFR and the eventual sale of oil blocs that it says President Obasanjo used to 
achieve his purpose. For all these reasons, the so-called oil-for-infrastructure deals 
sealed in Nigeria that the report evaluates were not contracts in any legal sense
8
 and, 
assuming that they were indeed legal contracts, they did not embody a resource-for-
infrastructure form.
9
 
 
                                                 
8
 Phone interview with Markus Weimer, Research Fellow in the Africa Programme at Chatham House 
(May 24, 2010)(explaining that the ‗oil-for-infrastructure deals‘, as used in the Thirst for African Oil 
report, referred not only to commercial transactions but also to political deals).  
9
 Incidentally, the fact that those Nigerian contracts, as presented in the report, were not legal contracts 
means in turn that they were not comparable to the resource-for-infrastructure contracts signed in Angola 
because the latter deals were contracts in the legal sense of the word. 
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The defects in the Thirst for African Oil offer two important lessons. First, it is not 
because a party intends to exchange natural resources for infrastructure that the 
arrangement that he will enter into will necessarily take the contractual form of 
resource for infrastructure. Second, before moving on to analyze and evaluate R4I 
contracts, it is a prerequisite to ensure that those contracts were formed in the first 
place.  
 
The next section lists and briefly describes the known R4I contracts.  
 
1.3. The deals 
An informative 2009 World Bank study entitled Building Bridges reported a number of 
deals in which Chinese investors associated natural resources, mainly oil, with 
infrastructure investments in resource rich countries in Africa.
10
 It documented eight 
such deals, struck between 2001 and 2007. According to the report, China has entered 
into ‗resource-backed‘ deals with Congo-Brazzaville in 2001, Sudan in 2001, Angola 
in 2004, Nigeria in 2005, Guinea in 2006, Gabon in 2006, Zimbabwe in 2006, and 
Ghana in 2007. After 2007, at least three other similar contracts have been entered into 
by Chinese investors with the DRC in 2008, Guinea in 2009, and Ghana in 2010. China 
even employed the R4I model that it used in Africa to negotiate the swap of 
Indonesia‘s coal for China‘s financing of the crumbling infrastructure in Indonesia.11 
 
Table 23: Resource-for-infrastructure contracts in Africa 
 
Country year Status  Resource Project Financing 
     (in million   
                                                 
10
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 55ff. 
11
 Anthony Deutsch, Indonesia Swaps Coal for Infrastructure, Financial Times (UK), 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/09/09/rebounding-asia-drives-demand-for-indonesian-coal/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
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US dollars) 
Rep. 
Congo 
2001 under 
construction 
oil Congo River (Imboulou) dam 280 
Sudan 2001 completed oil El-Gaili Power Plant 128 
Angola 2004 mostly 
completed 
oil repair of infrastructure bombed 
in the country‘s civil war 
4,500 
Nigeria 2005 completed oil Gas turbine power plant at 
Papalanto 
298 
Guinea 2006 Re-assessed bauxite Souapiti Dam project 1,000 
Gabon 2006 agreement iron Bélinga iron ore reserve 790 
Zimbabwe 2006 agreement, 
possibly 
not materialized 
chromium new coal mines and 3 thermal 
power 
stations in Dande, the Zambezi 
valley 
on the Zambian border 
not 
available 
Ghana 2007 under 
construction 
cocoa Bui Dam hydro-power project 662 
DRC 2008 under 
construction 
copper, 
cobalt 
various basic mining and social 
infrastructure 
6,000 
Guinea 2009 re-assessed various 
minerals 
various mining and social 
infrastructure 
7,000 
Ghana 2010 agreement oil roads and railways networks 10,400 
Total     31,058 
  
Source: author; V. Foster et al., Building bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier in Africa (2009) 57. 
 
In all those deals, resource and infrastructure investments coincided. Chinese investors 
have built or are building infrastructure in return for or backed by oil exports in the 
case of Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria and Ghana. In the case of Guinea, 
Gabon, Zimbabwe, Ghana, the DRC, the natural resources associated with China‘s 
infrastructure finance are bauxite, iron, chromium, cocoa, and copper and cobalt, 
respectively. While the total value of these investment contracts is in excess of 31 
billion US dollars, the biggest deals by value are the ones that Chinese investors signed 
with Angola (4.5 billion US dollars), the DRC (6 billion US dollars) Guinea (7 billion 
US dollars), and Ghana (10.4 billion US dollars). 
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1.4. Resource-backed transactions 
The first sub-literature on the Chinese mining deals calls them and views them as 
‗resource-backed‘ or ‗resource-based‘ transactions or loans. 12  Underlying this 
designation and view is an assumption, explicit or implicit, that the deals are instances 
of asset-based project finance. Here is the scenario. China invests in infrastructure 
projects in a given resource rich host country in Africa by both providing a huge loan 
and by carrying out itself the infrastructural works. The host country is obliged in terms 
of the loan agreement to pay for the loans with its natural resources. In order to insure 
against the risk that the host country will fail to repay the loan, China agrees with the 
typically credit unworthy host country that the latter pledges its natural resources as 
collateral. Therefore, in this scenario, resources are both a mode of payment and 
security for the repayment of the loan. 
  
The view that natural resources may be payment and collateral at the same time does 
not echo the available terms of R4I contracts, which reveal that natural resources 
function primarily like payment as distinct from collateral. The resource-backed 
conception of the Chinese deals pays little attention to the intention of the parties 
concerning the property rights involved in those transactions. Since the parties intend 
natural resources to be a mode of payment upon signing a R4I contract, China lays a 
claim over the natural resources as the owner thereof and not as a pledgee. It is clearly 
apparent from the terms of R4I contracts that natural resources is primarily the object 
of performance due in return for loans, and neither a remedy for nor protection against 
a possible breach of the parties‘ agreement by the borrower.  
                                                 
12
 Examples of such designations and views can be found in VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 22; 
DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, supra Ch. 2 note 11; and Lucy Corkin, All’s Fair in Loans and War: The 
Development of China-Angola Relations, in CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGON? AFRICA AND CHINA 
108-123 (Kweku Ampiah & Sanusha Naidu eds. 2008). 
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However, the situation may be different when the Chinese investors build the 
infrastructure first and receive payment of natural resources some time after 
construction commenced in installments. In all the known R4I contracts performance is 
not simultaneous and entails payments of natural resources in installments, owing to 
the structure of R4I contracts as long-term foreign investment. At any point in time 
before the Chinese investors are in effective control of the natural resources, the 
resources function as collateral. This is a necessary inference from the fact that when a 
buyer buys something and pays in installments, the seller is essentially making a loan,
 
13
  with the consequence that the non-simultaneous performance by the parties amounts 
to a sale on credit. Some form of commitment, by posting collateral or otherwise, is 
necessary in exchanges where performance is sequential, because the contracting party 
who performs first is effectively extending credit to the party who performs second.
14
 
 
Nonetheless, there is a difference between a credit sale and a R4I contract in the case of 
a default. If a buyer defaults on a loan, the seller in a credit sale can repossess the thing 
sold whereas the seller of infrastructure works in a R4I contract cannot claim back the 
infrastructure he built. The seller can however impound property owned by the buyer in 
executing a court order in the seller‘s favor. The seller can also claim damages or claim 
that the buyer provides additional natural resources should the ones already provided in 
terms of a R4I contract prove insufficient.
15
 Therefore, the correct position is that 
natural resources constitute payment in consideration of the overall structure of the 
                                                 
13
 JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, supra Ch. 1 note 19, at 208. 
14
 Benjamin E. Hermalin, supra Ch. 3 note 233, at 10. 
15
 This remedy was an explicit clause of the R4I contract between the DRC and China. However, due to 
the heavy pressure exerted by the IMF on the DRC government to remove this clause from the contract, 
the DRC government and China eventually agreed to remove the clause from the contract. 
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deals and intention of the parties, but that they work like collateral before payment and 
to the extent that resources are needed to cover the costs of infrastructure works.
16
 
  
The most relevant observation when it comes to the conception of the R4I deals as 
resource-backed or resource-based is that it reflects a failure to read those deals 
properly. Admittedly, infrastructure contracts, like BOT schemes, are depressingly 
complex. With such arrangements, the question becomes: ‗How to navigate through 
and make sense of a vast complex of bewildering networks of contractual obligations?‘ 
The answer to this question is to be found in the principle of international commercial 
contracts that says that contracts should be interpreted according to the common 
intention of the parties.
17
  
 
The common intention of the parties and the purpose of contracts are found in the 
clauses framing the relationship between the parties; and there is no ideal place other 
than the framework agreement where to find such constitutive clauses. Most of the 
known deals that involve the exchange of resources for infrastructure in Africa (e.g. 
Angola, the DRC, Guinea) are structured by a framework agreement. Framework or 
concession agreements may incorporate other related contracts like a shareholders‘ 
agreement and a loan agreement, but it is still possible to identify the constitutive 
clauses according to their position at the beginning of the framework agreement and the 
role that they play in organizing the overall contractual relationship.  
 
                                                 
16
 Nils Tcheyan shared this opinion (phone interview with Nils Tcheyan, supra Ch. 3 note 237) by telling 
the author that natural resources in R4I contracts were more payment than collateral. 
17
 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts art. 4.1, 2004, International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law. 
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A close look at the common intention of the parties and the constitutive clauses of 
framework agreements reveals that the resource-backed conception of the Chinese 
deals does not quite fit within the overall contractual relationship created by the deals. 
Where these agreements manifestly provide for an exchange of resources for 
infrastructure, the resourced-backed conception sees a massive infrastructure project 
financed by resource-backed loans. As is shown below, the resource-backed 
scholarship is ill-conceived, not so much because it is only partially true, but above all 
because it mistakes a part for the whole or – more precisely – because it makes a major 
part (i.e. infrastructure project) look greater than the whole (i.e. resource-for-
infrastructure framework contract).  
 
1.5. Barter agreements 
A second sub-literature on emerging R4I deals in Africa conceives of those deals as a 
form of barter trade agreements.
18
 This sub-literature adds an important element that 
resource-backed views tend to overlook or downplay, namely the mining contract. One 
of the first things that meets a bird‘s eye view of framework agreements between 
African countries and their Chinese counterpart is that those deals stand firmly on two 
long legs: A mining contract and an infrastructure contract. ‗Resource-backed‘ 
concepts amputate, as it were, the mining leg as they over-emphasize the infrastructure 
contract and analyze natural resources only in relation to the infrastructure contract. 
Apart from giving the wrong impression that the deals are primarily infrastructure 
contracts, these views fail as a result to adequately explain the organic relationship that 
exists between the natural resources exploited in terms of the mining contract and the 
                                                 
18
 Examples of such views can be found in Paul Collier, supra Ch. 2 note 29; Hannah Edinger & Johanna 
Jansson, supra Ch. 1 note 25 at 8; Patrick Keenan, supra Ch. 1 note 31; senior economic officials in the 
DRC such as the Governor of the Congolese Central Bank, Jean-Claude Masangu; and Jean Paul 
Kimbulu Kandolo (interview with Jean Paul Kimbulu Kandolo, supra Ch. 5 note 34).    
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infrastructure built in terms of the infrastructure contract. If the proponents of resource-
backed conceptions could provide adequate explanations of how the R4I deals worked 
and were organized, they would have realized that their explanations have no clear 
basis in the contracts that they set out to describe.  
 
The group of experts that sees R4I deals as barter trade agreements seems to be more 
faithful to the essential terms of the deals than the one that sees them as secured 
transactions. Under the barter scenario, China ‗sells‘ infrastructure to specific host 
governments in Africa and those governments ‗buy‘ that infrastructure with natural 
resources as ‗currency‘. This sales metaphor should not however mask the fact that, 
unlike sales agreements, barters do not involve any transaction that sounds in money 
and that they only look like sales because barters are historically primitive forms of 
sales. The value of the infrastructure determines the amount of natural resources 
needed to ‗buy‘ the infrastructure. Should there be any deficiency the host governments 
will have to ‗pay‘ or ‗save‘ more resources to cover the deficiency.  
 
The oil-for-food resolution that the UN Security Council passed in 1995 is akin to a 
barter trade agreement.
19
 Barter trade agreements, common in international trade, are a 
kind of countertrade, which accounts for 5 to 40 percent of world trade volumes.
20
 Yet 
the UN Security Council resolution was not a contract but its terms resemble those of 
barter trade agreements and R4I contracts. The Security Council, convinced of the need 
to provide as a temporary measure for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,
21
 
authorized the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq 
                                                 
19
 S.C. Res. 986, U.N. Doc. S/Res/986 (Apr. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Oil-for-Food Resolution]. 
20
 Amanda J. Perry, Legal Implications of Countertrade in an Economic Context 3 (SOAS Law 
Department, Occasional Paper No. 2, Mar. 1996).  
21
 Oil-for-Food Resolution preamble. 
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sufficient to produce 1 billion US dollars every trimester.
22
 That amount was to be paid 
into an escrow account,
23
 which would in turn finance the export to Iraq of medicine, 
health supplies, foodstuffs, materials and supplies for essential civilian needs.
24
  
  
Yet, when all the facts are known, even conceptions that the Chinese mining deals are 
barters fall short of an accurate description for at least two reasons. First, ‗barter‘, 
strictly defined as the contemporaneous exchange of commodities, is different from 
other forms of countertrade where exchange is executed at separate times, sometimes 
with 5 to 20 years of time interval.
25
 Exchanges in some R4I contracts are not entirely 
contemporaneous, which suggests that R4I contracts are not entirely barters. For 
instance, with the DRC-China R4I contract, infrastructure construction began first and 
resource extraction will start 3 years later.
26
  
 
It is also inaccurate to put R4I contracts in the same category as countertrade because 
those deals are not trade agreements but investment contracts, even if mining 
investments often translate into increased exports of primary commodities. The 
difference between trade and investment is fundamental and lies in the idea of political 
risks. Foreign direct investment runs over larger time horizons – a factor that results in 
political risks, which do not usually attend trade agreements. The difference is also 
visible in the impressive arsenal deployed in investment contracts to mitigate, if not 
eliminate, political risks. R4I contracts are equipped with a similar arsenal, as can be 
                                                 
22
 Oil-for-Food Resolution ¶ 1. 
23
 Oil-for-Food Resolution ¶ 1(b). 
24
 Oil-for-Food Resolution ¶ 8(a). 
25
 John E. Parsons, A Theory of Countertrade Financing of International Business 2-3 (Alfred P. Sloan 
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Working Paper No. 1632-85, Mar. 
1985). 
26
 Colette Braeckman, Paul Fortin, PDG de la Gécamines, Défend les Accords avec la Chine, LE SOIR 
(Belg.), Feb. 28, 2008.  
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seen by the financial models employed, the high internal rates of return, the myriad 
guarantees and the reference of disputes to the ICSID, which is a neutral forum for the 
resolution of investment disputes.  
 
1.6. Are R4I contracts new? 
Now that preceding sections have demonstrated that resource-backed and barter 
conceptions of the R4I contracts are inaccurate when they are not distorting, can one be 
certain of the true nature of the deals? The answer is a simple ‗No, so far‘. It is this 
uncertainty that fuels the arguments of those experts who have said that the Chinese 
deals are unique. A mining expert, who has researched and been involved in several 
mining projects in Latin America, Africa and eastern Europe, said that in the 13 years 
of her career she has never seen a contract that resembles a R4I contract.
27
 She noted 
that R4I contracts are a ‗unique‘ type of contracts that cannot be classified as classical 
or typical.
28
 A World Bank infrastructure specialist, with 16 years of experience, could 
not recall having been involved in a R4I contract.
29
  
 
At the same time, the World Bank stated in its Building Bridges report that R4I 
contracts are ‗by no means novel or unique, but follows a long history of natural 
resource-based transactions in the oil industry.‘ 30  However, in light of the 
demonstrations made earlier in this chapter, it is evident that the World Bank report 
mistakenly lumps asset-based project finance and R4I contracts together; and that the 
                                                 
27
 Phone interview with Anida Yupari Aguado, Graduate Institute in Geneva (Apr. 17, 2010). 
28
 Id. 
29
 Phone interview with Jeffrey Delmon, Infrastructure Specialist, World Bank (Mar. 1, 2010). However, 
Delmon claimed that the basic idea of investing with the hope of accessing natural resources is as old as 
civilization. 
30
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 42. 
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report‘s assertion would apply only to the asset-based project financial facets of R4I 
contracts.   
 
Deborah Bräutigam‘s highly instructive book The Dragon’s Gift sheds some light on 
what might have been the origins of this type of contracts: Japan‘s trade and investment 
in and with China in the late 1970s.
31
 However, the book does not clear the clouds of 
uncertainty over the present-day R4I contracts. This is because, in addition to being a 
resource-backed conception of the deals, the book indicates from the very words that it 
uses that what it describes are actually ‗long-term trade‘ agreements 32  – and not 
investment contracts.  
 
The uncertainty does not allow this chapter to confirm or deny the uniqueness or 
unprecedented nature of R4I contracts, but it proves that recurrent names and 
depictions of the R4I contracts are misnomers, thus misleading. The name that the 
author prefers is resource-for-infrastructure (investment) contracts because it depicts 
the overall contractual structure
33
 set up by the parties without undue emphasis on 
either the mining or infrastructure part of the deal. Of course, other names, and better 
names for that matter, could be proffered and preferred. There is a sense in which 
names are arbitrary; and R4I contracts could be dubbed, let us say, ‗Angola mode‘, 
kung-fu contracts, ‗strategic deals‘, win-win business partnerships or China Inc. 
agreements. The point is that names can be arbitrary when they merely perform a 
naming function but they become problematic when they seek to define the thing that 
they refer to. In the latter case, names must be clear, accurate and rational.  
                                                 
31
 DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, supra Ch. 2 note 11, at 46ff. 
32
 Id. 
33
 This opinion is shared by Sanusha Naidu: Phone interview with Sanusha Naidu, Research Director of 
the Emerging Powers in Africa Programme at Fahamu (May 10, 2010). 
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1.7. The problem 
The problem with the existing descriptions and classifications of the R4I contracts that 
some resource rich countries in Africa signed is that R4I contracts have been 
mischaracterized and misplaced into wrong categories. Effectively, the current 
characterizations of R4I contracts have been shaped and molded by and large by 
insights from political science, economics and development theory. There is neither a 
contract nor a contract law perspective on R4I contracts and, as a result, those deals 
have been described either as ‗resource-backed‘ loans or ‗barter‘ agreements even 
where the plain terms of those contracts unequivocally provided otherwise.  
 
Moreover, different mining contracts have been squeezed under the same rubric. The 
relevant literature did not distinguish between mining contracts where natural resources 
are exchanged for infrastructure investments (i.e. R4I contracts) and where they have 
been used as collateral for those investments (i.e. secured transactions). Instead, they 
have all been painted with the same brush as a sort of asset-based project finance, 
completely ignoring the fact that some of these Sino-African mining contracts are more 
akin to barter trade agreements than resource-backed transactions. This indiscriminate 
use of the concepts ‗resource-backed‘ and ‗barter‘ has negative repercussions on 
assessments as to whether R4I contracts have succeeded or failed. This chapter 
instanced this risk of negative repercussions on assessments when discussing the 
flawed concept of resource for infrastructure in Nigeria by the Chatham House report 
Thirst for African Oil. 
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2. The terms of resource-for-infrastructure exchanges 
2.1. Framework agreements 
Framework agreements are the most essential contractual obligations in resource-for-
infrastructure exchanges. Framework agreements are one of two key legal documents 
required by Chinese concessional finance, the other being loan agreements.
34
 As their 
name indicates, they frame the agreements between resource rich states in Africa and 
their Chinese counterpart.  
 
Perhaps, one of their foremost virtues is to evidence the common intention of the 
contracting parties and laying bare the overall structure of the parties‘ agreements. The 
Guinean Framework Agreement provides the clearest example of the purpose-revealing 
role of framework agreements. It declares that its objective is to ‗coordinate and 
summarize the global intention of the parties and the principles by which the parties 
must cooperate within the framework of this agreement and agreements on future 
activities of the joint venture in the foreseeable future.‘35    
 
In the Angolan, Ghanaian, Congolese (DRC) and Guinean cases, China signed 
framework agreements with their counterparts. In both the Congolese and Guinean 
cases, the host government and China signed one main framework agreement on 22 
March 2008
36
  and on June 12, 2009, respectively. In the Ghanaian case, the parties 
signed one framework agreement, the ‗Loan Framework Agreement‘, as well as a loan 
                                                 
34
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 55. 
35
 Le Fonds International de Chine, SA, une Société Agréée à  Hong Kong et le Gouvernement de la 
République de Guinée, Jun. 12, 2009. (hereinafter Guinean Framework Agreement)  
36
 Convention de Collaboration entre la République Démocratique du Congo et le Groupement 
d‘Entreprises Chinoises : China Railway Group Limited, Sinohydro Corporation Relative au 
Développement d‘un Projet Minier et d‘un Projet d‘Infrastructures en République Démocratique du 
Congo, Mar. 22, 2008. (hereinafter DRC Framework Agreement)   
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agreement.
37
 With respect to the Angolan case, a minimum of two loan agreements and 
two framework agreements had been signed.  
 
By Cabinet resolution, Angola approved on March 17, 2004 a loan agreement signed 
with China for an amount of 2 billion US dollars.
38
 On October 20, 2004, the Angolan 
Cabinet resolved to approve a Framework Agreement on Strategic Public-Private 
Partnership between Angola and the Peoples‘ Republic of China (PRC).39 On February 
11, 2005, the Cabinet approved the Protocol on Economic and Technical Cooperation 
between Angola and the PRC.
40
 The Cabinet also approved an additional credit line 
from China Eximbank in November 2007
41
  and ratified a basic loan agreement that the 
Angolan government concluded with the China Investment Bank in July 2008.
42
  
 
2.2. The basic structure 
The common intention of the parties is evident from the framework agreements. The 
intended basic structure is the exchange of natural resources for national infrastructure 
through the instrumentality of two related investment contracts, a resource (mining or 
oil) contract and an infrastructure contract (see Figure 12 below). The relation between 
the two investment contracts is the extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons, the export 
of these resources, and the use of the revenues generated by these extractive and export 
activities to fund infrastructural works in the host country.  
 
                                                 
37
 See Kwadwo Baah-Wiredu, Minister, Finance and Economic Planning, Remarks on the Occasion of 
the Signing of a Concessional Loan Agreement Between Ghana and the Export-Import Bank of China 
(May 26, 2007), http://www.mofep.gov.gh/speech_china_24907.pdf.  
38
 Resolução No. 4/04, de 17 de Março de 2004, Diário da República de 26.03.2004. (Angl.) 
39
 Resolução No. 31/04, de 20 de Outubro de 2004, Diário da República de 15.12.2004. (Angl.) 
40
 Protocol de Cooperação Económica e Técnica entre o Governo da República de Angola e o Governo 
da República Popular da China, Resolução No. 53/05, de 11 de Fevereiro de 2005, Diário da República 
de 21.11.2005. (Angl.) [hereinafter Angolan  Cooperation Protocol] 
41
 Resolução No. 105/07, de 28 de Novembro de 2007, Diário da República de 20.11.2007. (Angl.) 
42
 Resolução No. 76/08, de 30 de Julho de 2008, Diário da República de 19.9.2008. (Angl.) 
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The basic mechanism of R4I contracts is visible in the DRC Framework Agreement 
and Angolan Cooperation Protocol. The DRC Agreement stipulates that the parties 
recognize and declare that by signing the present Agreement they pursue the realization 
of the following objectives.
43
 For the DRC, the objective is to find the financial 
resources necessary for the realization of national infrastructure projects deemed 
important and urgent.
44
 For the consortium of Chinese corporations, the objective is to 
invest in non-iron metals in the territories of the DRC.
45
 
 
The Angolan Cooperation Protocol lays down that, at the request of the Angolan 
government, the Chinese government agreed to grant 50 million Yuan for a period of 
10 years, counting from March 1, 2005 until February 28, 2015.
46
 The Protocol 
specifies that the 50 million Yuan loan is for financing projects to be awarded to both 
the Chinese and Angolan governments.
47
 It continues by providing that reimbursement 
of the loan is to be effected by the export of Angolan commodities or in convertible 
currency.
48
  
   
Figure 12: Basic structure of R4I contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 1.1. 
44
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 1.1.1. 
45
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 1.1.2. 
46
 Angolan Cooperation Protocol art. 1. 
47
 Angolan Cooperation Protocol art. 2. 
48
 Angolan Cooperation Protocol art. 3. 
African government 
Chinese government 
Mining or oil 
contract 
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2.3. Variations 
Beyond that basic structure, however, each framework agreement is unique; and 
several variations on that basic structure exist and are possible. Thus, the relation that 
exists between the Guinean government and Chinese investors unmistakably indicates 
that the Guinean Framework Agreement is not a pure type of R4I contracts (see Figure 
13 below).  
 
In terms of the Framework Agreement, the Guinean government must see to it, among 
other things, that the CIF and the joint venture obtain all the necessary permits and 
fiscal exonerations for the realization of the joint project and that they operate in 
conformity with Guinean law and regulations.
49
 CIF, on the other hand, must ensure 
that it contributes to the appropriate financing of the joint project, conceive and 
implement projects to be agreed upon by the parties, and enable technology transfer 
and the utilization of the local workforce and industrial subcontracting.
50
 In view of the 
general organization of the Guinean Framework Agreement, it would be more accurate 
to describe it as a resource-and-infrastructure contract rather than a resource-for-
infrastructure contract. 
 
                                                 
49
 Guinean Framework Agreement art. 2.3(c).  
50
Guinean Framework Agreement art. 2.3(d).   
Project finance 
                                                                                                                             271 
In the Guinean Agreement, the exchange is not mediated by two related investment 
projects but by one single special purpose vehicle (SPV), a holding company in 
particular, combining infrastructural investments and the exploitation of minerals.
51
 
Another deviation of the Guinean Agreement from the basic structure is that the 
Chinese party is private, that is the Hong-Kong registered CIF. The CIF has 
considerably less resources than the Chinese government – a factor that probably 
explains why the parties did not opt for a pure type of R4I contracts. Accordingly, the 
Guinean variation of R4I contracts raises the question as to whether it is possible for 
private parties to enter into a pure type of R4I contracts with a host government in 
Africa without the private parties overrunning their economic resources.    
 
Figure 13: Guinean variation of R4I contracts 
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 Guinean Framework Agreement art. 2.1.1. 
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3. Resource side of the agreement 
3.1. Introduction 
There are two sides to a R4I contract, the resource side and the infrastructure side. This 
part of the chapter examines the resource side and the next section tackles the 
infrastructure side of a R4I contract. The resource side of the deal habitually consists of 
a joint venture between a Chinese state-owned corporation and a host country‘s 
national resource company for the exploitation of natural resources. The joint venture 
then serves as a financing vehicle for the infrastructure projects. 
 
3.2. Joint venture 
The first installment in the formation of the resource project is the constitution of a 
joint venture. With R4I contracts, the resource side of the agreement almost invariably 
involves forming a joint venture between a Chinese state-owned corporation and a 
national mining or oil corporation. This was the case with Angola where the para-statal 
Sonangol established a joint venture with the Chinese stated-owned oil corporation 
Sinopec called Sinopec Sonangol International Ltd.  (SSI).
52
  
 
An exception is the Sino-Ghanaian R4I contract, which does not provide for a joint 
jointure between a Ghanaian national mining or oil corporation and a Chinese state-
owned corporation. Instead, the parties have agreed that the Ghana Marketing Board, a 
state-owned institution, will export cocoa products to China to pay for the construction 
of the Bui Dam.
53
 The Ghana Marketing Board does not produce cocoa directly; it 
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contracts with middle companies, which in turn negotiate the price of cocoa with cocoa 
farmers.
54
  
 
Taxation is often the reason for the decision to form a joint venture,
55
 but with China‘s 
FDI in the mining sectors of Africa it appears to be also a matter of China‘s foreign 
policy. Additionally, in some countries in Africa, like the DRC, joint ventures are 
required by applicable mining or hydrocarbon legislation; in other countries, like 
Angola, joint ventures are not required albeit they are encouraged.
56
 The Nigerian 
national oil corporation NNPC operates under joint venture arrangements with 
international oil majors like Shell and Exxon Mobil.
57
  
 
Joint ventures may be partnerships or corporations and, in some countries like China 
and the Former Soviet Union, it is even possible to have a joint venture as a business 
form of its own right.
58
 In the business world, a joint venture is an agreement between 
two or more distinct and separate parent corporations to engage in a partnership to pool 
complementary resources for a common goal.
59
 In mining law, however, a joint venture 
is an ‗unincorporated association, formed to carry out exploration and/or development 
of a specific mineral property or properties located within a specific geographic area of 
interest.‘60 In FDI law and in this dissertation, the concept of joint ventures subsumes 
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an association between a foreign investor and a local corporation or other juristic 
person.  
 
Joint ventures fall in any of two categories: Equity joint venture or contractual joint 
ventures. Depending on its ownership structure, an equity joint venture may itself take 
on several forms. Governed by corporate law, equity joint ventures are the most 
common type of joint ventures between foreign investors and developing countries. It 
is incidentally the joint venture type that most R4I contracts set up. A contractual joint 
venture, on the other hand, does not provide for a joint corporation or partnership. They 
are designed to attract capital, equipment, industrial property, know-how and other 
resources that the local partner lacks. Contractual joint ventures are increasingly used 
in the extractive industries where the host country wants to retain control over natural 
resources. 
 
Various joint venture structures are possible in R4I contracts. A multinational 
corporation may find a local partner and form a joint venture, or invite the local partner 
to form a joint venture in order to make an acquisition and operate the 
business/acquisition together.
61
 Parties may also identify a core business and organize a 
business form for the core business; parties may form a network of contracts to allow 
third parties to supply goods and services to the joint venture; or they may negotiate a 
management agreement whereby the multinational corporation supplies various 
management services to an existing company.
62
 Finally, after the parties identify a 
business relationship, the multinational corporation invests between 5 and 10 percent in 
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the local partner or a newly formed company and then negotiates an option agreement 
to buy up to 51 percent.
63
 
 
Whatever their category and structure, joint ventures created by R4I contracts are 
owned by Chinese investors. In the case of Guinea, CIF owns 75 percent of the joint 
venture ADC;
64
 in the case of the DRC, the consortium of Chinese corporations own 68 
percent of Sicomines.
65
 Joint ventures share a number of salient characteristics, the 
most important of which include common ownership of pooled assets; several liability, 
disclaimer of corporate personality or/and advantages; appointment of the majority 
partner as manager of the venture; right to receive and market a proportionate share of 
the mineral production; separate accounting of capital contributions, property, profit 
and loss; and partnership flow-throw tax treatment.
66
     
 
In a joint venture, the one party is putting on the table what the other does not. The 
contributions of each party are complementary yet do not carry the same economic 
value. Unsurprisingly, therefore, parties have equal interests in a joint venture as they 
differ in terms of corporate culture, financial wherewithal or skill capabilities.
67
 
Contributions by each party can be summarized as follows: 
 
Table 24: Contributions of parties to a joint venture 
 
Foreign investors Host countries 
Machinery Land 
Financial resources Industrial sites and 
production facilities 
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Intellectual property 
(patents, industrial 
property) 
Intangible contributions - 
(environmental knowledge, 
government contacts, supplier 
political and social goodwill) 
Technical skills 
(marketing and 
production 
techniques) 
Trained personnel 
Specialized personnel 
 
The contributions that each party makes to the joint venture are indicative of the 
advantages of forming a joint venture. 
 
3.2.1. Sicomines 
As just shown, the resource side of R4I contracts entails the creation of a joint venture 
between a national mining or oil corporation and a Chinese state-owned corporation. 
The DRC and Guinean framework agreements expressly create such joint ventures. 
Other framework agreements may contain similar provisions but most are strictly 
confidential. 
 
The DRC Framework Agreement states that the Chinese and Congolese parties will 
realize their cooperation by the constitution of a mining joint venture to which the 
Congolese party will cede through its national mining company, Générale des 
Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines), the mining rights and titles that are the object of 
the cooperation.
68
 The joint venture between the DRC (through Gécamines) and China 
(through the consortium of Chinese state-owned corporations) has been incorporated in 
terms of Congolese corporate laws.
69
 The name of the joint venture is Sino-Congolaise 
des Mines (Sicomines). The Congolese state participates in Sicomines through 
Gécamines whereas the Chinese state participates in the joint venture through a 
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consortium of state-owned corporations, consisting of China Railway and Engineering 
Corporation (CREC) and SinoHydro. 
 
Sicomines will have to generate profits for the reimbursement of not only the mining 
investments but also the infrastructure investments made by China.
70
 In order to 
guarantee that the Chinese parties recover their investments in the mining and 
infrastructure projects, the parties agreed that the Chinese parties will have a 68 percent 
interest in the joint venture and that Gécamines will own the remaining 32 percent.
71
 
This ownership structure may appear unfairly disproportionate to some analysts, but 
analysts should not lose sight of the fact that this formula aims to facilitate the 
recoupment of costs sunk by the Chinese investors into the project. 
 
3.2.2. African Development Corporation 
The Guinean Framework Agreement is, as has already been shown, a variation on the 
basic structure of R4I contracts. Likewise, the joint venture that it establishes is 
different from Sicomines and other joint ventures created by other R4I contracts. The 
Guinean Framework Agreement declares that the principal goal of the cooperation 
between the Chinese investors and the Guinean state is to invest, primarily in energy; 
water; electricity; transport by road, rails and air; ports and airports; housing; extraction 
of aluminium; and in any other sectors of common interest as identified by the 
parties.
72
   
 
The name of the joint venture between the Guinean state and the Chinese parties is 
African Development Corporation (ADC). Unlike Sicomines, the joint venture ADC is 
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not a standard corporation but a holding company, that is, a corporation with 
controlling interests in a number of subsidiary corporations. The Guinean state 
participates in the joint venture through its national mining corporation, Compagnie 
Nationale Minière (CNM), whereas the Chinese parties participate in the venture 
through a consortium of private investors, consisting of CIF and China Sonangol 
International (CSI). The Chinese investors are neither entirely Chinese nor entirely 
private since one of the partners in CSI, Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de 
Angola (Sonangol), is an Angolan parastatal and Angola‘s national oil company.73 
 
The Framework Agreement directs the parties to enter into a shareholders‘ agreement 
and prescribe the following general terms and conditions for the shareholders‘ 
agreement.
74
 First, the shareholders‘ agreement will constitute the joint venture in 
terms of Singaporean laws.
75
 Second, CIF will own 75 percent interest in the joint 
venture and the Guinean state will own 10 percent.
76
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3.3. Natural resources 
‗Resource‘ refers to a country‘s means of supporting itself, as represented by its 
minerals, land and other assets.
77
 The resource side of R4I contracts entails the 
utilization of natural resources as a medium of exchange. The DRC Framework 
Agreement contains a list of mineral deposits whose rights have been granted to 
Chinese state-owned corporations in terms of the Agreement,
78
 as shown in the Table 
below. In the case of Sino-Ghanaian R4I contract, while it is known that the Ghana 
Marketing Board, a state-owned institution, will export cocoa products to China, it is 
nonetheless not known how much cocoa products the Board will have to export.
79
  
 
It is noteworthy that R4I contracts are only possible where the state owns the resources 
to be exchanged. The state bargaining for a R4I contract must be able to encumber and 
transfer mining or/and oil rights. Where the state has ceded mining or oil rights to 
private firms or where the rights are otherwise privately owned, the state cannot 
exchange the rights to those resources in a R4I agreement.  
 
Table 25: Copper and cobalt granted by the DRC to Chinese corporations 
 
Types of reserves Deposits Copper 
(in tons) 
Cobalt 
(in tons) 
Proved reserves Dima basin 1,933,160 49,883 
Dikuluwe 2,248,673 42,037 
Dima juncture 334,408 19,776 
West Mashamba 1,593,512 163,592 
Mashamba basin 703,617 151,331 
Total 6,813,370 426,619 
Probable and possible 
Reserves 
Dilukuwe 100,000  
West Mashamba 50,000  
                                                 
77
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Dima basin 2,000,000  
Mashamba basin 300,000  
Synclinal Dik Hill D 1,352,000  
Total 3,802,700 200,000
80
 
Total  10,616,070 626,619 
 
In the reported instances of R4I contracts, oil (Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Angola, 
Nigeria and Ghana), bauxite (Guinea), iron (Gabon), chromium (Zimbabwe), cocoa 
(Ghana), copper and cobalt (DRC) have been so utilized. What that list of resources 
reveals is that R4I contracts not only exchange minerals and hydrocarbons but also 
agricultural products for national infrastructure. The types of natural resources traded in 
terms of R4I contracts imply that several countries in Africa that have not yet signed 
any R4I contracts with China are perfect candidates for signature of R4I contracts. 
Below is a list of potential candidates in Africa and the comparative advantage they 
enjoy with respect to the natural resources they possess under their soil. 
 
Table 26: List of candidates for R4I contracts in Africa 
 
 country natural resources 
1 Algeria natural gas, gas and oil 
2 Angola Oil 
3 Botswana Diamonds 
4 Cameroon oil (modest amount) and cocoa 
5 Chad Oil 
6 DRC diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, coltan, zinc 
7 Congo-Brazzaville Oil 
8 Côte d‘Ivoire oil, gas, palm oil, coffee and cocoa 
9 Equatorial Guinea Oil 
10 Gabon oil, gold, manganese 
11 Ghana oil, gold and cocoa 
12 Guinea Bauxite 
13 Liberia diamonds, timber, rubber 
14 Libya oil and gas 
15 Mali gold and cotton 
16 Mauritania Iron 
17 Morocco Phosphate 
18 Namibia diamond, uranium, copper, lead, zinc, tin, silver, tungsten,  and fish 
19 Niger Uranium 
20 Nigeria Oil 
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21 Sierra Leone Diamonds 
22 South Africa platinum, gold and chromium 
23 Sudan Oil 
24 Tanzania Gold 
25 Togo phosphate, coffee, cotton and cocoa 
26 Tunisia phosphate and iron 
27 Uganda coffee and oil 
28 Zambia Copper 
29 Zimbabwe coal, gold, platinum, copper, nickel, tin, clay 
 
Source: CIA, World Factbook (2010) 
 
The above table shows both the geological and, in some cases, the agricultural potential 
of selected countries in Africa, but the emphasis is on minerals and hydrocarbons, and 
on countries generously endowed with them. More specifically, this dissertation‘s 
emphasis is on PIRSA, namely Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, the DRC, Guinea, Côte 
d‘Ivoire, Niger, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville. As said in Chapter 5, the key 
findings and R4I model proposed in this dissertation primarily apply to PIRSA. 
Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that there is at a minimum 2 dozen potential 
African countries for R4I contracts that Chinese FDI in the mining and construction 
sectors of those countries will be complementary in all those countries. There may be 
cases and countries where Chinese FDI would be competitive, and would indirectly 
divert resources away from the economy and compete with infant industries.
81
       
 
3.4. Incentives 
Incentives can be defined as any measurable economic advantage afforded to specific 
enterprises or categories of enterprise by or at the direction of a government, in order to 
encourage them to behave in a certain manner.
82
 They are instruments that host 
governments use to attract FDI, to steer it into favored industries or regions, or to 
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influence the character of an FDI, for instance where a certain type of FDI is needed.
83
 
They include measures specifically designed either to increase the internal rate of 
return of a specific FDI project or to redistribute its risks.
84
 
 
A few rationales justify the use of FDI incentives, with the overarching rationale being 
to rectify market failures. The first rationale is to correct market failures to reflect the 
wider benefits arising from the positive externalities of production.
85
 A second 
rationale is to correct market failures to reflect the gains that may accrue over time 
from decreasing unit costs and skills transfer.
86
 Third, incentives compensate foreign 
investors for lost return because of other government interventions. Finally, incentives 
encourage foreign investors to shoulder certain public costs that the host government 
cannot carry because it does not have the institutional capacity to do so.
87
 Despite these 
noble and laudable market-correction rationales, FDI incentives can yield unintended 
results. For instance, they can distort production structures, favor large foreign 
investors over small ones, and entail financial and administrative costs.
88
  
 
The two main types of incentives are fiscal and financial, but this section focuses only 
on fiscal incentives as R4I contracts feature them. The main aim of fiscal incentives is 
to lighten the tax burden of foreign investors.
89
 A common type of fiscal incentive is 
profit-based. This type of fiscal incentive is one that the Guinean and DRC framework 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 1.  
84
 Id. at 3. 
85
 Id. at 9. 
86
 Id. at 10. 
87
 Id. at 11. 
88
 Id. at 11-12. 
89
 Id. at 4. 
                                                                                                                             283 
agreements utilize. In the Guinean Framework, Guinea undertakes to grant to the joint 
venture ADC applicable exonerations in terms of Guinean laws and regulations.
90
  
 
In the DRC Agreement, the DRC grants to the consortium of Chinese investors all the 
advantages relating to tax, customs and excise, and foreign exchange, applicable in 
terms of Congolese laws and regulations.
91
 The DRC grants to the consortium, during 
the first two phases of the three-phase amortization of China‘s FDI, total exoneration 
from taxes (direct or indirect), customs and excises, royalties, internal taxes or 
export/import taxes, and those relating to the extractive activities and the development 
of infrastructure.
92
 During those first two phases, all relevant and applicable taxes will 
be treated and accounted for as expenses for the infrastructural works to be carried out 
in terms of the Agreement.
93
  
 
3.5. Credit enhancement strategies 
Credit enhancement aims to (1) improve the most severe equity and lender risks in a 
triage of project finance risks identified and (2) distribute risks among project 
participants.
94
 Credit enhancement can take several forms, including direct guarantees 
by the project sponsors or the project participants, guarantees by third parties not taking 
any active part in the project, contingent guarantees and ‗moral obligations‘ of the 
project participants.
95
 Parties to R4I contracts have used myriad credit enhancement 
strategies, especially guaranties, sovereign or otherwise. Credit enhancement is a tool 
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of choice in minimizing investment risks and blunting certain facets of the resource 
curse.  
 
3.5.1. Guarantees 
Guarantees are the risk-shifting mechanism par excellence. In order to control changes 
to their risk profiles, lenders such China Eximbank will want to maintain control over 
the project joint venture‘s power to change project plans, project contracts, capital 
expenditure program or debt program without the lenders‘ consent.96 Guarantees and 
undertakings from the project joint ventures or participants serve to enable lenders to 
maintain control on the risk profile underlying the project. Lenders use these 
representations, guarantees and undertakings as bases to claim damages and as events 
of defaults, triggering the lenders‘ decision to suspend drawdown, terminate, demand 
repayment and enforce security.
97
   
 
Guarantees are a mechanism that permits entities to invest capital without becoming 
involved directly in a project by shifting risks to the entities.
98
 The DRC Framework 
Agreement contains a number of guarantees whereby the DRC guarantees, among other 
things, that mining titles and rights awarded to the joint venture Sicomines will be free 
of all defects;
99
 and that mineral deposits whose rights have been ceded to Sicomines 
contain mining reserves envisaged by the parties to the Agreement.
100
  
 
Important guarantees in the Agreement come in the form of guarantees against political 
risks. The DRC guarantees that, one year after the approval of the Agreement by the 
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Chinese government, it commits to obtaining from the Congolese parliament the 
enactment of legislation securing the financial regime (i.e. tax, customs and excise, and 
foreign exchange) applicable to the DRC-China joint project because of its 
specificity.
101
 The DRC also makes the commitment that it will in no circumstances 
appropriate, nationalize and expropriate, directly or indirectly, the mining joint venture 
or the latter‘s property.102 It then promises to respect the BIT between China and the 
DRC signed on 18 December 1997.
103
 Finally, the DRC guarantees the security of 
China‘s mining and infrastructure investments and the reimbursement of the 
infrastructure to be built in accordance with the Framework Agreement.
104
    
 
3.5.2. Insurance guarantees 
Another guarantee found in the DRC Framework Agreement is that, if the consortium 
of Chinese investors or its affiliates decide to take out at their own expenses investment 
insurance from institutions like MIGA to protect themselves against political risks, the 
DRC will grant recognition if subscription to insurance schemes requires recognition 
from the host state.
105
  
 
Insurance schemes, national and multilateral, are common in FDI law. Three options 
are available to insure against the risks of a project. The first option is the guarantee or 
insurance against political risks (‗political risk cover‘), thus leaving private sector 
lenders with only the commercial risks on the project.
106
 MIGA only offers political 
risk cover. The second option is the guarantee or insurance that covers all risks, both 
                                                 
101
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 15.1. 
102
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 15.2. 
103
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 15.3. 
104
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 15.6. 
105
 DRC Framework Agreement art. 15.4. 
106
 E.R. YESCOMBE, PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT FINANCE 217 (Academic Press 2002). 
 286 
 
political and commercial (‗full cover‘), thus leaving lenders to provide finance with no 
risk on the project.
107
 A third option is direct loans to the project company from public 
sector lenders, national or multi-national, prepared to accept political risks that private 
sector lenders are not willing to take.
108
 These mitigation options are offered and 
provided by export credits, ‗untied‘ financing, insurance from IFI such as the World 
Bank, and the private insurance market.
109
 For example, China has taken out a policy 
under a national insurance scheme, China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation 
(Sinosure), to insure against political risks in the construction of the Bui hydroelectric 
power dam in Ghana.
110
 
 
3.5.3. Undertakings 
Undertakings and representations are another way of allowing lenders to control the 
risk profile of projects and shifting risks on the project. Project joint ventures typically 
undertake to comply with contractual and legal obligations, refrain from exercising 
certain rights and powers, and take out and maintain insurances.
111
 In the DRC 
Framework Agreement, the Congolese state makes a series of representations as to the 
feasibility and profitability of the mining project.
112
 
 
3.5.4. Sovereign guarantees  
Sovereign guarantees are a financial tool used in some R4I contracts. They are a form 
of government credit enhancement technique whereby the host government guarantees 
to the project corporation that, should certain events occur or not occur, it will 
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compensate the project corporation.
113
 The scope of sovereign guarantees is a question 
of fact answered by the individual circumstances and the risk matrix of a project.
114
  
 
A good argument could be made that, insofar as the exploitation of natural resources 
does not produce sufficient returns, sovereign guarantees provide additional security.
115
 
In that sense, natural resources in R4I contracts would be more payment than 
security.
116
 Indeed, the R4I contract terms that may resemble collateral-secured 
transactions are sovereign guarantees provided by host governments that if certain 
events do or do not occur, the host government will provide China with more natural 
resources. Sovereign guarantees and collaterals are legally different, although the 
Building Bridges report – to mention but one example of a common trend – does not 
differentiate between the two. The conflation between sovereign guarantees and 
collaterals may be due to the fact that the two are comparable from an economic 
perspective, albeit legally distinguishable.
117
 
 
Some experts believe that sovereign guarantees made without the involvement of the 
World Bank are basically worthless,
118
 but this sort of observations assume that the 
economic exchange is between a host country and a private country. Such observations 
would not hold when the exchange is between two states, as in the case of most R4I 
contracts, because state-to-state agreements benefit from undeniably stronger political 
will and support. R4I contracts are very expensive and costly; and, without political 
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will, participants to R4I contractual arrangements will not take any pain implementing 
them.  
 
The DRC Framework Agreement provides a clear example of a sovereign guarantee in 
a R4I contract. The DRC Framework Agreement stipulates that the reimbursement 
guarantee is insured by the DRC, which commits itself within the framework of the 
agreement to grant to the consortium of Chinese corporations additional mining 
concessions or other resources in the event that revenues expected from the mining 
joint venture turned out to be insufficient for the reimbursement of mining and 
infrastructure investments.
119
  
 
3.6. Sovereign guarantees and debt sustainability 
The sovereign guarantee in the DRC Framework Agreement is an instructive case for 
other heavily indebted resource rich countries that mull over signing R4I contracts. 
When the DRC announced its mega-contract with China the reaction of the IMF and 
the Paris Club of creditors was almost immediate. The IMF threatened not to relieve 
the DRC of its external debt, estimated to be more than 12 billion US dollars. The IMF 
argued that the DRC‘s contract with China, which was then worth 9 billion US dollars, 
would result in an explosive increase in the DRC‘s external debt, 120  making it 
unsustainable. The Chinese investments would considerably increase the DRC‘s debt 
burden with little certainty that the DRC would be able to repay the debt because most 
fragile states like the DRC have weak economies.
121
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Yet the concept of debt sustainability is as debatable as the argument that R4I contracts 
augment a host country‘s debt burden because uncertainty reigns over the most 
appropriate measure of a country‘s insolvency. 122  Another problem is the contrast 
between Chinese flexible financial models and the models employed by the IMF, 
which calculate a country‘s debt on the basis of the value of the contract upon signature 
instead of basing such calculations on the money actually spent.
123
   
 
For their part, the Congolese government and the Chinese Ambassador to the DRC 
vehemently opposed the idea that the R4I contract increased the DRC‘s external debt. 
They argued that there was no additional debt burden on the DRC‘s shoulders as the 
infrastructure loans were guaranteed by mineral deposits, verified by feasibility 
studies.
124
 Stated differently, the nature of the mining contract as a resource-for-
infrastructure arrangement ensured that the infrastructure loans would not add to the 
host country‘s external debt.  
 
Eventually, however, after several months of wrangling and tremendous pressure from 
the IMF and the Paris Club on the DRC to renounce its contract with China, the DRC 
adopted a middle course and accepted to renegotiate the contract with China so as to 
make it compatible with the IMF‘s relief program. The DRC adjusted the terms of the 
R4I contract by removing the sovereign guarantee in the 3 billion US dollars mining 
project and scaling the amount of infrastructure loans from 6 down to 3 billion US 
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dollars, thereby reducing the overall value of the R4I contract from 9 to 6 billion US 
dollars.
125
    
 
3.7. Collateral 
In order to protect themselves against counterparty credit defaults, lenders often take 
security against the assets of the borrower. Lenders liquidate the security to satisfy the 
amount of a loan that they granted in the event of the borrower failing to repay the loan. 
With specific reference to R4I contracts, the existing scholarship does not clearly 
differentiate between contracts where natural resources serve as collateral – that is 
security for the repayment of the loan – and contracts where they are a mode of 
payment. The World Bank report Building Bridges does mention that natural resources 
are used to secure finance for the construction of hydro-electric power dams in Congo-
Brazzaville and Ghana.
126
 However, this statement entangles collateral-secured finance 
and exchange for natural resources for national infrastructure.  
 
In fact, the available body of evidence on R4I contracts does not back up statements 
that natural resources are collaterals as a matter of law. Cabinet resolutions and/or 
framework agreements in the Angolan, Guinean and DRC cases do not present natural 
resources as protection against the risk that the host governments will default on the 
infrastructure loans. In the Sino-Congolese R4I contract, it is the joint venture between 
the DRC and China that constitutes collateral and not the mineral resources per se.
127
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Some scholars have argued that the distinction between natural resources as payment 
and protection is superfluous because natural resources in R4I contracts essentially 
perform both functions.
128
 These arguments are incorrect. Not only do they 
misrepresent the role of natural resources and the common intention of parties in R4I 
contractual arrangements, but they also fail to perceive the difference of nature of those 
two concepts in contract law. The payment of national infrastructure with natural 
resources is the principal obligation in the commercial sale transaction that is a R4I 
covenant, non-compliance with which is a breach of contract, calling for a remedy. 
Conversely, the use of natural resources as security is a contract clause that provides 
lenders with a remedy, that is foreclosure, if borrowers default on loans provided by 
lenders. 
 
Breach of payment and security provisions calls for different remedies; and the 
difference between these remedies is of great significance. The breach of a payment 
provision would attract a judicial or arbitral order to pay damages whereas the breach 
of a security provision would attract an order for damages or alternatively an order to 
foreclose on the collateral provided by the debtor. In a sale transaction, foreclosure is 
tantamount to a forced sale, thus an order for specific performance, which is an 
exceptional contractual remedy.
129
 This remedy would be extremely hard to enforce in 
the sale of natural resources by a sovereign country because, with very few exceptions, 
states own and exercise permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which means 
that a court order cannot in fact and in law force them to sell their resources.
130
  
                                                 
128
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Nothing, however, prevents courts from impounding property owned by a host state if 
the latter breaches a promise to sell natural resources to an investor.  
 
The foremost significance of the distinction between payment and security provisions 
is the corresponding distinction between barters and asset-based project finance, which 
in turn determines the question as to whether infrastructure loans add to a host 
country‘s debt burden. States which are subject to the IMF austerity measures keeping 
them from – among other things – buying foreign goods and services may wish to 
avoid increasing their debt burden by resorting to cashless transactions.
131
 If a 
transaction is a barter, debt does not increase; if on the other hand the transaction is not 
a barter, debt is likely to increase. In the dispute that pitted the IMF and the Paris Club 
against the DRC and China over the R4I contract signed in the DRC, the DRC and 
China have in essence argued that if infrastructure loans are part of a resource-for-
infrastructure they will not burden the host country. Thus, to the extent that R4I 
contracts bear a likeness to barters, the claim may be made that they do not add to a 
host country‘s debt.   
 
3.8. Reimbursement of infrastructure investments 
An essential function of natural resources in R4I contracts is to reimburse or pay for 
China‘s infrastructure investments. From the fact that the amount of infrastructure 
investments determines the amount of reimbursement it follows that the larger the 
infrastructure investments the higher the amount of natural resources allocated to the 
servicing of the infrastructure loans. Large infrastructure loans also imply longer 
amortization periods and riskier investments. 
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Chinese investors have resorted to a wide array of financial models to ensure an 
efficient amortization of their massive investments. In this respect, China Eximbank 
plays a pivotal role. Financial models and ratios can quantify many aspects of a project 
joint venture, such as its business, operations and financial position.
132
 
 
3.8.1. Debt-equity ratios 
One of the financial tools that Chinese investors make use of is debt-equity ratios. In 
designing the capital structure of a project corporation or joint venture the interests of 
lenders and investors often conflict. In traditional project finance, lenders‘ interests are 
to decrease the portion of debt in the capital structure and to increase the level of equity 
in order to ensure shareholders‘ commitment to the project, push up the net value of 
project assets, and provide lenders greater security flowing from the increased capital 
injection into the project.
133
 By contrast, shareholders would like to decrease equity and 
see a corresponding increase in debt so as to expand the return on their equity 
investment.
134
 
 
The idiosyncrasy of R4I contracts is that lenders and the majority shareholders would 
all be Chinese state-owned corporations such that the dynamics described above do not 
apply and that the interests of lenders and majority shareholders in R4I schemes 
converge. During the phase of the reimbursement of China‘s mining investments, the 
capital structure of Sicomines in the DRC is 30 percent of debt in the form of 
shareholders‘ loan with no interest to Sicomines and the remaining 70 percent is 
equity.
135
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3.8.2. Internal rate of return 
To understand what the internal rate of return (IRR) is, unpacking the concept of the 
rate of return or return on investment is apposite. The rate of return, or the return on 
investment (ROI), or simply the return, is ‗the ratio of money gained or lost on an 
investment relative to the amount of money invested, usually on an annual basis.‘136 
That rate includes return on debt and equity. The IRR on the other hand is the discount 
rate that results in a net present value (NPV) of zero of revenues over the project 
period, which shows the annualized effective compounded
137
 rate of return that can be 
earned on the invested capital.
138
 This definition means that the IRR is the interest rate 
or discount rate at which foreign investors would recoup the entire cost of their 
investments over the project period. In the DRC Framework Agreement, the IRR is 19 
percent, a rate reflecting the large amounts invested in the mining and infrastructure 
projects in the DRC.  
 
3.8.3. Interest rates 
Another financial tool used by Chinese investors is interest rates. An interest rate or 
discount rate is the compensation for the risk of default. Any reduction or increase in 
the risk of default will reduce or increase the interest.
139
 Interest rates or discount rates 
are determined by calculating the return on investment had the investment been made 
in the next best alternative project.
140
 In other words, opportunity costs determine 
interest rates.  
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China Eximbank typically signs a loan agreement with a host country in Africa 
pursuant to an intergovernmental framework agreement but the terms of the loan 
agreements are secret in the majority of R4I contracts.
141
 The Sino-Angolan R4I 
contract provides for a concessional interest rate, London Inter-Bank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) + 1.5%, with a grace period of up to 3 years.
142
 The World Bank estimates 
that, in addition to grants, the interest rates offered by China Eximbank across all its 
products range from 1 to 2 percent.
143
 However, the DRC Framework Agreement 
derogates from this standard practice by stipulating that reimbursement of China‘s 
equity investments in the joint venture Sicomines will be at an annual interest rate of 
6.1 percent.
144
 This derogation is most probably a signal that the risk of default by the 
DRC in reimbursing China‘s investments in the joint mining project is above average.  
 
3.8.4. Valuation 
One important issue that arises with respect to R4I contracts is the valuation of natural 
resources. The question is whether the resources are under-valued or over-valued.
145
 
The World Bank states that the value of traded natural resources is slightly 
discounted.
146
 In the case of Angola, Nigeria, Guinea, Gabon and the DRC, the value of 
oil, bauxite, iron, copper and cobalt is determined by the spot market. Until 2002, 
Angola would repay its commercial oil-backed loans at fixed barrels-per-day rates,
147
 
but since 2004 Angola has started using spot market rates for the R4I contract that it 
signed with China.  
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The value of natural resources depends on the implicit price agreed upon for the natural 
resource traded and its relation to current and future market prices. The wider 
experience with R4I contracts is that the price of the resources is not set over the 
project period, but that the value of the resources rises and falls as commodities 
markets rally and tumble.
148
 The terms of R4I contracts are adjusted accordingly. 
Rising commodity prices do not lead to an increase in income but to an acceleration of 
loan repayment, and vice versa.
149
 Conversely, falling commodity prices will probably 
prompt parties to suspend payment of the loan and wait for economically viable price 
levels.
150
 While these financial terms are an efficient way of fixing the economic value 
of commodities it nonetheless leaves resource rich countries, including PIRSA, at the 
mercy of price fluctuations in international commodities markets. The risk of price 
volatility in commodities markets is high given that those markets are inherently 
volatile.   
 
3.8.5. Amortization period 
Amortization periods vary. While the Sino-Angolan R4I contract stipulates that the 
Chinese loan is payable over 12 years,
 151
  the 2010 Sino-Ghanaian R4I contract 
stipulates a repayment period over 20 years
152
 and the DRC-China R4I contract 
stipulates a period of 25 years.
153
 The DRC Framework Agreement arranges the 
reimbursement of the mining and infrastructure investments in three periods.
154
 The 
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first period will reimburse the mining investments and the second period will reimburse 
the first half of infrastructure investments. The third and final period will be the 
commercial period, during which the DRC will directly share in the profits and will no 
longer have to apply them to the reimbursement of the mining and infrastructure 
investments. If Sicomines has not reimbursed the loans and the interest thereon 25 
years after its creation, the DRC government undertakes to reimburse Chinese investors 
by any other means.
155
 
 
During the first period, Sicomines is to allocate all of its profits to the complete 
reimbursement of mining investments, including the payment of interest rates, of the 
consortium of Chinese corporations in the project. The DRC Framework Agreement 
obliges Sicomines to apply 66 percent of its profits to the reimbursement of the first 
half of the infrastructure investments for as long as the total amount of the 
reimbursement does not exceed 3 billion US dollars, the latter being the amount of the 
principal. In the commercial phase of the amortization, partners in Sicomines will share 
profits among themselves according to their contribution to the joint venture‘s capital.  
 
 
4. Infrastructure side of the agreement 
4.1. Valuation and escalating costs 
The other leg of R4I contracts is the infrastructure project. The R4I contracts signed in 
Africa have provided for the construction of a wide variety of infrastructure, like 
schools, hospitals, bridges, hydroelectric power plants, roads, and railways. Because 
the value of infrastructural works fixes the amount of natural resources needed to repay 
the money invested in building infrastructure, a very high level of coordination 
                                                 
155
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between the participants in the mining project and their counterparts in the 
infrastructure project is called for.  
 
The need to coordinate the mining and infrastructure projects makes the organization of 
R4I arrangements relatively complex.
156
 Yet the complexity of organizing and 
operating a R4I contract does not solely rest on the coordination of the infrastructure 
and mining twin projects but also on each of the project, especially the infrastructure 
project. The ownership of natural resources by the state facilitates such coordination.
157
  
 
Another difficulty is the prospect of escalating costs. In the lifetime of an R4I contract 
and any construction contract, the costs of erecting infrastructure may shoot up for a 
multitude of causes. To guard against such contingency, parties must place a cap on 
costs by covenanting that, where costs reach a specified quantitative threshold, the 
construction contractor must suspend work and consult with the other party on how to 
resolve the cost issue. This clause allocates the responsibility to take precautions 
against escalating costs to the foreign investor (i.e. Chinese construction contractors) 
because it is the superior risk bearer. That is, the foreign investor is in the best position 
to minimize the probability of escalating costs, the extent of cost increases to the host 
country or to insure against the residual risk of the loss that cannot be feasibly 
averted.
158
  
 
                                                 
156
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 55-56.  
157
 Id. at 58. 
158
 On the analytical framework for the superior risk bearer, see Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. 
Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 83 (1977). 
                                                                                                                             299 
4.2. Infrastructure versus reconstruction projects 
The fact that the R4I contracts signed in the mining sectors of Africa concomitantly 
provide for the construction of infrastructure does not presuppose that the infrastructure 
projects are equal or equally significant. A review of the available evidence shows two 
scales of infrastructure projects. Most R4I contracts target infrastructure investments in 
mega-projects whereas more recent R4I contracts are in reality ambitious plans for the 
reconstruction of the entire host country. The dichotomy between mega-projects and 
national reconstruction plans should not be taken too far because at bottom that 
dichotomy is more a matter of degree or scale than a difference of kind. Aside from 
these two scales of resource-for-infrastructure contracts, R4I contracts also serve to 
diversify the economy of the host country. 
 
The R4I contracts that may be viewed as mega-projects are the Congo River hydro-
electric (Imboulou) power dam in Congo-Brazzaville, the El-Gaili (Al Jaily) power 
plant in Sudan, the gas turbine power plant at Papalanto in Nigeria, the Souapiti 
hydroelectric power dam in Guinea, new coal mines and three thermal power stations 
in the Zambezi valley in Zimbabwe, and the Bui hydroelectric power dam in Ghana. 
Only 4 R4I contracts in Angola, DRC, Guinea and Ghana embody plans for the 
reconstruction of the entire country. But since the Guinean Framework Agreement does 
not list the infrastructure projects to be financed by the exploitation of natural 
resources, the tables below only detail the infrastructure projects envisaged by R4I 
contracts in Angola, the DRC and Ghana. 
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4.3. Infrastructure projects in the Sino-Angolan deal 
4.3.1. National fiber-optic telecommunication network 
On April 3, 2006, the Angolan Cabinet approved 4 infrastructure contracts for the 
supply, installation and the commissioning of telecommunication equipments as well as 
their financing within the framework of the credit line extended by China Eximbank for 
a total value in Kwanzas equivalent to 276,307,189.00 US dollars.
159
 The 4 approved 
contracts or projects refer to 4 corresponding basic telecommunication networks.
160
 
The first project, worth 74,331,285.00 US dollars, covers the axis Luanda-Malanje-
Kuito, using optical fiber and satellite for transmission, and reaches various adjacent 
localities in the provinces of Luanda, Bengo, Cuanza-Norte, Malanje, Cuanza-Sul, Bié 
and Moxico, with a total supply of 23,040 lines.
161
 The second project, worth 67, 
954,756.00 US dollars, spreads over the following axes: Lueala-Negage-Uíge, Chibia-
Cahama-Ondjiva, and Benguela-Tchindjenje-Longonjo.
162
 Using optical fiber and 
satellite for transmission, the project reaches various adjacent locations in the provinces 
of Benguela, Cuanza-Norte, Cunene, Huambo, Uíge and Zaire, with a total supply of 
25, 984 lines.
163
  
 
The third project, worth 75,275,357.00 US dollars, refers to the expansion of the 
metropolitan network of Luanda, with a total supply of 65,232 lines, covering the mid-
west and south-east region, by creating circles and systems of harmonizing the entire 
national network, including a universal system of managing and monitoring the 
network.
164
 For that purpose, the project will create technical bases, taking into account 
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the implementation of certain systems, namely an integral data base for the network, 
the integral management and billing of customers, and a call center of Angola 
Telecom.
165
 The fourth project, worth 58,745,791.00, covers the axis Cuito-Huambo-
Lubango, using optical fiber and satellite for transmission, and reaches various adjacent 
locations in the provinces of Bié, Huambo and Huíla.
166
 
 
4.3.2. National infrastructure contracts 
The Angolan Cabinet also approved a host of infrastructure contracts that it signed with 
Chinese corporations in the context of Angola‘s national reconstruction program. 167 
The implementation of the infrastructure projects covered by the 2 billion US dollars 
loan from China Eximbank was divided in 2 phases. The first phase of the 
infrastructure construction comprised of 31 contracts on energy, water, health, 
education, communication and public works, for 50 projects across the whole nation, 
valued at 1.1 billion US dollars.
168
 By 2007, the first phase was complete.
169
 The 
second phase involved 17 contracts for 52 projects, with some projects carried over 
from the first phase.
170
 The largest project is the rehabilitation of the 371 kilometers 
road from the capital Luanda to Uíge.
171
  
 
By Cabinet resolution, the Angolan government published a list of these contracts,
172
 as 
shown in the Table below. 
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Table 27: Angolan infrastructure contracts with Chinese corporations 
 
Infrastructure projects/contracts Description 
Rehabilitation of the city of 
Luanda 
Rehabilitation of the City of Luanda and five municipalities, 
namely Kilamba Kiaxi, Rangel, Ingombota, Cazenga and  
Sambizanga 
Rehabilitation of infrastructure 
in Cazenga-Cariango 
Construction of the principal channels and the branches of  
the drainage system as well as the construction of  
infrastructure in the municipalities  
Construction of a draining system 
and rehabilitation of infrastructure 
in Precol and Suroca 
Construction of the principal system of rehabilitating the 
infrastructure in Suroca and Precol. 
Construction of a central draining  
system and rehabilitation on 
Senado Street of Câmara, Rio 
Seco and Maianga  
Construction of the principal system of ramification 
(i.e. branches) of infrastructure on Senado Street of 
Câmara, Rio Seco and Maianga  
Distribution project for water 
supply 
Renovation of 300 kilometers of water supply, 300 fountains, 
 2800 valves, 30 000 meters, 13 pumps and 5 control stations 
Construction of 215, 500 houses in 
24 cities and 18 provinces 
Construction of 215 500 housing units with one total 
construction 
area of 31, 436 709m
2
 
Rehabilitation of the road 
Luanda-Sumbe-Lobito 
Rehabilitation consisting of a total of 497 kilometers of roads, 
including reconstruction of roads, bridges and ditches 
Rehabilitation of the road  
Malanje-Saurimo and Luena-Dundo 
Rehabilitation of roads with a total length of 1,107 kilometers,  
including reconstruction of roads, bridges and ditches  
Rehabilitation of the railway of 
Luanda   
Rehabilitation of railways with a total length of 444 kilometers, 
including reconstruction of roads, bridges and ditches, and  
other installations 
General rehabilitation of the railway 
of 
Benguela 
Rehabilitation of railways with a total length of 1,547,2 
kilometers, including reconstruction of roads, bridges, ditches 
and other installations 
General rehabilitation of the railway 
of 
Moçamedes 
Rehabilitation of railways with a total length of 1003,1 
kilometers, 
including reconstruction of roads, bridges, ditches and other 
installations 
New International Airport of Luanda EPC, preparation, supply and construction contract for a new 
airport, including ‗carport,‘ cargo areas and other constructions 
Studies and technical projects 
1. Projects for the building of housing 
Project for the construction of 215 000 housing units with a 
total 
construction area of 31,436,709 m
2
 
2. Rehabilitation of infrastructure Project for the rehabilitation of five public infrastructures 
3. General and urban planning  of the 
new City of Luanda 
General planning of one new city, including management and 
investment proposals and urban planning 
4. General and urban planning of the 
administration center of Luanda 
General planning of an administration center, including 
ministerial office buildings, a Supreme Court building, 
parliament, presidential house, etc. 
5. Landscape project for Luanda Landscape project for the administration center of Luanda 
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Drawing information from the Angolan Ministry of Finance, the Chatham House report 
Thirst for African Oil lists infrastructure projects by phase and by sector as follows:
173
 
 
Table 28: Projects financed by China Eximbank (phase 1) 
 
Sector Number of 
contracts 
Total value  
(in million US dollars) 
Health 9 206,1 
Education 8 217,2 
Energy and water 8 243,8 
Agriculture 3 149,8 
Transport 1 13,8 
Social communication 1 66,9 
Public works 1 211,7 
Total 31 1,109.3 
 
 
Table 29: Projects financed by China Eximbank (phase 2) 
 
Sector Number of 
contracts 
Total value  
(in million US dollars) 
Health 1 43,8 
Education 3 229,6 
Energy and water 3 144,9 
Agriculture 1 54,0 
Fisheries 3 266,8 
Post 4 276,3 
Public works 2 89,5 
Total 17 1,104.9 
 
In May 2007, China Eximbank granted 500 million US dollars to finance 
‗complementary actions‘, that is, projects from the first phase that had not been 
budgeted for.
174
 These projects included water and energy networks, water treatment 
plants, and new telecommunication lines.
175
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Table 30: Complementary actions financed by China Eximbank 
 
Sector Total value  
(in million US dollars) 
Health 159,4 
Education 145,6 
Energy and water 76,5 
Education and health 1,7 
Fisheries 40,0 
Telecommunications 56,3 
Public works 65,5 
Total 545,0 
 
Source: A Vines et al., Thirst for African oil: Asian national oil companies in Nigeria and Angola (2009) 63. 
 
In September 2007, another 2 billion US dollars credit line was extended to Angola by 
China Eximbank. However, it is not clear whether China and Angola entered into a 
second R4I contract or whether they used the same R4I contract by simply extending 
the initial 2 billion US dollars with the same amount. The new credit line will finance 
an additional 100 projects, including water and energy, with priorities set on education 
and health by building schools and hospitals throughout the country.
176
  
 
4.4. Infrastructure projects in the Sino-Congolese deal 
Just like the Sino-Angolan R4I contract provided for several infrastructure projects 
aimed at Angola‘s national reconstruction, so does the R4I contract between the DRC 
and China cover construction, rehabilitation, and modernization projects nationwide. 
As was the case with the Sino-Angolan R4I contract, the implementation of the 
infrastructure projects envisaged by the Sino-Congolese R4I contract is divided in more 
than one phase. The first phase, which is still ongoing, is valued at 350 million US 
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dollars while the second phase, which started in March 30, 2010, is valued at 400 
million US dollars.
177
 The following is a list of the projects to be implemented within 
the framework of the R4I contract between the DRC and China.
178
 
 
Table 31: Congolese infrastructure projects with Chinese corporations 
 
Number Projects Length 
(in 
km) 
Description 
1 Railway   
Tenke-Kolwezi-Dilolo  Rehabilitation and 
modernization 
Sakania-Lubumbashi-Kamina-Mwene Ditu- 
Kananga-Ilebo 
1833 Modernization 
Kinshasa-Matadi 365 
2 Railway   
Ilebo-Kinshasa 1015 Construction 
3 Roads   
3.1. Tarred roads  Construction 
Kasindi-Beni-Komanda-Niania 520 
Komanda-Bunia 71 
Lubumbashi-Kasomeno-Kasenga 207 
Kasomeno-Pweto 336 
Likasi-Kolwezi 180 
Bukavu-Kamanyola 55 
Moba slip road 462 
3.2.bridge over the Lualaba river 0,110 Construction 
3.3. Tarred roads   
Pweto-Kalemie-Fizi 730 Construction 
Fizi-Uvira-Kavinvira 142 
Bukavu-Goma-Beni 590 
Niania-Bafwasende-Kisangani 363 
3.4. Tarred roads   
Matadi-Boma 135 Rehabilitation 
Uvira-Kamanyola 85 
Moanda-Banana 9 
Mbuji Mayi – Mwene Ditu 135 
3.5. Untarred roads   
Kananga-Mbuji Mayi-Kasongo-Kindu-  887 Rehabilitation 
Kolwezi-Kasaji-Dilolo 426 
Dilolo-Sandoa-Kapanga-Kananga 709 
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Kasaji-Sandoa 139 
Boma-Moanda-Yema 125 
Niania-Isiro 232 
- 220 
4 Public roads   
City of Kinshasa 250 Rehabilitation 
Other cities: Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kisangani, 
Kananga, Mbuji Mayi, Goma, Matadi, 
Bandundu, 
Mbandaka, Kindu 
300 
5 Airports   
Goma airport   
Bukavu airport   
6 Hospitals and medical equipment   
 10 hospitals, each with 150 beds, one 
In each province 
 Construction 
 21 hospitals, each with 150 beds, one in each 
Province 
 
 Hospital in the centre of Kinshasa  Rehabilitation and completion 
7 Energy (electricity)   
Kakobola hydroelectric dam (Bandundu)  Construction 
Katende hydroelectric dam (Kasai Occidental)  
Electric distribution network in Kinshasa  Rehabilitation 
Electric distribution network in Lubumbashi  
8 Training centers for public works  Construction and rehabilitation 
9 Housing   
2000 houses in Kinshasa  Construction 
3000 houses in provinces  
10 Health centers   
 145 health centers equipped with 50 beds, one 
In each territory 
 Construction and equipment 
11 2 modern universities  Construction 
 
 
As can be clearly seen, the R4I contract between the DRC and China is wide-sweeping. 
It covers such basic socio-economic infrastructure as railways, roads (tarred and 
untarred), public roads, bridges, airports, hospitals and medical equipment, electricity 
or power generation, training centers for public works, housing, health centers and 
universities.  
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4.5. The infrastructure projects in the Sino-Ghanaian deals 
Ghana is so far the only resource rich country in Africa that signed two R4I agreements 
with China. The first Ghana-China R4I contract, concluded in 2007, consists in the 
construction of the Bui dam hydroelectric power project and the second Ghana-China 
R4I contract, concluded in 2010, is a nation-wide construction project. The Bui dam 
hydroelectric power project in northwestern Ghana is the single largest Chinese-funded 
project and by far Ghana‘s largest foreign investment in Ghana since the construction 
of the Akosombo hydroelectric power project in the early 1960s.
179
 The Bui dam 
involves in fact the construction of an entire complex. The Bui dam complex will 
consist of a main dam in the Bui gorge and two smaller saddle dams in the neighboring 
Banda Hills, a power house and a switchyard, transmission lines from Bui to Kumasi 
and Kenyasi, access roads in and around the dam site, irrigation systems and the 
nucleus of a metropolis called ‗Bui City‘.180 
 
The Bui Dam is expected to be completed in February 2013 at the cost of 622 million 
US dollars.
181
 The contract that Ghana and China signed is of the resource-for-
infrastructure kind whereby China (through SinoHydro) builds the Bui dam in 
exchange for Ghana‘s exports of cocoa products to China. When completed, the dam 
will have a maximum generation capacity of 400 megawatts and a net average annual 
energy production of 1000 gigawatt hour per year, a generation capacity that will be 
crucial in meeting the country‘s future energy needs.182 The Bui dam is immensely 
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significant to Ghana‘s economy as it is envisaged that it will help propel the country‘s 
economic growth towards middle income status by 2015.
183
 
 
In September 2010, Ghana announced the signing of a 10.4 billion R4I contract with 
China Eximbank on the sidelines of an official visit of Ghana President John Atta Mills 
to China. This R4I contract, the largest by dollar value, is of the Sino-Angolan sort 
because it is preoccupied with infrastructure development on a national scale and in 
various sectors. It covers the development of a road and railway system from Kumasi 
to Paga, Ghana‘s eastern corridor roads network and other sectors of the economy.184 In 
short, the 2010 Ghana-China R4I contract unveils two constitutive projects, namely a 
project to promote the exploitation of mineral deposits; and a road and railway project 
to open up the upper west, upper east and the eastern, middle, and northern regions of 
Ghana for development.
185
 
 
 
As the above information shows, the type of infrastructure involved is testimony to the 
new pattern of economic exchanges taking place with R4I contracts. In the past, 
colonial enterprises, in Africa as in parts of Asia, built all the infrastructure (roads, 
houses, railways, ports and airports) necessary for the exploitation and exports of 
natural resources. That infrastructure was built for the purposes of mineral extraction. 
While those colonial patterns could be thought to have been repeated with R4I 
contracts,
186
 the type and purposes of the infrastructure built as well as their overall 
political context present a strikingly contrasting picture. Infrastructure like roads, ports 
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and airports, bridges still enables the extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons, but they 
now cover several other purposes unrelated to extractive activities, like education, 
water, agriculture, housing and health. These other purposes are apparent in the non-
mining types of infrastructure built, modernized and rehabilitated by Chinese investors, 
such as hospitals and medical equipment, and training centers and universities.  
 
Having said that, resource rich countries in Africa should stay the course in investments 
in mining infrastructure because this is infrastructure that considerably augments 
production and thus revenues for state coffers. This sort of public investments is wise 
and efficient, and it cannot be equated to a duplication of colonialism because political 
control over minerals and hydrocarbons is firmly in the hands of the host country. The 
Thirst for African Oil explicitly states that the experience of Asian oil corporations in 
Nigeria and Angola belies the stereotype of weak African states being ruthlessly 
exploited by resource-hungry Asian tigers.
187
 Both Nigeria and Angola exerted a great 
deal of control and influence over their economic relations with Chinese and other 
Asian oil corporations.   
 
The general political context also tells a non-colonial story: In the colonial days the 
decision as to the quantity, the location and sort of infrastructure to be built were 
dictated by colonialists; with R4I contracts these decisions are made by sovereign 
states. Whether these states are democratic in making these decisions is however a 
separate albeit fundamental issue.       
 
                                                 
187
 ALEX VINES ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 29, at 3. 
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4.6. Monitoring institutions 
Very often, host countries set up institutions to monitor the infrastructural works 
provided for in R4I contracts and carried out by Chinese construction companies. The 
host countries do not have physical control over infrastructure funds but they 
nevertheless decide where, how much and which types of infrastructure must be built 
and they monitor the construction process. In countries where R4I contracts have been 
signed, the institutions implementing infrastructural works are usually directly linked to 
the presidency of the host country. Those links are for instance found in Angola and the 
DRC. In addition to signaling their importance for the host country‘s economy, these 
direct connections to the presidency signal the highly political nature of R4I contracts. 
In fact, R4I contracts can be seen more as political deals between the host countries and 
China than as commercial transactions.
188
 
 
4.7. The Angolan Office for the Management of the Eximbank Credit Line  
The Angolan government has not just fully integrated its R4I contract with China into 
its National Reconstruction Program, it also set up a number of institutions to monitor 
the credit line that it received from China Eximbank. The Angolan incorporation of 
China‘s investments into its national strategies and the creation of monitoring 
institutions may be the most proximate cause of the relative success of the Sino-Angola 
R4I contract in Angola.
189
 By contrast, in Nigeria President Obasanjo‘s attempts to 
trade oil for infrastructure were not part of a national strategy; Obasanjo did not set up 
                                                 
188
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any monitoring institution or mechanism, nor were the promise by the Asian oil 
corporations to build infrastructure legally binding.
190
 
 
In Angola, the government created on July 6, 2004 an office to monitor the 
infrastructure-related credit line that it obtained from China within the framework of 
the R4I contract that it signed with China. It created upon publication of a government 
dispatch (despacho) the Office for the Technical Support and Management of the 
Credit Line with Eximbank of China (Gabinete de Apoio Técnico à Gestão da Linha de 
Crédito com Eximbank da China).
191
 The 6
th
 Extraordinary Session of the Cabinet 
Meeting on June 30, 2004 approved the proposal for the creation, under the authority of 
the Ministry of Finance, an Office for the Technical Support and Management of the 
Credit Line with Eximbank of China.
192
 The Session was attended by the Finance 
Minister, the Minister of Planning, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet 
Secretary, the Governor of the National Bank of Angola and the Prime Minister of 
Angola.
193
 
 
At that extraordinary Cabinet meeting, the then Finance Minister José Pedro de Morais 
Júnior created the Office for the Technical Support and Management of the Credit Line 
with Eximbank of China (OMCL or Office). The Finance Minister placed the Office 
under the authority of the Ministry of Finance, which also coordinates the Office.
194
 He 
also appointed as OMCL deputy coordinator the then Deputy Finance Minister 
Eduardo Leopoldo Severim de Morais (who later became Finance Minister).
195
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The Finance Minister incorporated into the Office several officials from other 
important national institutions, making the Office a multi-sectoral technical group. 
Among other officials, the Finance Minister incorporated into the Office an adviser and 
an expert from the Ministry of Finance, a department head of the National Directorate 
of the Treasury, the National Director of Investments and an expert from the Ministry 
of Planning, an administrator and 2 department heads from the National Bank of 
Angola, the director of General Services of the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Coordinator 
of Bilateral Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
196
 
   
4.7.1. Nature and objectives of the Office  
The Finance Minister made several provisions on the organization and functioning of 
the Office for the Technical Support and Management of the Credit Line with 
Eximbank of China by adding a legal instrument to that effect as an annex to the 
government dispatch that created the Office.
197
 The OMCL dispatch explains that the 
credit line agreed upon by China Eximbank and the Angolan government, in addition to 
being the principal source of finance for the Program of Public Investments for the 
period 2004-2006, would be the financial support for the revival of economic activities 
and the betterment of social conditions in important areas of the country.
198
 The OMCL 
was created specifically for the complete fulfillment of these objectives.
199
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The OMCL is an organ designed for technical support and affiliated to the Ministry of 
Finance, as borrower, for the implementation and management of financial facilities in 
order to articulate coordination between all participants and to assist the government in 
obtaining all the information necessary to accompany the government in its quest for 
the fulfillment of the objectives prescribed in its general program.
200
 
 
The objectives of the Office are threefold. The Office aims at the (1) the execution of 
the tasks envisaged in the implementation mechanisms of the agreement on the credit 
line, (2) the treatment and technical organization of the approved projects and their 
respective contracts; and (3) the monitoring and supervision of the (physical and 
financial) execution of the investments program with the support of the Chinese credit 
line.
201
      
 
4.7.2. Composition and functioning 
The Office is coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and composed of the following 
officials: 3 senior experts of the Finance Ministry, 2 senior experts from the Ministry of 
Planning, 2 senior experts from the National Bank of Angola, one senior expert from 
the Cabinet Secretariat, and one representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
202
 
The OMCL dispatch stipulates that one of the representatives from the Finance 
Ministry, the Ministry of Planning and the National Bank of Angola must work full 
time for the Office.
203
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The Office has an interlocutor (point of contact) in each Ministry (sector) that will be 
the coordinator or/and project leader of the teams in their respective sector.
204
 The 
contact point is also the primary person in charge of the materialization of the goals 
defined in each project.
205
 Sectoral ministries are responsible for the execution of 
infrastructure projects falling under their respective sectors and for ensuring the 
training of sufficient staff, like nurses and teachers.
206
 
 
The Office functions within the premises and budget of the Ministry of Finance.
207
 For 
the realization of its mission, the Office will be able to count on specialized technical 
assistance through the punctual employment of or agreement with specialists, 
consultants and the like.
208
   
 
The OMCL dispatch has attributed to the Office various responsibilities. The Office 
must:
209
 
(1) ensure the application and execution of the tasks that have been attributed to it 
in the implementation mechanism set out in the agreement on the credit line 
(procedures); 
(2) guarantee good coordination, administration, discipline and rigor in the 
implementation of the investment program with the financial support of 
Eximbank; 
(3) establish, within the ambit of the abovementioned mechanism, connections with 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China Eximbank, Angolan ministries 
                                                 
204
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through interlocutors or points of contact, national banks, financial 
intermediaries and intervening national operators (corporations, institutions, 
etc.). 
(4) accompany transfers in the Escrow Account, proposing measures deemed 
necessary for the execution of the agreement on the credit line and suggesting 
ways of utilizing excess amounts; 
(5) hand over contracts to the Economic Team and the Permanent Commission of 
Cabinet Meetings for approval, after agreeing with the intervening sectors; 
(6) propose to the Economic Team of the government a model for the participation 
of national corporations into ventures and acquisitions of national products (30 
percent of local contents) and accompany its execution; and 
(7) submit to the Economic Team and the Permanent Commission of the Cabinet 
Meetings detailed monthly reports on the implementation mechanism of the 
credit line, highlighting: 
i) the situation of ongoing projects; 
ii) the execution of initial payments; 
iii) the projects awaiting Chinese approval; 
iv) the available assets in the credit line; 
v) expenditures effected and debt servicing; 
vi) position of the escrow account; 
vii) monitoring of the physical execution of ongoing projects; and 
viii) proposals of measures deemed necessary210.  
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4.8. Congolese monitoring institutions 
The Congolese government has also put in place institutions staffed by technical 
experts to monitor and supervise the infrastructural works in the context of the R4I 
contract between the DRC and China. Like Angola, the constitutive documents of those 
institutions are readily available, just like the Sino-Congolese R4I contract itself, which 
has been officially published, initially on the Congolese President‘s official website and 
later on the website of the President‘s Five Great Works.211 
 
Upon request by the Infrastructure Minister, the Congolese government has created 
institutions whose attributions include monitoring and supervising the infrastructural 
works carried out as part of the R4I contract between the DRC and China. Those two 
main institutions are the Congolese Agency for the Great Works (ACGT, an acronym 
from its French name Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux) and the Bureau of the 
Coordination and the Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Program (BCPSC, from its 
French name Bureau de Coordination et du Suivi du Programme Sino-Congolais). The 
Congolese President created both the ACGT and the BCPSC by presidential decree on 
August 26, 2008.
212
 Unlike the Angolan Office for the Technical Support and 
Management of the Credit Line with Eximbank of China, the Congolese ACGT and 
BCPSC do not fall under the authority of the Finance Minister but under the 
Infrastructure Minister, who also acts as the president of the ACGT.
213
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4.8.1. The Congolese Agency for the Great Works 
The Congolese Agency for the Great Works (ACGT) is a technical public service 
enjoying administrative and financial autonomy but working at the instigation and 
under the instructions of the Infrastructure Minister.
214
 The presidential decree that 
instituted the ACGT expressly states that the ACGT has been created for the purposes 
of the DRC‘s national reconstruction program, implementing its Five Great Works, 
especially basic infrastructure, and the R4I contract between the DRC and its Chinese 
partners.
215
  
 
The ACGT is tasked with the coordination, supervision and control of the execution of 
the R4I contract between the DRC and China. It plays the role of the contracting 
authority and serves as a single window or one-stop center in the execution of 
infrastructure projects.
216
 More specifically, the functions of the ACGT include 
documenting all infrastructure projects, defining and planning the infrastructure 
program, approving feasibility studies after their ratification by the relevant 
government structures, designating the office of public works and drainage and the 
roads office as contracting authority where it is necessary, preparing infrastructure 
contracts to be submitted to and signed by the Infrastructure Minister. The functions of 
the ACGT also include supervising and coordinating infrastructure works, monitoring 
of billing and disbursement with respect to the infrastructure works executed in 
collaboration with Sicomines and other Chinese partners, and acting as the interface 
between infrastructure projects and sectoral ministries and other government 
structures.
217
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The ACGT has two main structures, the Executive Committee (Comité de Direction) 
and the General Directorate (Direction Générale). The Executive Committee is 
composed of people from the Infrastructure Ministry and from various departments of 
the AGCT.
218
 The General Directorate of the ACGT comprises a dozen sections cutting 
across infrastructure sectors. It comprises sections on, among other areas, roads, public 
roads, buildings, railways, ports and airports, environment and energy.
219
 The ACGT 
Decree stipulates that the operations of ACGT are facilitated by financial and physical 
resources provided by Sicomines or any other Chinese partners and the Congolese 
government.
220
 The ACGT may also benefit from the expertise of experts provided by 
national and international organizations and partners.
221
 And in order to facilitate the 
operations of the ACGT, the ACGT Decree exonerates the ACGT from all taxes.
222
  
 
4.8.2. The Bureau of the Monitoring of the Sino-Congolese Program 
Like the ACGT, the Bureau of the Coordination and the Monitoring of the Sino-
Congolese Program (BCPSC) is a multi-sectoral technical public service enjoying 
administrative and financial autonomy. However, unlike the ACGT, the BCPSC does 
not work under the instructions of the Infrastructure Minister but the Prime Minister.
223
 
Still like the ACGT, the BCPSC has been set up for the materialization of the DRC‘s 
national reconstruction program, implementing its Five Great Works, especially basic 
infrastructure, and the R4I contract between the DRC and its Chinese partners.
224
 
 
                                                 
218
 ACGT Decree art. 8. 
219
 ACGT Decree art. 15. 
220
 ACGT Decree arts. 4-5. 
221
 ACGT Decree art. 5. 
222
 ACGT Decree art. 21. 
223
 BCPSC Decree art. 1. 
224
 BCPSC Decree preamble. 
                                                                                                                             319 
The principal function of the BCPSC is to manage and monitor the R4I contract 
between the DRC and its Chinese partners in the sectors of mining and basic 
infrastructure.
225
 A more specific function of the BCPSC is to serve as interface 
between the different parties and entities with an interest in the projects originating 
from cooperation agreements on infrastructure, especially the Congolese government, 
the consortium of Chinese state-owned corporations, Sicomines or any other joint 
ventures for the exploitation of natural resources, the ACGT as well as the structures of 
Chinese partners charged with the monitoring of those projects.
226
 Other specific 
functions are to monitor the application of agreements with China, to prepare different 
meetings and negotiations between the parties and to ensure that negotiations with 
banks or financial institutions for additional support are successful.
227
  
 
The BCPSC is composed of an Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee (Comité 
Interministériel de Coordination) and an Executive Secretariat (Secrétariat 
Exécutif).
228
 The Coordination Committee is constituted of all Ministers directly 
involved in the projects resulting from agreements with Chinese partners.
229
 
Nevertheless, a number of Ministers are members of the Coordination Committee by 
virtue of their function. Those Ministers are the Minister of Presidential Affairs, the 
Minister of Prime Ministerial Affairs (Ministre Près le Premier Ministre), the 
Infrastructure Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Finance Minister, the Budget 
Minister, the Minister of Mines, the Transport Minister, the Energy Minister, the 
Minister for Housing, the Minister of Relations with Parliament, the General Director 
of the ACGT, the Vice-President of the joint venture for the exploitation of natural 
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resources, and the Executive Secretary of the BCPSC.
230
 The Executive Secretariat is 
composed of three structures, namely a multidisciplinary committee of experts, an 
economic mission in the Congolese Embassy to China and a support service.
231
 The 
Economic Mission in the Congolese Embassy to China is charged with information on 
projects and with maintaining contact with China.
232
          
 
The Congolese government provides the BCPSC with a budget and further supports it 
with subsidies.
233
 The patrimony of the BCPSC includes movable and immovable 
property with which the government has endowed it; material equipment and diverse 
things acquired in the context of the DRC-China R4I contract, represented by the 
Chinese state-owned corporation China Railway and Engineering Corporation (CREC); 
any other thing from other partners to the contract; and donations and bequests.
234
 
 
4.9. The Bui Power Authority in Ghana 
President John Kuffuor enacted on 31
st
 July 2007 the Bui Power Authority Act to 
establish an Authority charged with the development of a hydroelectric power project 
on the Black Volta River at Bui and any other potential hydroelectric power project on 
the River.
235
 The Authority plans, executes and manages the Bui hydroelectric power 
project.
236
 It (1) controls the flow and the level of water in the lake to prevent flooding 
downstream, the overtopping or breaching of the dam by flood,
237
 and (2) warns of 
possible flooding from the lake or the River downstream from the dam.
238
 The Act 
                                                 
230
 Id. 
231
 BCPSC Decree arts. 12 and 13. 
232
 BCPSC Decree art. 14. 
233
 BCPSC Decree art. 20. 
234
 BCPSC Decree art. 19. 
235
 Bui Power Authority Act preamble, 740 of 2007.  
236
 Bui Power Authority Act 11(1). 
237
 Bui Power Authority Act 12(1). 
238
 Bui Power Authority Act 12(2). 
                                                                                                                             321 
empowers the Authority to perform a number of tasks with relation to the transmission 
lines for the evacuation of the electrical power generated at the dam to the national 
electricity grid.
239
 
 
The Act has tasked the Authority with the acquisition of lands and resettlement 
measures. Subject to article 20 of the Ghanaian Constitution, the President must cause 
to be acquired lands, which in the opinion of the Authority‘s Board, may be required 
(1) to be inundated by the filling of the lake, (2) for the development of the Bui 
township, and (3) for the use of persons being resettled. Article 20 of the 1992 
Ghanaian Constitution prevents the state from compulsorily taking property unless the 
taking is necessary in the public interest or for the public purpose,
240
 and unless the 
necessity for the taking is clearly stated and reasonably justified.
241
 Furthermore, the 
state can compulsorily take property only if it promptly pays fair and adequate 
compensation and if the persons affected by the taking are entitled to approach the 
High Court for compensation and the determination of their rights.
242
 Where a 
compulsory taking of land by the state involves displacement of any inhabitants the 
state must resettle the displaced inhabitants on suitable alternative land with due regard 
for their economic wellbeing and social and cultural values.
243
 However, the 
Constitution does not derogate from any general law that provides for the compulsory 
taking of property
244
 for as long as may be necessary for the carrying out of work on 
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any land for the purpose of the provision of public facilities and utilities, subject to 
compensation in case of damage.
245
  
 
The governing body of the Bui Power Authority is a Board consisting of a chairperson, 
a chief executive officer, and 5 other members with expertise in finance and the 
operations of a power utility, with 1 of the five members representing major consumers 
of electrical power.
246
 The Authority has many sources of funding, including money 
approved by Parliament, loans granted by the government or any other person, revenue 
accruing from banks, and donations.
247
 Though it collaborates with other government 
departments and agencies and any other public authorities,
248
 the Authority is not the 
kind of multi-sectoral technical groups that the Angolan OMCL and Congolese BCPSC 
are. This difference is most probably due to the narrower scope of the Bui dam project 
compared to the nationwide infrastructure projects in the Sino-Angolan and Sino-
Congolese R4I contracts.   
 
4.10. Fiscal regimes 
In the case of the Sino-Angolan R4I contracts, a Cabinet resolution creates two fiscal 
regimes, one for independent corporations and another for other corporations. All 
supply contracts and contracts for services relating to the construction of infrastructure 
must be subject to the fiscal regime of an independent firm (empresa independente).
249
 
Taxation must be effected for entities totally independent of the contracts.
250
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The agreement on the fiscal regime will have to take into account the principal 
objectives of inspection, supervision, control and monitoring of the execution of the 
infrastructural works, which is the objective of the main contract.
251
 The latter contract 
does not include other infrastructural works that can prejudice the main agreement, 
especially the accessory technique of the monitoring institution, on the management of 
the project in question and the training of workers.
252
 For the execution of the contracts, 
the monitoring institution and contractors remain subject to the fiscal regime in force 
with respect to other entities.
253
 Agreements on fiscal regimes are negotiated and 
signed by the institutions monitoring the main contract, with the Finance Ministry 
being responsible for the designation of the sources of finance for those contracts.
254
    
 
In the case of the Sino-Congolese R4I contract, the parties have agreed that, in order to 
facilitate the reimbursement of infrastructure investments, the DRC undertakes to 
exonerate the mining and infrastructure projects of the R4I contract from all customs 
and excise requirements, mining royalties and taxes, direct or indirect, within the 
country or at import or export, due in the DRC and those relating to mining and 
infrastructure activities.
255
 All taxes paid by Sicomines during the reimbursement 
period will be accounted for as infrastructure expenses.
256
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4.11. Subcontracting 
The Angolan government passed a resolution setting down eligibility criteria for 
subcontracting as well as the rules and procedures for subcontracting. 
257
 The 
subcontracting resolution expressly stated that the reinforcement of the role of the 
Angolan business class in the process of national reconstruction is one of the objectives 
of the Angolan government.
258
 The resolution takes into account the 2 billion US 
dollars loan agreement between Angola and Eximbank, which implicitly embodied the 
principle of subcontracting to the Angolan firms for the realization of subcontracts up 
to 30 percent of the value of each contract.
259
 For the purposes of the subcontracting 
resolution, are ‗Angolan‘ all firms owned by Angolan citizens, or commercial firms, 
duly incorporated and with their headquarters in Angola, and in which at least 51 
percent of the capital is owned by Angolan citizens or firms.
260
 
 
In turnkey projects or BOT or any other project that permits or recommends the 
constitution of a subcontract job, an Angolan firm must be selected.
 261
 The Chinese 
company hired for the construction job must transfer to the Angolan firm – 
progressively and according to a program that has a clearly defined objective, 
implementation and timeframe – scientific knowledge, professional and management 
techniques, that will allow the full assumption by the Angolan firm and for a period 
established by agreement the management of the (construction) business.
262
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To qualify for subcontracting, firms must satisfy the following requirements 
cumulatively: Their legal and fiscal situation must be in order; their accounting must be 
organized; they must have technical capacity, endogenous or acquired through 
contractual association, for the performance of the responsibilities they assumed; they 
must not be indebted to some organ of the public administration or some organism or 
firm of a public nature or whose majority shareholder is the state;  and they must have 
been incorporated at least two years before the subcontracting.
263
 In circumstances of 
equality, preference is given to a firm that possesses rights to a credit, legally 
recognized, vis-à-vis some organ of the public administration or some organism or firm 
of a public nature or in which the state is the majority shareholder.
264
 For the selection 
of subcontractors by the competent ministries and provincial governments, depending 
on whether the projects are central or local, a list of Angolan firms must be 
established.
265
 
 
The Ministry of Finance must through restricted competition select an Angolan firm, 
with recognized competence and suitability, as advisor and assistant to the government 
in all matters relating to the subcontracting of construction works to Angolan firms.
266
 
The selected Angolan firm will advise and assist the government, especially with 
respect to the publication of infrastructure contracts, the assessment of the candidatures 
of firms, technical assistance to the Angolan firms during negotiations with a Chinese 
party, the preparation of contracts, and the monitoring of the implementation of the 
contractual obligations assumed by the parties.
267
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In addition, an economic team of the government must conduct a systematic 
monitoring of the process of subcontracting business to Angolan firms, within the 
ambit of the agreement between Angola and Eximbank, so as to ensure that the 
objectives of the economic policy of the government are fully attained.
268
 The team 
must report on its progress to the Permanent Commission of Cabinet Meetings and 
formulate appropriate recommendations on that matter.
269
 
 
A Coordinating Group, composed of economic assessors from the Office of the 
President, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Office for the Management of the 
Eximbank Credit Line, must be the articulation between the economic team and the 
firm advising and assisting the government.
270
 The Group will have to prepare all the 
documents necessary for the facilitation of the monitoring of the process of 
subcontracting business to Angolan firms by the economic team and its control by the 
Permanent Commission of Cabinet Meetings.
271
  
 
Subcontracting and the selection of firms must take place without prejudice to the 
atmosphere of competition among the firms operating in the Angolan business and 
harmonious investment within the national territory.
272
      
 
 
 5. R4I versus other investment contracts 
In this final part, the chapter compares and contrasts R4I contracts with other 
investment contracts. The chapter first compares R4I contracts with production sharing 
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agreements (PSA), the most common type of mining investment contracts. Then it 
compares R4I contracts with infrastructure investment contracts and build own and 
transfer (BOT) projects, which are a frequently used type of infrastructure contracts. In 
the end, the chapter shows that R4I contracts are the combination of a PSA and a BT 
project and that the R4I contracts yield greater FDI benefits than the mere sum of a 
mining contract and an infrastructure project. 
 
5.1. R4I contracts and production sharing agreements 
Profit sharing agreements or, more commonly, production sharing agreements (PSAs) 
are the most common contract form in oil and mining FDI. Under PSAs, if and when 
oil reserves are found and produced, the two parties to the PSA divide the product 
among themselves following a negotiated formula, often subject to a gradual decrease 
of the rights of the investor,
273
 as shown in Figure 14 below.  
 
Figure 14: Production-sharing agreement model 
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Source: K. Bidemann, Production-Sharing Agreements (1999) 13. 
 
 
Perhaps, the most obvious difference between R4I contracts and PSAs is that PSAs 
constitute but one half of R4I contracts, the other half being the infrastructure project. 
As is the case with PSA, with R4I contracts host countries share profits with foreign 
investors according to a negotiated formula. The difference is that the dividends of the 
host country are first allocated to the full repayment of infrastructure investments 
before they can fill the coffers of the host country‘s treasury. Nonetheless, some jurists 
may object that the fact that the host government directly allocates its mining revenues 
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to the construction of infrastructure implies that it is incorrect to refer to the oil/mining 
side of R4I contracts as a PSA.
274
 
 
Another difference is that PSAs became common in the 1960s and 1970s while foreign 
investors and host countries started using R4I contracts at the turn of the 21th century. 
And whereas PSAs followed the wave of independence in the 1960s, R4I contracts 
followed the ascendency of China as a global economic player in the early 2000s. Since 
their early implementation by Indonesia in the 1970s, PSAs became popular with many 
governments in developing countries saddled with uncertain legal regimes.
275
 Since the 
early 2000s, Chinese recurred to R4I contracts in resource rich countries with which 
they form joint ventures. Those joint ventures became vehicle for the financing of 
major infrastructure projects in the host countries. PSAs place the burden of financing 
on the shoulders of host states.
276
 However, with R4I contracts, the burden of financing 
is placed on one shoulder of the foreign investor and on one shoulder of the foreign 
investor, by swapping resources for infrastructure.  
 
 
5.2. R4I contracts and infrastructure projects 
5.2.1. Contracts and infrastructure projects  
Contracts and contract law perform essential functions in the provision of public 
infrastructure. One such function is risk mitigation. Indeed, the structure of contracts 
allocates risks between the numerous parties in infrastructure projects. Foreign 
investors face a set of risks unique to FDI in public infrastructure, which often calls for 
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the intervention of the host state. These risks may arise over the life of an investment in 
infrastructure for several reasons. First, the majority of infrastructure projects take 
place in sectors dominated by government-owned ‗natural‘ monopolies (for instance, 
the oil, water, electricity, transport, and telecommunication sectors) and where state 
regulation is necessary for consistent and fair standards for prices and services.
277
 State 
regulation is therefore necessary for foreign investors to reap sufficient return on their 
investment.  
 
Second, public infrastructure as water and transportation are widely consumed by and 
thus essential to local populations such that infrastructure-related activities are likely to 
ignite social pressures.
278
 Third, since FDI in infrastructure involves large sunk costs 
and long amortization periods, government support is crucial for continued adherence 
to contract terms over the life of the investment and for investors to recover cost and 
make a profit.
279
 Finally, the economy of infrastructure projects tends to be unstable 
and political risks are hard to mitigate in such projects.
280
 
 
Infrastructure contracts must be so designed that they match the overall legal 
framework of the host state for the infrastructure project. In practice, the legal history, 
tradition and ideology make certain contract types incompatible with the legal system 
of the host countries. Concession contracts are more familiar with Anglophone, 
common law systems whereas affermage more familiar with Francophone, civil law 
systems in Africa.
281
 Noting that not all legal frameworks are comparable and that 
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infrastructure reforms will not remedy this situation, Antonio Estache says that one of 
the challenges facing policy makers will be to ensure that infrastructure contracts fit the 
legal system of the host country while still improving performance across infrastructure 
sectors.
282
 
 
5.2.2. Contractual framework 
A concession agreement is the entry point of a wider contractual complex that may 
comprise seven contracts, namely a shareholders‘ agreement, a performance-based 
maintenance agreement, a loan agreement, an input supply agreement, an offtake 
purchase agreement and a construction contract. Each agreement puts on the table 
something that the other agreements do not. For instance, the loan agreement, the 
concession, the construction contract, and the input supply agreement will put on the 
table financing ability, political authority, technical know-how, procurement of 
supplies and human resources, respectively.
283
 Although it is not rare for public private 
partnership (PPP) like a BOT (build, operate and transfer) project to consist of all these 
seven contracts, infrastructure projects may include any number of contracts greater or 
lesser than the seven mentioned above. In practice, however, parties incorporate one to 
three, if not more, of the above contracts into one and the same agreement document.  
 
Similarly, in R4I investment contracts, one and the same project participant, that is 
China, cumulates numerous roles and functions (shareholder, lender, construction 
contractor, input supplier and offtake purchaser) through its state-owned corporations. 
Thus, Figure 15 below provides a conceptual framework for analyzing PPPs, especially 
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BOT projects, and do not describe the structure of all PPPs, which widely vary in 
practice from project to project. Moreover, the framework does not illustrate (yet does 
not exclude) the recurrent necessity in practice for the project company to enter into 
direct agreements with some or all the project participants. A BOT project, which is 
very common in PPP, would usually display a structure that look like the one in Figure 
15 just below. 
 
Figure 15: The contractual structure of a BOT project 
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Source: J. Demon, Private sector investment in infrastructure (2009) 99. 
 
1) Concession agreement  
A concession agreement is an instrument concluded between a state and a foreign 
person in which the state grants to the foreign investor for an extended period of time 
certain rights or powers which normally would belong to or be exercised by the state.
284
 
Concession agreements are just one, albeit pivotal, piece among others in a wider 
contractual web in a typical PPP project. Under the concession agreement, the grantor – 
usually a government agency or a national or local division of the host government – 
grants to the joint venture or project company a concession of public infrastructure or a 
number of rights to the infrastructure for a certain period of time. When the foreign 
investor is responsible for project finance, then the arrangement is a ‗pure 
concession.‘285  
 
Concession agreements are the axis around which other agreements and contracts 
revolve in a PPP project. The infrastructure side of R4I contracts contains clauses 
similar to concession agreements. Concession agreements are dealt with in greater 
detail in another section below. 
 
2) Shareholders’ agreement 
A shareholder‘s agreement is a formal agreement among shareholders that regulates the 
relations among the shareholders (who often consist of the project sponsors) of a 
project company or joint venture. These internal relations include the creation of the 
                                                 
284
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project company or joint venture, the business of the project company, voting 
agreements, buy/sell agreements and restrictions on the issuance of new shares. 
Generally, the project company or joint venture is a party to the shareholders‘ 
agreement.
286
 Shareholders‘ agreements may contain many documents (for example, 
shareholder loans and stand-by credits), and constitutional documents (for example, 
articles of association or incorporation and a joint venture agreement).
287
 
 
3) Lending agreements 
Lending agreements refer to the set of distinct agreements that provide for the terms 
and conditions for the lending of money by the lenders to the project company. R4I 
contracts characteristically comprise an important infrastructure loan agreement. 
Lenders could be any one of the following persons: A private lender such as a 
commercial bank, an export credit agency like China Eximbank, a bilateral or 
multilateral financial institution like the AfDB, or any combination of these persons. 
Finance for infrastructure projects may also originate from bondholders through the 
sales of the project bonds on capital markets, sovereign wealth funds or other financial 
intermediary.
288
 Lending agreements provide for various security and account 
arrangements and intercreditor arrangements among lenders in projects involving more 
than one lender.
289
 
 
The financing of infrastructure projects is highly leveraged in the sense that 80 to 100 
percent of the financing comes from debt,
290
 as opposed to equity. High leverage 
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allows sponsors to risk a smaller portion of their funds and equity investment in 
projects and, sometimes, to reduce the cost of capital by substituting lower-cost tax-
deductible interest for higher-cost taxable returns on equity.
291
 In a BOT project or 
project finance transaction, the credit decision of a rational lender is based primarily on 
estimated cash-flow and the collateral value of the project's assets.
292
 The loan is 
usually non-recourse, which means that the sponsors are not obliged to repay the 
balance of the loan should the project‘s revenue turn out to be insufficient for the full 
repayment of the loan. To minimize risks associated with non-recourse loans, lenders 
often require indirect credit support in the form of guarantees and other covenants from 
the sponsors, their parent companies affiliates, and other third parties involved in the 
project.
293
  
 
4) Construction contract 
Construction contracts – also known as engineering, procurement and construction 
(EPC) contracts – govern the construction phase of a BOT project. The project 
company or joint venture enters into a construction contract with the construction 
contractor to delegate or divest the duty that it owes to the grantor to design and build 
infrastructure. Lenders often require the signing of a construction contract that sets a 
fixed lump-sum price and the time frame for the completion, and places the majority – 
sometimes all – of the construction risk on construction contractors.294 The contract 
will be as far as possible back-to-back with the concession agreement such that any 
construction risks shifts through the construction contract from the project company to 
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the contractor.
295
 For instance, mining rights under the concession should be granted to 
at least the same duration as the duration of the loan to ensure the project company can 
generate the cash flows necessary to fully repay the loan.
296
  
 
5) Input supply agreement and offtake purchase agreement 
An input supplier is in terms of an input supply agreement obliged to supply to the 
project company a certain amount of input like fuel and, in some cases, a service rather 
than input.  The input supply agreement places the supply risk on the shoulders of the 
input supplier. An offtake purchase agreement, on the other hand, obliges the offtake 
purchaser to buy a minimum amount of the project output or project service or pay for 
all fixed costs over a specified time no matter how much output it takes, creating a 
secure revenue stream and an important source of financing.
297
 The offtake purchase 
agreement removes market risk from the risk matrix of the lender and grantor, and 
allocates it to the offtake purchaser. The offtake purchaser can be the grantor or the 
lender, as is the case with Chinese mining investment in R4I contractual arrangements.  
Input supply agreements and purchase agreements are not always necessary in 
infrastructure projects. There are projects, like waste water treatment, where the tag 
‗input supply agreement‘ is used to describe what is in fact an offtake purchase 
agreement and other projects, like roads, where offtake purchase agreements are not 
necessary. 
 
6) Operation and maintenance agreement 
An operation and maintenance agreement obliges an operator to operate and maintain 
the infrastructure project, a task that incidentally requires that the operator also 
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manages the input supply and offtake purchase agreements. The operator is in charge of 
the operation and maintenance of the project over a defined period of time, 
characteristically from completion of construction, or the first completed section, until 
the end of the concession period.
298
 The obligations of the operator should be in sync 
with those in the concession agreement, the offtake purchase agreement, the input 
supply agreement and other agreements relating to the operation of the project.
299
 
 
The operator might be an agency of the host state, like a roads agency. Foster & 
Briceño-Garmendia say that countries with road funds are more successful in 
safeguarding road maintenance expenditures and spending on key segments that 
maximize network value, while those that also have road agencies attract more funding 
for the amelioration of road quality.
300
 Timely attention to maintenance reduces the 
expenditure needed to sustain the road system in the long term.
301
 Long-term 
maintenance neglect has caused a massive investment backlog of 3 billion US dollars 
in Africa.
302
 The cost of rehabilitating infrastructure is many times greater than the cost 
of preventive maintenance.
303
 
 
5.2.3. Concession agreements 
As explained earlier in this dissertation,
304
 since the early 1990s public agencies in 
developing countries have widely used concession agreements in PPP arrangements to 
finance infrastructure works and performance-based contracts to maintain those works. 
Concessions of public infrastructure to private corporations must be distinguished from 
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concessions of natural resources to private investors, both of which have a long and 
rich history in developing countries. In the 1990s, many countries in Africa introduced 
concessions after the failure of attempts to commercialize railway businesses while 
retaining ownership of the railways. Today, concessions also form part of R4I 
contractual framework.  
 
Concessions are a type of PPP in which the state retains the ownership of a public 
infrastructure while a private investor is allowed not only to design and build, but also 
to operate and maintain, and in some cases finance, the infrastructure and the rolling 
stock,
305
 as is the case with railways in many African nations. Concessions are the 
primary contract between host governments and project companies, and form the 
contractual basis on which other contracts are entered into.
306
 Put another way, 
concession agreements are the backbone of PPP arrangement and sit in the structure the 
PPP structure as shown in Figure 16 below.
307
 
 
Figure 16: PPP project structure 
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Source: J. Demon, Private sector investment in infrastructure (2009) 251. 
 
Concessions of public infrastructure to private entities have in common the assumption 
of risks by private entities whose investments will be repaid with tolls (i.e. user 
charges), government availability payments, shadow tolls or a combination of tolls and 
subsidies.
308
 Concessions are fragile as parties have to address changing political and 
economic circumstances and complex engineering and financial issues.
309
 Modern 
concessions employ financial models to manage uncertainty and political risks flexibly. 
In terms of these financial models, the parties regularly update the concession 
agreement to reflect variations in political and economic parameters and to quantify the 
impact of these variations on a project company.  
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5.2.4. Contracts and the construction industry 
The contractual network of a typical BOT project grows more complex when analysis 
shifts to the construction contract and the web of contractual relationships that it 
unravels. Effectively, the construction industry has its own web of contractual 
relationships, quite apart from those created by a BOT project or a R4I contract. The 
construction industry is comprised of design services (architects and engineers), 
construction services (general and subcontractors, skilled and unskilled labor), and 
consulting services related to the others (including management and training 
personnel).
310
 A large web of contractual relationships regulates the behavior of the 
different actors in the construction industry, including EPC contracts, employment 
contracts, consulting contracts. 
 
Where governments have granted concessions, low-interest sovereign loans to 
concessionaires have substantially contributed to the financing of investments, though 
the share of the private finance is in many cases well below 50 percent.
311
 
Concessionaires, the majority in all concessions to date, provide a relatively low 
proportion of the equity and most plan to finance over 80 percent of their investment 
with debt.
312
 
 
5.3. R4I contracts and build operate transfer projects 
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects are not the most common type of infrastructure 
projects. However, BOT projects mitigate and allocate among the contracting parties 
the key risks specific to PPP projects.
313
 For that reason, BOT projects offer a 
                                                 
310
 HARRY BROADMAN, supra Ch. 1 note 51, at 254. 
311
 VIVIEN FOSTER & CECILIA BRICEÑO-GARMENDIA EDS., supra Ch. 1 note 17, at 238.  
312
 Id. at 238ff. 
313
 JEFFREY DELMON, supra Ch. 1 note 56, at 93. 
                                                                                                                             341 
convenient way of comparing the most important issues arising in infrastructure 
projects with the central features of R4I contracts.  
 
BOT projects are a type of debt finance in which lenders in a large project primarily 
rely on the revenues of the project for repayment, and the assets and contracts of the 
project as security.
314
 By contrast, R4I contracts can be seen as a form of debt finance 
in which lenders rely on the revenues of a mining joint venture closely associated with 
an infrastructure project within the same contractual framework for the payment of 
infrastructure works. In both cases, the foreign investors or lenders base their decision 
to invest less on the creditworthiness of the host country or borrowers than on their 
assets for the grant and repayment of the investment.  
 
From the perspective of the role that the private sector plays in FDI, BOT projects and 
R4I contracts divide. BOT projects, like project finance in general, normally takes 
place within the framework of public-private partnerships (PPP), which places private 
firms at the forefront. The PPP framework is a brainchild of the neoliberal policies that 
inspire the current international financial architecture, which extols privatization 
alongside liberalization and stabilization.
315
 In contradistinction, R4I contracts employ 
a state-to-state business model. This strategy signifies a remarkable departure from the 
neoliberal bias prevalent in classic FDI law and re-instates the state in its central role as 
the initiator and facilitator of economic development. This state-to-state strategy is of 
incredible importance given that the involvement of the Chinese state and host states 
drives the decision of Chinese investors to invest in the Africa as opposed to states with 
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a more attractive investment climate. When the state-to-state business model is applied, 
the BOT project might look like this:  
 
Figure 17: The contractual structure of a state-to-state BOT project 
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In terms of a traditional concession agreement, the grantor – here a host resource rich 
country in Africa – would grant to the joint venture or project company a concession of 
public infrastructure or a number of rights to the infrastructure for a certain period of 
time. R4I contracts differ from a concession agreement in the sense that R4I contracts 
do not concede or grant any rights relating to infrastructure to Chinese investors. 
Instead, R4I contracts provide for infrastructure projects in terms of which a Chinese 
construction contractor is obliged to erect infrastructure following the priorities set by 
the host government. Most R4I contracts therefore involve BT (build and transfer 
immediately) projects and not BOT projects. Effectively, those who operate the 
infrastructure built after the completion of their construction is often the host state or its 
subdivisions.  
 
In project finance, lenders could be a private lender such as a commercial bank, an 
export credit agency, a bilateral or multilateral financial institution, or any combination 
of these persons. However, with R4I contracts, the lender is most often China 
Eximbank, a state-owned Chinese bank. Host governments have sometimes granted 
low-interest sovereign loans to concessionaires in order to make a substantial financial 
contribution to the construction of infrastructure, but with R4I contracts the 
exploitation of mineral or/and oil resources finance the construction. In both project 
finance and R4I contracts, financing of infrastructure projects is highly leveraged in the 
form of debt. Similarly, in both project finance and R4I contracts, the credit decision of 
a rational lender is based primarily on estimated cash flow and the collateral value of 
the project's assets. For instance, in the DRC-China R4I contract, China‘s decision to 
advance loans and build infrastructure was based on the joint venture Sicomines, which 
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constitutes security for the mining rights and titles granted to the consortium of Chinese 
corporations.
316
  
 
Construction contracts or EPC contracts regulate the behavior of construction 
contractors during the construction phase. Both traditional infrastructure and R4I 
contracts entail EPC contracts. In March 2010, for example, a consortium of Chinese 
construction firms signed an EPC in Botswana for the construction of a hydroelectric 
dam. China National Electric Equipment Corporation (CNEEC), a Chinese state-owned 
corporation, and Shengyang Blower Works Electro-Mechanics Import and Export Co. 
Ltd. entered into an EPC with the Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) for the 
construction of the Morupule B power station in Palapye.
317
 Similarly, both traditional 
infrastructure contracts and R4I contracts also include other related contracts such as 
input supply and offtake purchase agreements.  
 
In terms of concession agreements a host state retains the ownership of a public 
infrastructure while a private investor is allowed not only to design and build, but also 
to operate, maintain and sometimes finance the infrastructure. In terms of R4I 
contracts, the host state also retains ownership of the public infrastructure however a 
foreign state (i.e. China) finances and builds the infrastructure. A concession agreement 
is a contract between host governments and project companies whereas a R4I contract 
is a contract between one state as host and another state (i.e. China) as source of 
investment. The foreign investor in a R4I contractual arrangement could be a private 
corporation or a group of private corporations but it is going to be hard though not 
impossible for private corporations to sustain such arrangements. Concession 
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agreements are the contractual basis on which other contracts are concluded whereas in 
the case of R4I contracts a framework agreement is usually the basis on which other 
contracts are entered into.  
 
5.4. R4I contracts: A combination of a BT project and a PSA 
One of the primary findings of this dissertation is that the structure of R4I contracts 
elicits a combination of a PSA and a BT project. In view of the above comparison of 
R4I contracts with PSAs and BOT projects, the general structural organization of R4I 
contracts appear as follows: 
 
Figure 18: Structural organization of R4I contracts  
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5.5. R4I contracts versus traditional investment contracts 
This section compares resource-for-infrastructure investment contracts with traditional 
investment contracts in generating revenues that the host state could use to finance 
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infrastructure development. This comparison is more illuminating on the nature of R4I 
contracts when placed in the different fiscal contexts in which R4I contracts and 
traditional investment contracts evolve.
318
  
 
5.5.1. Conventional fiscal practice 
Conventional fiscal practice consists in deriving revenues for the state through taxes. In 
resource rich countries in Africa, mining is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, 
contributors to state coffers. In Nigeria, Africa‘s second largest economy, oil 
production accounted for 80 percent of the federal budgetary revenues in 2009
319
 
whereas, in Sudan, oil production accounted for more than 60 percent of the state‘s 
total revenues in 2008.
320
  
 
Host states derive revenues from extractive activities often by using production-sharing 
agreements (PSAs). With PSAs, host states levy taxes, mining royalties and dividends, 
which are then supposed to be accounted for as revenues in the national budget. 
Between the time when taxes, royalties and dividends are collected and the time when 
those revenues are formally accounted for in the host country‘s budget, considerable 
amounts are taken from the revenues and diverted to private accounts. This sort of 
corrupt practices is not uncommon in PIRSA, most of which occupy the lower ranks of 
the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.
321
 It is difficult to 
calculate precisely the level of embezzlement but it is significantly high. 
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As a result of institutionalized corruption, revenues from the extraction of mineral 
resources are smaller than it would have been had the host state been more transparent. 
From these smaller revenues, the host state earmarks a specified amount for investment 
in infrastructure development. Usually, budgetary allocations do not suffice for 
infrastructure development, amid competing priorities, even in developed countries. In 
the US, for example, the government routinely sells bonds to raise money from capital 
markets in order to finance infrastructure development.
322
  
 
However, governments in Africa find it extremely hard to access capital markets 
because most countries in Africa have a reputation as high-risk FDI destinations. The 
leading credit rating agencies, such as Fitch, Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s, do not 
evaluate the sovereign risk of most countries in Africa.  Mining firms operating in 
Africa are considered more volatile, and foreign investors often factor in an ‗Africa 
discount‘ on the firms‘ share price. 323  Furthermore, most African countries cannot 
source finance from local capital markets because, except for South Africa and Nigeria, 
most resource rich states in sub-Saharan Africa do not have sufficiently large financial 
sectors.
324
      
 
In addition, foreign aid and development assistance from multilateral institutions, such 
as the IMF, the World Bank and the AfDB, are not sizeable enough to make a visible 
impact on infrastructure development in Africa. Infrastructure projects are very 
expensive; they therefore necessitate sizeable financial commitments. Yet the chief 
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reason for the dearth of infrastructure finance is the fact that the infrastructure sectors 
are generally not profitable for foreign investors. It follows from all these barriers to 
infrastructure investments that what host countries in Africa will get from the private 
sector, foreign states and development agencies in terms of infrastructure finance is 
insufficient, as shown in the Figure below.  
 
Figure 19: Conventional fiscal practice 
 
 
                                                                                                           
 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2. Resource-for-infrastructure fiscal practice 
R4I contracts require a certain form of fiscal practice. Here, the host state does not 
collect taxes and utilize them to finance infrastructure with additional funding coming 
from the private sector, foreign aid or development agencies. Instead, the state and 
foreign investors identify the taxes, royalties and dividends owed to the state and apply 
them directly to the financing of infrastructure (see Figure 20 below). The upshot of 
such a system is that, by bypassing the state as far as mining revenues are concerned, 
R4I contracts reduce significantly, without nonetheless eradicating, the risks that 
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government officials misappropriate money destined for infrastructure. Stated 
differently, R4I contracts provide a mechanism that instills discipline and ensures that 
money earmarked for infrastructure development investments is disbursed only for that 
purpose and no other purposes. It is a mechanism that Deborah Bräutigam referred to 
as an ‗agency of restraint.‘325  
 
A second function of R4I contracts relates to efficiency. By applying mining revenues 
directly to the infrastructure projects, R4I contracts are efficient because the 
elimination of intermediaries reduces transaction costs, especially when the 
intermediary is as wasteful as the bureaucracy of a PIRSA. To fully grasp this 
argument, the concept of ‗transaction costs‘ must be clarified. ‗Transaction cost‘ refers 
somewhat tautologically to the cost of the transaction itself, yet it is not the cost of an 
item or a right sold or exchanged through the transaction.
326
 It is any costs incurred to 
make the primary exchange occur and includes the search costs, information costs, and 
the costs of meetings and negotiations.
327
 If these costs exceed the benefits from the 
exchange, the exchange will be inefficient and will most likely not materialize.  
 
R4I contracts – and this is one side of the dissertation‘s main argument – exponentially 
increase the level of infrastructure finance by reducing the costs of transactions. 
Traditionally, the sponsors of a project will have to incur transaction costs to exploit 
mining or oil resources.  Similar costs would be owed if there were a second, unrelated, 
project to build an infrastructure project. Combining the revenue generating project and 
the infrastructure into one transaction, while probably not cutting transaction costs in 
half, may well reduce the overall transaction costs for both projects and thus create 
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synergies.  In addition, earmarking the profits of the mining or oil project ahead of time 
eliminates the host government's ability to put these funds to other use and thus gives 
the infrastructure project greater stability.
328
  
 
These costs can be prohibitively high because of the credit risk, payment insecurity and 
low creditworthiness of most resource rich countries in Africa. The Bui hydroelectric 
dam project is an example in point. Since Independence in 1957, successive 
governments in Ghana have made unsuccessful attempts to find foreign investor to 
fund and build the Bui dam.
329
In other words, the search costs of a proper foreign 
investor have proved prohibitively high for Ghana with respect to the Bui dam project. 
This is the outcome with the traditional structure, which consists in using a mining or 
oil contract and an infrastructure project separately.  
 
It is only by signing a R4I contract in 2007, that is, half a century after Independence, 
that Ghana has stopped incurring search costs for the Bui dam project. That is the 
outcome with R4I model, which combines a mining or oil contract and infrastructure 
projects in one and the same contract. Without R4I contracts, host governments will 
therefore have to seek out and find a contractor to build the infrastructure project at 
much greater costs. Simply put, R4I contracts make transactions possible that would 
not have otherwise materialized because of high transactions costs.    
 
The main argument is that R4I contracts exponentially increase the level of 
infrastructure finance by joining mining and infrastructure in the same deal. R4I 
contracts attract more capital needed for infrastructure development by combining 
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mining infrastructure. Unlike the infrastructure sectors, mining is very lucrative and 
attracts the bulk of FDI going to Africa. By using mining as bait, host governments 
draw in more finance, the assumption being that the combination of a non-lucrative 
project (i.e. infrastructure) with a lucrative one attracts more investors than if the non-
lucrative project were offered alone. As a result, most of the R4I contracts represent the 
largest infrastructure investments that the host countries that concluded them have had 
since independence. The Bélinga iron ore project in Gabon,
330
 the Bui hydroelectric 
power project in Ghana,
331
 the 4.5 credit line from China Eximbank in Angola, the 3 
billion US dollars infrastructure project in the DRC, and the mining and infrastructure 
deal in Guinea, are the largest projects since the independence of the countries where 
they are being executed. 
 
A third function of R4I contracts is transparency-related. Exchanging natural resources 
for national infrastructure enables the citizenry to see clearly how the proceeds of 
mineral or oil exploitation are being used. This form of transparency is of the utmost 
importance for good governance, and more so in countries reputed to be corrupt. Like 
DRC President Joseph Kabila once said in a 2007 state of the nation address, with the 
exchange of copper and cobalt for infrastructure, ‗for the first time in [their] history the 
Congolese people will at last be able to see to what use their cobalt, their nickel, and 
their copper can be put !‘332 It is not the mere conclusion of a R4I contract that serves 
transparency; the host government must go beyond official announcements of the 
general agreement and publish the terms of the contract partially or entirely.  
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Another notable feature of R4I contracts is that it generally involves a state-to-state 
business model. Where infrastructure projects would normally receive funding from the 
private sector, R4I contracts substitute the Chinese state for the private sector. This 
state-to-state model is a far cry from contemporary foreign investment law where the 
private sector is expected to spearhead investments in infrastructure and mining. The 
R4I model holds some positive implications for efficiency. In terms of R4I contracts, 
China or Chinese state-owned corporations carry the total costs of executing 
infrastructure projects while sharing the costs of monitoring the execution of the 
projects with host countries. It follows that the success of the infrastructure projects or 
the quality of the infrastructure built will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness 
of the monitoring institutions of the host states in shouldering monitoring costs.  
 
Figure 20: Resource-for-infrastructure fiscal practice 
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This chapter has surveyed, using the chosen criteria (i.e. maximizing benefits and 
minimizing costs), R4I contracts, with a view to answering the question as to the terms 
of economic exchanges that optimize the construction of local infrastructure and 
minimize the risks and costs associated with such investments. For a mutually 
beneficial economic exchange, it is important to minimize costs and maximize benefits 
for both foreign investors and host countries. The next chapter lays out the contractual 
model that is aimed at minimizing costs while maximizing the construction of local 
infrastructure. 
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The dissertation has now come full circle. It started with a brief exposition of the gist of 
its main argument. It then developed its argument by stating its premises and the 
inferences that engendered it. And in this chapter it goes back to its main argument 
with a twist by emphasizing economic efficiency perspectives on R4I contracts. To 
recall, the dissertation‘s central thesis is that R4I contracts increase infrastructure 
investments in Africa by far more than traditional investment contracts. This thesis is 
basically saying that R4I contracts are more efficient. Chapter 4 described how 
macroeconomic fundamentals dictate the economic exchanges between resource rich 
African countries and China, and Chapter 3 how these fundamentals drive China‘s FDI 
in the mining sectors of Africa in general and R4I contracts in particular. Chapter 5 
dealt with the political economy of the countries in Africa hosting Chinese investments 
and R4I contracts. Chapter 6, the essential part of the dissertation, dissected the terms 
and conditions of R4I contracts. This part completes the circle by presenting R4I 
contracts as an efficient model to optimize China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of Africa.  
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1. A mutually beneficial relationship with China 
Words in any language are for the most part conventional; and legitimate questions 
could be asked about the practical significance of an analysis of a key word like 
‗benefit‘ in this dissertation. In fact, the analysis of the word ‗benefit‘ cannot be done 
away with. First, the word ‗benefit‘ in English means the same thing and has the same 
Latin roots as its French equivalent ‗bénéfice‘. This equivalence is important in the 
context of this research because the overwhelming majority of countries in Africa have 
either English or French as official languages. Most importantly, from the observation 
that the meaning of words in any language depends on convention, no false inference 
should be drawn that language is entirely arbitrary. This inference is false because in 
general, even though the meaning of words in any language is conventional, the truth 
of words in a language is not.
1
 This means that the analysis of ‗benefit‘ as a concept 
and its truth or relation to reality is not dependent on convention. This is the reason 
why a thorough understanding of R4I contracts as a means to benefit from China‘s 
mining FDI to the fullest would not be complete without a firm understanding of what 
it means and what it is to ‗benefit.‘ 
 
‗Benefit‘ comes from the Latin noun benefactum, which means ‗good deed.‘ 2 
Benefactum in turn comes from the Latin verb bene facere, which – one could have 
guessed – means ‗do good.‘3 This definition of benefit ties in well with the economic 
analysis that informs the R4I contractual model proposed in this dissertation. Seen 
through the lens of law and economics, contract law must strive to satisfy the utility of 
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the contracting parties by reducing the costs of transacting business. In other words, 
R4I contracts as well as traditional investment contracts must ‗do good‘ to the 
contracting parties.  
 
A phrase often heard from government officials from both Africa and China, 
practitioners, academics and the general population, is ‗win-win‘. A phrase borrowed 
from business schools, ‗win-win‘ seems to be simple enough so as to be self-
explanatory. But in practice different people read the phrase the term differently and, as 
a corollary, they differ on the issue as to whether China‘s engagement with Africa is a 
‗win-win‘ in general and in specific instances. Though ‗win-win‘ has received different 
interpretations, the dissertation holds, based on information in Chapter 4, that it is more 
accurate to read the realization of economic complementarities between investing state 
and the host state into it. 
 
R4I contracts have direct and indirect benefits. Following the methodology adopted in 
this dissertation, the benefits of R4I contracts are the costs of the infrastructure projects 
that resource rich host countries are exchanging for mineral resources because ‗benefit‘ 
and ‗cost‘ are two sides of the same coin. Thus, the total direct benefit of R4I contracts 
is at least 31,058 billion US dollars. This figure is the addition of the costs of the 
infrastructure built or to be built in terms of individual R4I contracts.  
 
31,058 billion US dollars is the sum when are added together the costs of the Congo 
River dam project in Congo-Brazzaville (280 million US dollars), the El Gaili power 
plant in Sudan (128 million US dollars), the credit line from China Eximbank expended 
on infrastructure in Angola (4,500 million US dollars), the gas turbine power plant at 
Papalanto in Nigeria (298 million US dollars), the Souapiti dam project in Guinea 
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(1,000 million US dollars), the Bélinga iron ore project (790 million US dollars), the 
Bui dam in Ghana (622 million US dollars), the costs of the Eximbank-funded 
infrastructure projects in the DRC (6,000 million US dollars), the 2009 resource and 
infrastructure contract in Guinea (7,000) and the 2010 R4I contract in Ghana (10,400 
million US dollars). This sum represents 69 per cent of Africa‘s total annual spending 
on infrastructure, which is estimated to be 45 billion US dollars. To put these figures in 
perspective, it only took 10 R4I contracts in 8 resource rich countries to reach an 
amount of infrastructure finance that equals roughly three quarters of the continent‘s 
total annual spending on infrastructure. 
 
Indirect benefits are most probably greater than the direct benefits of R4I contracts. The 
Bui hydroelectric power project in Ghana is a good example of indirect benefits. The 
total cost of the Bui dam is 622 million US dollars, which according to the 
dissertation‘s methodology also represents the benefits Ghana gains from the dam. 
Since Ghana must repay the 562 million US dollars of that amount with cocoa, the 562 
million US dollars is also the value of cocoa that cocoa farmers in Ghana will have to 
export to China, which means that the Sino-Ghanaian R4I contract indirectly provides 
demand for Ghanaian farming products.  
 
Yet even the above figure does not tell the whole story of how Ghanaians stand to gain 
from the dam. Before the project was awarded to SinoHydro, French firms assessed 
that it would cost them around 1.2 billion US dollars to build the Bui dam.
4
 The 
Chinese later came and told the Ghanaian government that they could build the dam at 
half that price.
5
 The Chinese proposal means that Ghana has saved close to 600 million 
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US dollars by entering into a R4I contract with China. In addition, the electricity 
capacity generation of the Bui dam is 400 megawatts. If a monetary value could be 
placed on each kilowatt generated, the indirect benefits of the Bui dam would be 
impressively high. The Ghanaian already estimates that the Bui dam could play a 
crucial role in pushing the country up to middle income status by 2015.
6
 Achieving this 
status is an indirect benefit that is incalculable.    
 
Another indirect benefit is employment for local workers. Unlike mining, infrastructure 
construction is labor-intensive. During the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, 
infrastructure development was a key feature of the multibillion US dollars stimulus 
packages adopted by leading economies like the US and China because major 
infrastructure projects always create several jobs, mainly for low-skilled workers. 
African parties to R4I contracts must insist on the employment of local construction 
workers because of the bigger job-creating impact of great infrastructure projects. 
 
 
2. Optimizing China’s investments 
As seen in the previous chapter, R4I contracts are an optimal contractual form that 
effectively serves not only to procure but also to increase the level of infrastructure 
finance. This is a function that traditional mining and infrastructure investment 
contracts do not perform. It is an important function because the severe lack of 
infrastructure finance has been nagging countries in Africa for decades. Moreover, 
Chinese practices in Africa have demonstrated that the R4I formula is most efficient as 
it reduces high transaction costs by bypassing notoriously wasteful or otherwise 
                                                 
6
 Anthony Yaw Baah et al., supra Ch. 6 note 179, at 99. 
  361 
inefficient local bureaucracies, entrusting funds with China Eximbank and by 
disbursing them directly to Chinese construction contractors in the host country.  
 
Law and economics allows for the modeling of R4I contracts by turning the R4I model 
into an equation. The gain from reducing the model into an equation is that the equation 
can be manipulated to produce an irrefutable conclusion.
7
 The R4I contractual model 
holds that if a resource rich country packages an infrastructure project with a mining 
contract the host country will increase finance for infrastructure development. The 
model compares a level of infrastructure finance with an undefined function of the 
combination of an oil/mining contract and an infrastructure project. Where the level of 
infrastructure finance is l and the function of the combination g(.), the R4I model can 
be formulated as  
 
R4I = l > g(.) 
 
The level of infrastructure finance is a function of the way host countries and investors 
use oil/mining and infrastructure contracts. The theory of this dissertation is that if l > 
g(.) then the investment contract is optimal. In other words, the level of infrastructure 
finance reaped by an investment contract is optimal if it is greater than the level of 
finance that other oil/mining and infrastructure contractual arrangements could have 
yielded. Since R4I contracts can attract greater finance than other use of oil/mining and 
infrastructure contracts could, R4I contracts are an optimal investment contract given 
the respective interests of African host countries and China. The argument is not that 
the actual level of finance brought in by R4I contracts will always be greater than that 
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brought in by other mining and infrastructure contractual arrangements. Rather, the 
argument is that R4I contracts will always have the ability to bring in more 
infrastructure finance for the benefit of resource rich countries than traditional 
investment contracts.  
 
Every host state expects to incur some costs c in searching and finding finance for the 
development of its infrastructure, but it will not accept costs that are too high. 
However, not incurring a cost at all for infrastructure development will harm the 
economy of the host state and its people because inadequate infrastructure decreases 
the economic growth and thereby human welfare. The Infrastructure Consortium for 
Africa estimates that Africa loses 2 percent of economic growth per capita because of 
inadequate infrastructure.
8
  
 
The more infrastructure costs imply a smaller cost of inadequate infrastructure on the 
host economy e(c). The host state incurs costs c in searching and finding an appropriate 
infrastructure investor and the costs of inadequate infrastructure on the economy e(c) 
from the failure to find such an investor. The total cost of infrastructure C is therefore 
 
C = c + e(c) 
 
The interest of a resource rich host state in Africa is to induce the lowest possible total 
cost of infrastructure C*, which it does best by employing the R4I formula. By 
drastically decreasing the costs of searching and finding infrastructure finance, R4I 
contracts induce the lowest possible total cost of infrastructure. 
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Figure 21: Optimal level of total infrastructure cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
The cost of inadequate infrastructure on the economy depends inversely on the costs c 
of searching and finding infrastructure finance. If the costs of inadequate infrastructure 
on the economy and the level of infrastructure finance are presented as functions e(c) 
and l(),then the two functions can be joined into the following single argument. The 
cost of inadequate infrastructure on the economy depends inversely on the level of 
infrastructure investments, which in turn depends on the costs of finding and searching 
infrastructure finance, e(l(c)). 
 
If badly negotiated, R4I contracts may create negative externalities, misallocate risks, 
and over- or under-estimate the economic value of the infrastructure built or/and the 
resources exported. However, all these important issues are matters for contractual 
design and may, with skillful negotiations, be adequately catered for by the contracting 
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parties, without having to call the basic R4I idea into question. In a nutshell, R4I 
contracts are a more efficient way of optimizing China‘s FDI in the mining sectors of 
Africa than ordinary investment contracts.   
  
‗Efficiency‘ is a cornerstone of the economic analysis of law, contract laws and 
contracts. The core of the economic efficiency is the absolute necessity to avoid waste.
9
 
In reality, it is a polysemic term that stands for productive efficiency, allocative 
efficiency, Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and welfare maximization. 
Productive efficiency arises where a certain level of output is produced at the lowest 
possible cost per unit.
10
 Consistent with this understanding of efficiency, the 
dissertation tries to design a R4I contract model that would allow the construction of 
infrastructure at the lowest possible costs.  
 
Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are more common in the literature on 
law and economics. Shavell observes that, in the language of economics, a contract is 
mutually beneficial when it is Pareto efficient.
11
 Originating from Italian economist 
Vilfredo Pareto, the concept of ‗Pareto superior‘ refers to an efficient allocation of 
resources.
 An allocation is ‗Pareto superior‘ if a trade makes at least one participant 
better off and no participant worse off.
12
 On that view, much of contract law is 
designed to encourage the formation of contracts under circumstances that promote 
Pareto superior outcomes.
13
 An allocation is ‗Pareto optimal‘ if it is not possible for 
one to gain by further trade without making the other person worse off. The problem 
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with Pareto efficiency is that it is almost never possible for one allocation to result in 
gains without making at least one person worse off.  
 
Because Pareto efficiency is such an exacting and confining standard, it is more usual 
for cost-benefit analyses to employ the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency. Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency or wealth maximization permits involuntary transfers when those 
gaining by the reallocation could have fully compensated those who lose but it 
nonetheless does not require compensation.
14
 The key is to ensure that resources end up 
in the possession of those who value them most.
15
 This standard is met when 
infrastructure projects within the framework of R4I contracts are submitted to 
competitive bidding.
16
 The auction of infrastructure projects does not necessarily have 
to be subjected to a bidding process that involves investors other than those who are 
parties to the R4I contracts (i.e. Chinese investors), but even the contracting investors 
should compete among themselves (i.e. Chinese investors among themselves).
17
 
 
Allocative efficiency relates to the allocation of resources to the production of goods 
and services that are the most valued by society whereas welfare maximization, an 
alternative way of viewing allocative efficiency, relates to production of goods and 
services that generated both consumer and producer‘s surpluses.18 In both allocative 
efficiency and welfare maximization, efficiency is achieved when markets are 
competitive. This result is hard to achieve in the real world because markets are 
incomplete, behavior is strategic if not irrational, and information is asymmetrical. 
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Still, the best evidence that R4I contracts are efficient is that they increase 
infrastructure finance, leading to the reasonable inference that it augments social 
welfare.  
 
Allocative efficiency is achieved on the mining side of R4I contracts because the value 
of the resources exported is fixed by the spot price of the commodities in international 
markets. Allocative efficiency can also be achieved on the infrastructure side of R4I 
contracts if host governments survey their own citizens for approval of the proposed 
(amounts of) infrastructure projects. The practice of parliament approving the R4I 
contract signed by the host government, as seen in the case of the DRC-China R4I 
contract, speaks to this sort of efficiency. 
 
 
3. Optimizing China’s investments: The contractual model 
For PIRSA to make the most of China‘s FDI they need to design a contractual 
framework or model, rooted in resource-for-infrastructure contracts, that takes full 
account of the salient features of China‘s FDI and the objective realities of PIRSA. The 
R4I contractual model is a form of investment contracts. As a form of investment 
contracts, it is more than just the structure exhibited by its terms. Although the terms of 
each R4I contract are unique and context-specific, they display abstract yet systematic 
patterns common to them. They encode something about the internal relations between 
the terms relating to mining and those relating to infrastructure.  
 
China‘s general successes in lifting 400 million Chinese out of absolute poverty, 
coupled with its ability to weather the 2008-2009 financial crisis, rendered China‘s 
development model very attractive to many a developing country. In Africa, analysts 
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debate whether Africa should adopt the Chinese model or the so-called Beijing 
Consensus. Some analysts advocate espousing the Chinese model,
19
 some analysts 
advise that Africa should define development in its own terms,
20
 some analysts are of 
the opinion that the continent should do both.
21
 China‘s African Policy takes the 
position that ‗common development‘ entails that China and African countries work 
together in the exploration of the road to sustainable development.
22
 However, the 
probable origins of R4I contracts from China‘s own experience with trade and 
investment from Japan in the late 1970s suggest that, contrary to official statements, 
R4I contracts are a ‗Chinese‘ development model.   
 
Although the model whose broad categories of clauses are presented below suffer from 
the fact that the terms of most R4I contracts are confidential, available evidence, 
published contract terms, and publically released R4I contracts (i.e. those signed with 
the DRC and Guinea) allow this dissertation to design a general R4I model. While 
building on traditional mining and infrastructure investment contracts, R4I contracts 
are original in the way they are (1) structured, (2) financed, (3) beneficial and (4) 
justified or justifiable.  
                                                 
19
 Martyn J. Davies, supra Ch. 3 note 32 (observing that China is exporting its development model to 
Africa through special economic zones). 
20
 Most Chinese commentators and high-ranking officials maintain that China‘s FDI and aid to Africa is 
mainly aimed at enabling governments in Africa to attain self-sufficiency by finding their own 
development brand: see KWEKU AMPIAH & SANUSHA NAIDU, supra Ch. 1 note 45, at 11; ROBERT I. 
ROTBERG, supra Ch. 3 note 33, at 2 (stating that China is not interested in exporting its development 
model).   
21
 Joshua Eisenman & Joshua Kurlantzick, supra Ch. 4 note 35, at 219-64 (arguing that China‘s 
engagement with Africa lacks in substance and is driven by resource needs and energy security 
concerns). 
22
 Part III of China‘s African Policy. 
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3.1. Structural clauses 
Confronted with the actual risks in resource rich states and the potential rewards that 
their mining sectors offer, China and its African counterparts have molded a unique 
breed of investment contracts, innovative and competitive. R4I contracts exhibit unique 
structural clauses, which Edinger & Jansson (2008) describe as ‗barter trade 
agreement‘.23 While Davies (2008) sums up these structural clauses as a ‗combination 
of both aid and private sector commerce models‘, these clauses are, in their essential 
form, reminiscent of the contrat d‘échange (exchange contract) found in civil law 
jurisdictions.
24
 Frédéric Leclerc (2007) traces sales contracts to exchange contracts, an 
early ancestor of sale contracts, but exchange contracts differ from sale contracts in that 
exchange contracts dispense with financial intermediation.
25
Similarly, resource-for-
infrastructure contracts do not involve any direct transfer of money to host 
governments, which considerably reduces the risk that governments will 
misappropriate investment money.  
 
All the same, descriptions of R4I contracts as barter trade agreements or exchange 
contracts because they provide for an exchange of things are mistaken. Virtually all 
contracts consist in an economic exchange such that defining a contract as barter or 
exchange contracts because it exchanges things is unhelpful. The terms of R4I 
contracts are so complex and imbedded in investment law that they bear little 
resemblance, the economic exchange aside, to barters or exchange contracts. Scholars 
should therefore jettison such descriptions for they distort the terms of R4I contracts 
and mislead their analysis. 
                                                 
23
 Hannah Edinger & Johanna Jansson, supra Ch. 1 note 25, at p.8. 
24
 See FRÉDÉRIC LECLERC, supra Ch. 1 note 26, at 188. 
25
 Id. 
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The basic structure of R4I contracts is an innovative combination of mining or oil 
contract and an infrastructure project, as shown in the Figure 12 in Chapter 6. 
 
Energy security and natural resources are the focus of the R4I structure. In that respect, 
the focus of these Sino-African economic exchanges does not depart from practices of 
traditional investors but it departs from those practices in the way natural resources are 
used for the mutual benefit of African countries and China. Another departure from 
investment tradition is the emphasis on physical infrastructure, which is also at the 
heart of the R4I structure. South-South and Chinese investments are distinguishable in 
the sense that they prioritize infrastructure building.
26
 In so doing, they also concentrate 
on PIRSA, post-conflict countries and LDCs by encouraging the reconstruction of 
physical infrastructure in those nations and by covering a vaster realm of economic 
sectors beyond natural resources.  
 
R4I contracts give host states a leading role in mining and infrastructure investments. 
Much of the advantages of R4I contracts are attributable to the state-to-state business 
model that they brandish. Classic FDI law is premised upon a tripartite relationship 
between a home state, a host state and a private foreign investor. R4I contracts 
generally substitute the home state for the private foreign investor. This state-to-state 
model manifests itself by the presence of several Chinese state-owned corporations in 
the host countries in Africa. The involvement of the Chinese state and host states 
translates a re-evaluation of risks and investment climates in Africa, which is why more 
and more Chinese investors see the continent optimistically as a place of opportunity 
despite the real credit risks. R4I structures are intended to shift the focus away from the 
                                                 
26
 Provisions on physical infrastructure, see Marrakech Framework ¶ 9. 
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credit strengths of the host country towards the credit of the revenue generating project 
exploiting the resources of the host country.
27
 
 
3.2. Financial clauses 
The originality of the R4I contracts is not only structural. Chinese finance in general 
offer to developing countries an alternative and richer source of development finance. 
China‘s finance differs in size, scale, scope from those of international financial 
institutions like the World Bank.
28
 The financial arrangements woven through R4I 
contracts have attracted the most attention because they are substantial and contributing 
to bridging Africa‘s vast infrastructure deficit.29 In the same way, such use of finance 
by Chinese investors should come as no surprise as Chinese aid is, as a matter of 
policy, a means to greater Chinese FDI. The purpose of the absence of aid 
conditionalities is to enable self-development in the host countries in Africa. 
  
China‘s finance allows poor countries with very limited access to capital markets to 
obtain infrastructure investments. In that sense, R4I contracts are more suitable to the 
financial circumstances of most African countries as capital-scarcity is the overarching 
feature of low-income countries.
30
 By exchanging resources for infrastructure, R4I 
contracts turn a country‘s geological potential into financial capacity and ‗monetize‘ 
precious metals and strategic minerals. They convert natural capital into physical 
capital.
31
      
 
                                                 
27
 Phone interview with Elke Rehbock, supra Ch. 3 note 204. 
28
 Telephone Interview with Johanna L. Jansson, Former Senior Analyst, Centre for Chinese Studies, 
University of Stellenbosch (Dec. 17, 2009). 
29
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 2. 
30
 See Glenn Gottselig, Still the Bottom Billion: Glenn Gottselig Interviews Oxford Economist Paul 
Collier, FIN. & DEV., Jun. 2009, at 4. 
31
 Phone interview with Vivien Foster, supra Ch. 4 note 163. 
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Figure 22: Financial terms of R4I contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The World Bank report Building Bridges states that the financial terms of R4I contracts 
are not novel or unique in the respect they resemble a long tradition of resource-based 
dealings in the oil industry.
32
 However, it is evident, from the sources that they rely on 
to back up that statement,
33
 that the World Bank report lumps together (1) financial 
obligations, repayment of which is secured by natural resources, and (2) exchanges of 
natural resources for infrastructure investments. Telling transactions secured by 
collateral from barter-like exchanges is crucial because, unlike secured transactions, 
barter agreements do not in theory increase a country‘s debt burden.34 The significance 
of distinguishing between secured transactions and barter-like transactions is therefore 
not overshot, notably because of recurrent debates on Chinese finance risking plunging 
African nations into another vicious debt trap.  
 
                                                 
32
 VIVIEN FOSTER ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 23, at 42. 
33
 I.e. DANIEL JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM FISCAL SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTION-SHARING 
CONTRACTS (PennWell Publishing Co. 1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001 (Human 
Rights Watch 2001).  
34
 Amanda J. Perry, supra Ch. 6 note 20, at 8. 
Source: V Foster et al., Building bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier in Africa (2009) 56. 
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3.3. Social clauses 
Most importantly, Alden and others (2008) note that a ‗new ―social clause‖ has come 
into Chinese investment in Africa,‘ 35  referring to Chinese construction and 
rehabilitation of social infrastructure in Africa. Though traditional investment contracts 
provide for a bundle of socio-economic benefits (like employment; increased overall 
domestic demand; state revenues; personal income; productive efficiency;
36
 transfer of 
technology, labor and managerial skills; and overseas market networks),
37
 China has 
added ‗social clauses‘, that is clauses on such social infrastructure as hospitals, health 
centers, housing, universities and institutes, to its investment contracts.  
The ‗social clauses‘ of R4I contracts connects the obligations of African states to 
realize socio-economic rights and infrastructure investments. The connection flows 
from the decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights in 
Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia and SERAC and Another v. Nigeria. The 
Commission declared that the obligation to promote requires the state to ensure 
individuals exercise their rights by inter alia ‗building infrastructure‘ 38  and that 
‗infrastructure and resources…facilitate the full enjoyment‘ of socio-economic rights.39 
It went on to rule that the obligation to fulfill human rights is ‗very much intertwined 
with the duty to promote.‘40 It therefore follows that building infrastructure promotes 
socio-economic rights and, as such, it is intimately bound to the fulfillment of human 
rights.   
 
                                                 
35
 CHRIS ALDEN ET AL., supra Ch. 1 note 11, at 23. 
36
 Milton Iyoha, Foreign Direct Investment, Macroeconomic Policy, Environment and Economic 
Growth: The African Experience, AFR. NOTES, Spring 2009 3.  
37
 JAMES C. BAKER, supra Ch. 2 note 129. 
38
 SERAC ¶ 46. 
39
 Purohit and Moore ¶ 46. 
40
 SERAC ¶ 47. 
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Host states and foreign investors must minimize the environmental impacts of mining 
activities and the construction of hydroelectric power dams to safeguard the human 
rights of surrounding populations. Should environmental degradation or pollution occur 
as a result of the extraction of oil or mineral resources, host states or foreign investors 
or both will have to internalize the costs of the degradation or pollution. Such 
internalization of costs would basically mean complying with national and international 
law obligations with respect to property rights and the environment. Those obligations 
include environmental impact assessments, adequate provisions for mine closure, 
reclamation and clean-up, and taking into account local populations‘ concerns.41  
 
 
3.4. Preambular clauses 
Preambular clauses are the principles in key documents signed by African states and 
China that govern their economic relations. Inferentially, those principles guide the 
clauses of R4I contracts. Most of these principles nestle in the South-South cooperation 
discourse.
42
 South-South cooperation historically emerged as a reaction to colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, economic domination by Western powers, and underdevelopment. It 
insists on equality, mutual benefit, co-development, respect for sovereignty and self-
determination.
43
 Subsumed under self-determination is the principle of economic self-
determination.  
 
                                                 
41
 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM THE MINING SECTOR 7 (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2002). 
42
 Uche Ewelukwa, supra Ch. 1 note 49, at 516. 
43
 Accra Agenda for Action, ¶ 19(d) (encouraging actions on South-South cooperation aims to observe 
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, equality among development partners and respect for 
their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local content). 
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5 core documents spell out the legal and policy framework of the flourishing trade and 
investment relations between China and Africa:
44
 The 2000 Beijing Declaration,
45
 the 
2000 Programme for Cooperation,
46
 the Addis Ababa Action Plan,
47
 the Declaration of 
the Beijing Summit,
48
 and the 2007-2009 Action Plan.
49
 These core documents embody 
the preambular clauses of R4I contracts. The preeminent policy document is the China 
Africa Policy, which states that the five guiding principles of China‘s relations with 
Africa, namely sincerity, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity and common development.  
 
 
R4I contracts combine traditional mining contracts and infrastructure projects. In this 
combination lies one of the sharpest competitive edges of R4I contracts, which is that 
they produce better distributive outcomes while tackling the resource curse by 
strengthening the state. R4I contracts achieves wider distribution thanks to its unique 
way of accomplishing intersectoral complementarities in construction and mining in 
Africa, thus extending FDI benefits from the mining to the infrastructure sector. R4I 
contracts have the real effect of expanding infrastructure finance in Africa. Traditional 
investment contracts like PSAs do not yield the same results because PSAs are 
confined to hydrocarbons and minerals. R4I contracts are therefore more efficient than 
traditional investment contracts. 
 
                                                 
44
 Uche Ewelukwa, supra Ch. 1 note 49, at 523ff. 
45
 2000 Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 1
st
 Ministerial Conference. 
46
 2000 Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development, Platform for 
Cooperation. 
47
 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis-Ababa Action Plan 
2004-2006. 
48
 Beijing Summit & Third Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, 
P.R.C., Nov. 4-5, 2006, Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(draft). 
49
 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-
2009), November 16, 2006. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The cover of Adama Gaye‘s book Le Dragon et l’Autruche (the dragon and the ostrich) 
forcefully sums up general misgivings about the engagement of China in Africa. In that 
imagination, China is perceived as the self-assured dragon widely smiling, spitting 
flames, dumping cheap products in Africa, and drowning the continent in cash and 
debt.  Africa, for its part, too scared to face its overbearing partner decides to bury its 
head in the sand. It is with this picture in mind that many a critic, mostly in the West, 
takes the high road and passes scathing judgments on ventures carried out by Chinese 
investors and traders in Africa.  
 
This dissertation on resource-for-infrastructure (R4I) investment contracts paints a 
different picture of Africa‘s dealings with the Asian giant. It does not see China in or 
into Africa but rather Africans with Chinese. The cover of Ampiah & Naidu‘s book 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? aptly captures these African dealings. This image of 
Africans as a crouching tiger dealing with Chinese investors and traders is not a 
caricature. It mirrors what Africans may, with the right policies, derive from the great 
transformative potential of Chinese investments in Africa. It is with these opportunities 
in mind that this dissertation set out to propose an investment policy framework for 
Africans to take the most out of China‘s investments in the mining sectors of the 
continent‘s resource rich soil. Far from being paternalistic, the dissertation argues that 
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the R4I contract model, which crystallizes that investment policy framework, is more 
beneficial to countries in Africa than traditional investment contracts. 
 
The 21
st
 appears to be the century of unparalleled Chinese trade and investments in 
Africa. And, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 21
st
 century saw the birth of 
R4I investment contracts in Africa. This new type of investment contracts gives a 
precise and definite form to the meeting of minds between African and Chinese parties 
as to their respective priorities. Resource rich countries in Africa use R4I contracts not 
only to develop their mines but above all to develop their inadequate infrastructure; 
China uses R4I contracts because it needs raw materials to sustain its industrialization.  
 
The large finance that investment contracts channel have led a host of scholars and 
experts to inquire into the best ways for resource rich countries in Africa to benefit 
from trade and investment from China. This dissertation joined the debate by arguing 
that R4I contracts are a much better way to optimize China‘s investments in the mining 
sectors of Africa. To arrive at that conclusion, it asked several questions. Why do 
African states and China trade natural resources for infrastructure? How do China‘s 
African investments in the natural resources sector and in general look like? What are 
the costs of doing business in African countries richly endowed with natural resources? 
How do resource for infrastructure contracts bring down these costs and, most 
important, how do they maximize gains from Chinese investments in the natural 
resources sector? This chapter concludes the dissertation by reflecting on these core 
questions.  
 
Why do African countries and their Chinese counterpart exchange hydrocarbons and 
minerals for roads and bridges? Because Africa needs China to finance its 
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infrastructure development while China needs the raw materials of resource rich 
nations to strengthen its industrialization. Both African countries and China cannot 
expect their economies to grow sustainably without attending to their infrastructure 
deficit and industrialization, respectively, by trading natural resources for infrastructure 
finance. These underlying macroeconomic conditions are the reason for the trade and 
the most essential clause of R4I contracts. They also fix the contents and the overall 
structure of R4I contracts as a creative conjugation of an oil or mining contract and an 
infrastructure project.  
 
The oil and mining component of R4I contracts is shaped by the natural resource 
sectors of Africa and the dynamics of commodities markets. With its abundant natural 
resources, Africa is a very wealthy continent, which is why the oil and mining 
component of R4I contracts reproduces the terms of production sharing agreements 
(PSA), the most common type of oil and mining investment contract. Furthermore, the 
instability of markets for commodity markets prompts the parties to R4I contracts to 
opt for a price of commodity exports that tracks the market price.  
  
The infrastructure component of R4I contracts tries to respond to the enormous 
infrastructure needs in the host countries. R4I contracts match the size of the finance 
that it makes available for infrastructure development to the large amount of 
investments that host countries receive in their mining sectors. This is a clever move in 
view of the fact that in comparison African countries in general do not enjoy as much 
foreign direct investment in infrastructure. This is also, together with the notable 
presence of Chinese state-owned construction firms, one of the terms that thrust 
themselves into attention as unique in the infrastructure component of R4I contracts. 
The infrastructure sub-contractual arrangements are far less original as they use 
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extensively the contract models found in public-private partnerships (PPP), mostly 
turnkey projects.   
 
The efficacy of the R4I contract model goes beyond the interests of the contracting 
parties as it equally serves as a framework to analyze and predict the behavior of 
South-South contracting parties. As an analytical tool, the R4I contract model breaks 
down South-South investment into its constitutive elements, many of which appear in 
R4I contracts. The model places R4I contracts within the general context of South-
South cooperation, stressing its investment aspects. The key elements of China‘s FDI in 
Africa and the guiding principles of South-South cooperation are equality, co-
development, resource extraction, infrastructure, state-to-state business model, joint 
ventures, cooperation, and summit diplomacy. 
 
Equality and co-development merit special treatment. These two elements are crucial 
because of their close connection to the ‗win-win‘ approach or the mutually beneficial 
relationship that, African and Chinese leaders say, defines their exchanges. R4I 
contracts are the essence of the ‗win-win‘ approach because, through them, African and 
Chinese parties mutually benefit by satisfying their macroeconomic interests in signing 
R4I contracts. The R4I model thus provides a useful tool for analyzing Sino-African 
economic relations as well as South-South cooperation. 
 
As a predictive framework, the R4I contract model foresees that South-South economic 
exchanges will consist in increased exports of hydrocarbons and minerals to emerging 
countries and more finance streaming in for the construction of infrastructure in various 
sectors of the host economies in Africa. In that sense, the high-level official delegations 
from Ghana and South Africa, headed by their respective presidents, that travelled in 
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2010 to China to transact business and several agreements on infrastructure 
development was predictable. The R4I model predicts that African parties and their 
partners will enter into R4I contracts because resource rich African countries are in dire 
need of infrastructure and, for the partners, because industrialization demands raw 
materials.  
 
The next important question is: What are the costs of doing business in the African 
countries cursed by their abundant natural resources and, more important, how do FDI 
law and R4I contracts mitigate these costs? From the outset, it must be said that the 
resource-cost causal relationship is mediated by several third variables, hinting that the 
proponents of the resource curse have left many intervening factors out of the picture. 
The resource curse thesis is not entirely reliable. It indicates the risks of incurring high 
transaction costs more than it predicts those risks and costs.  
 
Having said that, both host countries in Africa and foreign investors suffer high 
transaction costs, which can be traced to insufficient transparency and capacity 
constraints, for instance the lack of infrastructure. The risks for host countries include 
unsustainable debt, corruption, badly negotiated R4I contracts, pollution, 
environmental degradation, labor relation issues, and low-quality infrastructure. For 
foreign investors, the most substantial risks are political, like expropriation, contract 
breaches and civil unrest. Both FDI law and R4I contracts are mechanism to allocate 
and mitigate these costs and risks. FDI law provides an external mechanism that creates 
a credible commitment by creating an institution that imposes penalties on the host 
states from breaking the promises they made to foreign investors.  
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R4I contracts are also a mechanism to keep risks and costs at low levels. Bypassing the 
bureaucracy of the host state by setting off the taxes, royalties and dividends due to the 
state against infrastructure loans and costs is a way for R4I contracts to maintain the 
risk and costs of wastage and embezzlement at a low level. In addition, R4I contracts 
induce the lowest possible total cost of infrastructure by radically reducing the time that 
it takes to search and find suitable infrastructure financier. The longer it takes to find a 
financier and finance the greater the negative incidence of inadequate infrastructure on 
the economy and, in the end, the welfare of citizens. Those are the real costs of 
infrastructure. 
 
The theory of this dissertation is that if a host country in Africa bundles a mining 
contract and infrastructure project it will attract more infrastructure finance than other 
contractual arrangements could have brought in. The lucrative nature of mining lures 
legions of foreign investors. Thus, by using the lucrative mining sector as bait, R4I 
contracts also lure investors into financing its infrastructure development. This is 
exactly how R4I contracts maximize the benefits of China‘s investments while 
minimizing costs and risks.      
 
Noticing the significant transformative and developmental potential of R4I contracts 
requires that one first be able to tell them apart from other contracts. The very few 
scholars (such as Deborah Bräutigam and Alex Vines) who attempted to study these 
contracts, though unsystematically, have for the most part failed to notice them or their 
originality. They mistook them for barter agreements, collateral arrangements or simply 
loans, or contractual phenomena that remotely or otherwise involve mining and 
infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, they situate the origins of R4I contracts at a time as old 
as those other contracts.  
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The researchers who tried to understand R4I contracts did not notice them because they 
were wearing the wrong lenses. None of them used a contract or contract law approach. 
As a consequence, Alex Vines, for example, confused ‗oil-for-infrastructure‘ deals in 
Nigeria with pre-contractual documents (i.e. a memorandum of agreement, a right of 
first refusal) and a licensing round, all combined. He also concluded that the key 
weakness of these arrangements was that there was no legally binding mechanism tying 
oil licenses to infrastructure, implying that the so-called ‗oil-for-infrastructure‘ contract 
had never been formed in the first place. These shortcomings result from the absence of 
a contract or contract law approach to the literature on the investments of emerging 
countries in Africa. Virtually every foreign investment entry is accomplished through a 
contract;
1
 the absence of a contract or contract law approach to the dealings of African 
countries with China is therefore startling. 
 
 
This dissertation has introduced a contractual approach in the scholarship on China‘s 
FDI in the oil and mining sectors of Africa. It is an approach that examines and 
interprets investment contracts or contractual relationships in a manner justifiable in 
terms of a contract theory. However, this dissertation makes no pretense to be the last 
word on R4I contracts, if only because R4I contracts have arisen of late. On the 
contrary, it is only opening the debate by proposing R4I contracts as a model for 
optimizing China‘s mining FDI and, by way of a keynote address, identifying the areas 
of further research. Future studies will certainly enrich the debate and, perhaps, close it. 
                                                 
1
 M. SORNARAJAH, supra Ch. 1 note 70, at 277. 
  
APPENDIX 
 
 
RESOURCE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTUAL MODEL 
 
As part of my doctoral research, I have to design a resource-for-infrastructure (R4I) investment contract 
model. The recent emergence of this investment contract type means that no secondary sources of 
information have been solely devoted to R4I contracts. The lack of information on these contracts 
prompted me to interview experts in various fields. I have designed the R4I contract model below and 
added an analysis/commentary to the salient clauses.  
 
The analysis/commentary of this (R4I) contract model is enclosed in boxes and does not form part of the 
terms of R4I contracts. This model was built on the basis of available evidence of the terms of existing 
R4I contracts, especially the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)-China R4I contract and the 
Angola-China R4I contract. It aims to be an optimal form of the resource-for-infrastructure contracts.  
 
 
– Dunia P. Zongwe 
  383 
 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
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Between 
The Republic of _________, represented for the purposes of the present Agreement by 
Ms./Mrs./Mr. _________, Minister responsible for infrastructure,  
Owing to the special nature of the R4I contract as a combination of an infrastructure contract and a 
production sharing agreement (PSA), the representative of the African Party may be the Minister 
responsible for mines/hydrocarbons, the Minister responsible for infrastructure, or the Prime Minister. 
However, it is preferable that the representative be the Prime Minister in order to overcome potential 
legal restrictions concerning the ministers who may sign government contracts and bind the African 
Party. For example, analysts have questioned the validity of the signature of the Minister of 
Infrastructure on the R4I contract between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and China 
because the mining laws required that the Minister of Mines, and not the Minister of Infrastructure, sign 
any agreement to cede mining rights.
1
 This situation shows that some legal systems do not accommodate 
– as they have never anticipated – the advent of the new type of investment contracts that R4I contracts 
represent. The way around these situations is for the African Party to be represented by its Prime 
Minister. Representation by the Prime Minister would be a recognition that the R4I contract in question 
is neither a mining/oil contract nor an infrastructure contract but a combination of both so that potential 
legal restrictions on the ministers who may sign government contracts and bind the African Party do not 
apply.    
 
Hereinafter referred to as _________ [African Party] 
The African Party is always a resource rich country. R4I contracts consist in the exchange of natural 
resources for national infrastructure; and those contracts are not possible in a resource-poor country. Of 
the 53 countries constituting the African continent, more than half of the countries (i.e. at least 30) are 
resource rich, namely Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, the DRC, the Republic of Congo 
(Congo-Brazzaville), Côte d‘Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, 
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Any of these resource rich countries can in principle be 
a party to a R4I contract with China. 
 
 
and 
 
_________ [Chinese Corporation No. 1], represented for the purposes of the present 
Agreement by its _________ [Officer/Director of Chinese Corporation No. 1], 
Ms./Mrs./Mr. _________, its legal representative;  
 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Jean Paul Kimbulu Kandolo, Chief Technical Advisor in Human Rights and 
Governance at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Togo (Jan. 23, 2010); phone 
interview with Anida Yupari Aguado, Graduate Institute in Geneva (Apr. 17, 2010).  
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_________ [Chinese Corporation No. 2], represented for the purposes of the present 
Agreement by its _________ [Officer/Director of Chinese Corporation No. 1], 
Ms./Mrs./Mr. _________, its legal representative; 
 
_________ [Chinese Corporation No. 3], represented for the purposes of the present 
Agreement by its _________ [Officer/Director of Chinese Corporation No. 1], 
Ms./Mrs./Mr. _________, its legal representative; 
 
hereinafter referred to as _________ [Chinese Consortium]. 
The corporations making up a consortium in a R4I contract are often Chinese state-owned corporations. 
The presence of state-owned corporations from China facilitates the necessary high level of coordination 
between the corporations in the mining project with those operating in the infrastructure project. Such 
level of coordination is required for the success of R4I contracts. The presence of the Chinese state, 
through its corporations, and the host state also infuses R4I contracts with some public interest in the 
pursuit of development objectives over and above the purely business motives of the Parties. 
 
The African Party and the Chinese Consortium are hereinafter referred to as ‗Party‘ 
individually and ‗Parties‘ collectively. 
 
WITNESSETH: 
Available evidence shows that R4I contracts do not have this sort of preambles, though they exist in 
other types of investment contracts, like the mining concession agreement that Liberia signed in January 
2009 with a Chinese consortium to develop the Bong iron ore mines in north central Liberia. Thus, even 
if they are not strictly speaking necessary for R4I contracts, these preambles declare the intention of the 
parties and provide a good background to investment contracts in general. They can certainly play the 
same role with R4I contracts. They are not binding but they serve the teleological interpretation of 
investment contracts.  
 
A. The government of the African Party desires to encourage investments in the 
infrastructure of the African Party for economic development, and wishes to 
promote and facilitate the emergence of national companies in connection 
therewith. 
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The African Party must attract foreign direct investments (FDI) for the sole purpose of promoting 
economic development. The comparative advantage of R4I contracts is to allow greater flexibility 
for development than any other existing type of investment contracts. As a matter of public policy, 
host governments in Africa should take advantage of foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
infrastructure to build local capacity in the construction industry so that they do not become 
constantly dependent on foreign investors for the construction, maintenance and operation of 
national infrastructure. Part of the solution to achieving that goal is to promote and facilitate the 
emergence of national companies in the local construction industry. 
 
B. Every natural resource on the surface of the ground or in the soil or sub-soil, 
rivers, water courses, territorial waters and continental shelf of the African 
Party is the property of the African Party and all rights related to the exploration 
for and exploitation of natural resources belong exclusively to the African 
Party.  
With the notable exception of the United States (US), in virtually all legal systems the state is the owner 
of natural resources. The African Party may wish to re-affirm its permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources in an investment contract in order to justify its decision to encumber, vindicate, control, use or 
cede mining rights to foreign investors. 
 
 
C. The government also desires to encourage the further exploration and 
development of mineral resources in the African Party, and wishes to promote 
and facilitate national mining companies in connection therewith. 
D. The government further desires to increase, through the implementation of this 
Framework Agreement, its exports of mineral resources and the 
competitiveness of its mining sector, to encourage and develop technology 
transfers, and to facilitate the enhancement of human capital. 
This section recounts some FDI benefits brought about by investment contracts, namely integration into 
the world economy through higher exports, technology transfer, human capital development, 
competitiveness (hard to measure), and industry development. The African Party should keep these 
policy choices at the back of its mind as it negotiates the terms of R4I contracts. These policies should 
also guide the interpretation of R4I contracts to the extent that they reflect the intention of the African 
Party. 
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E. On or about _________ [date], representatives of the government of the African 
Party entered into direct negotiations with representatives of the Corporations 
composing the Chinese Consortium. On or about _________ [date], the Parties 
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding and, on or about _________ 
[date], they signed the present Framework Agreement. 
In apparent defiance of best practices, R4I contracts do not result from the award of contracts through 
tender but from direct negotiations with foreign investors. Many an analyst has raised alarm at the 
opacity of the negotiation process and the great risk of corruption and favoritism. These transparency 
concerns are laudable and understandable; unfortunately most analysts misunderstand the complex 
nature of R4I contracts and miss the point of an auction, which is what a tender essentially is. First, R4I 
contracts are not simply the sale of primary commodities; they are also building contracts, which are 
complex contractual arrangements. Private negotiations are appropriate when a contract is complex, 
involves the provision of services and the possibility of win-win moves and outcomes.
2
 Second, auctions 
are meant to get for the seller the best value for his or her property when there are many buyers in the 
market. Whereas several foreign investors would line up if a host government in Africa conducted a 
mining/oil licensing round, it is doubtful whether any foreign investors other than the Chinese state-
owned corporations would be willing or able to build national infrastructure in return for minerals/oil. 
The fact that the number of qualified investors is strictly limited means that the costs of holding an 
auction would surpass those of direct negotiations with the already known high-value investors. 
Regarding issues of transparency, the partial or complete publication of the terms of the R4I framework 
contract, after negotiations and signature, can equally serve the purposes of transparency. The DRC 
published entirely its R4I framework contract with Chinese state-owned corporations.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties hereby agree as follows: 
 
CHAPTER I  SUBJECT MATTER 
Article 1 Objectives of the Parties 
1.1. The Parties recognize and declare that by signing the present Framework 
Agreement, they set out to achieve the following objectives: 
1.1.1. For the African Party, to find financial resources necessary for the realization of 
national infrastructure projects deemed important and urgent. 
1.1.2. For the Chinese Consortium, to invest in mining or hydrocarbons in the territory 
of the African Party. 
                                                 
2
 GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, NEGOTIAUCTIONS: NEW DEALMAKING STRATEGIES FOR A COMPETITIVE 
MARKETPLACE 47-49 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010). 
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These clauses spell out the intentions of the African Party and the Chinese Consortium; and, as such, 
they are indispensable tools in the interpretation of R4I contract terms. The clauses also translate the 
macroeconomic complementarities between Africa and China. Africa has a major infrastructure deficit 
while China has a globally competitive construction industry; Africa has a wealth of natural resources 
while China is in need of natural resources to fuel its economy. These macroeconomic complementarities 
form the underlying structure of R4I contracts. The strategic value of R4I contracts lies in the fulfillment 
of those Sino-African macroeconomic complementarities. 
 
 
1.2. In order to realize, to the satisfaction of both of them, the above objectives, the 
two Parties agree to cooperate as follows: 
The following two clauses (i.e. 1.2.1. and 1.2.2.) are the essential terms of the R4I contracts. Essential 
terms are the terms that define a contract or place it into a specific category, like sale, lease, agency, etc.  
 
1.2.1. The Chinese Consortium undertakes to mobilize and commit finance to the 
construction of infrastructure in the African Party (hereinafter the 
‗Infrastructure Project‘). The finance will be reimbursed with revenues from the 
exploitation of minerals or hydrocarbons whose exploitation rights are owned 
by the national oil or mining corporation of the African Party. The concrete 
terms of the reimbursement of this finance are defined in Part IV of the present 
Framework Agreement. 
This is the infrastructure leg of R4I contracts. The terms of this part of the agreement closely resemble 
traditional project finance.  
 
1.2.2. The Chinese Consortium undertakes to mobilize and commit finance necessary 
to the development of mineral deposits or oil blocks listed in Annex A 
(hereinafter the ‗Mining/Oil Project‘). The terms of the reimbursement of this 
finance are defined in Part IV of the present Framework Agreement. 
This is the resource leg of R4I contracts. The terms of this part of the agreement closely resemble 
traditional mining or oil contracts. However, the terms of R4I contracts are more than the mere sum of 
project finance and mining/oil contracts. It is the innovative combination of these two types of contracts 
that constitutes R4I contracts and that brings to host countries more FDI benefits than the two contract 
types, used separately. R4I contracts increase infrastructure investments exponentially by drastically 
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reducing the cost of capital, especially the prohibitively high costs of seeking an investor willing and 
able to fund and build the needed infrastructure.
3
 For instance, Ghana started incurring search costs for 
its Bui dam project as far back as 1957, that is, since Ghana became an independent country. 5 of the 8 
countries that signed R4I contracts (Gabon, Ghana, Angola, the DRC, and Guinea) enjoyed their single 
largest infrastructure investments since independence.  
 
1.3. The Mining Project and the Infrastructure Project are hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the ‗Cooperation Project‘.   
1.4. For the constitution of the ‗Mining/Oil Joint Venture‘ and the realization of the 
Mining/Oil Project, the African Party designates its national oil or mining 
corporation referred to in 1.2.1 above. 
R4I contracts have involved the participation of national mining/oil corporation in joint ventures with 
Chinese corporations or consortiums in Angola (i.e. Sonangol) and the DRC (i.e. Gécamines). In Gabon, 
the government itself is directly in a joint venture with China National Machinery & Equipment Import 
& Export Corporation (CMEC).   
 
1.5. For the constitution of a mining/oil joint venture and the realization of the 
Mining Project, the Chinese Corporation No. 1, Chinese Corporation No. 2, 
Chinese Corporation No. 3, etc. designate _________ [number of] corporations, 
namely _________, _________, _________, these corporations forming the 
Consortium. 
 
Article 2 Objectives of the Framework Agreement 
The objective of the present Framework Agreement is to coordinate and summarize the 
common intention of the Parties, to define and specify the Cooperation Project that the 
Parties propose to realize, the general and particular terms of its realization as well as 
the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to this Cooperation Project. 
Framework agreements are one of two key legal documents required by Chinese concessional finance, 
the other being loan agreements. As their name indicates, they frame the agreements between the African 
Party and its Chinese counterpart. One of their foremost virtues is to evidence the common intention of 
the Parties and laying bare the overall structure of the parties‘ agreements.  
                                                 
3
 This proposition was developed in a phone interview with Elke Rehbock, Associate, Greenberg Traurig 
(May 3, 2010). 
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CHAPTER II MINING/OIL PROJECT 
Article 3 Terms of cooperation – constitution of the mining/oil joint venture 
3.1.  The Parties will realize their cooperation through the constitution of a 
mining/oil joint venture to which the African Party will cede, through the 
intermediation of its national mining/oil company and the participation the 
latter, rights on the mineral deposits or oil blocks that are the object of the 
Mining/Oil Project part of the present Framework Agreement. 
Some R4I contracts promote state-to-state partnerships through joint ventures like La Compagnie 
Minière de Bélinga (COMIBEL) in Gabon and La Sino-Congolaise des Mines (Sicomines) in the DRC. 
These partnerships are preferable to mining concessions because they develop national mining/oil 
corporations. They thus fall within China‘s win-win philosophy, which favors joint ventures with host 
countries in Africa, though the law in some countries like the DRC requires that mining investors form 
joint ventures with Congolese nationals. They also revive the developmental role of host states, with 
joint ventures acting as vehicles for the finance of infrastructure projects. The revival runs counter to the 
mining/oil reforms initiated by international financial institutions (IFIs) in many an African country. 
These reforms consisted in weakening the state as a development agent by urging countries in Africa to 
privatize mining/oil sectors or remove state monopolies in those sectors.
4
  
 
3.2. The mining/oil joint venture shall be constituted in conformity with the rules 
and current usages on the constitution of business corporations in the African 
Party. 
3.3.  It shall be managed according to the law of business corporations and shall 
generate profits, part of which shall serve to reimburse mining/oil investments 
as well as infrastructure investments.  
This clause shows that R4I contracts do not entirely dispense with monetary intermediation as it says that 
the joint venture must generate profits, part of which must reimburse mining/oil and infrastructure 
investments. The Parties will share the remainder of the profits. The part payment allocated to the 
reimbursement of investments is a set-off and not the absence of financial intermediation, as is the case 
with barter trade agreements. The latter observation in turn shows that analysts who argue that R4I 
contracts are barter trade agreements have not noticed the set-off actually taking place in those contracts.  
                                                 
4
 See BONNIE CAMPBELL (ED.), MINING IN AFRICA: REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Pluto Press 
2009). 
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3.4.  To guarantee that the Chinese Consortium have the means to recover their 
investments  in the Mining/Oil Project and the Infrastructure Project, the Parties 
fix the capital structure of the mining/oil joint venture as follows: 70% for the 
Chinese Consortium and 30% for the national mining/oil corporation. 
The capital structure in Sicomines is 32% for the DRC and 68% for the Chinese consortium; in 
COMIBEL it was reportedly 25% for Gabon and 75% for the Chinese consortium, as of December 2007. 
A great many analysts have criticized the capital structure of these ventures. While critics are right in 
their concerns, they are asking the wrong questions. They are asking whether the capital structure is 
unconscionable or unfairly disadvantageous instead of asking whether the profit sharing formula reflects 
the respective contribution of the parties and creates the right incentives for the parties to apply their best 
efforts at a given time during the lifetime of the contract. In this model, the capital structure is justified 
by the need to guarantee that the Chinese Consortium recoup the costs that it sank into the mining/oil and 
infrastructure projects. It is difficult to be too precise as to the appropriate share for foreign investors. It 
is nonetheless evident that a formula that does not allocate a high share of the revenues to the foreign 
investors for cost recovery in the early stages of resource exploitation will remove the incentives for the 
investors to commit substantial finance to projects, especially when the political risks and transaction 
costs are high in the host country, as is the case in several countries in Africa. After recovering sunk 
costs, the capital structure should gradually increase to reflect the new economic position of the contract 
and to produce the right incentives for the local partner in the joint venture.   
 
 
Article 4 Cession of rights over mineral deposits/oil blocks 
The African Party undertakes that its national mining/oil corporation cede to the 
mining/oil joint venture, the rights covering the following natural mineral deposits/oil 
blocks: _________, 
_________, 
_________, 
_________. 
The natural resources traded in the existing R4I contracts are oil, bauxite, iron, copper, cobalt and cocoa. 
This list indicates that R4I contracts not only exchange minerals and hydrocarbons but also agricultural 
products for national infrastructure.    
 
These deposits/blocks, whose rights the national mining/oil corporation holds under 
_________ [identification number] as registered in the Mining/Oil Register, are located 
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in the region of _________, in the state/province of _________, in the Republic of 
_________ [the host country, that is the African Party], in conformity with Annex 
_________ of the present Framework Agreement.    
The value of the mineral deposits or oil blocks, whose mining/oil rights the national 
mining/oil corporation cedes to the Chinese consortium, is the market value.  
Though not explicitly stated in this clause, the R4I contract indexes the price of natural resources to the 
market price. This is the appropriate price adjustment mechanism. The benefit of indexing lies in the 
reduction of the discrepancy between the initial contract price and the market price at delivery. 
 
Article 5 Signature bonus and financial assistance for the technical 
renovation of the national mining/oil corporation 
5.1.  Within the framework of the Cooperation Project, the Chinese Consortium 
undertakes to pay a signature bonus of _________ million US dollars to the 
African Party, on condition that: 
Common in the extractive industries, a ‗signature bonus‘ is a payment made in addition to royalties and 
rent as an incentive for the host country to sign a mining/oil contract.
5
 Signature bonuses can be paid to 
the African Party as a lump sum or in installments, as China does with the R4I contract that it signed 
with the DRC.  
 
-  a feasibility study is approved by the Chinese government, during the approbation 
of the Mining/Oil Joint Venture Agreement to be concluded between the national 
mining/oil corporation and the Chinese Consortium; 
This is an efficient condition as China bears the information costs.  
 
-  an audit carried out by the Chinese Consortium on the legality and validity of the 
mining/oil rights and that the rights do not disclose any defect, latent or apparent; 
This is an efficient condition as China bears the audit costs. The information and audit conditions are not 
cumbersome for the African Party as China pays their costs.   
 
                                                 
5
 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8
th
 ed. 2004), sv ‗bonus.‘ 
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-  the cession of mining/oil rights by the national mining/oil corporation to the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture covering natural mining deposits or oil blocks and other 
valuable mineral resources or hydrocarbons as envisaged by article 4 of the 
present Framework Agreement have taken place. 
The cession of mining/oil rights should also not be time-consuming; the African Party should be able to 
effect the cession very cheaply.  
 
5.2. The Chinese Consortium further promise to search and put in place a financial 
assistance on the order of _________ million US dollars, in the form of a loan to 
the national mining/oil corporation, for the rehabilitation of its physical 
infrastructure in _________ [location on the territory of the African Party]. For 
the purchases of equipment, priority shall be given to Chinese firms. 
Rehabilitation work will be done by subcontractors from the African Party. If 
resort has to be made to subcontractors from a country other than the African 
Party, priority shall be given to Chinese firms. 
Financial assistance to the African Party is necessary if the latter lacks the physical infrastructure for the 
exploitation of mineral deposits/oil blocks. The African Party can use this assistance to build, rehabilitate 
or modernize its mining/oil infrastructure.   
 
This financial assistance will not create any obligations vis-à-vis the cession of 
mining/oil rights and their enjoyment in favor of the Chinese Consortium. The 
financial assistance will be put in place after the approbation of the Cooperation 
Project by the Chinese government. At the request of the national mining/oil 
corporation, the financing shall be paid in cash or equipment. 
 
Article 6 Prefeasibility and feasibility studies 
6.1. The Chinese Consortium will carry out a Prefeasibility Study on the Mining/Oil 
Project on behalf and the account of the Mining/Oil Joint Venture. The 
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Prefeasibility Study shall be submitted to the authorized organs of the national 
mining/oil corporation and the Chinese Consortium for approval. 
Geological information is often incomplete, and just as often many a host country in Africa has limited 
capacity to conduct geological surveys. Since it is vitally important for the Chinese consortium to 
ascertain if there are sufficient mineral/oil resources for the reimbursement of its mining/oil and 
infrastructure investments, the consortium needs to carry out feasibility studies. It is thus also a way of 
minimizing commercial risks. This clause, which appears in the DRC-China R4I contract, is problematic 
because it assigns to the Chinese consortium the task of conducting a prefeasibility study. As a general 
proposition, firms engaged as contractors to construct infrastructure works should not conduct 
prefeasibility studies because a conflict of interests may distort the findings of the studies.
6
 Thus, ideally, 
a third party should carry out the feasibility studies.   
 
6.2. The Mining/Oil Joint Venture will then carry out a Feasibility Study on the 
Mining/Oil Project whose conclusions will be submitted to the Board of Directors 
and the General Assembly of the Mining/Oil Joint Venture. The Feasibility Study 
thus approved shall then be approved by the governments of China and the 
African Party. 
6.3. The Parties agree that Prefeasibility and Feasibility Studies must demonstrate the 
Mining/Oil Project will be able to generate an internal rate of return (IRR) of at 
least _________ % for the benefit of the Chinese Consortium. 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is the interest rate or discount rate at which foreign investors will recoup 
the entire cost of their investments over the lifetime of the investment project. The DRC-China R4I 
contract provided for a 19% IRR.  
 
Article 7 Realization of the Mining/Oil Project          
7.1. In order to allow the Mining/Oil Joint Venture to promptly start the 
reimbursement of investments that it will receive and those to be made in the 
infrastructure projects, the Parties agree that the African Party and Chinese 
Consortium must help the Mining/Oil Joint Venture commence commercial 
production within the time frame set by the Feasibility Study carried out by the 
                                                 
6
 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGAL GUIDE ON 
DRAWING UP INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL WORKS 9 (United 
Nations 1988). 
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Mining/Oil Joint Venture. The target for the first year of commercial production 
is _________ tons/barrels. _________ [further targets for subsequent years]. 
7.2. The total amount of the mining investments as well as the timetable for this 
financing are determined by the Feasibility Study. 
 
 
CHAPTER III  INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT 
Article 8 Infrastructure works 
The list of infrastructure works to be financed by the Chinese Consortium proposed by 
the African Party is attached in Annex _________ of the present Framework 
Agreement.       
R4I contracts have provided for numerous types of infrastructure projects, including dams in Congo-
Brazzaville (Imboulou), Guinea (Souapiti) and Ghana (Bui); power plants in Sudan (El-Gaili) and 
Nigeria (Papalanto); iron ore reserve in Gabon (Bélinga), and roads, railways, bridges, training centers, 
schools, universities, houses, health centers, hospitals, and airports, in Angola and the DRC. A review of 
the available evidence on R4I contracts elicits two scales of infrastructure projects. Most R4I contracts 
target infrastructure investments in mega-projects whereas more recent R4I contracts are in reality 
ambitious plans for the reconstruction of the entire host country (Angola, the DRC, and Guinea). R4I 
contracts create possibilities for export diversification by building infrastructure in other sectors of the 
economy. This role of R4I contracts is of the utmost importance because resource rich countries, 
especially oil and gas exporters, are the least diversified economies in Africa, like Equatorial Guinea, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Libya, Chad and Angola.
7
   
 
 
Article 9 Realization of the Infrastructure Project 
The Chinese Consortium will mobilize and commit finance to the Infrastructure 
Project, through the Mining/Oil Joint Venture. The total amount of the finance will be 
determined by the result of the mining/oil exploitation. The infrastructure project will 
be executed in two phases. 
The Mining/Oil Joint Venture is a vehicle for the financing of infrastructure projects. The total amount of 
infrastructure finance in a single R4I contract can be very large relative to the size of the host economy: 
                                                 
7
 See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, LIONS ON THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN 
ECONOMIES 5 (McKinsey & Company 2010). 
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4.5 billion US dollars in Angola in 2004-2007 and 9 billion US dollars in the DRC in 2008 (before the 
amendment of the DRC-China R4I contract in August 2009). It is a situation that raises fears that the 
debt thus contracted will not be sustainable as the risk of sovereign debt default grows higher the higher 
the debt. A simple solution is to avoid specifying the total value of the contract in the R4I contract itself 
and instead split the total amount of the investments into a series of infrastructure contracts falling under 
the framework R4I contract and entered into at different points in time over the life of the R4I contract. 
In this manner, default in one mini-contract will not result in default of the whole R4I contract. This 
strategy will prevent the high value of the R4I contract debt to ever pose a threat to the solvency of the 
host country. The Parties may specify the total amount of infrastructure finance in a non-binding 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) but must refrain from making that specification in a binding R4I 
contract.  
 
9.1. The infrastructure works of the first phase 
The list of the first phase of infrastructure works to be realized, ranked in order of 
priority, will be proposed and submitted by the African Party to the Chinese 
Consortium immediately after the signature of the present Agreement so as to allow 
technical teams of the latter to realize and present to the African Party technical and 
financial propositions of those works and to plan their execution. The infrastructure 
works start immediately after the approval of the Feasibility Study by the governments 
of the African Party and China. 
The Parties must prioritize infrastructure works so that the most urgent ones are carried out first. In 
particular, the African Party must ensure that subcontractors start construction work immediately after 
signature of the R4I contract and months before the start of resource extraction in order to allow the 
African Party to detect defects in the infrastructure built and notify the Chinese consortium of the defects 
and then give it time to rectify them. This remedial action might not avail to the African Party if resource 
exploitation started before or at the same time as the infrastructure works because, if resource 
exploitation is completed before the infrastructure works, there would be much less pressure on the 
consortium to rectify the defects.  
 
9.2. The second phase of infrastructure works 
The start as well as the volume of infrastructure works of the second phase shall be 
determined by mutual consultation of the Parties depending on the profitability of the 
Mining/Oil Project. The infrastructure works of the second phase shall be reimbursed 
by the taxes, custom and excise duties owed to the African Party by the Mining/Oil 
Joint Venture during the third period of exploitation (see article 13), that follows the 
end of the reimbursement of the first phase of infrastructure works. 
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9.3. Notwithstanding the provisions of article 9.1 above and after the mining/oil rights 
envisaged by article 4 of the present Framework Agreement have been ceded to the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture and on condition that the Mining/Oil Joint Venture constitute 
a security interest in the mining/oil rights, the Chinese Consortium will mobilize and 
commit finance to the implementation of the most urgent infrastructure works and 
whose requirements for implementation have been met. The finance must be counted in 
the investments for the first phase of infrastructure works and will be reimbursed by the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture in terms of the provisions of Chapter IV of the present 
Framework Agreement.  
This is an essential clause. It states that the Mining/Oil Joint Venture is a collateral and not the natural 
resources, as much of the literature mistakenly assumes. This clause features the DRC-China R4I 
contract, which has reportedly duplicated – with necessary adjustments – the Angola-China R4I 
contract.
8
 In actual fact, the common intention of the Parties in R4I contracts indicates that natural 
resources are a medium of exchange and not security if the exchange fails. However, if a Chinese 
consortium builds the infrastructure first and receives payment of natural resources some time after 
construction commenced in installments, natural resources are collateral before the consortium is in 
effective control of the resources. This is a necessary inference from the fact that when a buyer buys 
something and pays for it in installments, the seller is essentially making a loan,
 9
  with the consequence 
that the non-simultaneous performance by the parties is akin to a sale on credit.   
 
 
Article 10 Contract of infrastructure works 
Each project of infrastructure works shall be the object of a specific contract between 
the Contracting Owner, the Mining/Oil Joint Venture, one of the corporations in the 
Chinese Consortium and/or its affiliates authorized and called upon to carry out those 
works. The contract will have the following terms: 
To leave room for flexibility and experimentation, it is imperative that each infrastructure work be the 
object of a separate infrastructure contract falling under a framework R4I contract. The alternative, 
which is to provide for all infrastructure works in one and the same framework R4I contract, will be too 
rigidly complex and will increase the probabilities of contract renegotiation, disputes over contract terms 
and litigation down the road. These infrastructure contracts may take on the form of build, own and 
                                                 
8
 See Colette Braeckman, Paul Fortin, PDG de la Gécamines, Défend les Accords avec la Chine, LE 
SOIR (Belg.), Feb. 28, 2008. 
9
 JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 208 (W.W. Norton & Company 
2008). 
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transfer (BOT), build, operate, and own (BOO), build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT), build, operate 
and renew the concession (BOR) projects, among other possible forms. However, build and transfer 
immediately (BT) or turnkey projects are the standard infrastructure contract form in R4I contracts.  
 
10.1. The borrower of funds for the infrastructure works will be the Mining/Oil Joint 
Venture and/or the Chinese corporations. The Mining/Oil Joint Venture shall be 
constituted to realize the Mining/Oil Project and be responsible for the 
reimbursement of investments in mining/oil and infrastructure. 
10.2. The reimbursement of the finance for infrastructure works shall be effected by 
the Mining/Oil Joint Venture following the provisions of Chapter IV of the 
present Framework Agreement. 
10.3. The guarantee of reimbursement is given by the African Party which 
undertakes, within the framework of the present Framework Agreement, to 
grant to the Chinese Consortium additional mining concessions/oil blocks or 
any other resources and satisfactory means in the event that revenues expected 
from the Mining/Oil Joint Venture turns out to be insufficient to reimburse the 
investments in the Mining/Oil Project and Infrastructure Project. 
This clause is a sovereign guarantee. Some analysts have argued that this sort of provisions is evidence 
that in R4I contracts natural resources are collaterals,
10
 and in effect collaterals and sovereign guarantees, 
though legally distinguishable, are structurally comparable from an economic perspective. Sovereign 
guarantees are government credit enhancement techniques whereby a host government guarantees to the 
project corporation that, should certain events occur or not occur, it will compensate the project 
corporation.
11
 Collaterals in secured transactions are private credit enhancement techniques whereby a 
lender takes security against the assets of a borrower in order to protect itself against credit defaults by 
the borrower. Both sovereign guarantees and collaterals are guarantees and both provide remedies upon 
the occurrence of the defined events. In R4I contracts, the remedy, with sovereign guarantees, is to 
increase payment by providing additional natural resources whereas, with collaterals, the remedy would 
be foreclosure, whereby the lender liquidates the security to satisfy the amount of a loan that it granted in 
the event of the borrower failing to repay the loan. However, the reason why sovereign guarantees in R4I 
contracts do not signify that natural resources are collaterals is because those guarantees do not pertain to 
the natural resources initially traded in terms of the contract but to additional natural resources other than 
the initial amount of resources allocated to Chinese investors. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that 
the natural resources to be initially traded in terms of R4I contracts are not collaterals, but that the natural 
resources to be added to the initial grant of resources function like collaterals.    
                                                 
10
 Phone interview with Nils Tcheyan, Consultant and Former Director of Strategy and Operations in the 
Africa Region, World Bank (May 14, 2010). 
11
 SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW OF BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 416 (Kluwer Law 
International 2001). 
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10.4. The Contracting Owner of the Infrastructure Project within the framework of 
the present Framework Agreement will be the ministry responsible for 
infrastructure. 
10.5. The Architect of infrastructure works within the framework of the present 
Framework Agreement will be any person nominated by the Contracting 
Owner. 
10.6. The Entrepreneur will be the Chinese Consortium or its affiliates duly 
nominated. 
10.7. The Mining/Oil Joint Venture will not intervene in the conduct or supervision 
of infrastructure works. It is however authorized to carry out its operations and 
financial and accounting procedures, transfers, and to make available the funds 
destined for infrastructure works. The Mining/Oil Joint Venture will make 
payments upon request by the Contracting Owner, on the basis of invoices 
presented by corporations working under the Entrepreneur (construction 
contractors) and after it has verified conformity in terms of prices. 
To avoid the risk that Chinese subcontractors inflate the costs of infrastructure works, this clause allows 
the African Party, through its participation in the Mining/Oil Joint Venture, to control the valuation of 
infrastructure works. With respect to the overall value of the entire infrastructure project, one expert 
recommended that the African Party must subject the allocation of the infrastructure project to a tender 
process if it is serious about getting the best value for its natural resources.
12
 Another expert observed 
that subjecting the infrastructure project to tender will most probably make no difference as Chinese 
bidders often have more competitive prices.
13
 However, if and when the Chinese bidders have the most 
competitive prices, the African Party must encourage the Chinese bidders to compete among 
themselves.
14
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Phone interview with Vivien Foster, Lead Economist, Sustainable Development Department, Africa 
Region, World Bank (Jan. 6, 2010). 
13
 Phone interview with Deborah Bräutigam, Associate Professor, School of International Service, 
American University (Jan. 15, 2010). 
14
 Phone interview with Vivien Foster, supra note 12. 
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Article 11 Specific provisions concerning the Infrastructure Project 
11.1. Given the importance of the volume and cost of infrastructure projects with 
their character as public works, long amortization periods and the slow 
accumulation of the state‘s dividends and, in particular, in order to accelerate 
infrastructure development and national reconstruction to serve as early as 
possible socio-economic advancement, the Parties recognize that the financing 
of infrastructure development by the state‘s dividends from the exploitation of 
mineral resources/oil will not be the unique funding option within the 
framework of the present collaboration between the African Party and China. 
This clause maintains enough flexibility to permit the achievement of the ultimate goal that is socio-
economic advancement. Socio-economic advancement is vital for post conflict countries and countries in 
dire need of infrastructure development or economic diversification. Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, the DRC, 
Guinea, Côte d‘Ivoire, Niger, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville are perfect candidates for R4I contracts 
with nationwide socio-economic advancement objectives (like the Angola-China R4I contract), as 
opposed to R4I contracts simply involving megaprojects, like the Imboulou dam in Congo-Brazzaville, 
the El-Gaili power plant in Sudan, or the Papalanto gas turbine power plant in Nigeria.  
 
 To that effect and if necessary, the African Party will propose to the Mining/Oil 
Joint Venture to accept other payment terms of part of the projects for the major 
infrastructure works with greater volume and cost. Other terms include payment 
by the Contracting Owner by dint of buyer‘s credit. In that case, the Chinese 
Consortium could take all the necessary steps to assist the Contracting Owner or 
the African Party for the obtention of finance from banking institutions in China 
with acceptable conditions and, the African Party undertakes to fulfill in due 
course the formalities and procedures necessary for economic cooperation, the 
loan agreement and the guarantee in the matter, etc. 
Payment by means of a buyer‘s credit, coupled with a concessional loan, is the financial structure of the 
Ghana-China R4I contract. The buyer‘s credit (298,5 million US dollars) and the concessional loan 
(263,5 million US dollars) covers 90% of the construction cost of the Bui dam (622 million US dollars) 
in the Bui National Park in the center-west of Ghana. The African Party should negotiate R4I contract 
such that Chinese investors cover the full cost of infrastructure works if it foresees that it may encounter 
some severe challenges in paying its part of the costs or in paying them in due course, though Ghana 
certainly does not fall into that category of countries.  
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11.2. The Parties agree that for the realization of investments that they will make in 
the Mining/Oil Project and the Infrastructure Project, the Chinese Consortium 
resort to firms from the African Party to the maximum for all supplies and all 
tasks that they will be able to perform. 
Resorting to firms from the African Party is as a policy matter an economically sensible choice as it 
develops the construction industry of the latter. For mineral or oil value addition and the increased 
benefit of its citizens, the African must also strive to process minerals and refine its oil locally.   
 
 They agree nonetheless that, for supplies from abroad and for tasks that the 
firms from the African Party will not be able to perform, the Chinese 
Consortium give priority to the Chinese market on condition that prices offered 
by Chinese sellers are competitive.    
This clause ensures that Chinese financial assistance creates employment opportunities for Chinese 
subcontractors.  
 
 
Article 12 Subcontracting 
Article 12 of this R4I contract model is inspired by the subcontracting policy that the Angolan 
government adopted for its R4I contract with China. 
15
  
 
12.1. The reinforcement of the role of the business class in the process of national 
reconstruction is one of the objectives of the African Party. For the purposes of 
this Article, are ‗_________‘ [corporate citizens of the African 
Party](hereinafter ‗national subcontractor‘) all firms owned by citizens of the 
African Party, or commercial firms, duly incorporated and with headquarters in 
the African Party, and in which at least _________ [percentage of shares] 
percent of the capital is owned by citizens or firms of the African Party.  
                                                 
15
 Resolução No. 21/05, de 12 de Maio de 2005, Diário da República de 22.7.2005. 1 (Angl.). 
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12.2. In turnkey projects or BOT or any other infrastructure projects that permit or 
recommend subcontracting, a national subcontractor must be selected. The 
Chinese company hired for the construction work must transfer to the national 
subcontrator – progressively and according a program that has a clearly defined 
objective, implementation and timeframe – scientific knowledge, professional 
and management techniques, that will allow the full assumption by the national 
subcontractor and for a period established by agreement the management of the 
(construction) business.   
12.3. To qualify for subcontracting, national subcontractors must satisfy the 
following requirements cumulatively: Their legal and fiscal situation must be in 
order; their accounting must be organized; they must possess technical capacity, 
immanent or acquired through contractual association, for the performance of 
the responsibilities assumed; they must not be indebted to some state 
organizations or corporations of a public nature or whose majority shareholder 
is the state;  and they must have been incorporated at least two years before 
applying for the subcontracting job.  
12.4. Where two or more national subcontractors are equally qualified, preference is 
given to a corporation to whom the African Party is indebted. For the selection 
of national subcontractors by the competent ministries and sub-national 
governments, according to whether the projects are central or sub-national, a list 
of national subcontractors must be established. Subcontracting and the selection 
of national subcontractors must take place without prejudice to competition 
among the business corporations operating in and harmonious investment 
within the African Party.      
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CHAPTER IV REIMBURSEMENT OF INVESTMENTS 
The concept of ‗reimbursement‘ in R4I contracts is indicative of the fact that Chinese infrastructure 
finance are loans and that the exchange of natural resources for national infrastructure is not 
contemporaneous, contemporaneity being arguably a defining characteristic of barter trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, this indication should not lead to inferences that natural resources are in R4I contracts 
collaterals because the common intention of the Parties is clearly to utilize natural resources as payment.   
 
Article 13 Reimbursement of investments of the Chinese Consortium 
There will be three periods for the reimbursement of the investments of the 
Cooperation Project: 
- The first period, the period of mining/oil reimbursement (First Step), 
- The second period, the period of the reimbursement of the first phase of 
infrastructure works (Second Step), 
Both the Angola-China and the DRC-China R4I contracts divide the infrastructure project in two phases.  
 
- The third period, commercial period (Third Step). 
The Mining/Oil Joint Venture will reimburse the investments of the Chinese 
Consortium in the Mining/Oil Project and the Infrastructure Project as follows: 
- During the First Period: The Joint Venture will allocate all its profits to the 
complete reimbursement of the mining/oil investments, including interest 
payments, of the Chinese Consortium in the development of the Mining/Oil 
Project. 
This clause led analysts to believe that R4I contracts are barter trade agreements as the Mining/Oil Joint 
Venture directly applies all the profits of the African Party to the reimbursement of mining and 
infrastructure projects. Put another way, the absence of the intermediation of money misled analysts into 
thinking that R4I contracts are barter agreements. However, as the clause below reveals the African 
Party, reimburses the investments in most part by a set-off, not by barter. But it is noteworthy that this 
clause is effective in acting as a restraint on the possible embezzlement of investment money on the part 
of host government officials. By bypassing the state as far as mining/oil revenues are concerned, R4I 
contracts ensure discipline and reduce significantly, without nonetheless eradicating, the risks that 
government officials misappropriate money earmarked for infrastructure development – a mechanism 
that an expert on China in Africa once referred to as an ‗agency of restraint.‘16   
                                                 
16
 Deborah Bräutigam, Africa’s Eastern Promise: What the West Can Learn from Chinese Investment in 
Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 5, 2010. 
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- _________ % of the financing of the Mining/Oil Project will be in the form of 
loans, to be reimbursed without interest. The remaining _________ % will be 
reimbursed at an annual interest rate of _________ %. 
- During the Second Period, the Mining/Oil Joint Venture will allocate 
_________ % of its profits to the reimbursement of investments of the first 
phase of infrastructure works and to the payment of their annual interest of 
LIBOR (six months) +100 BP, it will distribute the remaining _________ % to 
shareholders, in proportion to their share in the capital structure. The total 
amount of reimbursement during this period must not exceed 3 billion US 
dollars in principal. 
This clause shows that China uses market rates for its loans but good market rates. It also shows that 
after allocating a certain (usually a very high) percentage of the profits accruing during the first phase to 
the reimbursement of the first phase of the infrastructure works, the African Party receives the remaining 
part of the profits. Parliament, civil society and other stakeholders must at that point closely follow 
mining/oil revenues to prevent theft and waste.  
 
- During the Third Period, the Mining/Oil Joint Venture will distribute all profits 
to its shareholders, in proportion to their share in the capital structure. 
With this clause, there is absolutely no restraint on the possible misappropriation of taxes, royalties and 
dividends, which means that the African Party must set up other safeguards, including parliamentary 
control and audit by civil society and other stakeholders, to intensify scrutiny with a view to ensuring 
transparency and accountability with regard to mining/oil revenues. 
 
- The second phase of infrastructure works as well as payment of their annual 
interest of LIBOR (six months) + 100BP will be financed by all taxes, custom 
and excise duties to which the African Party will be entitled in the Third Period, 
that is the commercial period. 
The possible balance between the actual bank rate and the rate applied to the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture will be at the expense of the Chinese Consortium. 
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PART V UNDERTAKINGS AND GUARANTEES OF THE AFRICAN 
PARTY    
The undertakings of the African Party vis-à-vis the Chinese Consortium are as follows: 
 
Article 14 Guarantees relating to the deposits/blocks and mining/oil rights
  
 14.1. The African Party guarantees that, during the entire period of the Cooperation 
Project, the mining/oil rights that will be the object of the cession to the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture will be free of any defect, hidden or/and apparent, 
capable of impairing the peaceful enjoyment of the rights. The Chinese 
Consortium will ensure that it carries out an audit on the legality and validity of 
the mining/oil rights. The cession will only take place on condition that the 
abovementioned audit demonstrates that the mining/oil rights are free of any 
defect hidden and/or apparent. Otherwise, if the existence of one or several 
defects hidden and/or apparent is proved, the national mining/oil corporation 
undertakes to remedy the defects without delay. If the defects hidden and/or 
apparent cannot be corrected, the present Framework Agreement will be 
rescinded. 
Guarantees are the risk-shifting mechanism par excellence. In order to control changes to their risk 
profiles, lenders such China Eximbank will want to maintain control over the project joint venture‘s 
power to change project plans, project contracts, capital expenditure program or debt program without 
the lenders‘ consent.17 Lenders use these representations, guarantees and undertakings as bases to claim 
damages and as events of defaults, triggering the lenders‘ decision to suspend drawdown, demand 
repayment, enforce security, or cancel the contract.
18
 Regarding cancellation, irremediable defects go to 
the root of any contract and should therefore warrant cancellation. Hence the cancellation also provided 
in this clause.  
                                                 
17
 JEFFREY DELMON, PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE: PROJECT FINANCE, PPP 
PROJECTS AND RISK 83 (Kluwer Law International 2009). 
18
 Id. at 84. 
  407 
 
14.2. The African Party guarantees that the deposits/oil blocks, whose rights will be 
ceded to the Mining/Oil Joint Venture, contain mining/oil reserves mentioned in 
article 4 of the present Framework Agreement. If verification through the 
Feasibility Study reveals that reserves are below the reserves indicated in article 
4 of the present Framework Agreement, the African Party undertakes to grant 
new concessions to the Mining/Oil Joint Venture. Infrastructure investment will 
be suspended until the level of reserves provided for in article 4 of the 
Agreement is attained. 
The risk that this guarantee shifts to the African Party is the probability of insufficient reserves.  
 
14.3. Undertaking relating to the feasibility and profitability of the Mining/Oil Project 
14.3.1. If the Prefeasibility Study on the Mining/Oil Project is not accepted by the 
Chinese Consortium or/and the national mining/oil corporation, the Chinese 
Consortium will end infrastructure investments. The Parties will meet to find 
a solution. 
14.3.2. If the Feasibility Study is not validated by the Chinese government and the 
African Party, the Parties will meet to find the measures to take in order to 
either grant new mining/oil concessions to the Mining/Oil Joint Venture or to 
adjust the amount of infrastructure investments. 
This is the appropriate adjustment mechanism. It indexes the amount of infrastructure works to the 
amount of mineral/oil resources.  
            
 If the African Party brings other mining/oil rights, the Mining/Oil Joint 
Venture will carry out an audit on the legality and validity of the rights. The 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture will carry out a Feasibility Study on these new 
mining/oil concessions. 
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 Infrastructure investment will be suspended until the new Feasibility Study is 
approved by the governments of China and the African Party. 
 If, after two grants of new mining/oil concessions, the Feasibility Studies are 
not approved by the governments of China and the African Party, the present 
Framework Agreement will be rescinded. The Mining/Oil Joint Venture will 
be dissolved and liquidated. 
14.3.3. If the Feasibility Study proves that the internal rate of return (IRR) of the 
Chinese Consortium is below _________ %, the African Party undertakes to 
take all the measures capable of improving the conditions of the cooperation 
in order to reach the _________ % threshold for the benefit of the Chinese 
Consortium. 
14.3.4. If the Mining/Oil Joint Venture has not reimbursed the investments and the 
interests of the Mining/Oil Project and the Infrastructure Project within 30 
years following its creation, the African Party undertakes to reimburse the 
balance of the investments and interests by any other means. 
This is the lifetime of the R4I contract. It may extend up to 30 years or even a longer period, depending 
on the terms of the contract.  
 
 
Article 15 Commercial, fiscal and other advantages granted by the African 
Party       
This article provides a set of incentives, which can be defined as any measurable economic advantage 
afforded specific corporations or categories of corporations by or at the direction of a host government in 
order to encourage them to behave in a certain manner.
19
 They are instruments that host governments use 
to attract FDI, to steer it into favored industries or regions, or to influence the character of an FDI, for 
instance where a certain type of FDI is needed.
20
 The overarching rationale for FDI incentives is to 
correct market failures. 
 
                                                 
19
 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 3 (United Nations Publications 1996). [hereinafter UNCTAD, INCENTIVES] 
20
 Id. at 1.  
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15.1. General provisions 
15.1.1. The African Party grants, within the framework of this Cooperation Project, to 
the Mining/Oil Joint Venture all the advantages in terms of taxes, custom and 
excise duties and foreign exchange provided for by legislation and regulations 
of the African Party as well as the provisions applicable to government 
contracts to be funded by foreign investments. 
15.1.2. In order that the accumulation of dividends on the shares of the African Party 
accruing from extractive activities of the Mining/Oil Joint Venture reach as 
soon as possible the level that would allow the payment or reimbursement of 
infrastructure investments, the African Party agrees that particular provisions 
relating to government contracts will apply to the Chinese Consortium. 
R4I contracts necessitate a special fiscal regime and not simply fiscal exonerations or exemptions 
because of their particular financial requirements.  
 
15.1.3. The African Party guarantees to the Chinese Consortium and/or the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture the free transfer of funds, the holding of accounts in 
foreign and local currency within and without the territory of the African 
Party, the security of related operations and the exemption of taxes and bank 
fees linked to administrative regulation. 
The transfer of funds, the holding of accounts in foreign and local currency within and without the host 
country, exemption of taxes and bank fees are recurrent financial incentives. The common denominator 
of financial incentives is that they are profit-based attempts to lighten the tax burden of foreign 
investors.
21
  
 
15.1.4. For the purposes of ensuring the success of its mining/oil exploitation and 
infrastructure works, the Mining/Oil Joint Venture will be free to choose, 
without prejudice to article 11.2 of the present Framework Agreement, the 
supplier of equipment and materials, technology and service, to employ inside 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 4. 
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and outside of the territory of the African Party qualified personnel in 
conformity with applicable legislation in the African Party. 
15.1.5. Within the framework of the present Cooperation Project, the African Party 
undertakes to facilitate the grant of visas and work permits to expatriate 
workers of the infrastructure entrepreneur and the Mining/Oil Joint Venture. 
 
The above two clauses (15.1.4. and 15.1.5.) introduce the immigration flexibility needed to address the 
skill shortages that the infrastructure project may face. This is a welcome introduction but the African 
Party must approach this question responsibly as employment of local workers is one of the main 
benefits for the African Party, apart from the infrastructure built. At present, the majority of workers at 
construction sites are Africans. The African Party must be careful to anticipate and resolve problematic 
trends observed in some African host countries, like tense labor relations, violations of workers‘ rights, 
poor working conditions, and unfair labor practices.
22
 Fortunately, when African governments have 
presented a concerted complaint, Chinese investors have allowed for local labor content or at least 
offered offsets such as training programs.
23
 This Chinese tractability notwithstanding, the African Party 
must tackle these issues head on if it does not want to see worker agitations negatively impact the ability 
of construction contractors to meet contract terms and inexorably take the shine out of otherwise 
commendable infrastructure projects.
24
  
 
 
15.2. Particular advantages during the first two periods 
The African Party grants, during the periods of reimbursement of the mining 
investment and the first phase of infrastructure works, the following particular 
advantages: 
These exonerations and exemptions must match the infrastructure phases and reimbursement clauses of 
the R4I contract.  
 
15.2.1. The total exoneration of all taxes, custom and excise duties, royalties, direct or 
indirect, within borders or import and export taxes, payable in the territory of 
                                                 
22
 See ANTHONY YAW BAAH ET AL. EDS. CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA: A LABOUR PERSPECTIVE 
(African Labour Research Network, 2009). 
23
 CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA 130 (Zed Books 2007). 
24
 Phone interview with Kwabena Nyarko Otoo, Director of Labour Research & Policy Institute in Ghana 
(Apr. 19, 2010). 
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the African Party and those linked to the extractive activities and the 
development of infrastructure. 
15.2.2. The exemption from fees and payment relating to the application, grant, 
transfer and cession of mining/oil rights, prospection and exploitation permits. 
15.2.3. The Mining/Oil Joint Venture is exempted from royalty fees linked to 
mining/oil exploitation. 
15.2.4. During the two first periods, all payments of taxes, custom and excise duties, 
royalties, that would have been paid by the Mining/Oil Joint Venture or the 
Chinese corporations responsible for infrastructure works, within the 
framework of the present Framework Agreement, will be considered and 
accounted for as expenses for infrastructure works. 
 
 
Article 16 Guarantees by the African Party against political risks 
This article is a boilerplate in investment contracts. Foreign investment law holds an arsenal of 
contractual devices to shield foreign investors from political risks and other types of risks that they run in 
host countries. The devices are stabilization, choice-of-law clauses, arbitration, damages, waiver of 
sovereign immunity, waiver of the local remedies exhaustion requirement, currency conversion, profit 
repatriation, interest rates, force majeure clauses, state interest in project, and state-as-party clauses. One 
chief strategy to shield foreign investors from political risks and other risks in the host country is through 
internationalization. Internationalization (achieved chiefly through stabilization clauses, choice-of-law 
clauses and arbitration) requires R4I contracts to go through a process that propels them out of the sphere 
of the domestic law of host states to a higher orbit composed of a complex blend of private international 
law, general principles of law and international law.   
 
16.1. The African Party undertakes to maintain security on the sites of the Mining 
Project and the Infrastructure Project. It also undertakes to resolve in due 
course all problems related to or caused by riots, public violence, strikes, etc. 
so that the Mining Project and the Infrastructure Project can be realized in the 
best conditions. 
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16.2. Without prejudice to the advantages acquired in the framework of this 
Framework Agreement, the Mining/Oil Joint Venture and the entrepreneur 
responsible for infrastructure works will benefit from the advantages granted 
by all new legal provisions and regulations enacted after the African Party or 
agreements that the latter will conclude with other investors. Nonetheless, all 
new legal provisions and regulations bringing disadvantages to the Mining/Oil 
Joint Venture and the infrastructure entrepreneur will not apply to them. 
This clause is a stabilization clause or a guarantee against subsequent changes to the law.  
 
16.3. Within the 12 months that follow the approval of the Cooperation Project by 
the Chinese government, the African Party undertakes to obtain from its 
Parliament the adoption of a law to secure the regime for taxes, custom and 
excise duties, and foreign exchange applicable to the Cooperation Project 
because of its specificity. If the national Parliament does not adopt the said 
law, the Chinese Consortium will have the right to decide to realize or rescind 
the present Agreement. 
This clause secures the fiscal regime for the R4I contract. It is a form of guarantee against subsequent 
changes to the law.  
 
16.4. The African Party undertakes to never, and in no circumstances whatsoever, 
appropriate, nationalize, nor expropriate, directly or indirectly, the Joint 
Venture as well as its property. 
This clause aims at protecting Chinese investors by prohibiting the African Party from taking or 
otherwise interfering with the property and property rights of the investors. The problem that may arise 
with this clause is whether a certain measure by the African Party amount to a ‗taking‘. Indeed, certain 
measures by host states may not result in the actual physical taking of property, but may still make 
investors lose management, use or control or a significant value of their assets.
25
  
 
                                                 
25
 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES 1. Vol. 1. (United Nations 2004). 
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16.5. The African Party undertakes to respect to the _________ [bilateral investment 
treaty] signed between the Chinese and African Party‘s governments on 
_________ [date of signature]. 
In FDI law, a contract is not a treaty. Thus, for a consortium of Chinese corporations to defer a dispute 
with the host country to an international forum for adjudication and settlement, it must make sure that it 
enters a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the host country. It is a potent way for foreign investors to 
internationalize R4I contracts and guard against political risks.   
 
16.6. In case the Chinese Consortium or its affiliates decide to take up insurance at 
their own expenses for the Mining/Oil Project, infrastructure investments or any 
other possible cooperation projects subsequently agreed upon, through 
specialized agencies such as MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency), against political risks in particular, and if subscription to the insurance 
schemes requires recognition of the host state, the African Party undertakes to 
give such recognition on time. 
Even though this clause is about multilateral insurance guarantee agencies, it mentions the possibility of 
other cooperation projects subsequently agreed upon by the Parties. If a host country is executing or has 
fully executed a R4I contract with a Chinese consortium, it does not have to sign another R4I contract, 
should it desire to make use of the same R4I contractual arrangement. It can renegotiate the terms of the  
terms of the existing or completed R4I contract by linking up new contracts and adding new additional 
resources to the framework R4I contract.
26
 Likewise, the old Mining/Oil Joint Venture under the existing 
or completed R4I contract can serve yet again as a vehicle for the financing of the new infrastructure 
projects.  
 
16.7. If the Chinese Consortium and its affiliates, after insurance subscription, receive 
payment by way of reparation, the African Party must not only recognize the 
validity of the payment but also to accept the insurer‘s subrogation for the 
reimbursement. The insurer‘s subrogation right shall not exceed the right to 
reimbursement of the Chinese Consortium or its affiliates. 
This is probably the most effective insurance for a Chinese consortium against political and other risks as 
it not only shifts those risks to the African Party but it brings international institutions, like the World 
Bank-affiliated MIGA, into the enforcement equation.  
                                                 
26
 Phone interview with Sanusha Naidu, Research Director of the Emerging Powers in Africa Programme 
at Fahamu (May 10, 2010). 
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16.8. The African Party guarantees to the Mining/Oil Joint Venture the security of its 
mining/oil investments and the reimbursement of infrastructure works to be 
realized within the framework of the present Framework Agreement, notably in 
conformity with articles 12 and 13 of the present Framework Agreement. 
 
Article 17 Other undertakings and guarantees 
The African Party undertakes to institute, upon signing the present Framework 
Agreement, a multisectoral committee (Steering and Coordination Committee) 
responsible for (1) the monitoring of the present Framework Agreement and 
agreements within the framework of the present Framework Agreement; (2) the 
facilitation of the realization of the Cooperation Project, especially questions related to 
transportation, access to water and electricity, etc.; (3) the monitoring of governmental 
infrastructure works; (4) the interface between the Chinese government, the African 
Party and the Mining/Oil Joint Venture. This Committee will serve as a one window 
center able to represent the African Party. Moreover, the Committee will be in charge 
of all questions and formalities relating to the infrastructure works. The Committee is 
also in charge of relations and formalities between the Mining/Oil Joint Venture and 
governmental authorities. The African Party and the Chinese Consortium may later 
agree to attribute to the Committee further responsibilities. Rules of internal order will 
be developed as quickly as possible by the Committee in order to ensure the smooth 
operation of the Cooperation Project.  
Some host countries, such as Angola and the DRC, have set up institutions to monitor the infrastructural 
works provided for in R4I contracts and carried out by Chinese construction companies. The host 
countries do not have physical control over infrastructure funds but they nevertheless decide where, how 
much and which types of infrastructure must be built and they monitor the construction process. In the 
countries where R4I contracts have been signed the institutions implementing infrastructural works are 
usually directly linked to the presidency of the host country (Angola, the DRC). In addition to signaling 
their importance for the host country‘s economy, these direct connections to the presidency signal the 
highly political nature of R4I contracts. In fact, R4I contracts can be seen more as political deals between 
  415 
the host countries and China than as commercial transactions.
27
 In Angola, the government created on 
July 6, 2004 an office to monitor the infrastructure-related credit line that it obtained from China within 
the framework of the R4I contract that it signed with China. It created upon publication of a government 
dispatch (despacho) the Office for the Technical Support and Management of the Credit Line with 
Eximbank of China (Gabinete de Apoio Técnico à Gestão da Linha de Crédito com Eximbank da China). 
In the DRC, upon request by the Minister responsible for Infrastructure, the Congolese President set up 
on August 26, 2008 two institutions whose primary responsibilities are the monitoring and supervision of 
the infrastructural works carried out as part of the R4I contract between the DRC and China. Those two 
main institutions are the Congolese Agency for the Great Works (ACGT, an acronym from its French 
name Agence Congolaise des Grands Travaux) and the Bureau of the Coordination and the Monitoring 
of the Sino-Congolese Program (BCPSC, from its French name Bureau de Coordination et du Suivi du 
Programme Sino-Congolais). In Ghana, the President enacted on July 31, 2007 the Bui Power Authority 
Act to establish the Bui Power Authority, which is charged with the development of a hydroelectric 
power project on the Black Volta River at Bui and any other potential hydroelectric power project on the 
River. It is a much smaller institution than the Angolan and Congolese monitoring institutions, but it 
equally underscores the necessity of these institutions for the success of R4I contracts.   
 
 
PART VI GUARANTEES BY THE CHINESE CONSORTIUM      
Article 18 Undertakings and guarantees by the Chinese Consortium 
Guarantees in favor of the African Party are inescapable as a R4I contract that would place all the risks 
on the shoulders of the African Party would be exceedingly burdensome. This article does not tell what 
will be the consequences should the Chinese consortium breach the guarantees. Presumably, in such 
circumstances, the African Party will be entitled to damages.  
 
18.1. The Chinese Consortium guarantees and declare that it has the firm intention to 
commit, in partnership with the African Party or the national mining/oil 
company, to the realization of the Mining/Oil Project and the Infrastructure 
Project described in the present Framework Agreement. 
18.2. The Chinese Consortium undertakes to mobilize the finance necessary for the 
realization of the projects mentioned above in conformity with the conditions 
described in the present Framework Agreement. It undertakes to grant to the 
Mining/Oil Joint Venture, in the form of a loan to the shareholders, to be 
reimbursed without interest, 30% of the investments deemed necessary for the 
                                                 
27
 Phone interview with Jeffrey Delmon, Infrastructure Specialist, World Bank (Mar. 1, 2010); phone 
interview with Markus Weimer, Research Fellow in the Africa Programme at Chatham House (May 24, 
2010). Both experts explained that resource-for-infrastructure agreements are not just commercial 
transactions, they are also political deals. 
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development of the Joint Venture by the Feasibility Study to be carried out 
beforehand and for the application of the Mining/Oil Project. 
18.3. The Chinese Consortium undertakes to lend to the national mining/oil 
corporation the funds necessary for its participation in the capital structure of 
the Mining/Oil Joint Venture and in possible increases of the Joint Venture‘s 
capital. 
18.4. The Chinese Consortium will specially see to it that the Mining/Oil Joint 
Venture is capable to effect the prompt reimbursement of the mining/oil 
investments and governmental infrastructure works. It will ensure, among other 
objectives, that the Mining/Oil Joint Venture opt for an effective technology, 
capable of reducing exploitation costs, which must be advantageous comparable 
to those incurred by firms operating in the same sector. 
18.5. The Chinese Consortium, on the strength of its professional, technical and 
management advantages, undertakes to take all measures necessary to reduce 
production costs (including distribution costs), economize the financial 
resources for construction works, ensure the modern conception, the quality, the 
high profitability, the dependability and the durability of infrastructure works 
and services through its participation in national reconstruction in the African 
Party. 
The Parties should read into the phrase ‗production costs‘ the costs of environmental degradation and 
resettlement.  In countless instances, resource extraction has polluted or caused the degradation of the 
environment. In other instances, the construction of infrastructure has displaced residents. In Ghana, 
relevant legislation tasks the Bui Power Authority with the acquisition of lands and resettlement 
measures. Subject to article 20 of the Ghanaian Constitution, which provides for the right to property and 
outlines procedures for expropriation, the President must cause to be acquired lands, which in the 
opinion of the Authority‘s Board, may be required to be inundated by the filling of the lake, and for the 
use of persons being resettled. The Parties should be jointly responsible for internalizing the costs of 
environmental degradation and resettlements by compensating the persons aggrieved by these negative 
externalities. Such internalization of costs would basically mean complying with national and 
international law obligations with respect to property rights and the environment. Therefore, by 
guaranteeing to take all measures necessary to reduce production costs, the Chinese consortium 
impliedly guarantees that it will limit the deleterious effects of resource extraction on the environment 
and of infrastructure construction on the property rights of residents.   
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18.6. The Chinese Consortium will see to it that the Cooperation Project is approved 
by the competent Chinese authority within 120 days after the signature of the 
present Framework Agreement. 
 
 
PART VII REGULAR CONSULTATION OF THE PARTIES 
Article 19 Regularity of consultations 
In order to guarantee the smooth execution of the Cooperation Project, representatives 
of the Chinese Consortium and those of the African Party shall meet each year, during 
the first semester on the initiative of the most diligent Party. The meeting may take 
place in Beijing or _________ [the capital city of the African Party]. During the 
meeting, discussions will focus on the following matters: 
- the verification of the execution of the present Framework Agreement, 
- the amicable consultation in order to resolve possible disputes arising from the 
execution of the Cooperation Project, 
- the formulation of proposals in order to improve the execution of the 
Cooperation Project, 
- various matters relating to the execution of the Cooperation Project. 
These consultations, together with monitoring institutions, are some of the hallmarks of the state-to-state 
business model ushered by Chinese investments. Consultations build a relationship of trust between the 
Parties, a core ingredient in long-term, relational contracts, as is the case with R4I contracts and most 
investment contracts. Classic FDI law is premised upon a tripartite relationship between a home state, a 
host state and a private foreign investor. R4I contracts generally substitute the home state for the private 
foreign investor.  
 
 
PART VIII FORCE MAJEURE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
Article 20 Force majeure 
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19.1. All circumstances of force majeure will be appreciated according to the law. 
Force majeure means any act, legal or factual situation, phenomenon or 
circumstance that is unpredictable, irresistible or beyond the reasonable control 
of the Party that wishes to avail of this defense.        
19.2. In the event of force majeure, the aggrieved party must immediately and in 
writing notify the other party of the situation. In case the situation of force 
majeure lasts for more than 60 days, the Parties should consult each other to 
find a solution.  
19.3. The performance of the parties‘ obligations will be suspended for as long as 
force majeure lasts. 
19.4. The Parties to the present Framework Agreement have agreed that, given the 
nature of this agreement, expropriation, nationalization, the promulgation of 
new legislation or the modification of existing legislation in the host country 
may in no way constitute force majeure.       
 
Article 20 Dispute resolution and arbitration 
20.1. Any dispute on the interpretation and execution of the present Framework 
Agreement must be resolved first by amicable discussions between the Parties. 
Traditional values in both African and Chinese societies emphasize reconciliation and harmony in the 
community over adjudication.
28
 The Parties to R4I contracts can build on those values to reconcile their 
divergences of position amicably.  
 
20.2. If the parties fail to settle their dispute within the six months following the 
amicable discussions, the dispute must, at the request of either Party, be 
subjected to arbitration under the ICSID (International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes) according to the latter‘s rules. 
                                                 
28
 WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND 
AFRICA 380ff and 493ff (Cambridge University Press 2006).  
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Some differences are irreconcilable, even with the noblest of intentions. In those cases, litigation or 
arbitration may the best solution. More often than not, arbitration is preferable to litigation.    
 
 
Article 21 Applicable law 
The applicable law is the law of the act. In case the applicable law cannot be 
determined according to the preceding criterion, the parties will – in order to determine 
the applicable law – refer to criteria commonly utilized in international trade to settle 
disputes of the same nature.  
 
 
PART IX FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 22 Domicile and notices 
Any notice, directives, requests or any other communication, required or contemplated 
by virtue of a provision of the present Framework Agreement must be in writing and 
sent to the following addresses: 
 
FOR THE AFRICAN PARTY 
 _________ [address] 
_________ 
_________  
 
FOR THE CHINESE CONSORTIUM 
_________ [address] 
_________ 
_________ 
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Any notice, directives, requests or any other communication will be deemed to have 
been received on the day of delivery or, in the case of faxes, the working day after the 
reception of the fax transmission report. Any change of address will be notified to the 
other party in writing and at least 30 days after the actual change of address.  
 
Article 23 Contradictions 
In case the provisions of the contracts concluded in terms of the present Framework 
Agreement, the Mining/Oil Joint Venture Agreement or the Articles of Incorporation 
conflict with the provisions of the present Framework Agreement, the provisions of the 
Framework Agreement must prevail. 
 
Article 24 Amendment 
Any amendment to the present Framework Agreement must only take place after and 
through a contractual amendment duly signed by the Parties. 
 
Article 25 Language 
This Framework Agreement is written in English/French/Portuguese and Mandarin 
Chinese. Both versions of the contract enjoy probative force. In the event of any 
divergence of interpretation between the two versions, the English/French/Portuguese 
version must prevail.  
Any one of the following four official languages (English, French, Portuguese and Arabic) is spoken in 
the overwhelming majority of countries in Africa. It is therefore practical for the R4I contract to be 
written in both the official language of the African Party and Mandarin Chinese.    
 
Article 26 Annexes 
The documents listed below constitute the annexes to the present Framework 
Agreement and form an integral part of the Agreement. Those documents are: 
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Annex A: List of mineral deposits/oil blocks ceded to the Mining/Oil Joint Venture 
Annex B: Geological description of the mineral deposits/oil blocks 
Annex C: List of infrastructure projects 
 
Article 27 Entry into force 
The present Framework Agreement will enter into force on the date of its signature. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed, in _________ [number of] copies, 
the present Framework Agreement in Beijing/capital city of African Party, on 
_________ 
[date], and each of the two Parties possesses two original copies. 
 
FOR THE AFRICAN PARTY 
Mr./Mrs./Ms. _________ [name of Minister] 
MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR MINES/OIL/INFRASTRUCTURE 
___________________________ [signature] 
 
 
FOR CHINESE CORPORATION No. 1 
Mr./Mrs./Ms. _________ [name of Officer/Director of the Corporation] 
___________________________ [signature] 
 
 
FOR CHINESE CORPORATION No. 2 
Mr./Mrs./Ms. _________ [name of Officer/Director of the Corporation] 
___________________________ [signature] 
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FOR CHINESE CORPORATION No. 1 
Mr./Mrs./Ms. _________ [name of Officer/Director of the Corporation] 
___________________________ [signature] 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
ANNEX A 
TO THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
_________ 
_________ 
_________ 
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